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C. Sathish Kumar v. Commissioner, Hindu ...

Madras High Court
Feb 5, 2007
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Summary of the Opinion (Dharma Rao Elipe, J.) — Writ Appeal against dismissal of W.P. No. 5277 of 2006

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ appeal challenges an order of the learned single judge dismissing W.P. No. 5277 of 2006. The writ petition sought to restrain the respondents from cancelling the petitioner's leasehold right or evicting him from paddy field comprised in R.S. Nos. 534 of 2003 and 534 of 2005 (extent 0.84.5 acres) in Thazhakudi village, Thovalai taluk, Kanyakumari district, except by due process of law.

The second respondent (executive officer of the temple) in a counter affidavit stated that he had taken possession of the land as early as 2004 and that the fifth respondent was recovering rent. Respondents 3 and 4, who claimed to be in possession through the petitioner as sub-lessees, filed O.S. No. 39 of 2005 in the Principal District Munsif Court, Nagercoil, for permanent injunction; that suit was dismissed. The learned single judge dismissed the writ petition on the basis that the matter required evidence.

The petitioner appealed, contending (inter alia) that the original lease in favour of the petitioner's father was not disputed, that leasehold rights devolved on the petitioner by family arrangement, and that the learned single judge erred in dismissing the writ petition. The petitioner also contended that the second respondent initiated revenue recovery proceedings and that proper procedures under Sections 34, 34-B, 34-C, 78 and 79 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (referred to in the opinion as Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959) were not followed.

The special government pleader supported the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent. The appellate bench examined the statutory framework (Sections 34, 34-A, 34-B, 34-C, 34-D and Chapters dealing with Sections 78-79) and concluded that the correct statutory procedure for termination and recovery under Section 34 (and 34-B/34-C) had not been followed. The bench set aside the single judge's order and allowed the writ appeal, while permitting the second respondent to recover possession only by following the procedures under Section 34-B of the Act. No costs were awarded.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned single judge erred in dismissing the writ petition without permitting evidence, given the admissions and factual history concerning the leasehold right?
  2. Whether the second respondent (temple executive officer) could recover possession of the leased property by instructing the fifth respondent to take possession, or by invoking revenue recovery proceedings, instead of initiating proceedings under Section 34-B of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959?
  3. Whether the suits filed by respondents 3 and 4 (claiming as sub-lessees) were maintainable in the face of the statutory regime under Section 34 and whether filing those suits was barred by Section 34-C / contrary to Section 34-B?
  4. Whether Sections 78 and 79 of the Act (chapter VII) applied to the present facts or were inapplicable because they address a different purpose (encroachments and specific temporary leasings for pilgrims, fairs, vending, etc.)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Writ Petitioner) Arguments

  • The petitioner's father had a lease in respect of the paddy field; on his death the leasehold right devolved to the petitioner by family arrangement and the petitioner was cultivating the land as lessee.
  • The lease in favour of the petitioner's father was not in dispute and therefore dismissal of the writ petition was illegal.
  • The second respondent admitted the petitioner's possession by initiating revenue recovery proceedings; consequently the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed.
  • The fifth respondent cannot be authorized to recover possession after the dismissal of the suit filed by respondents 3 and 4 (the sub-lessees).
  • Procedures contemplated under Sections 78 and 79 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 rather than revenue recovery provisions, should govern recovery (contention that these sections apply).

Respondents' / Second Respondent's Arguments (as represented in counter affidavit)

  • The second respondent (executive officer of the temple) asserted that he had taken possession of the land as early as 2004 and that the fifth respondent was receiving rent.
  • The second respondent relied on proceedings taken (including O.S. No. 150 of 1999 for arrears and revenue recovery proceedings) to justify his actions; these factual assertions formed the basis for asking the single judge to dismiss the writ petition.
  • The learned special government pleader supported the second respondent's contentions in the counter affidavit.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by examining the statutory provisions of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (referred to in the judgment as Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959), and applying those provisions to the factual matrix established in the pleadings and counter affidavit:

  1. Statutory framework: The court summarized key provisions:
    • Section 34: alienation of immovable trust property (sale, mortgage or lease exceeding five years) requires sanction of the Commissioner, publication inviting objections and previous government approval; a lease that effectively exceeds five years (including renewals) is treated as exceeding five years.
    • Section 34(2): Commissioner may impose conditions about utilization of amounts raised and investment/mortgage discharge.
    • Section 34-A: fixation of lease rent.
    • Section 34-B: termination of lease on non-payment of lease rent after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard; proceedings to terminate the lease must be initiated in specified circumstances and upon termination the property vests in the religious institution and the executive officer shall take possession.
    • Section 34-C: payment to the lessee for buildings/superstructures/trees erected in accordance with the agreement or with the permission of the Commissioner after vesting under Section 34-B.
    • Section 34-D: bar on civil court jurisdiction in respect of orders passed under Sections 34-A, 34-B or 34-C except as provided under those sections.
  2. Application to facts:
    • The court noted admissions by the second respondent that the petitioner was in possession and that revenue recovery proceedings (O.S. No. 150 of 1999) had been initiated for arrears of rent.
    • The court found that although the petitioner had a subsisting leasehold right (admitted by the second respondent), the second respondent had not followed the statutory procedure under Section 34/34-B to terminate the lease despite rent default; instead, the second respondent instructed the fifth respondent to recover possession and resorted to revenue recovery proceedings.
    • The court held that initiation of possession recovery through the fifth respondent (outside Section 34-B) and by the route taken was contrary to the provisions of Section 34-B of the Act.
    • The court addressed the suit by respondents 3 and 4 (O.S. No. 39 of 2005) and concluded that filing such suits was inconsistent with the statutory scheme: the subsistence of the lease (as admitted) and the statutory bar (Section 34-C and related provisions) meant the suit by respondents 3 and 4 was contrary to Section 34-B and Section 34-C.
    • The court rejected the petitioner's counsel's contention that Sections 78 and 79 applied: it explained that Chapter VII (Sections 78-79) deals with different purposes (leasing for pilgrims' amenities, vending during festivals, fairs, exhibitions, etc.) and therefore does not apply to the present case; the court held Section 34 alone was applicable to the suit schedule property.
  3. Conclusion from reasoning:
    • Because the statutory procedure under Section 34/34-B had not been followed and the second respondent's actions to recover possession were contrary to those provisions, the court could not accept the stand in the counter affidavit that possession had been validly taken through the fifth respondent after dismissal of O.S. No. 39 of 2005.
    • The court therefore concluded that the single judge's dismissal of the writ petition should be set aside and the writ appeal allowed, while clarifying that the second respondent remained free to recover possession by following the procedures under Section 34-B of the Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Writ appeal allowed; the order of the learned single judge is set aside.

Direct implications and consequences:

  • The appellate court set aside the learned single judge's order that dismissed the writ petition and allowed the writ appeal.
  • The court held that the second respondent's purported recovery of possession through the fifth respondent (and the course adopted) was contrary to Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, because the statutory procedure for termination of a lease under Section 34-B had not been followed.
  • The court clarified that the second respondent may recover possession of the property only by following the procedures contemplated under Section 34-B of the Act (i.e., initiation of statutory termination proceedings and compliance with the scheme in Sections 34, 34-B and 34-C).
  • No costs were awarded by the appellate court.
  • Broader precedent-setting: The opinion does not state that it creates new law; it applies existing statutory provisions to the facts and emphasizes that statutory procedure under Section 34 (and its sub-sections) governs termination and recovery of trust immovable property belonging to religious institutions. The decision's effect is to require compliance with Section 34-B procedures rather than endorsing extra-statutory possession-recovery methods in the facts before the court.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the information in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Dharma Rao Elipe, J.:-

(1) The present writ appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned single judge in w. P. No. 5277 of 2006. The said writ petition was filed by the writ petitioner forbearing the respondents 1 and from cancelling the lease - hold right of the petitioner or evicting him from the paddy field comprised in r. S. No. 534 of 2003 and 534 of 2005 of an extent of 0. 84. 5 area in thazhakudi village, thovalai taluk, kanyakumari district except due pro?cess of law.

(2) The learned single judge on the basis of the statements made in the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent in support of the writ petition who is the executive officer of the temple that he has taken possession of the land as early as 2004 and that the fifth respondent is paying rent to him. Further, the re?spondents 3 and 4 who have claimed to be in possession of the said property through the writ petitioner as sub - lessees. The respondents 3 and 4 filed a suit in o. S. No. 39 of 2005 before the principal district munsif court, nagercoil for the relief of permanent injunc?tion and not to disturb the possession against the temple and the same is dismissed. Therefore, the learned single judge dismissed the writ petition stating that it can be resolved only by letting in evidence by the parties.

(3) Against which the writ appeal is filed contending that the decision of the learned sin?gle judge is against the law. Further, contended that the learned single judge has failed to note that the lease in favour of the peti?tioners father in respect of paddy field com?prised in r. S. No. 534 of 2003 and 534 of 2005 of an extent of 0. 84. 5 acres situate in thazhakudi village, thovalai taluk, kanyakumari district was not in dispute and on his death, the lease hold right in the prop?erty devolved upon the petitioner by way of a family arrangement. Therefore, the dismissal of the writ petition is illegal. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit filed by the second re?spondent in support of the writ petition stated that the possession of the petitioner is admitted by way of initiating proceedings under the rev?enue recovery proceedings. Therefore, the writ petition should not have dismissed. Fur?ther contended that the 5th respondent cannot be authorised to recover the possession of the property in question after dismissal of the suit tiled by the respondents 3 and 4 who are the sub - lessees of the petitioner. Further contended that as per procedures contemplated under sections 78 and 79 of the tamil nadu hindu religious and charitable endowments act, 1959 the area has, to be recovered not by the provisions of the revenue recovery pro?ceedings act. Therefore, the order passed by the learned single judge is liable to be set aside.

(4) It is in the interest of justice and to understand the issue in the writ petitions brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of this ap?peal are as follows: it is submitted that paddy field comprised in r. S. No. 534 of 2003 and 534 of 2005 of an extent of 0. 84. 5 acres situate in thazhakudy village, thovalai taluk kanyakumari dis?trict belongs to thazhayil kandan sastha temple controlled by the 2nd respondent herein was originally leased to chidam?harathanu pillai who was cultivating the lands till he died on 20. 3. 1985 and thereafter by way of family arrangement the leasehold right, over the paddy field fell to the petitioners share and he was cultivating the same as lessee. Fur?ther, it is submitted that this second respondent filed a suit in o. S. No. 150 of 1999 before the principal sub - court, nagercoil against the claiming arrears of patton admitting his status as lessee of the said lands under the 2nd respondent. Further it is submitted that he could not carry on the cultivating but he assigned the leasehold right upon the property on 1. 8. 1997 in favour of the 3rd respondent. The decree was also passed on the suit for recovery of ar?rears along with costs. Thereafter, the respondents 3 and 4 after dismissal of the suit in o. S. No. 150 of 1999 the second respondent resorted to record the same by invoking the reve?nue recovery proceedings act. Meanwhile in the year 2005, the respondents 3 and 4 who are claiming possession of the land through the petitioner have filed a suit in o. S. No. 39 of 2005 before the principal district munsif court, nagercoil against the respondents 2 and 5 for permanent injunction restraining them from disturbing their peaceful possession in r. S. No. 534 of 2003 and 534 of 2005 and ulti?mately the suit was dismissed holding that the possession of the plaintiffs wherein namely the respondents 3 and 4 is legally recognized as on date. But it is stated that the proceedings are initiated by the second respondent only to recover all the arrears of the rent payable by the writ petitioner to the respondents and the lease granted in favour of the petitioner originally was not cancelled and the possession of the leased out land was not taken by the second re?spondent by following the procedures contemplated under sections of 78 and 79 of the tamil nadu hindu religious and charitable endowments act, 1959.

(5) On the other hand, the learned special government pleader supported the contentions raised by the second respondent in the counter affidavit, filed in support of the writ petition.

(6) Therefore, considering the facts and cir?cumstances of the case, it is relevant to cite some provisions of the tamil nadu hindu re?ligious and charitable endowments act, 1950 (tamil nadu act 22 of 1959) which came into force on 2. 10. 1959 and extended to the whole state of tamil nadu with regard to the admin?istration of the properties of the religious and endowment under section 34 of the act reads with alienation of immovable trust property, any exchange, sale or mortgage and any lease for a term exceeding five years of any immov?able property, belonging to or given or en?dowed for the purposes of any religious insti?tution shall be null and void unless it is sanc?tioned by the commissioner as being neces?sary or beneficial to the institution. It contem?plates that before such sanction is accorded, the particulars relating to the proposed transaction shall be published in such manner as may he prescribed, inviting objections and suggestions with respect thereto and all objec?tions and suggestions received from the trustee or other persons having interest shall be duly considered by the commissioner. Fur?ther, provides that the commissioner shall not accord such sanction without the previous ap?proval of the government. Further, it explains that any lease of the property above mentioned though for a term not exceeding five years shall, if it contains a provision for renewal for a further term so as to exceed five years in the ag?gregate, whether subject to any condition or not, be decided to be a lease for a period ex?ceeding five years.

(7) In sub - section 2 of 34 of the act empow?ers that the commissioner may impose such conditions and directions regarding the utilization of the amount raised by the transaction, the investment thereof and in the case of a mortgage, regarding the discharge of the same within a reasonable period.

(8) Section 34 - a of the act deals with fixa?tion of lease rent and section 34 - b of the act deals with termination of lease of immovable property, the lease of immovable property belonging to, or given or endowed for the pur?pose of any religious institution shall be liable to be terminated on the non - payment of the lease rent after giving a reasonable opportu?nity of being heard. The proceeding to termi?nate the lease shall be initiated if the time for appeal or revision under sub - section (3) or sub - section (5) , as the case may he, of section 34 - a has not expired; or the order has been made the subject of such appeal or revision till the disposal of the scatter. Sub - section 3 of 34 - b of the act states that on the termination of the lease under sub - section (3) , the property shall vest with the concerned religious institu?tion free from all encumbrances and the exec?utive officer, the trustee or the chairman of the board of trustees, as the case may he, of such religious institution shall take possession of the property including the building or super structure and trees, if any.

(9) Section 34 - c deals with payment of amount that there shall he paid an amount to the lessee for the building, superstructure and trees, if any, erected or planted in accordance with the terms of agreement or with the permission of the commissioner by the lessee on the property vested with the religious institu?tion under section 34 - b.

(10) Section 34 - d deals with bar of jurisdic?tion of the civil court that, save as otherwise provided in section 34 - a or 34 - c, no suit or other legal proceeding in respect of an order passed under section 34 - a or 34 - b or 34 - c, as the case may be shall be instituted in any court of law.

(11) Therefore, from the above provisions of law, the claim of the petitioner that his father granted lease but subsequently as per section 34 of the act, it is with the commissioner to grant the lease for a period of five years and thereafter renewing the lease but no such ac?tion was initiated by the commissioner in the interest of temple and also not brought to our notice.

(12) Considering the facts and circum?stances of the case that the second respondent has admitted that the petitioner is in possession in the suit schedule property and initiated rev?enue recovery proceedings for recovery of the arrears of rent by filing the suit in o. S. No. 150 of 1999 before the sub court, nagercoil. Therefore, considering the fact that the peti?tioner is having his leasehold right over the suit, schedule property, but instead of cancelling the lease for the default committed by the writ petitioner in the payment of the rent in the suit schedule property as contemplated under section 34 - b of the act, instructed his lessee 5th respondent to recover of the posses?sion granted from the respondents 3 and 4 who are claiming to be sub - lessees of the writ peti?tioner. Therefore, after the dismissal of the suit filed by the respondents 3 and 4, the second re?spondent should have initiated proceedings under section 34 - b of the act terminating the lease and once the lease is terminated in accor?dance with law the property vested with the second respondent, therefore, the question of law claiming the fifth respondent to recover the suit schedule property from the petitioner or the respondents 3 land 4 is contrary to the provisions of section 34 - b of the act.

(13) Therefore, we are unable to appreciate the stand taken by the second respondent in the counter affidavit filed in support of the writ pe?tition. Therefore, as the subsistence of the lease admitted by the second respondent and the suit is barred by section 34 - c of the act and filing of the suit by the respondents; 3 and 4 is contrary to section 34 - b, the only course open for the recovery of the suit schedule prop?erty by the second respondent is following the procedures as contemplated under section 34 of the act. Further, with regard to the conten?tions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the application of sec?tion 78 and 79 of the act in chapter vii deals with the encroachments from the petitioner that he claimed possession through his father who is a lessee and which facts are not disputed by the second respondent which cannot be termed as encroachment. This chapter incorporated for a different purpose leasing the land belonged to the religious institutions for the purpose of providing amenities to pilgrims or of vending flowers or other articles used for worship or of holding for specified periods, fairs or exhibitions during festivals connected with religious institution. Therefore, this chapter is not connected with the present case. As we have discussed above, the section 34 alone is applicable to the suit schedule prop?erty.

(14) Therefore, we are unable to accept the contentions raised by the second respondent the suit schedule property was taken posses?sion through 5th respondent after dismissal of the suit in o. S. No. 39 of 2005 is contrary to section 34 of the act. Therefore, we set aside the order of the learned single judge, accord?ingly, the writ appeal is allowed. However, it is open to the second respondent to recover the possession of the property from the writ peti?tioner following the procedures contemplated under section 34 - b of the act. But no costs. Writ appeal allowed.