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Constable Rajender Kumar v. Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi & Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion by Ajit Prakash Shah, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
Constable Rajender Kumar (petitioner) and Constable Virender Kumar (co-delinquent) were jointly charged with stopping a truck and extorting Rs. 20 from its owner while on motorcycle patrolling duty near Apollo Hospital on Mathura Road during the night of 4-5-6.05.05. The charge alleged that the two constables chased trucks, intercepted a truck (No. 38-A-4918), and extorted money on the pretext of not taking action for loading animals beyond permissible limits.
The Inquiry Officer, in a report dated 25 January 2006, found the charges substantiated. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, South District, New Delhi, issued disciplinary orders on 19 April 2006 imposing punishment that included forfeiture of three years' approved service permanently and reduction in pay. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal on 23 August 2006.
The petitioner filed OA No. 468/2007 contending that the spot inquiry conducted by ACP (Vigilance) R.S. Chauhan amounted to a "preliminary enquiry" under Rule 15(2) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 and that prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police was not obtained, thereby vitiating the departmental proceedings. The Tribunal rejected this contention following Full Bench decisions that distinguished anti-corruption raids and vigilance enquiries from "preliminary enquiry" under Rule 15, and the present writ petition challenges that conclusion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a "preliminary inquiry" under Rule 15(1)–(2) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 must be initiated by an express order of the competent disciplinary authority (i.e., whether the preliminary inquiry is required to be ordered by the competent authority).
- Whether anti-corruption raids, investigations or vigilance enquiries (including spot inquiries and enquiries by Vigilance/Crime Branch/PGR cells) fall within the expression "preliminary enquiry" used in Rule 15(2) of the Rules.
- Whether the spot inquiry and report by ACP (Vigilance) R.S. Chauhan in the present facts can be treated as a preliminary enquiry under Rule 15(1)/(2) such that prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police was required.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (on behalf of Constable Rajender Kumar)
- Under sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 a preliminary inquiry is a fact-finding inquiry with four listed purposes: (i) establish nature of default and identity of defaulter(s); (ii) collect prosecution evidence; (iii) judge quantum of default; and (iv) bring relevant documents on record. If an inquiry satisfies these four ingredients it must be treated as a "preliminary inquiry" regardless of whether a formal order was passed to initiate it.
- When any inquiry by any person satisfies the four ingredients, it should be taken to be a preliminary inquiry; therefore the spot inquiry by ACP Chauhan amounted to a preliminary inquiry.
- Because the preliminary inquiry disclosed a cognizable offence, sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 required prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police; absence of such approval vitiates the departmental enquiry and consequent orders.
- Reliance was placed on the Tribunal's decision in Ravinder Singh and its affirmation by a Division Bench of this Court (Deputy Commissioner of Police v. Ravinder Singh).
- It was argued that if this Court does not accept his interpretation, Rule 16(iii) would be rendered redundant (submission aimed at underlining the inter-relationship between the rules).
Respondent's Arguments (on behalf of State/Disciplinary Authority)
- There must be an order by the concerned competent authority to hold a "preliminary inquiry"; the person holding the inquiry must find the four ingredients and then, if necessary, a departmental inquiry can be initiated.
- A preliminary inquiry cannot be equated with an investigation, vigilance inquiry, anti-corruption raid, or similar operations conducted without an order; such enquiries are not necessarily "preliminary enquiries" under Rule 15(2) unless a competent authority has ordered them to be so.
- If there were, however, an order by the competent authority to hold such an inquiry as contemplated under Rule 15, that could qualify as a preliminary inquiry.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ravinder Singh v. Government of NCT of Delhi (Tribunal decision, 15.10.2004) and Deputy Commissioner of Police v. Ravinder Singh (Division Bench of this Court, 23.3.2005) | Held that an inquiry by Crime Branch Cell was a "preliminary enquiry" within Rule 15(1) (as earlier interpreted by the Tribunal and, in part, by this Court's Division Bench). | The opinion notes this authority but also explains that the Division Bench did not go into the question whether anti-corruption/vigilance inquiries per se qualify as "preliminary enquiry" under Rule 15(2); the present Full Bench finds that Ravinder Singh was not dispositive on that narrow question. |
| Ranvir Singh & Another v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others (Full Bench of the Tribunal; OA Nos. 340/2004 & 1613/2004; 10.5.2005) | Held that there must be an order to initiate a preliminary enquiry by the competent authority; anti-corruption raids, vigilance enquiries, etc., do not fall within "preliminary enquiry" in Rule 15 unless so ordered. | The Court endorses this Full Bench view and holds it lays down the law correctly for present purposes. |
| Constable Gyanender v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Others (OA 2425/2006; 22.8.2007) (Full Bench of the Tribunal) | Affirmed the view that vigilance enquiries/raids are not necessarily "preliminary enquiries" under Rule 15 unless ordered by the competent authority. | The Court records that this Full Bench affirmed the earlier Full Bench view and treats it as correctly deciding the legal question. |
| R.K. Gupta v. Union of India & Others (Division Bench decision; 1971 (1) SLR 477) | Distinguished preliminary enquiry from investigation for purposes of suspension rules; treated "preliminary enquiry", "probe" and "verification" as not equivalent to investigation under Section 157 CrPC. | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that preliminary enquiries are distinct from criminal investigations and that language and context matter in interpretation. |
| Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India (1964 SCR 190) | Distinction between departmental inquiry and preliminary inquiry; preliminary inquiry is for fact-finding and satisfaction of authority whether to hold formal departmental inquiry. | The Court invoked this Supreme Court distinction to explain the nature and purpose of a preliminary inquiry and to stress that the two inquiries must not be confused. |
| Rt. Rev. B.P. Sugandhar Bishop in Medak v. Smt. Dorothy Dayasheela Ebeneser (JT 1996 (6) SC 221) | Recognized the preliminary enquiry as a fact-finding instrument and held that quashing of a preliminary enquiry was inappropriate when the formal inquiry had not yet been held. | The Court cited the case for the proposition that preliminary enquiries are fact-finding and that courts should not prematurely quash them when a formal enquiry has not been initiated. |
| Vijay Singh v. Union of India, (2007) 9 SCC 63 | Interpreted Rule 15(2) and held prior approval of Additional Commissioner of Police mandatory where a preliminary inquiry discloses commission of a cognizable offence; such approval is a mandatory protection for the delinquent officer. | The Court relied on Vijay Singh to state that sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 affords a mandatory safeguard and that prior approval of the Additional Commissioner must be given after due application of mind. |
| Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police (JT 1999 (8) SC 603) | Explained Rule 16(iii) as akin to Sections 32 and 33 of the Evidence Act; set out conditions for when earlier statements may be brought on record in departmental proceedings. | The Court used this authority to distinguish the operation of Rule 16(iii) from sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 and to clarify the conditions precedent for invoking Rule 16(iii). |
| Jaikishan v. Government of NCT of Delhi (OA 81/2004) | Represented a contrary view at the Tribunal level to Ravinder Singh on the character of certain inquiries vis-à-vis Rule 15. | Mentioned in the narrative as part of the sequence of conflicting Tribunal rulings, which led to reference to larger Full Bench consideration. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion proceeds methodically from the text of the Rules, precedents and the factual matrix to interpret what constitutes a "preliminary enquiry" under Rule 15 and how Rule 16(iii) operates in the departmental inquiry scheme.
Key steps in the Court's analysis:
- The Court first observes that the term "preliminary inquiry" is not defined in the Delhi Police Act or the Rules, and therefore turns to authoritative judicial pronouncements (including Champaklal Chimanlal Shah) to understand the functional distinction between a preliminary inquiry and a regular departmental inquiry. The Supreme Court's exposition in Champaklal clarifies that a preliminary inquiry is typically a fact-finding exercise to determine whether a prima facie case exists to proceed to a departmental inquiry.
- The Court quotes and closely analyses the text of Rule 15(1)–(3) and Rule 16(iii). Rule 15(1) prescribes the four purposes of a preliminary inquiry (nature/identity, evidence, quantum, documents) and allows a departmental inquiry to be ordered straightaway where specific information covering the above exists. Rule 15(2) requires prior approval of the Additional Commissioner where a preliminary inquiry discloses a cognizable offence. Rule 15(3) prescribes procedural features of a preliminary inquiry and provides that the file of the preliminary inquiry shall not form part of formal departmental record though statements may be relied upon under particular circumstances. Rule 16(iii) is a separate provision governing admission of prior statements when witnesses cannot be brought without undue delay, inconvenience or expense.
- The Court rejects the petitioner's contention that any inquiry satisfying the four ingredients of Rule 15(1) should be treated as a "preliminary enquiry" irrespective of whether it was ordered by the competent authority. The Court reasons that the phraseology and scheme of Rule 15 indicate that a preliminary inquiry is an inquiry which the competent (disciplinary) authority orders to collect facts for its satisfaction; the Inquiry Officer referred to in Rule 15(3) must be an officer appointed for that purpose.
- The Court distinguishes between inquiries conducted pursuant to a specific order to hold a preliminary inquiry and other evidentiary or investigative activities (such as anti-corruption raids, vigilance enquiries, or investigations by Crime Branch or PGR Cell). Investigations, raids and vigilance enquiries conducted without an order of the disciplinary authority are, at best, information supplied to the authority rather than a "preliminary enquiry" as contemplated by Rule 15. The Court stresses that an inquiry conducted by an officer on his own does not assume the character of a preliminary inquiry without an appointment/order by the competent authority.
- In arriving at the above, the Court relies on Full Bench decisions of the Tribunal (Ranvir Singh and Constable Gyanender) which held that an order is required to initiate a preliminary inquiry and that anti-corruption raids etc. do not fall within "preliminary enquiry" unless so ordered. The Court also refers to R.K. Gupta to reinforce the proposition that a "preliminary enquiry" cannot be equated to an investigation under criminal procedure rules, and to Vijay Singh which made clear that prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police under Rule 15(2) is mandatory where a preliminary inquiry discloses commission of a cognizable offence.
- The Court distinguishes sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 from Rule 16(iii). Sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 deals with statements recorded in a preliminary inquiry; Rule 16(iii) is a broader provision allowing earlier statements to be brought on record in departmental proceedings where a witness cannot be procured without undue delay, inconvenience or expense, subject to additional conditions (attestation, signature or recording in an investigation/judicial enquiry). The Court thus rejects the submission that the two provisions are redundant or interchangeable.
- Applying these principles to the facts, the Court finds that the ACP's on-the-spot observations, enquiries and recorded statements — being based on a spot collection of material during vigilance activity — do not have the character of a preliminary inquiry under Rule 15(1) unless there was an express order by the disciplinary authority initiating such preliminary inquiry. Consequently, the ACP's report could not be treated as a preliminary inquiry that would attract the mandatory requirement of prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police under Rule 15(2).
The Court therefore answers the framed questions by holding that a preliminary inquiry must be ordered by the competent authority and that anti-corruption raids, investigations or vigilance enquiries do not automatically qualify as "preliminary enquiry" under Rule 15(2) unless so ordered by the competent authority.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling): There must be an order by the competent disciplinary authority to initiate a "preliminary enquiry" under Rule 15; and anti-corruption raids, investigations or vigilance enquiries (including spot enquiries by Vigilance/Crime Branch/PGR Cell) cannot be equated with a "preliminary enquiry" under Rule 15(2) unless such enquiry was ordered by the competent authority.
Consequences and immediate implications:
- The Court held that the spot inquiry and report by ACP R.S. Chauhan in the present case do not amount to a "preliminary enquiry" as envisaged under Rule 15(1)/(2) because no order of the disciplinary authority initiating a preliminary inquiry was shown to exist.
- Because of this conclusion, the Court answered the question raised in the petition in favour of the legal position that a preliminary enquiry must be ordered by the competent authority; however, the opinion does not itself dispose of the writ petition. The Court directed that the papers be placed before the Division Bench for disposal of the writ petition.
- The opinion affirms the correctness of the Full Bench view of the Tribunal (Ranvir Singh; Constable Gyanender) on the narrow point that only an ordered preliminary inquiry attracts the procedural safeguards in Rule 15(2). It clarifies the legal relationship between Rule 15(3) and Rule 16(iii) and accepts the requirement of prior approval (where a true preliminary enquiry discloses a cognizable offence) as articulated in Vijay Singh.
- The Court's ruling draws a clear procedural line: departmental authorities should ensure that where they intend to treat an inquiry as a "preliminary enquiry" under Rule 15 they must expressly order it; otherwise findings from vigilance/raid/investigation activities should be treated as material to be considered by the disciplinary authority but not as the substituted formal preliminary inquiry contemplated by Rule 15(2).
Note: The present opinion does not set aside or affirm the disciplinary punishment imposed in the earlier orders; it resolves the interpretative question concerning the nature of "preliminary enquiry" and directs further placement of papers before the Division Bench for final disposal of the writ petition.
Ajit Prakash Shah, C.J— Constable Rajender Kumar, the petitioner herein, faced a joint departmental inquiry with his co-delinquent Constable Virender Kumar on the following charge:
“I, Inspector Ashok Goswami, E.O/D.E Cell, Delhi charge you Const. Virender Kumar, No. 1737.SD and Const. Rajender Kumar No. 3417.SD that you were on Motor Cycle patrolling duty in the area of PS Sarita Vihar in the night between 4.5.6.05, Shri R.S Chauhan, ACP was on surprise checking from Vigilance Branch and at about 01.30 AM, he reached near Apollo Hospital on Mathura Road, he saw a few long route trucks parked on the road near patrol pump. He also saw four yellow colour Police Motor Cycles with staff near petrol pump. He watched the motor cycles for 5-10 minutes. Soon these motor cycles started chasing a few trucks coming from Badarpur side. The ACP/Vigilance also followed motor cycles after taking U-turn and intercepted one motor cycle No. DL-1 SL-6653 with you two Constables, Virender Kumar No. 1737.SD and Rajender Kumar NO. 3417.SD, who had stopped a truck (mini) NO. 38-A-4918. When the ACP/Vigilance reached near motor cycle, he found Const. Rajender Kumar, No. 3417.SD standing near the left side window of the truck and truck owner Israr Ahmed was giving Rs. 20/- to you. Both of you Constables were on patrolling duty. On enquiry it was revealed that the motor cycle staff on patrolling stopped trucks, carrying goats to Sadar Bazar slaughter house and you extorted money from them on the pretext of not taking action for loading animals over and above the permissible limits. You Const. Rajender Kumar, No. 3417.SD and Const. Virender Kumar, No. 1737.SD also stopped truck No. HR-38-A-4918 with intention to extort money from truck operator. The aforesaid act of you Const. Rajender Kumar No. 3417.SD and Const. Virender Kumar NO. 1737.SD amounts to gross misconduct negligence, remissness in discharge of your duty as public servant and unbecoming of a police officer which renders you both for punishment under the provisions of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980.”
2. The Inquiry Officer in his report dated 25th January, 2006 held that the charge against both the Constables stood substantiated. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, South District, New Delhi, after following due procedure, vide order dated 19th April, 2006 inflicted upon the petitioner and the co-delinquent punishment of forfeiting three years' approved service permanently, entailing reduction in their pay from Rs. 4240/- to Rs. 3965/- per month and Rs. 4050 to Rs. 3795 respectively. The appeal carried against the order of the disciplinary authority was dismissed by the appellate authority vide order dated 23rd August, 2006.
3. In OA No. 468/2007 preferred before the Tribunal it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the inquiry conducted by the ACP (Vigilance) Shri R.S Chauhan was preliminary inquiry as envisaged under Rule 15(2) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter for brevity's sake referred to as the Rules) and inasmuch as the preliminary inquiry disclosed commission of cognizable offence by a police officer of a subordinate rank in his official relations with the public, departmental inquiry could be ordered after obtaining prior approval from the Additional Commissioner of Police concerned as to whether a criminal case should be registered and investigated or a departmental enquiry should be held. It was urged that no approval as envisaged under sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 was accorded by the Additional Commissioner of Police and that being so the entire proceedings culminating into the impugned orders would be vitiated and deserve to be set aside. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision of the Tribunal in the matter of Ravinder Singh… v. Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi….. 1125/2004 decided on 15.10.2004) which was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in Deputy Commissioner Of Police… v. Ravinder Singh…., decided on 23rd March, 2005). The Tribunal, however, following two full Bench judgments of the Tribunal in Ranvir Singh & Another v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Others (OA Nos. 340/2004 and 1613/2004 decided on 10.5.2005) and Constable Gyanender v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Others (OA 2425/2006 decided on 22.8.2007) held that the spot inquiry made by the Additional Commissioner of Police-Vigilance on which his report was based would not partake the character of a preliminary inquiry as envisaged under Rule 15(1) of the Rules and consequently the argument of violation of Rule 15(2) was rejected. The order of the Tribunal is impugned in the present petition.
4. Ravinder Singh v. Government of NCT of Delhi (supra) interpreted Rule 15(2) of the Rules pursuant to which an inquiry held by Crime Branch Cell was held to be a preliminary inquiry within the meaning of rules 15(1) of the rules. Thereafter another Bench of the Tribunal in Jaikishan v. Government of NCT of Delhi (OA 81/2004) took a contrary view. In view of this, the matter was referred to a larger Bench in the case of Ravinder Singh… v. Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi…. 340/2005 and 1613/2004). In the meanwhile, in the writ petition filed in this Court against the judgment dated 15th October, 2004 passed in Ravinder Singh v. Government of NCT of Delhi the view taken therein was upheld by this Court and the writ petition was dismissed on 23rd March, 2005. Notwithstanding this, the Full Bench of Tribunal took a view contrary to the view taken in Ravinder Singh while interpreting Rule 15(2) of the Rules. The Full Bench noted an earlier Division Bench decision of this Court in R.K Gupta… v. Union Of India & Others…S, 1971 (1) SLR 477 and held that there has to be an order to initiate preliminary enquiry by the competent authority and anti-corruption raids, investigations or vigilance enquiries would not fall within the expression “preliminary enquiry” used in Rule 15 of the Rules. Another Full Bench of the Tribunal was constituted in the case of Constable Gyanender v. Government of NCT of Delhi which affirmed the earlier view of the Full Bench. When this writ petition came up for hearing before the Division Bench on 18th December, 2007, it was argued that the view taken by the two Full Benches of the Tribunal is contrary to the judgment of this Court dated 23rd March, 2005 which upheld the judgment of the Tribunal in Ravinder Singh. It was urged that in R.K Gupta's case the question related to interpretation of CCS(CCA) Rules which deal with suspension pending inquiry/investigation into criminal case whereas Rule 15(2) of the Rules deals with preliminary inquiry disclosing commission of cognizable offence on the basis of which a departmental inquiry is ordered after prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police. Therefore, these two rules deal with entirely different situations and the language is also totally different. In view of the fact that Tribunal in the Full Bench has dealt with both the judgments in substantial details and agreed with the opinion in R.K Gupta, the Division Bench deemed it proper to refer the issue to be decided by a larger Bench. Accordingly the matter has been placed before this Full Bench.
5. On behalf of the petitioner, great stress was laid by Shri K.C Mittal on the fact that under sub-rule(1) of Rule 15 preliminary inquiry has been prescribed as a fact finding inquiry (i) to establish the nature of default and identity of the defaulter(s) (ii) to collect prosecution evidence (iii) to judge the quantum of default and (iv) to bring relevant documents on record. It was urged that when such four ingredients are satisfied, it must be taken to be a preliminary inquiry irrespective of the fact whether an order was passed for preliminary inquiry or not. Shri Mittal urged that when any inquiry by any person satisfies the four ingredients, it must be taken to be a preliminary inquiry. Shri Mittal also urged that if his interpretation is not to be accepted then Rule 16(iii) would become redundant as it provides that in absence of the examination of a witness, his earlier statement recorded in trial or even in investigation, can be brought on record. According to him for want of application of mind by the Additional Commissioner of Police under Rule 15(2) of the Rules, the departmental enquiry and consequent orders would be a nullity.
6. On the contrary, on behalf of the respondents Mr. Aditya Madan had contended that there has to be an order passed by the concerned authority to hold a preliminary inquiry and the person holding the preliminary inquiry has to find out the four ingredients and thereupon, if necessary, a departmental inquiry can be initiated. Therefore according to him, a preliminary inquiry cannot be equated with an investigation, vigilance inquiry or raids etc. However, if there was an order by the competent authority to hold such an inquiry as contemplated under Section 15 of the Rules it can be taken to be so.
7. In the light of the rival contentions advanced at the Bar, the question that arise for our consideration is whether the preliminary inquiry against the delinquent police officer is required to be ordered by the competent authority. Further question would be whether anti corruption raids, investigations or vigilance enquiries are covered under the expression “preliminary enquiry” used in Rule 15(2) of the Rules.
8. Before adverting to these questions, it would be necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Rules. Rule 15 and Rule 16(iii) of the Rules, which are material for our purpose, read as follows:
“Rule 15(1) A preliminary enquiry is a fact finding enquiry. Its purpose is (i) to establish the nature of default and identity of defaulter (s), (ii) to collect prosecution evidence, (iii) to judge quantum of default and (iv) to bring relevant documents on record to facilitate a regular departmental enquiry. In cases where specific information covering the above-mentioned points exists a Preliminary Enquiry need not be held and Departmental enquiry may be ordered by the disciplinary authority straightaway. In all other cases a preliminary enquiry shall normally proceed a departmental enquiry.
(2) In cases in, which a preliminary enquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer of subordinate rank in his official relations with the public, departmental enquiry shall be ordered after obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police concerned as to whether a criminal case should be registered and investigated or a departmental enquiry should be held.
(3) The Suspected police officer may or may not be present at a preliminary enquiry but when present he shall not cross-examine the witness. The file of preliminary enquiry shall not form part of the formal departmental record, but statements therefrom may be brought on record of the departmental proceedings when the witnesses are no longer available. There shall be no bar to the Enquiry Officer bringing on record any other documents from the file of the preliminary enquiry, if he considers it necessary after supplying copies to the accused officer. All statements recorded during the preliminary enquiry shall be signed by the person making them and attested by enquiry officer.”
“Rule 16(iii) if the accused police officer does not admit the misconduct, the Enquiry officer shall proceed to record evidence in support of the accusation, as is available and necessary to support the charge. As far as possible the witnesses shall be examined direct and in the presence of the accused, who shall be given opportunity to take notes of their statements and cross-examine them. The Enquiry Officer is empowered, however, to bring on record the earlier statement of any witness whose presence cannot, in the opinion of such officer, be procured without undue delay, inconvenience or expense if he considers such statement necessary provided that it has been recorded and attested by a police officer superior in rank to the accused officer, or by a Magistrate and is either signed by the person making it or has been recorded by such officer during an investigation or a judicial enquiry or trial. The statements and documents so brought on record in the departmental proceedings shall also be read out to the accused officer and he shall be given an opportunity to take notes. Unsigned statements shall be brought on record only through recording the statements of the officer or Magistrate who had recorded the statement of the witness concerned. The accused shall be bound to answer any questions which the enquiry officer may deem fit to put to him with a view to elucidating the facts referred to in the statements of documents thus brought on record.”
9. At the outset, it must be remembered that the expression “preliminary inquiry” is not defined in the Delhi Police Act or the Rules. The Supreme Court in the matter of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India (1964 SCR 190) has drawn a distinction between the departmental inquiry and the preliminary inquiry as follows:
“…But even where it is intended to take action by way of punishment what usually happens is that something in the nature of what may be called a preliminary enquiry is first held in connection with the alleged misconduct or unsatisfactory work. In this preliminary enquiry the explanation of the government servant may be taken and documentary and even oral evidence may be considered. It is usual when such a preliminary enquiry makes out a prima facie case against the servant concerned that charges are then framed against him and he is asked to show cause why disciplinary action be not taken against him…
Generally therefore a preliminary enquiry is usually held to determine whether a prima facie case for a formal departmental enquiry is made out, and it is very necessary that the two should not be confused. Even where government does not intend to take action by way of punishment against a temporary servant on a report of bad work or misconduct a preliminary enquiry is usually held to satisfy government that there is reason to dispense with the services of a temporary employee or to revert him to his substantive post, for as we have said already government does not usually take action of this kind without any reason. Therefore when a preliminary enquiry of this nature is held in the case of a temporary employee or a government servant holding a higher rank temporarily it must not be confused with the regular departmental enquiry (which usually follows such a preliminary enquiry) when the government decides to frame charges and get a departmental enquiry made in order that one of the three major punishments already indicated may be inflicted on the government servant. Therefore, so far as the preliminary enquiry is concerned there is no question of its being governed by Art. 311(2) for that enquiry is really for the satisfaction of government to decide whether punitive action should be taken or action should be taken under the contract or the rules in the case of a temporary government servant or a servant holding higher rank temporarily to which he has no right. In short a preliminary enquiry is for the purpose of collection of facts in regard to the conduct and work of a government servant in which he may or may not be associated so that the authority concerned may decide whether or not to subject the servant concerned to the enquiry necessary under Art. 311 for inflicting one of the three major punishments mentioned therein. Such a preliminary enquiry may even be held ex parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of government, though usually for the sake of fairness, explanation is taken from the servant concerned even at such an enquiry. But at that stage he has no right to be heard for the enquiry is merely for the satisfaction of the Government, and it is only when the government decides to hold a regular departmental enquiry for the purposes of inflicting one of the three major punishments that the government servant gets the protection of Art. 311 and all the rights that that protection implies as already indicated above. There must therefore be no confusion between the two enquiries and it is only when the government proceeds to hold a departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the government servant one of the three major punishments indicated in Art. 311 that the government servant is entitled to the protection of that Article.”
10. In The Rt. Rev. B.P Sugandhar Bishop in Medak v. Smt. Dorothy Dayasheela Ebeneser, JT 1996 (6) SC 221 the respondent had filed a writ petition in the Andhra Pradesh High Court challenging the order of her suspension and also the action of the respondent constituting an Inquiry Commission. In the counter reply that was filed it had been stated that Inquiry Commission was only a fact finding body and that an inquiry officer will be appointed to hold the inquiry and that a detailed charge sheet will be issued based on the report of the Inquiry Commission. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court quashed the preliminary inquiry. The Supreme Court held:
“5. We find it difficult to appreciate how the Division Bench thought it fit to quash the preliminary enquiry particularly when the appellant had made it clear, by the time the Division Bench disposed of the appeal that the formal enquiry was yet to be held. Obviously, the purpose of constituting the Commission of Enquiry was to hold only a preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether there was some truth in the complaints made against the respondent No. 1 and whether there was enough material on the basis of which misconduct of respondent No. 1 could be proved…”
11. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Singh v. Union of India, (2007) 9 SCC 63 Rule 15(2) of the Rules fell for consideration. In that case the charge was framed after preliminary inquiry was conducted. The contention of the appellant before the Supreme Court was that the departmental inquiry was held preceded by a preliminary inquiry, but no approval was obtained from the Additional Commissioner of Police under Rule 15(2) and, therefore, the inquiry is vitiated. This being a pure question of law, the respondent was directed to produce records as to whether prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police was obtained or not. It was conceded on behalf of the respondents that the record does not disclose that prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police was obtained. A supplementary affidavit was, however, filed stating that no preliminary inquiry was ordered, hence prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police as per Rule 15(2) was neither required nor the same was taken. This stand of the government was rejected being completely contrary to the statement of PW-4. The Court while explaining the scope of Rule 15(2) observed as follows:
“A reading of rule 15(1)&(2) together and the language employed therein clearly discloses that a preliminary enquiry is held only in cases of allegation, which is of weak character and, therefore, a preliminary enquiry is to be held to establish the nature of default and identity of defaulter; to collect the prosecution evidence; to judge quantum of default and to bring relevant documents on record to facilitate a regular departmental enquiry. In cases, where specific information is available, a preliminary enquiry is not necessary and a departmental enquiry may be ordered by the disciplinary authority straightaway. It is because of this reason Sub-rule 2 of Rule 15 is couched in such a way as a defence to the delinquent officer. The Additional Commissioner of Police being higher in hierarchy next to DGP, the requirement of his approval is mandatory, so that the delinquent officer is not prejudiced or harassed unnecessarily in a departmental enquiry. Such approval, if any, must also be accorded after due application of mind. It is a case of violation of mandatory provisions of law.”
12. In R.K Gupta's case (supra) the order of suspension was challenged on the ground that it was passed mala fide and on the ground that it was not authorized by Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965. The argument was that the suspension was not authorized by Rule 10(1)(b) of the said Rules inasmuch as no investigation was pending against the petitioner in connection with any criminal offence at or prior to the date of passing of the said order. The stand of the respondents was that CBI was carrying on investigation against the petitioner in respect of certain matters. The Division Bench came to the conclusion that CBI was conducting merely a preliminary inquiry but it cannot be equated to an investigation within the meaning of Rule 10(1)(b) of the Rules, The argument of the respondents was negatived with the following observations:
“19. It is described as a preliminary enquiry. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the recording of information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is not mentioned in this document. After recording the information it is stated that the preliminary enquiry is being registered for verification as it requires a probe. In our opinion, the words ‘preliminary enquiry’, ‘probe’ and ‘verification’ are significant and got to show that this preliminary enquiry cannot be equated to an investigation as contemplated by Section 157 of the Code.”
13. Shri K.D Shrivastava in his book “Disciplinary Action against Government Servant and its Remedies” 5th Ed, at page 327 makes an attempt to describe as to what is a preliminary inquiry:
“3. Preliminary enquiry: (i) What is—On the receipt of a complaint or the facts coming otherwise to the knowledge of the authority competent to take disciplinary action, it is open to him to make such preliminary enquiry as he deems proper to ascertain the prima facie truth of the allegations and the evidence available in support thereof. It may sometimes be advisable to intimate the facts of the person concerned and to know what he has to say without framing a formal charge sheet. For such an enquiry hardly any rules exist, but such a procedure is implicit in the very nature of things.”
14. It is thus clearly seen that preliminary inquiry is for the purpose of collection of facts in regard to conduct and work of the government servant in which he may or may not be associated and as such for the satisfaction of the government which may decide whether or not to subject the government servant to departmental inquiry for inflicting any of the punishment mentioned in Article 311. Although, usually, for the sake of fairness, explanation is taken from the government servant, but he has no right of being heard because it is for satisfaction of the government. Therefore, since. the preliminary inquiry is held for the satisfaction of the government, necessarily it can be held after an order passed by the competent authority of the government.
15. A bare perusal of sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 would manifest that preliminary inquiry is held only in cases of allegations, which are of weak character, and before the department resorts to regular departmental inquiry it may like to ascertain veracity of the facts which are subject-matter of complaint against the delinquent. The purpose of preliminary inquiry has been mentioned in sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 which is (i) to establish the nature of default and identity of defaulter(s); (ii) to collect prosecution evidence; (iii) to judge quantum of default and (iv) to bring relevant documents on record to facilitate a regular departmental inquiry. The provisions contained in Rule 15(1) also unequivocally clothe the departmental authority to straightaway order departmental inquiry in cases where specific information covering the above-mentioned points exists, and preliminary inquiry need not be held. It is only in other cases i.e where matters as mentioned in sub-rule(1) of Rule 15 have to be ascertained that a preliminary inquiry is ordered. Further it is pertinent to note that Rule 15(3) provides that “all statements recorded during the preliminary inquiry shall be signed by the person making them and attested by the Inquiry Officer”. In other words, it provides a procedure for preliminary inquiry that statements have to be attested by Inquiry Officer. Thus, preliminary inquiry has to be by Inquiry Officer who has been appointed for the purpose. The appointment has to be necessarily by the disciplinary authority or an appropriate authority in this regard. Any person who records the statement of a delinquent and forwards the same with his report to the disciplinary authority cannot be taken to be Inquiry Officer. In other words a preliminary inquiry can only by an officer appointed for the purpose. Even if a person on his own investigates into the fact without the order of the competent authority, at best it can be taken to be information supplied to the authority rather than a preliminary inquiry. If such information is received pursuant to a raid, investigation or vigilance inquiry it cannot be equated with a preliminary inquiry. The competent authority can order preliminary inquiry in case he feels that facts have to be collected.
16. We are not impressed by the argument of Shri Mittal that if his interpretation is not accepted. Rule 16(iii) of the Rules would become redundant. A plain reading itself clearly shows the distinction between sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 and Rule 16(iii) of the Rules. sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 is relevant only with respect to the preliminary enquiry. It provides that there shall be no bar to the Inquiry Officer bringing on record any other document to the file of the preliminary enquiry if he considers it necessary after supplying copies to the accused. It further clearly provides that the file of preliminary enquiry does not form part of a formal departmental record but statements can be brought on record when witnesses are no longer available. Thus if there was a preliminary enquiry and witnesses are no longer available, only then the statements recorded in the preliminary enquiry can be brought on the record. As against this sub-rule (iii) to Rule 16 is a general provision. This Rule postulates examination of all the witnesses in the presence of the accused, who is also to be given an opportunity to cross examine them. However, in case, the presence of any witness cannot be procured without undue delay, inconvenience or expenses, his previous statement could be brought on record subject to the condition that the previous statement was recorded and attested by a police officer superior in rank than the delinquent. If such statement was recorded by the Magistrate and attested by him, then also it could be brought on record. The further requirement is that either the statement should have been signed by the person concerned, namely, the person, who has made that statement, or it was recorded during an investigation or a judicial inquiry or trial. The Rule further provides that unsigned statement shall be brought on record only through the process of examining the officer or the Magistrate, who had earlier recorded the statement of the witness, whose presence could not be procured. The Supreme Court in Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police, JT 1999 (8) SC 603 explained that Rule 16(iii) is almost akin to Sections 32 and 33 of the Evidence Act. Before the Rule can be invoked, the factors enumerated therein, namely, that the presence of the witness cannot be procured without undue delay, inconvenience or expense, have to be found to be existing as they constitute the condition-precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction for this purpose. In the absence of these factors, the jurisdiction under Rule 16(iii) cannot be exercised. The two Rules clearly operate in different situations. While sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 is confined to the statements recorded in the preliminary enquiry, sub-rule (iii) of Rule 16 is not confined to the preliminary enquiry and the prior statements can be brought on record subject to the compliance with other ingredients of sub-rule (iii) of Rule 16 which are already noted.
17. On going through the Division Bench judgment in Deputy Commissioner of Police v. Ravinder Singh it is seen that though it approves the reasoning of the Tribunal in the case of Ravinder Singh it was only to the extent that when the ingredients of sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 are satisfied, the file is to be put up before the Additional Commissioner of Police. There was no discussion on the question as to what constitutes a preliminary inquiry. It was not even remotely urged before the Division Bench that inquiry conducted by Anti Corruption Cell of Vigilance Cell would partake the character of a preliminary inquiry as envisaged in Rule 15(2). We find that the question as to what is preliminary inquiry has not been gone into. In our opinion the two Full Bench decisions of the Tribunal lay down the law correctly. We accordingly hold that there has to be an order to initiate preliminary enquiry by the competent authority. The preliminary enquiry must precede the departmental enquiry to collect the facts contemplated under Rule 15(1) of the Rules. Anti-corruption raids, investigation or vigilance enquiry including the enquiries by PGR Cell cannot be equated with preliminary enquiry as contemplated under Rule 15(2) unless there was an order by the competent authority to hold such an enquiry contemplated under Rule 15(1) of the Rules.
18. The facts of the present case reveal that the petitioner and his co-delinquent were seen by Shri R.S Chauhan, ACP accepting bribe. Inquiry was made from the truck driver and others on the spot and their statements were recorded on the spot. Report of the ACP, which was based on the spot collection of some material, would not partake the character of a preliminary inquiry as envisaged in Rule 15(1) of the Rules. That apart, a preliminary inquiry has necessarily to be ordered by the disciplinary authority and, therefore, any other inquiry, which is not ordered by the disciplinary authority, would not be a preliminary inquiry at all. The issue is answered accordingly. Let the papers be placed before the Division Bench for disposal of the writ petition.
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