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Mahendra Jain v. C.K Mohammed Ali

Madras High Court
Aug 6, 1997
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a power of attorney holder for his father Babulal Jain, filed a complaint on behalf of his father against the respondent Mohammed Ali for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The learned Magistrate recorded the sworn statement but dismissed the complaint on the ground that a complainant cannot be represented by a power of attorney holder, relying on the wording of Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and a decision in Sagayadurai v. J.D. Electronics (1997 (1) L.W (Crl.) 297 : 1997 (1) MWN (Cr.) 207). The petitioner challenged that dismissal by way of the present revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Power of Attorney agent, or a person authorised in writing by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, is competent to make a complaint in writing under Section 142(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1997 (1) L.W (Crl.) 297 : 1997 (1) MWN (Cr.) 207 (Sagayadurai v. J.D. Electronics) Authority for the proposition that a manager of a company, who is well connected with the affairs of the partnership firm, can represent the firm and prefer a complaint under Section 138 through the manager (drawing on the Court's recognition of representation by a manager of a company). The Court distinguished this decision as concerning representation of a company by its manager and held that its observations were not directly applicable to the distinct question whether a power of attorney agent can file a complaint on behalf of an individual payee or holder in due course. The lower Court's reliance on this authority to refuse representation by a power of attorney holder in an individual case was determined to be a misapplication.
AIR 1967 S.C. 349 (Ramachandra v. State of Bihar) Authority that a power of attorney holder duly constituted can act on behalf of a "person aggrieved" and thereby set the law in motion (illustrated by the Supreme Court's acceptance that a body corporate acts through its officers or agents bearing power of attorney). The Court relied on this decision as supporting the proposition that a power of attorney agent can initiate proceedings on behalf of a person aggrieved; by analogy, a power of attorney agent can file the complaint contemplated by Section 142(a) on behalf of the payee or holder in due course.
1994-1 L.W (Crl.) 34 (decision by Arunachalam, J.) Held that a Power of Attorney Agent could file a complaint on behalf of an individual complainant and that valid cognizance could be taken under Section 142(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Court cited this earlier batch decision as precedent supporting the view that a power of attorney agent may validly file a complaint on behalf of an individual and that the complaint would satisfy the eligibility criteria of Section 142(a).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining Section 142(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under Section 138 except upon a complaint in writing made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque. The Court observed that this special enactment governs who may initiate the complaint and that it overrides general provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court then addressed whether the provision prohibits a complaint being filed by a power of attorney agent acting on behalf of the payee or holder in due course. It distinguished the facts of Sagayadurai v. J.D. Electronics (which dealt with a manager representing a company) from the present case concerning a power of attorney agent representing an individual. Relying on Ramachandra v. State of Bihar, the Court noted that a body or person must act through authorised agents and that a duly constituted power of attorney holder may act on behalf of the person aggrieved and thereby set the law in motion.

The Court concluded that (1) there is no express prohibition in Section 142(a) against a power of attorney agent initiating the complaint; (2) the words "in writing" in Section 142(a) do not require that the payee or holder in due course personally sign or file the complaint if a duly authorised power agent does so; and (3) a power of attorney agent effectively steps into the shoes of the payee or holder in due course, so the eligibility requirement of Section 142(a) is not defeated by such representation. The Court also referred to an earlier decision (1994-1 L.W (Crl.) 34) holding similarly that a power of attorney agent could file a complaint for an individual.

Applying these principles to the present facts, the Court found that the lower Court's dismissal of the complaint for want of representation by the power of attorney holder was a patent illegality and a misapplication of the law. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside. The Court directed the lower Court to take the case on file, issue summons to the respondent accused, and dispose of the matter expeditiously.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The revision is allowed and the impugned order of the lower Court is set aside.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The complaint filed by the petitioner as power of attorney holder is held to be valid for the purposes of Section 142(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • The lower Court is directed to take the case on file, issue summons to the respondent (accused), and proceed to dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies existing authorities to hold that a power of attorney agent may initiate a complaint under Section 142(a) on behalf of an individual payee or holder in due course; the decision reverses the lower Court's dismissal but does not state that it establishes a novel legal principle beyond the application of cited precedents.

Show all summary ...

The petitioner is the power of attorney holder of his father Babulal Jain, filed a complaint on behalf of his father, against the respondent Mohammed Ali for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.

2. The learned Magistrate, after recording the sworn statement, dismissed the complaint on the simple ground that the complainant Babulal Jain cannot be represented by a Power of Attorney holder, in view of the wording contained under Section 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act to the effect that ‘No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, except upon a complaint in writing made by the payee, or as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque.’

3. To arrive at this conclusion, the learned Magistrate derived support from the judgment of this Court reported in 1997 (1) L.W (Crl.) 297: 1997 (1) MWN (Cr.) 207 (Sagayadurai v. J.D. Electronics). This order is being challenged in this revision 1997 (1) L.W (Crl.) -297: 1997 (1) MWN (Cr.) 207 supra is the authority for the proposition which is given below:

“In this case, there is no dispute that the complainant is a manager representing the company which is a firm. The manager of the company is very well connected with the affairs of the partnership firm on whose behalf the complaint has been made. In these circumstances, it cannot be stated that the manager representing the company shall obtain a special permission or authorisation from the company and file it along with the complaint. From the provision of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is clear that the Court is empowered to take cognizance if the complaint is preferred by the firm, a company under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, through the Manager of the Company.”

4. The observation as contained in the above stated decision, in my view, would not be applicable to this instant case. There, the question arose whether a manager of a Company can represent on behalf of the complainant the firm in a proceedings initiated for the offences punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. But, in the instant case, the question posed is whether a Power of Attorney Agent could file a complaint, on behalf of the complainant, the payee or as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque.

5. Unfortunately, the Learned Magistrate has not gone into this question and came to the conclusion that the Power of Attorney Agent cannot maintain the complaint on behalf of the payee, as he cannot be considered to be a payee or holder in due course of the cheque.

6. The question which has to be decided in this petition is whether the Power of Attorney agent or a person authourised in writing by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque be competent to make a complaint, in writing, under Section 142 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

7. To consider this question, it becomes necessary to read the Section 142 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Section 142 - Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)

(a) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheques.

8. It is clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, this special enactment contemplating the procedure in which the complaint could be filed alone would prevail. Therefore, the complaint shall be in writing as provided in Section 142 (a) made by the payee or as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque. But, it is to be noted that there is no prohibition to the Power of Attorney Agent for acting on behalf of the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque.

9. In this context, it will be relevant to refer to decision of Ramachandra v. State of Bihar, (AIR 1967 S.C 349). That was the case Where the Supreme Court was interpreting the words ‘person aggrieved’ within the meaning of the Indian Electricity Act. Section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act as referred in the said judgment reads thus:

“No prosecution shall be instituted against any person for any offence against this Act or any rule, licence, or order thereunder, except at the instance of the Government or a Electrical Inspector or of a person aggrieved by the same.”

The prosecution in that case was commenced with the charge sheet submitted by the police. It was contended that the submission of a charge sheet by the police was not the same thing as institution of prosecution at the instance of the Government or Electrical Engineer or of a person aggrieved by the same. In the context, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“It is true that Bhattacharya was not himself a ‘person aggrieved’ and that the ‘person aggrieved’ was the P.E.S.Co The P.E.S.Co however, is a Body Corporate and must act only through its directors or officers. Here we have the evidence of Ramaswami to the effect that he held a general power of attorney from the P.E.S.Co and that he was specifically empowered thereunder, act on behalf of P.E.S.Co in all legal proceedings. The evidence shows that it was at his instance that Bhattcharya launched the first information report, therefore, it would follow that the law was set in motion by the ‘person aggrieved’. The objection based on Section 50 must, therefore, be held to be untenable.”

10. This decision of Supreme Court will be an authority for the proposition that the power of attorney agent duly constituted could act on behalf of a person aggrieved. The object of the provision of Section 142-a of the Negotiable Instruments Act provided for making of a complaint by the payee or as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque appears to be that the person aggrieved has to set the law in motion. Therefore, if the payee or the holder in due course initiates complaint through their power agents, it cannot be stated Section 142 (a) of the Act has been violated.

11. It is no doubt true, the wordings contained in Section 142 (a) would provide eligibility criteria to the effect that the complaint should be made only by certain categories of persons. But, this eligibility does not get affected, if a power agent initiates a private complaint on behalf of those categories of persons, as contemplated under Section 142 (a), because the basic concept of power of attorney agent as interpreted in various decisions is that the power of attorney agent would step into the shoes of those categories of persons. Once a power agent makes a complaint for all practical purpose, it is the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque who is the complainant.

12. The words ‘in writing’ mentioned in Section 142 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be taken to mean that it must be in writing by the payee himself or the holder in due course of the cheque himself, for, if it is made by the power of attorney agent, it tantamounts to complaint being made by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque. As such the words in Section 142 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act does not provide prohibition or exclusion from the complaint being initiated by the power of attorney agent or by the payee or by the holder in due course of the cheque.

13. There cannot be any dispute that when the law specifies that an action should be taken in a particular way, it should be so done in that way and not in any other way. Once there cannot be any doubt that the power of attorney holder is virtually the payee himself or the holder in due course, it cannot be construed that the act of filing a complaint by a power of attorney holder is done in a way not contemplated by Section 142 (a) of the Act.

14. Therefore, in my view, the power of attorney agent of the payee or a holder in due course of the cheque, who is an individual will be competent to make a complaint in writing under Section 142 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act to facilitate the valid cognizance being taken by the Magistrate. The lower Court is under the misconception that the Manager alone can be, on behalf of the company, permitted to file a complaint, but not in the case of the individual, through power of attorney.

15. This question was earlier raised in this Court and in a batch of cases reported in 1994-1 L.W (Crl.) 34, Arunachalam, J. as he then was, has elaborately considered this aspect and held that the Power of Attorney Agent could file a complaint on behalf of the individual complainant and that is valid and the valid cognizance could be taken under Section 142 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

16. In the instant case, the petitioner is not only the power of attorney holder, but also, he seems to be the son of the complainant. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the complaint filed by the power of attorney agent i.e the petitioner is perfectly valid and as such, the impugned order passed by the lower Court suffers from patent illegality which is liable to be set aside and accordingly, the same is set aside.

17. In this case, even at the admission stage, this Court has thought it fit as requested by the counsel for the petitioner, not to issue notice to the accused, the respondent herein, since impugned order was passed by the Lower Court, even at the pre-cognizance stage. Therefore, this Court sought the help of the Public Prosecutor who assisted this Court before passing this order, and I record the valuable assistance given by Mr. N.R Elango, Government Advocate, representing the Public Prosecutor.

18. The lower Court is directed to take up the case on file and issue summons to the respondent accused and dispose of the same, as expeditiously as possible.

19. With the above observation, this revision is allowed.