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P.K Sukumaran v. Sulalman Khan.

Madras High Court
Jan 29, 1971
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Case Summary: Civil Revision concerning extension of time to deposit decree amount

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed O.S. No. 810 of 1968 seeking a declaration of title to certain trees and an injunction restraining the respondent from cutting those trees. After trial, the trial court rendered a judgment dated 22nd October, 1970, granting the declaration and injunction on the condition that the plaintiff pay a contract amount on or before 23rd November, 1970, and directing that in default the suit would stand dismissed.

The petitioner did not pay the contract amount by 23rd November, 1970. On 25th November, 1970 he filed an application under Sections 148 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking an extension of time to deposit the contract amount as per the decree dated 22nd October, 1970. The lower court dismissed that application on the ground that the conditional order had worked itself out and the suit stood dismissed, and that it had no power to extend time after the suit stood dismissed. The petitioner challenged that order by way of civil revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court (or the lower court) had jurisdiction and power to extend the time fixed by a decree for payment of a contract amount after the date fixed in the decree had passed and a default clause (directing that the suit stand dismissed in default) had operated.
  2. Whether a decree containing a condition that the suit will stand dismissed in default of payment operates as a final order that divests the court of further control (i.e., whether such a decree is in the nature of a final order as opposed to a preliminary decree in which the court retains control).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The court has undoubted jurisdiction and power to condone the delay and to extend the time for payment of the amount mentioned in the decree under Sections 148 and 151, C.P.C.
  • The petitioner relied on several authorities (as cited in the opinion) to show courts have power to extend time for compliance with conditional decrees: Venkatesan Chetti v. Jayaram; Abdul Shanker v. Abdul Rahman; and Mahanth Ram Das v. Gangadas.
  • The petitioner argued for a liberal construction of Sections 148 and 149, C.P.C., so as to allow an extension even though the period originally fixed had expired.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific arguments advanced by the respondent in this revision proceeding.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkatesan Chetti v. Jayaram Authority where court extended time for payment though the originally fixed time had expired (no default clause present in that decree). The court held this case inapplicable because the decree in Venkatesan Chetti did not contain a default clause such as the one present in the instant case.
Abdul Shanker v. Abdul Rahman Division Bench held that where a decree for specific performance is conditional on payment within a specified time and is in the nature of a preliminary decree, the original court retains control and can extend time; discussion referring to S. 35 of the Specific Relief Act. The court found this authority distinguishable: the present decree was not a preliminary decree retaining court control after the order dated 22nd October, 1970, and therefore that decision did not support the petitioner.
Mahanth Ram Das v. Gangadas Supreme Court decision indicating S. 148 (and S. 149) C.P.C. allowed extensions of time and could be invoked where an application for extension was filed before default operated; courts construed these sections liberally in appropriate circumstances. The court distinguished the case because in Mahanth Ram Das the application for extension was made within time (i.e., before the default clause operated), whereas in the present case the petitioner applied after the date fixed for payment had expired.
Bhutnath Das v. Sahadeb Chandra Held that where a decree for specific performance contains a direction that in default of deposit within the time specified the suit will stand dismissed, the trial court, by making such an order, in substance passed an order contemplated by the concluding portion of S. 35 Specific Relief Act and does not retain jurisdiction to extend time; hence inherent power under S.151 C.P.C. cannot be invoked after default. The court relied on and adopted this view as directly applicable to the present facts, treating it as authority that a decree with a default clause divests the court of jurisdiction to extend time after the clause has operated.
Bokarao and Ramgur Ltd. v. State of Bihar Followed the principle that where a decree is passed on condition that payment within a specified time must be made and in default the suit stands dismissed, after expiry of the time the court loses seisin and cannot extend time. The court cited this case as supporting the conclusion that a decree with a default clause results in loss of court control once the time has expired, and therefore S. 148/S.149 cannot be invoked thereafter.
Kanhu Charan v. Jagabandhu Held that once a judgment or decree is signed it shall not be altered or added to except as provided by S. 152 C.P.C or on review; S.148 C.P.C. cannot be used to negate this rule; distinction emphasized between a proceeding that has terminated and one in which the court retains control. The court applied this principle to conclude that where the decree was intended to be final and the default clause operated, the court no longer retained control and could not enlarge the time under S. 148 C.P.C.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by analyzing the authorities relied on by the petitioner and determining whether they applied to the present facts. The reasoning followed these steps:

  1. The court first examined Venkatesan Chetti v. Jayaram and found it distinguishable because that decree did not contain a default clause like the one in the present decree; therefore that decision did not address the present question.
  2. The court then considered Abdul Shanker v. Abdul Rahman, where a Division Bench construed a decree for specific performance (with time for payment) as being in the nature of a preliminary decree and held the court retained control and could extend time. The court concluded that Abdul Shanker did not support the petitioner because, in the present case, the decree of 22nd October, 1970 could not be said to be preliminary and the court had not retained control after passing that decree.
  3. The court reviewed Mahanth Ram Das v. Gangadas, acknowledging its liberal construction of S. 148 and S. 149 C.P.C., but distinguished it on its facts: in Mahanth Ram Das the extension application was made while the period fixed had not yet lapsed (i.e., before default operated), whereas in the present case the petitioner applied only after the time fixed for payment had passed.
  4. The court then relied on authorities (Bhutnath Das v. Sahadeb Chandra; Bokarao and Ramgur Ltd. v. State of Bihar; Kanhu Charan v. Jagabandhu) holding that where a decree contains a direction that in default of payment within a specified time the suit shall stand dismissed, the trial court's order is final in substance and the court does not retain jurisdiction thereafter to extend the time. These cases also emphasized that O.20 R.3 and S.152 C.P.C. prevent post-signing alteration of decrees except by review or revision as provided by law.
  5. Applying those principles, the court concluded that the decree dated 22nd October, 1970 was a final order after the period for payment expired and the default clause operated; consequently neither S. 148 nor S. 149 C.P.C. could be invoked to extend time at that stage and the lower court had correctly dismissed the petitioner's application for extension.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is dismissed; the order of the lower court refusing to extend the time for payment and holding that it had no jurisdiction to do so after the default clause had operated is affirmed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioner cannot obtain an extension of time from the trial court under Sections 148/149/151 C.P.C. once the conditional decree's time for payment has expired and the default clause has operated to dismiss the suit.
  • The court indicated that where a decree is final in this way, the proper remedies for the petitioner are review or appeal (i.e., relief must be sought by review or appeal rather than by invoking S. 148/151 after the default clause has taken effect).
  • No new legal principle was created; the court applied and followed existing precedents distinguishing cases where a decree is preliminary and the court retains control from those where a conditional decree operates as a final determination divesting the court of jurisdiction to enlarge time.

Order as recorded in the opinion: The civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs.

Judge's initial in the opinion: V.C.S.

Show all summary ...

The petitioner herein filed a suit, O.S No. 810 of 1968 for a declaration of his title to certain trees and for an injunction restraining the respondent herein from catting the said trees. After trial, the trial court decided the suit in favour of the petitioner and the operative portion of its judgment dated 22nd October, 1970 was as follows:

“In the result, the plaintiff is entitled to declaration and injuction as prayed for provided he pays the contract amount on or before 23rd November, 1970. Failing which the suit will stand dismissed.”

The petitioner however, did not pay the contract amount as directed on or before 23rd November, 1970. He, however, chose to file an application on 25th November, 1970 under Ss. 148 and 151 C.P Code to extend the time for depositing the contract amount as per the decree dated 22nd October, 1970. That application has been dismissed by the lower court on the ground that the order has worked itself out as a result of which the suit stands dismissed, and that it had no power to extend the time at that stage after the suit stood dismissed. It is the said order of the lower court that is attacked in this revision.

It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the court has undoubted jurisdiction and power to concone the delay in payment of the amount mentioned in the decree and that the lower court was in error in refusing to extend the time. The learned counsel referred to the decision of Kailasam, J. in Venkatesan Chetti v. Jayaram(1) in support of his submission that the court has got the undoubted power to extend time for payment of the decree amount notwithstanding the default clause. But, on a perusal of the and decision it is seen that mere was no default clause in the decree such as the one in this case. In that case the direction was:

“The plaintiffs will pay a sum of Rs. 5.000 to the defendant within two months from this date. On payment of the amount, there will be a decree that the plaintiffs are entitled to the entire suit house. The defendant will not be liable to pay any mesne profits from this date.”

When the plaintiffs had sought an extension of time beyond two months for payment of the amount, the court extended the time notwithstanding the fact that the time already granted had expired. Hence that decision dots not touch the question arising in this case.

The learned counsel then refers to the decision in Abdul Snanker v. Abdul Rahman in which a Division Bench of this court held that where a plaintiff was given a decree for specific performance of a contract to sell on condition of his paying a certain amount to the defendant within a specified time, this court was empowered to extend the time, the appropriate cases as the decree in seed cases in the nature of a preliminary decree, and the court has still control over the action and has fall power to make any just and necessary orders therein, including orders of extension of time. In that case; the trial court has passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs for specific performance of a contract for sale of certain lands and supe-structures thereon to them by the defendant and the operative portion of the judgment was as follows:

“I must therefore find for the plaintiffs and give them decree for specific performance on payment of Rs. 4,000. Time for payment two months.”

In pursuance of this judgment a decree was passed fixing time for payment of the amount till 19th December 1921, and directing that upon such payment the defendant had to put the plaintiffs in possession of the properties together with all documents and title deeds. The said decree was constrected by the court as being in the nature of a preliminary decree, the original court keeping control over the action and having fall power to make any just and necessary orders, and it was held that so long as no final orders have been pas ed terminating the proceedings, the court has got the power to extend the time, Wallace J. referred to the scope of S. 35 of the Specific Relief Act and expressed as follows:

“As I read that section, it lays down that when a decree for specific performance of a contract of sale has been passed and the parchaser makes default in payment of the sum which the court has orderea him to pay, the vendor may either file a fresh suit for rescission of the contract or may in the specific performance suit itself, apply to the court to rescind the contract. It is perfectly clear that the contract is not determinable or cetermincd by the mere future to comply with the terms of the decree. It is not determined until the court orders that it is determined.”

I am not in a position to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the above decision supports the plea put forward by him. In this case is it cannot be said that the decree is in the nature of a preliminary decree and that the court had retained control over the proceedings any further after the decree dated 22nd October 1970. Reference was also made to the decision in Mahanth Ram Das v. Gangadas(2) where it has been held that S. 148 C.P Code, in terms, allowed extensions of time, even if the original period fixed has expiree, that S. 149 is equally liberal, and that those sections could fortiori be invoked when the time has not actully expired. The learned counsel, relying on the above decision of the Supreme Court, wants this court to construe Ss. 148 and 149 liberally and hold the order of the lower court erroneous as it had rejected the application for extension on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. But it is seen that in that case there was a direction by the court that the proper court fee should be paid on the memorandum of appeal having regard to the amended reliefs claimed within three months from the date of the asceriainment of the same by the office and the communication thereof to the counsel, and that fulling such payment of court-fee, the appeal will stand dismissed. Even before default operated the petitioner filed an application for extension of time. The Supreme Court held in those circumstances that as the petition for extension had been filed within time the court had the power to extend the time under Ss. 148, 149 and 151 C.P Code. On a close reading of the above decision, it is seen that the court was inclined to hold that the appellant should have the extension of time sought for by him especially when he has moved the court for such a relief before the default clajse operated. In this case the petitioner did not move court for extension of time before 23rd November 1970, the date fixed for payment under the decree. Farther, the default cause which came up for consideration before the Supreme Court was the one arising out of the non-payment of court fee wheree there has been no effective appeal. In this case the suit bus been disposed of en merits after that and the plaintiff was given time for payment of the amount and in default of such payment, the suit was directed to be dismissed. It is not possible to say that the time fixed under the conditional decrees can be extended by the court after the default clause had operated. The remedy for the the petitioner can only be by way of review or appeal.

In Bhutnath Das v. Sahadeb Chandra there was a decree for specific performanes with a direction to deposit a specified sum within certain time as a condition and it provided that in default of such payment the suit would stand dismissed. The plaintiff did not pay the amount within the time specified in the decree. An extension of time was sought for after the time given for payment had expired, and the court declined to extend the time on the groand that the trial court, while making an order with a default clause that in default of deposit being made within the time as directed the suit will stand dismissed, was in substance making an order as contemplated under the concluding portion of S. 35 of the Specific Relief Act that as such it does not retain any jurisdiction in the suit after passing that order and that therefore the question of extending time in exercise of its inherent power under S. 151 C.P.C cannot arise. The learned Judges in that case referred to the decision in Shanker Lal…Applicant; v. Abdul Rahman…Opposite Party. and distinguished that case stating that time for payment was not fixed as a condition in the decree the decision in Bhutnath Dos v. Sahadeb Chandra(3) has also been later followed by another Division Bench of the same court in Bokarao and Ramgur Ltd. v. State of Bihar(4) and it was held therein that where a decree was passed on condition that if a certain sum of money be paid within a specified time, the suit would stand decreed and in default thereof the suit would stand dismissed, after the expiry of the time limited by the decree, the court loses seisin over the matter and therefore cannot extend time. Kanhu Charan v. Jagabandhu(5) has also taken the same view, it has been held in that case that O. 20, R. 3 lays down that once a judgment or decree is signed, it shall not afterwards be altered or add to, save as provided by S. 152 C.P.C or on review, that accordingly S. 148 C.P.C cannot be allowed to take away the effect of this role, that where a decree fixing the time was not intended to be final and the court still retains control over the same the court may extend the time granted under S. 148, C.P.C and that there is clear distinction between a case where the proceeding has come to a close and another case where it has not terminated and the court still retains control over it. The court has expressed the view that whether a proceeding has come to a close, or is still alive, would again depend upon the nature of the proceeding and the order passed thereon. If the order is a final order, the court in functus officio, otherwise the court can enlarge time.

On a due consideration of the principles set out in the decision above referred to, I find that in this case the court has passed a final order in the suit and the court does not retain control over the suit any further. In such a case it cannot be said that either S. 148 or S. 149, C.P Code could be invoked. I find the order of the lower court is in order and it does not call for any interference. The civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs.

V.C.S