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Dharam Pal Gupta & Ors. v. Anand Prakash .

Delhi High Court

Dec 11, 2008

Judgment

Subsequent
References

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Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This Revision Petition was preferred by the petitioners under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act against an order dated 22.11.1999 passed by the Additional Rent Controller (ARC) allowing the respondent's eviction petition and directing the petitioners to hand over the premises. The petitioners are tenants (the tenancy originally held by their father, who died during the pendency of proceedings and whose legal representatives were brought on record) and the respondent is the landlord.

Relevant facts as recorded in the opinion: the tenant occupied one room and two kothas on the ground floor at premises No. 1111-1112, Gali Samosan, Farashkhana, Delhi, originally let to the father of the petitioners for residential purposes by the previous owner. The landlord asserted title by a registered sale deed dated 6.5.1961 in favour of his mother, Smt. Chander Kala, who died on 7.3.1988; other legal representatives executed a Relinquishment Deed in favour of the landlord and he became absolute owner. The landlord stated he was living as a licensee with his father at House No. 260 Katra Peran, Tilak Bazar and that his father was pressing him to vacate that accommodation.

Leave to defend was granted to the tenant limited to the questions of (a) ownership and (b) the letting purpose (residential v. commercial). Evidence was recorded confined to those issues. The trial court found that the letting purpose was residential, that the landlord was the owner, and that the landlord's requirement (for himself, his wife and daughter) was bona fide; an eviction order was therefore passed against the tenant. The tenant filed the present revision challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether subsequent events occurring after institution of the eviction proceedings (specifically, the death of the landlord's father) can be taken into account in the revision proceedings so as to nullify or affect the bona fide personal requirement asserted by the landlord.
Whether the letting purpose of the premises was commercial or residential and whether that determination affects the landlord's ability to seek eviction under the relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
Whether, more generally, a court in revision/appeal should re-examine events occurring after institution of the suit when deciding an eviction petition that was founded on the facts as they existed at the time of filing.

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant's Arguments

After the eviction order and during the pendency of this revision, the landlord's father died; as a result the landlord's status changed from a licensee living with his father to an heir who now lives in the property as a matter of right. Therefore, the cause of action for eviction has evaporated and the revision court should dismiss the eviction petition.
Even earlier in the eviction petition and at all times till date, the landlord had not pleaded that the father's house was not reasonably sufficient for the landlord's residence and the residence of his family members. Now that the father is deceased and the accommodation from which the landlord was previously a licensee is available to the landlord, there is no bona fide requirement for the landlord's claimed need to occupy the tenant's premises.
The letting purpose of the premises was commercial (a commercial godown) and not residential; the trial court therefore erred in finding the letting purpose to be residential.
The tenant relied upon a number of authorities (including Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu, Hasmat Rai, P.V. Papanna, and Kedar Nath Agarwal) to support the proposition that subsequent events should be taken into account by the Court.

Landlord's Position (as recorded and decided by the trial court)

The landlord asserted title to the premises via purchase in 1961 by his mother and subsequent relinquishment to him by other legal representatives; no other premises were owned by the landlord.
The landlord was living with his father as a licensee and was being pressed by his father to vacate that accommodation; the landlord needed the premises for bona fide occupation by himself and his family (himself, his wife and daughter).
The trial court accepted the landlord's case on ownership and residential letting purpose and found the requirement to be bona fide, issuing an eviction order accordingly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR 1975 SC 1406	Cited by the tenant to support the proposition that subsequent events should be taken into account.	The opinion records this authority as one of the earlier decisions relied upon by the tenant; the court treats such earlier authorities as part of the historical debate but relies on later Supreme Court authority that limits the scope for considering subsequent events in revision/appeal.
Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 : AIR 1981 SC 1711	Cited by the tenant to support taking subsequent events into account.	The opinion records this citation among the tenant's relied authorities; the court does not treat it as overruling later Supreme Court pronouncements and therefore gives precedence to later cases that examine the question differently.
P.V. Papanna v. K. Padmanabhaiha, (1994) 2 SCC 316 : AIR 1994 SC 1577	Cited by the tenant for consideration of subsequent events; earlier noted as indicating a view contrary to later authorities.	The court notes that the contrary note in P.V. Papanna was held to be in the nature of an obiter in later Supreme Court decisions (specifically in Shakuntala Bai as discussed in Usha P. Kuvelkar). The opinion therefore treats Papanna's contrary observation as not binding.
Kedar Nath Agarwal v. Dhanraji Devi, (2004) 8 SCC 76	Cited by the tenant as authority supporting consideration of subsequent events.	The opinion lists this case among those relied on by the tenant; the court ultimately prefers more recent and relevant authority establishing that bona fide need is to be examined as on the date of institution of the suit.
Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287	Establishes that Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act applies equally to commercial premises and that premises let for commercial use can be sought to be vacated under that provision.	The court applied this authority to hold that the tenant's argument about the premises being commercial was redundant for the purpose of the eviction petition, since the statutory provision invoked would cover commercial premises as well.
Usha P. Kuvelkar v. Ravindra Subrai Dalvi, 2008 (1) RLR 63	Discusses the principle that death of the landlord during pendency does not affect the bona fide need as examined at the date of institution; refers to Shakuntala Bai and Shakuntala Bai's exposition that bona fide need must be examined as of the date of institution.	The court relied on Usha P. Kuvelkar to support the proposition that subsequent events (such as death of the landlord) do not nullify the bona fide requirement established at the time the eviction petition was instituted; the tenant's contention based on the landlord's father's death was therefore rejected.
Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das, (2004) 5 SCC 772	Holds that bona fide need of the landlord is to be examined on the date of institution of proceedings and that death of the landlord during pendency of appeal will not affect the rights of heirs to defend or the benefit accrued under a decree.	The court treated Shakuntala Bai as a controlling precedent for the proposition that subsequent events (including death of the landlord) cannot ordinarily defeat a decree founded on bona fide need determined at the time of institution; it relied on this reasoning to dismiss the tenant's revision argument.
Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanial Maganlal Telwala, (1976) 4 SCC 417	Referenced in Shakuntala Bai; earlier authority in the jurisprudential history of how subsequent events are to be treated.	The court notes that Shakuntala Bai referred to Shantilal Thakordas and observed that its view did not affect the view expressed in Phool Rani; the present court follows the analysis in Shakuntala Bai.
Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia, (1973) 1 SCC 688	Recognizes that where death of a landlord occurs after decree for possession has been passed in his favour, the legal heirs are entitled to defend further proceedings and to the benefit of the decree.	The opinion cites Phool Rani via Shakuntala Bai to underline that heirs can defend and benefit from a decree passed in favour of the original landlord; this supports the court's view that death during pendency does not invalidate the earlier established cause of action.
Carom Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan and Sons, 2007 (2) RLR 481	Affirms that rights of parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit; if the plaintiff had a substantive right at the date of institution, subsequent events should not ordinarily deny relief.	The court quoted paragraph 37 of Carom Ltd. to reinforce that the basic rule is to determine rights as of the date of institution and to support its conclusion that subsequent events during lengthy litigation cannot be permitted to defeat an eviction decree founded on a bona fide need shown at the time of filing.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds along the following lines, as recorded in the opinion:

The trial court granted leave to defend only on ownership and letting purpose; evidence was limited and the tenant objected to cross-examination on other issues. After evidence, the trial court found that the premises were let for residential purposes and that the landlord was the owner; the landlord's need for the premises for himself and his family was held to be bona fide and an eviction order was passed.
On revision, the tenant argued that a subsequent event (the death of the landlord's father) altered the factual matrix so that the landlord no longer had a bona fide need; the tenant also argued the premises were commercial and so the trial court erred.
The court dealt first with the letting-purpose argument by referring to Satyawati Sharma (2008), which holds that Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act applies equally to commercial premises; accordingly, the tenant's commercial-use argument was treated as redundant.
The court then addressed the core contention about subsequent events. It reviewed the jurisprudential evolution: whereas earlier decisions (cited by the tenant) suggested subsequent events might be considered, more recent Supreme Court decisions—particularly Shakuntala Bai (as discussed in Usha P. Kuvelkar) and Carom Ltd.—establish that bona fide need is to be examined as of the date of institution of the proceedings and that death of a landlord during pending proceedings does not ordinarily defeat the rights established at the earlier date.
The court provided practical and policy-oriented reasoning: litigation in eviction matters often takes decades; allowing subsequent events to be repeatedly invoked during the long pendency would encourage procedural delay and uncertainty, may prejudice one side (as subsequent events of tenants are often not apparent), and could make final resolution impossible during the lifetime of the original parties.
Given the legal authorities and practical considerations, the court held that it must look to the cause of action as it existed when the eviction petition was instituted and that, once trial and judgment are concluded, new circumstances arising thereafter should not be considered in revision or appeal to defeat an eviction decree founded on those earlier facts.
On that basis, the tenant's contention based on the landlord's father's death was rejected and the revision petition was dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition dismissed.

Implications and direct consequences:

The Revision Petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is dismissed; the ARC's order dated 22.11.1999 allowing the respondent's eviction petition and directing the tenant to hand over the premises remains in force.
The court applied existing Supreme Court authority (notably Shakuntala Bai as discussed in Usha P. Kuvelkar and Carom Ltd.) to hold that the bona fide need of a landlord is to be assessed as on the date of institution of proceedings and that subsequent events (such as the death of the landlord) occurring during pendency of proceedings or appeal/revision cannot ordinarily be permitted to defeat a decree founded on facts that existed on the date of filing.
The opinion contains policy observations cautioning against permitting subsequent events to be regularly invoked during protracted litigation, noting the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of doing so; however, the court grounded its decision on existing precedent rather than purporting to create a new legal principle.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or extrapolate facts or legal holdings beyond what the opinion itself records.

Show all summary ...

Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.— The petitioners have preferred this Revision Petition under Section 25B(8) of Delhi Rent Control Act against an order dated 22.11.1999 passed by the learned ARC whereby an eviction petition of the respondent was allowed and petitioners were directed to hand over the premises under their tenancy to the respondent (hereinafter petitioners are referred as tenant and respondent as landlord) [The tenant (father of petitioners) died during the pendency of the petition and his LRs were brought on record].

2. The facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this Revision Petition are that the tenant was in possession of one room and two Kothas on ground floor, let out to the father of the petitioners by the previous owner for residential purpose at premises No. 1111-1112, Gali Samosan, Farashkhana Delhi. The landlord pleaded that the premises was purchased vide a registered sale deed dated 6.5.1961 by his mother Smt. Ghander Kala. Smt. Chander Kala died on 7.3.1988 Other LRs of Smt. Chander Kala i.e her husband, one son and two daughters executed a Relinquishment Deed in favour of the landlord and he became absolute owner of the premises. No other premises was owned by the landlord. He was living with his father at House No. 260 Katra Peran, Tilak Bazar as a licensee. His father was pressing him hard to vacate the premises. Leave to defend was granted to the tenant on the question of ownership and letting purpose, since the tenant had challenged the contention of the landlord being owner of the premises and had also challenged the contention of the premises having been let out for residential purpose. The evidence of the parties was recorded and the same was also confined to these two aspects only. The tenant himself objected to cross examination of his witnesses on any other aspect.

3. The learned Trial Court after recording evidence of both the parties and considering the documents placed on record by the parties came to conclusion that the letting purpose was residential and that the premises was owned by the landlord. The landlord was living as a licensee with his father. His family consisted of himself, his wife and a daughter. His requirement was considered as a bona fide requirement and an eviction order was passed against the tenant.

4. The Counsel for the tenant argued that after passing of eviction order and during pendency of this Revision Petition, the father of the landlord had died and the status of the landlord living in the premises with his father as a licensee had changed and now the landlord was living in that premises as a matter of right, since he inherited the property. Thus, the cause of action had evaporated and this Court should take cognizance of this subsequent event and the Eviction Petition should be dismissed. The other argument is that right from the date of filing of Eviction Petition till date, it has not been the case of the landlord that father's house was not reasonably sufficient for his residence and residence of his family members. Since, now father is no more in this world, the accommodation in possession of landlord, where he had been living, being sufficient for his family, the bona fide requirement could not be there. The tenant relied on Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR 1975 SC 1406; Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 : AIR 1981 SC 1711; P.V Papanna v. K. Padmanabhaiha, (1994) 2 SCC 316 : AIR 1994 SC 1577 and Kedar Nath Agarwal v. Dhanraji Devi, (2004) 8 SCC 76, to fortify his point that Court should take into account the subsequent events. The other point pressed during arguments of the Revision was that the letting purpose of the premises was commercial since the premises was a commercial godown and the Trial Court wrongly held that the premises was being used for residential purposes.

5. The argument of the tenant regarding letting purpose has become redundant in view of the judgment of Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287, wherein the Supreme Court observed that Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act would be equally applicable to commercial premises and a premises let out for commercial purpose could also be got vacated.

6. The way the residential premises have been put to commercial use in most of the areas in Delhi, it shows that any premises can be converted for use as per the requirement. If the need be, a premises can be converted to commercial purpose, if need be the same premises can be put to residential use. There is no area left in Delhi (except Lutyen's Delhi) which is purely residential and there is no area in Delhi which is purely commercial. In the present case, also the room which has been let out to the tenant is having common use of latrine, WC bath, etc. and if the landlord wants to reside, he can bring the room to a proper shape and use it for residential purpose. There is no bar on the landlord from using this room for his residence.

7. There is no doubt that the view of the Supreme Court earlier had been that subsequent events should be taken into account however, the way the litigation in eviction matters has been taking decades, this view has now changed and the Supreme Court in recent judgment Usha P. Kuvelkar v. Ravindra Subrai Dalvi, 2008 (1) RLR 63, has observed as under:

“It was tried to be argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent that since the landlord had died, the need had expired with him and that the question will have to be examined again regarding the bona fide personal need of the landlord. The question is no more res integra and is covered by the decision of this Court in Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das, (2004) 5 SCC 772. This Court has observed:

‘…The bona fide need of the landlord has to be examined as on the date of institution of the proceedings and if a decree for eviction is passed, the death of the landlord during the pendency of the appeal preferred by the tenant will make no difference as his heirs are fully entitled to defend the estate.’

In the same decision a contrary note expressed by this Court in P.V Papanna v. Padmanabhaiah, (1994) 2 SCC 316 was held to be in the nature of an obiter. This Court in Shakuntala Bai (supra) referred to the decision in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanial Maganlal Telwala, (1976) 4 SCC 417 and specifically observed that the view expressed in Shantilal Thakordass case did not, in any manner, affect the view expressed in Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia, (1973) 1 SCC 688, to the effect that where the death of landlord occurs after the decree for possession has been passed in his favour, his legal heirs are entitled to defend the further proceedings like an appeal and the benefit accrued to them under the decree. Here in this case also it is obvious that the original landlord Prabhakar Govind Sinai Kuvelkar had expired only after the eviction order passed by the Additional Rent Controller. This is apart from the fact that the landlord had sought the possession not only for himself but also for his family members. There is a clear reference in Section 23(1)(a)(i) of the Act regarding occupation of the family members of the landlord. In that view the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent must be rejected.”

8. In 2007 (2) RLR 481, Carom Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan and Sons, the Supreme Court considered the impact of subsequent events on the eviction decree and held as under:

“37. In our judgment, the law is fairly settled. The basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit. Thus, if the plaintiff has no cause of action on the date of the filing of the suit, ordinarily, he will not be allowed to take advantage of the cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of the suit. Conversely, no relief will normally be denied to the plaintiff by reason of any subsequent event if at the date of the institution of the suit, he has a substantive right to claim such relief.”

9. The proposition that subsequent events should be taken into account may look attractive however, it is totally unjust proposition because most of the time only subsequent events of the landlord are placed before the Courts and subsequent events of tenant/tenant's family are never taken into account. As in this case, the original tenant had died, the rent of the premises has not been paid since 1992 and whether the premises is actually being used or not nobody knows. Normally, in such premises nobody resides and they are kept under lock and key. The deceased tenant's family also grew with time as his 5 LRs have been mentioned in the LRs application itself. It is obvious that they all would not be living in one room; all of them would be haying separate profession/business and would have acquired their own premises and living separately. The landlord, who had given one room on rent say on Rs. 50 or Rs. 60 per month years ago would have no means to know the developments in the family of the tenant, unless he is living in the same premises or in adjoining area and is close to the tenant's family. He would not know what different business interests the tenant's sons had acquired, what different properties the tenant's other family members had acquired; these things can only be found by investigating agencies. A person receiving rent of Rs. 50 or Rs. 60 per month would not like to spend Rs. 30,000-40,000 on investigating agency just to find out the present status of tenant's family. Most of the time tenants do not disclose their own growth, their own acquisitions of different premises either for residence or business and the premises are kept under lock and key only for the purpose of extracting money from the landlord at the time of vacating the premises, keeping in view of the fact that it takes 20-30 years in final culmination of a litigation in India. This is only one aspect. The other aspect of changing circumstances is that the person in dire necessity of premises for his bona fide requirement, files eviction petition under so-called summary procedure evolved by the legislature and this so-called summary procedure takes years and years and years in final culmination. The present Revision itself is pending in the Court since 2000 and has taken 8 years. During pendency of this Revision Petition, not only the father of the landlord/respondent had died but on the other hand the circumstances of tenant's family also changed and original tenant died. The litigation in Courts progresses at snail's pace. The judicial system, which is not alive to the urgent bona fide requirements of a landlord, cannot keep time standstill and cannot mandate that so long as the case is not decided, nothing shall happen in the world of landlord and tenant. Time does not wait for anybody, not even for Courts. The children of the landlord will grow. Finding that their own premises was under tenancy and was not being vacated despite litigation, they need not wait for 20 years to meet their requirement and are bound to make some alternate arrangements for themselves or for the other family members. It is highly unjust that the Court should not decide the matter within time bound limit and then take into account the change in circumstances of the landlord or tenant.

10. The span of 10-20 years, which is normally spent in eviction petitions, is long enough to change the circumstances in the life of anyone and with every change in circumstances, like growth in family or reduction in the family or death or marriage in the family, a new cause of action would arise during pendency of the Revision or Appeal and a de novo trial shall again start and in this manner no petition can come to an end during the lifetime of any person. I, therefore consider that the Court has only to look into the cause of action which was available at the time when eviction petition was instituted. Once the trial is over and judgment is pronounced no new circumstance can be considered either during revision or appeal.

11. Taking into consideration the subsequent events in fact has encouraged parties to prolong the case on one or the other pretext waiting for something to happen. If the landlord is old and ill enough the tenant keeps on dragging the petition waiting for landlord to die so that the entire cause of action evaporates. The dragging of petition is so easy in the Court that the whole purpose of filing the petition gets frustrated. I, therefore, consider that the subsequent events in the eviction petitions cannot form basis of decision in the revision and the Court has to stick to the cause of action which was there at the time of filing the petition. The subsequent events highly prejudice only one side because the subsequent events of the other side are always in dark. The argument of the petitioner is not tenable.

12. I find no force in the petition. The petition is hereby dismissed.

Petition dismissed.