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Mr. V.K.V Sarma v. Ms. Indra Sarma

Karnataka High Court
Aug 12, 2011
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent filed a petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeking maintenance of Rs. 18,000/- per month from the petitioner. The respondent alleged a live-in relationship with the petitioner, who was married with two children, and claimed ill-treatment and harassment. The petitioner contested the application, denying the allegations and asserting that the respondent was not his legally wedded wife. The Trial Court allowed the petition directing maintenance payment, and this order was confirmed by the Lower Appellate Court. The petitioner challenged these orders before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent qualifies as a "domestic relationship" under Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
  2. Whether the respondent is entitled to maintenance under Section 12 of the Act based on the nature of their relationship.
  3. Whether the Courts below erred in applying the law concerning "relationship in the nature of marriage" as interpreted by the Apex Court in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The relationship with the respondent does not fall within the definition of "domestic relationship" under Section 2(f) of the Act.
  • The respondent was aware that the petitioner was married with two children, yet developed the relationship.
  • The petitioner denied forcing the respondent to leave her job or undergo abortion and denied taking money from her.
  • The petitioner contended that the respondent is not a legally wedded wife and thus the petition should be rejected.
  • Relied on the Apex Court judgment in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal which sets out specific criteria for "relationship in the nature of marriage" that the parties do not satisfy.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent had a live-in relationship with the petitioner for several years, during which she suffered physical and mental hardships including abortion and surgery.
  • The petitioner abandoned the respondent, leaving her to suffer physically, mentally, and financially.
  • The Act is intended to protect women generally and is not confined to "relationship in the nature of marriage." Live-in relationships are covered under the expression "domestic relationship."
  • The expression "aggrieved person" in the Act includes any woman, not necessarily a wife, warranting a beneficial interpretation.
  • The Courts below rightly allowed maintenance to avoid depriving the respondent of support given her long-term relationship with the petitioner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, 2010 AIR SCW 6731 Definition and criteria for "relationship in the nature of marriage" under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Court relied on the Apex Court’s interpretation to assess whether the parties’ live-in relationship met the necessary conditions to qualify as a domestic relationship under the Act and concluded that it did not.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the definition of "domestic relationship" under Section 2(f) of the Act, which requires a relationship by consanguinity, marriage, relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or joint family living in a shared household. The Court referred to the Apex Court’s decision in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, which clarified that a "relationship in the nature of marriage" requires the parties to hold themselves out as spouses, be of legal age, be otherwise qualified to marry, voluntarily cohabit for a significant period, and live in a shared household.

Applying these criteria, the Court found that the petitioner and respondent’s relationship did not satisfy these conditions, particularly since the petitioner was already married and the relationship did not constitute a "relationship in the nature of marriage." Consequently, the Court held that the Courts below erred in granting maintenance under the Act, as the respondent’s relationship with the petitioner did not fall within the statutory definition of a domestic relationship.

Holding and Implications

The petition is allowed and the judgments of the Courts below are set aside.

The direct effect of this decision is that the respondent is not entitled to maintenance under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, based on the live-in relationship with the petitioner as it does not meet the statutory definition of a domestic relationship. The Court noted that this ruling does not prevent the parties from settling their differences amicably. No new precedent is established beyond reaffirming the Apex Court’s interpretation in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal.

Show all summary ...

Jagannathan, J.:—

The petitioner is before this Court aggrieved by the Trial Court allowing the application filed by the respondent u/s 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (‘the Act’ for short) and the said order of the Trial Court being confirmed by the Lower Appellate Court.

2. The brief facts are, the respondent filed a petition under Section 12 of the Act and sought, among other things, a direction to the petitioner to pay her maintenance of Rs. 18,000/- per month and in the petition it was stated by her that, she had a live-in-relationship with the petitioner despite the petitioner having wife and two children and on account of the companionship the respondent had with the petitioner, petitioner even took certain amount from the respondent by stating that he would buy a site in her name and the respondent, who was at that time working as a Consultant for many Companies including Nice Company, however, was not taken care of by the petitioner herein and she was ill-treated and harassed by the petitioner. Though the petitioner herein is well placed having 3 acres of land and a house at Nagarbavi apart from carrying on the business of Beauty Parlor and having number of vehicles and earning more than Rs. 1,50,000/- per month, the petitioner did not take care of the respondent herein and therefore she was constrained to file the petition under Section 12 of the Act.

3. The petitioner herein contested the said application before the Trial Court and contended that the petitioner never asked the respondent to leave her job and the respondent started staying in a separate house since 1993 and the petitioner herein did not force the respondent to undergo abortion nor he took any money from her and he also denied the income from various business alleged by the respondent and took up the contention that the respondent is not legally wedded wife of the petitioner and therefore the petition be rejected.

4. The Trial Court after considering the stand of the parties, ultimately allowed the petition by directing the petitioner herein to pay Rs. 18,000/- per month as maintenance from the date of the petition.

5. On appeal being filed by the petitioner herein, the Learned Judge of the Lower Appellate Court dismissed the appeal by confirming the order of the Trial Court.

6. I have heard the Learned Counsel Sri. Sunil S. Rao for the petitioner and Sri. Manivannan for the respondent and perused the orders of the Court below.

7. Submission of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is that, though the respondent was aware of the petitioner being a married person having wife and two children, yet she developed a relationship with the petitioner and that continued for several years. Nevertheless, it is his submission that, the relationship between the parties does not come within the definition of ‘domestic relationship’ as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act.

8. Further submission made is that, the Apex Court in the case of D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal. . 2010 AIR SCW 6731 has explained the expression ‘a relationship in the nature of marriage’ as the one which satisfies the requirements that are mentioned in para. 33 of the judgment. Therefore, it is argued that, when the petitioner and the respondent were not otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, the question of the relationship between the parties falling within the expression ‘a relationship in the nature of marriage’ does not arise. Therefore, the Courts below were in error in allowing the petition filed by the respondent.

9. On the other hand, submission of Sri. Manivannan Learned Counsel for the respondent is that, the respondent had developed a relationship with the petitioner and the couple lived together for several years and the respondent also underwent abortion and apart from that, she also had several complications and had to undergo surgery and she had put her entire hope on the relationship that she had with the petitioner and now the petitioner has left the respondent in lurch for her to suffer physically, mentally and financially. Therefore, the Courts below were justified in allowing the petition filed by the respondent.

10. Learned Counsel for the respondent further argued that the Act is meant to take care of the interest of women in general and therefore the Act does not confine itself to ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ and therefore even a live-in relationship is covered by the expression ‘domestic relationship’. Hence, having regard to the object with which the Act has been passed and the expression ‘aggrieved person’ in Section 2(a) also including any woman, it is therefore not necessary that the respondent will have to be a woman who would be like a wife and therefore by giving a beneficial interpretation to the expression woman and also to the expression live-in relationship, the Courts below have allowed the petition filed by the respondent. Under the said circumstances, the present petition be dismissed as otherwise the respondent would be deprived of the maintenance amount despite she having had live-in relationship with the petitioner for several years and having given herself to the petitioner in every respect. Therefore, in the interest of the respondent and her future, the order passed by the Courts below be sustained.

11. In the light of the aforesaid contentions put forward and having gone through the orders passed by the Courts below and the stand taken by the parties, it is not in dispute that the petitioner is a married man having wife and two children. It is also an admitted fact that the respondent and the petitioner lived together and the relationship was one of ‘live-in relationship’. In order to attract the definition of ‘domestic relationship’, the respondent will have to satisfy the ingredients of the said expression. Section 2(f) of the Act defines domestic relationship as to mean the following.:

“2(f) ‘domestic relationship’ means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family.”

12. It is therefore clear from the aforesaid expression that, domestic relationship means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family.

13. The Apex Court in the case of Velusamy v. Patchaiammal (Supra) has interpreted the expression ‘a relationship in the nature of a marriage’ thus at para. 33:

“33. In our opinion a ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ is akin to a common law marriage. Common law marriages require that although not being formally married:—

a. The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.

b. They must be of legal age to marry.

c. They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried.

d. They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time.

In our opinion a ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ under the 2005 Act must also fulfill the above requirements, and in addition the parties must have lived together in a ‘shared household as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. Merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a ‘domestic relationship’.”

14. The Apex Court therefore went on to observe at para. 34 that, live-in relationships will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of Act of 2005 and to get such benefit, conditions mentioned in para. 34 must be satisfied and this has to be proved by evidence.

15. Further, the Apex Court observed that the aforesaid view would take out many women who have had a live-in relationship from the benefit of the Act, but then it is not for the court to legislate or amend the law and the Parliament has used the expression ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ and not ‘live-in relationship’.

16. Having regard to the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court and the interpretation given to the ‘domestic relationship’, it is unfortunate that, in the instant case, the relationship that the respondent had with the petitioner does not come within the ambit of ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’. As such, the Courts below were in error in allowing the petition filed by the respondent for maintenance as the view taken is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned Velusamy's case.

17. Under the above circumstances, this petition requires to be allowed and it is allowed and consequently, the judgments of the Courts below stand set-aside.

18. Though this Court has allowed the petition and set-aside the orders of the Courts below, yet, the result of this petition however shall not come in the way of the parties settling their differences amicably.

19. At this stage, Learned Counsel for the respondent sought permission to approach the Apex Court. The submission of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is that, this is not a fit case to grant leave to approach the Apex Court.

20. Having thus heard both sides and the Apex Court having laid down the law in clear terms in the aforementioned Velusamy's Case, I do not see any case being made out for this Court to grant leave as sought for by the Learned Counsel for the respondent. Prayer of the Learned Counsel for the respondent is rejected.