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Yash Mehra v. Arundhati Mehra .
Factual and Procedural Background
The parties filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Statements of the parties were recorded on 21.4.2003, and orders were passed on the first motion. After the mandatory six-month period, the parties filed a petition for the second motion, supported by affidavits from both sides. The statements were recorded again, and the judgment was reserved and fixed for pronouncement.
Subsequently, the respondent/wife filed two applications under Order 23 Rule 1 and Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, alleging that the petitioner/husband had agreed to pay Rs. 70 lakh as permanent alimony and return Istridhan but failed to comply. The respondent claimed she was pressured into signing the application and sought to withdraw her consent. The trial Court allowed these applications, concluding that the divorce decree could not be passed due to the withdrawal of consent. The petitioner’s review applications were dismissed. The petitioner challenged these orders under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial Court had jurisdiction to allow the respondent’s applications to withdraw consent after the judgment was reserved at the second motion stage of a mutual consent divorce petition.
- Whether, once the hearing is concluded and judgment reserved, any further applications affecting the outcome can be entertained before pronouncement of the judgment under Order 20 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- Reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993, which states that once a judgment is reserved, the court’s function is limited to pronouncing the judgment and no further proceedings are permissible.
- Submission that the hearing was completed in its entirety and the suit was adjourned only for pronouncement of judgment under Order 20 Rule 1 of the Code.
Respondent’s Arguments
- Claimed that the petitioner had agreed to pay permanent alimony and return Istridhan, but failed to comply, which was not recorded in the settlement.
- Asserted that she was under pressure when signing the application and thus sought to withdraw consent through applications under Order 23 Rule 1 and Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 | Once judgment is reserved, the court’s role is limited to pronouncing judgment; no further proceedings are allowed after hearing is completed. | The Court applied this principle to hold that after the hearing and reservation of judgment in a mutual consent divorce, no application for withdrawal of consent could be entertained. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the procedural framework of mutual consent divorce under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, noting the two-stage process involving a first motion and a second motion after a six-month interval. The Court acknowledged the judicial evolution permitting withdrawal of consent before final decree but emphasized that in this case, consent was recorded at the second motion stage and the hearing was complete with judgment reserved.
The Court relied on Order 20 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which governs the pronouncement of judgment after hearing is concluded, and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arjun Singh to conclude that once the hearing is complete and judgment reserved, the trial Court’s jurisdiction to entertain further applications affecting the decree is barred.
Thus, the respondent’s applications filed after judgment was reserved, seeking to withdraw consent, were impermissible. If the respondent believed fraud had been played, the proper remedy was to challenge the decree after its pronouncement on grounds of fraud, not to delay or recall the decree before pronouncement.
Consequently, the Court held that the trial Court erred in allowing the applications and ordered dismissal of those applications with directions to proceed to pronounce judgment immediately based on concluded arguments.
Holding and Implications
The petition is allowed.
The Court set aside the trial Court’s orders allowing the respondent’s applications to withdraw consent after the judgment was reserved. The trial Court was directed to pronounce the divorce decree forthwith based on the previously recorded statements and concluded arguments. The parties were left to bear their own costs. No new precedent was established; the decision reaffirms the procedural principle that once hearing is complete and judgment reserved, no further applications affecting the decree may be entertained before pronouncement.
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.— Admit.
2. At request of learned Counsel for the parties, the petition is taken up for final disposal.
3. The parties filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The statement of the parties were recorded on 21.4.2003 and orders were passed on the first motion. The parties thereafter filed a petition for second motion after the lapse of six months' period of time. This application was duly supported by affidavits of both the parties. The statement of the parties were recorded and thereafter the judgment was reserved and was fixed for pronouncement of orders.
4. The two applications were filed by the respondent/wife under Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter to be referred to as, ‘the Code’) on 15.9.2003 and another one under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code on 22.7.2004
5. In the applications, it is stated by the respondent/wife that the petitioner/husband had agreed to make payment of Rs. 70 lakh towards permanent alimony and to return Istridhan, but the petitioner had failed to keep a compromise. It is not in dispute that there are no such terms recorded in the settlement. The respondent has stated that she was put under pressure and that is why she had signed the application. The trial Court came to the conclusion that in view of withdrawal of the consent by the respondent, the divorce decree could not be passed and allowed the applications on 22.12.2004 The applications for review filed by the petitioner was dismissed on 10.9.2005 Both these orders are impugned by the petitioner in the present proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
6. The limited question raised in the present petition arises from the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Additional District Judge in allowing the applications of the respondent after the judgment was reserved at the stage of second motion. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to judgment of the Supreme Court in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 to contend that once a judgment is reserved, nothing more is to be done other than pronouncement of judgment. The hearing of the suit has been completed in its entirety and the suit is adjourned merely for purposes of pronouncing judgment under Order 20 Rule 1 of the Code. The said provision reads as under:
“ORDER 20
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
1. Judgment when pronounced.—(1) The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in an open Court, either at once, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable and when the judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the Court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders:
Provided that where the judgment is not pronounced at once, every endeavour shall be made by the Court to pronounce the judgment within thirty days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where it is not practicable so to do on the ground of the exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case, the Court shall fix a future day for the pronouncement of the judgment, and such day shall not ordinarily be a day beyond sixty days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded, and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.”
7. The Supreme Court had further observed that once a hearing starts, the Code contemplates only two stages in the trial of the suit—(i) where the hearing is adjourned; or (ii) where the hearing is completed. Thus, where hearing is completed, the parties have no further rights or privileges in the matter and it is only for the convenience of the Court that Order 20 Rule 1 of the Code permits the judgment to be delivered after an interval after the hearing is completed.
8. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and I am in agreement with the submissions advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner.
9. The provision of mutual consent divorce was introduced with the object of providing for dissolution of marriage where both parties agreed without faults being attributed to one side or the other. However, there are two stages envisaged for the dissolution of such a marriage. There has to be a hiatus period of one year before the first motion for divorce is filed. Even thereafter the parties are given time to think over the matter and a second motion has to be filed on a date after six months from the first motion.
10. The judicial view earlier was that there was no option available unilaterally to one of the parties to withdraw the consent given at the first motion stage, but that judicial view was subsequently overruled and it was held that any one of the parties is also at liberty to withdraw the consent.
11. In the present case, the consent was available at the first stage and statements of parties were recorded. The parties took a conscious step of filing the second motion and even the statement of the parties were recorded at the second motion stage. Thus, the respondent was present before the Court to say whatever she wanted and she consciously gave consent to the second motion. It was open for the trial Court to have pronounced a decree for dissolution of marriage immediately, but the Court reserved orders and, thus, the provisions of Order 20 Rule 1 of the Code came into play. All that had to be done by the trial Court was to pronounce judgment in the matter. It was not permissible at that stage for the respondent to have moved the applications seeking to withdraw the consent. In view of the consent, the decree ought to have followed and in case the respondent was of the view that the fraud had been played on her, it was open for the respondent to seek to challenge the said decree limited to those grounds of fraud. However, the pronouncement of the decree for divorce could not have been recalled in view of the applications filed by the respondent.
12. In view of the aforesaid, I consider appropriate that the applications filed by the respondent, which have been allowed in terms of the impugned orders, be dismissed and the trial Court should proceed to pronounce judgment on the basis of the arguments already concluded prior to those applications being filed.
13. The petition is allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
14. List for directions before the trial Court on 11.9.2006
CM No. 15244/2005
15. No further directions are called for in this application in view of disposal of the main petition.
16. Application stands disposed of.
Petition allowed.
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