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Smt Kiran W/O Yugalkishore Bhattad v. Smt Sushila W/O Ramcharan Kattamwar Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The present appeal challenges the judgment and order of the 7th Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur (Special Court under the Negotiable Instruments Act), which acquitted the accused of an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in Criminal Complaint Case No. 4334 of 2005. The complainant advanced a hand-loan of Rs. 50,000 to the accused on or about 21st January 2002 for her business. The accused issued a cheque dated 22nd April 2002 for the same amount to discharge this debt. The cheque was presented within its validity period but was dishonoured due to insufficient funds on 5th June 2002. The complainant issued a demand notice on 10th June 2002, which was served on the accused, who failed to repay the amount and allegedly gave a false reply to avoid repayment. Consequently, the complaint was filed on 4th July 2002. Evidence was led by affidavit and cross-examination, revealing that no receipt was obtained by the complainant and no income-tax returns were filed. The accused claimed that a blank cheque was misused by the complainant through a third party, Nandkishor Harsh, whose evidence was not produced. During the proceedings, the accused's husband informed the court of a proposed settlement involving payment of Rs. 40,000, of which Rs. 10,000 was acknowledged as paid.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the accused is liable for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for the dishonour of the cheque issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
- Whether the statutory presumptions under sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act apply in the present case.
- Whether the learned Magistrate erred in acquitting the accused despite the complainant satisfying the ingredients of the offence.
- Whether the accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumptions through adequate and satisfactory evidence.
- The appropriate sentence and compensation payable to the complainant under section 357(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The complainant advanced a hand-loan of Rs. 50,000 to the accused, who issued a cheque in discharge of this debt.
- The cheque was presented within its validity period but dishonoured due to insufficient funds.
- The complainant issued a timely demand notice which the accused received but did not comply with.
- The statutory presumptions under sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act apply, establishing the accused’s liability.
- The accused had no intention to honour the cheque, as evidenced by the minimal balance in her account at the time of presentation.
- The accused failed to produce adequate evidence to rebut the statutory presumptions.
- The accused’s contention that the cheque was misused via a third party was unsubstantiated as the witness was not summoned.
- The complainant has proved all ingredients necessary for conviction under section 138 of the Act.
Respondent's Arguments
- Relying on precedents such as Mrs. Sayeeda Iqbal Vs. Mr. Javed Abdul and Rajaram Gulabi Naik Vs. Vithal Appa, the learned Magistrate’s acquittal was reasonable and should not be interfered with.
- The accused pleaded a specific defence that a third party misused a blank cheque given to arrange finance.
- The accused’s husband informed about a partial settlement during the proceedings.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mrs. Sayeeda Iqbal Vs. Mr. Javed Abdul, 2008(2) Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 258 | Supporting the reasonableness of the trial Court’s view in acquittal under section 138. | Respondent relied on this precedent to argue no interference was warranted in the acquittal. |
| Rajaram Gulabi Naik Vs. Vithal Appa, 2008(2) Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 609 | Supporting the reasonableness of acquittal in cheque dishonour cases. | Used by respondent counsel to justify the trial Court’s decision. |
| Devidas Vs. Harishchandra, 2009(3) Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 458(P.B.) | Reinforcing statutory presumptions under section 139 and rejecting trial Court’s acquittal as perverse. | Appellant relied on this to argue the trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. |
| Kusum Ingots Vs. Pannar, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. 428(S.C.) | Enumerating the five essential ingredients for offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. | Court applied these ingredients as the framework to analyze the case facts. |
| Arun Vs. State of Tamilnadu, 2008 DGLS (soft) 1420 | Appellate Court’s power to review acquittal but with caution due to presumption of innocence and double presumption in favour of accused. | Court acknowledged the principle but found the trial Court’s view was not based on legal and admissible evidence. |
| Bhagwan Singh Vs. State of M.P, 2002 DGLS (soft) 360 | Emphasizing avoidance of miscarriage of justice and appellate Court’s duty to re-appreciate evidence in acquittal appeals. | Supported interference with trial Court’s acquittal due to ignoring admissible evidence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by examining the statutory presumptions under sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which presume the cheque was issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt unless rebutted. The Court noted that the cheque was duly issued and presented within its validity period, and was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. The complainant issued a timely demand notice, which the accused received but failed to pay the amount within the stipulated time.
The Court criticized the trial Magistrate for framing a single cumulative point for determination instead of separately addressing the five essential ingredients of the offence as laid down by the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots Vs. Pannar. These ingredients include issuance of cheque for discharge of debt, presentation within validity, dishonour due to insufficient funds, demand notice, and failure to pay within 30 days.
The Court found that all five ingredients were satisfied on the facts. It further held that the trial Magistrate erred in overlooking the statutory presumptions and the requirement that the accused must provide satisfactory evidence to rebut them. The accused’s defence, including the claim of misuse of a blank cheque by a third party and allegations of illegal money-lending by the complainant’s family, was unsupported by evidence and not substantiated during cross-examination.
The Court also noted the partial settlement proposal made during the proceedings but found it insufficient to negate the accused’s liability. The Court relied on precedents emphasizing the appellate Court’s power to re-appreciate evidence while also considering the presumption of innocence, but concluded that the trial Court’s acquittal was not based on legal and admissible evidence and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.
Accordingly, the Court set aside the acquittal and found the accused guilty of the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed, the acquittal is set aside, and the accused is found guilty of the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Regarding sentencing, the accused is sentenced to simple imprisonment until the rising of the Court and ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 60,000 within two months. Failure to pay will lead to recovery of the amount by the trial Court through the procedure for recovery of fine. The fine recovered shall be paid to the complainant as compensation under section 357(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The accused is directed to surrender to the trial Court within two months to undergo the sentence.
The direct effect of this decision is to convict the accused and impose sentence and compensation. No new legal precedent is established beyond the application of existing statutory presumptions and principles in the context of the facts of this case.
Cases referred :
1. Mrs. Sayeeda Iqbal Vs. Mr. Javed Abdul, 2008(2) Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 258 : 2008 DGLS(Cri.) soft 467 : 2008 All.M.R.(Cri.) 2743.
2. Rajaram Gulabi Naik Vs. Vithal Appa, 2008(2) Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 609 : 2008 DGLS(Cri.) soft 1089 : 2008 All.M.R.(Cri.) 3462.
3. Devidas Vs. Harishchandra, 2009(3) Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 458(P.B.).
4. Kusum Ingots Vs. Pannar, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. 428(S.C.) : 2000 DGLS (soft) 402 : 2000 DGLS(Cri.) soft 755 : 2000(2) S.C.C. 745.
5. Arun Vs. State of Tamilnadu, 2008 DGLS (soft) 1420 : (2009)3 S.C.C. (Cri.) 1097.
6. Bhagwan Singh Vs. State of M.P., 2002 DGLS (soft) 360 : 2002 DGLS(Cri.) soft 103 : (2002)4 S.C.C. 85.
Advocates appeared :
C.F. Bhagwani, for appellant.
D.S. Shrimali, for respondent.
BHANGALE A.P., J.: - The present appeal is directed against judgment and order passed by learned 7th Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur (Special Court under the Negotiable Instruments Act) whereby learned Magistrate acquitted accused of an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in Criminal Complaint Case No. 4334 of 05.
2. According to the complainant (appellant) hand-loan in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- was advanced by him to the accused on her request for her business on or about 21st January, 2002. In order to discharge the said debt or liability, cheque bearing No. 039654 dated 22.4.2002 in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- drawn on Bank of India, Sitabuldi branch, Nagpur was issued as per Exhibit-52 on or about 22nd April 2002. The cheque was presented within the period of its validity in June 2002, but on 5.6.2002 it returned dishonoured with remarks funds insufficient vide Exhibits-53 and 54. The complainant had demanded the amount of Rs. 50,000/- by demand notice in writing dated 10.6.2002 (Exhibit-55). Although the notice was sent by registered post with A/d and served upon the accused, failed to comply and according to complainant, gave false reply to avoid repayment due on the cheque in question (Exhibit-58). As such, complaint came to be filed on 4.7.2002.
3. The evidence was led in support of the complaint by affidavit of the Kamalkishor Bhattad who was also cross-examined with reference to the contentions in the evidence on affidavit and documents on record. It appears that in the course of cross-examination, the deponent on behalf of the complainant was questioned about one case filed against Nandkishor Harsh. It is also questioned as to whether amount paid to the accused was shown in the income-tax return. The witness on behalf of the complainant admitted that no receipt was obtained from the accused in token of receiving sum of Rs. 50,000/- as also the fact that no income-tax returns were filed. The witness on behalf of complainant also denied suggestion that disputed cheque was given to Nandkishor Harsh to arrange finance.
4. Under these circumstances, it is contended that when it was specific defence pleaded by the accused in her reply notice that she had cordial relations with Nandkishor Harsh and he had requested the accused to allow him to request some smaller amount of money in business and took away blank cheque which, according to the accused, was misused by the complainant. To substantiate this defence, the material witness Nandkishor Harsh was not summoned although his evidence may have supported the defence contention had he been examined by the accused. Further, it is contended on behalf of the complainant that the accused is admittedly having business in the name of M/s. Ambika Enterprises at Khare Town, Dharampeth, Nagpur. Further, it is contended that during the pendency of proceedings before learned Magistrate on behalf of the accused, her husband applied before learned Magistrate informing that the matter has been settled by proposing payment of Rs. 40,000/- only out of which sum of Rs. 10,000/- was paid on 24.7.2008 which appears to have been acknowledged by the complainant vide Exhibit-72 along with acknowledgment in writing.
5. Thus, according to learned Counsel for complainant in view of the statutory presumptions under sections 118 and 139 of the Act, learned trial Magistrate ought to have concluded in the facts and circumstances of the case that the accused was liable to pay the amount due on cheque which was dishonoured by non-payment on account of insufficient funds since the complainant had also led evidence of a bank employee to bring the fact of dishonour of cheque on record by documentary as well as oral evidence indicating that the accused had no intention to honour the cheque as cheque in question was presented for encashment, balance in her account was meagre at Rs. 1450.13 ps. Learned Advocate for complainant submitted that the complainant has proved all ingredients of offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
6. To counter these submissions, learned Counsel for accused submitted with reference to ruling in (Mrs. Sayeeda Iqbal Vs. Mr. Javed Abdul and anr.)1, reported in 2008(2) Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 258 : 2008 DGLS(Cri.) soft 467 : 2008 All.M.R.(Cri.) 2743 to argue that view of the learned Magistrate was reasonable and possible and, therefore, there shall be no interference in the impugned judgment and order. Reference is also made to ruling in (Rajaram Gulabi Naik Vs. Vithal Appa and anr.)2, reported in 2008(2) Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 609 : 2008 DGLS(Cri.) soft 1089 : 2008 All.M.R.(Cri.) 3462 to substantiate the above submission. As against this contention, learned Advocate for the complainant has pressed into service judgment of this Court in (Devidas Vs. Harishchandra)3, reported in 2009(3) Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 458(P.B.). In the said case, learned Magistrate concluded that it could not be accepted that such huge amount of Rs. 1,80,000/- was advanced by complainant. It has been held by this Court in the said case that this amounts to reading in law a provision which does not exist and also overlooks presumption of liability in section 139 of the Act. It is further held that such an approach amounts to perversity warranting interference and judgment of acquittal was set aside and the Court convicted the accused for offence punishable under section 138 of the Act.
7. Looking to the impugned judgment and order it appears that learned Magistrate framed a solitary cumulative point for determination and proceeded to deliver judgment. In my view, the points for determination in such case must involve at least five ingredients which are required to be dealt with preferably by separate points for determinations. There are five vital ingredients of the offence punishable under section 138 of the Act as laid down by the Supreme Court in (Kusum Ingots Vs. Pannar)4, reported in 2000(5) Bom.C.R. 428(S.C.) : 2000 DGLS (soft) 402 : 2000 DGLS(Cri.) soft 755 : (sic 2000) 2002(2) S.C.C. 745. Ingredients laid down by the Apex Court are as under :
(i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any legally enforceable debt or other liability;
(ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;
(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;
(v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payer or the holder in due course of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of the said notice.
8. These ingredients are required to be considered with reference to sections 118 and 139 of the Act. In this case cheque No. 039654 dated 22.4.2002 was issued by accused drawn on Bank of India, Sitabuldi Branch, Nagpur. Cheque in question was returned by Bank of India to UCO Bank (banker of complainant) under memo dated 5.6.2002. It is thus obvious that the cheque was presented to the Bank within a validity period of six months. In its memo, bankers of accused have assigned the reason of insufficiency of funds in the account of accused for dishonour of cheque. It is evident from record that complainant who received intimation dated 5.6.2002 from his bankers, issued notice dated 10.6.2002, within fifteen days. It is a matter of record that accused did not make payment within fifteen days of the receipt of notice and sent reply notice dated 20.6.2002 denying his liability as provided under section 138(c) of the Act. Thus, all the five ingredients laid down by the Apex Court appear to have been satisfied in this case.
9. The trial Court is required to start with statutory presumption until the contrary is proved that the cheque was issued or drawn for consideration. It was bearing the same date on which it was made or drawn; that the holder of the negotiable instrument is holder in due course etc. under section 118 of the Act and that the holder of a cheque had received it for the discharge of whole or part of any debt or liability. Under these circumstances, learned trial Magistrate ought to have observed that since signature on cheque was not disputed as that of the accused, the presumption envisaged in section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as stated above, ought to have been raised that the cheque in question was made or drawn for consideration on the date which the cheque bears and further under section 139 of the Act to raise a presumption that the complainant had received it for the discharge of existing debt or liability. The burden in such case is on the accused in view of the statutory presumption to rebut the presumption by leading adequate and satisfactory evidence to substantiate contention in defence to the prosecution. Although it is not necessary for the accused to enter into a witness box, the burden of proof is required to be discharged by adducing satisfactory evidence by bringing on record admission or documents in the course of cross-examination of witnesses examined on behalf of complainant. If that cannot be done, it may become necessary for the accused to lead evidence that the cheque in question was not issued for discharge of any legally enforceable debt or other liability. It is true that accused is not required to lead evidence beyond all reasonable doubts, but satisfactory evidence of rebuttal must be such which would satisfy the minds of prudent person upon preponderance of probability in respect of case in defence. As defined under section 3 of the Evidence Act, a fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matter before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.
10. In the facts and circumstances revealed in this case, the learned trial Magistrate appears to have misled herself, first of all, by framing an all-inclusive point for determination and secondly, by overlooking statutory presumption as also the relevant provisions of the evidence act as to when the fact is said to be proved. In fact, in paragraph 12 of the impugned judgment and order, learned Magistrate is making a passing reference to presumptions under sections 118 and 139 of the Act in favour of the complainant, but failed to consider their value in the requirement of proof from the accused in rebuttal which can satisfy a prudent person about the probability of defence for to dislodge the said statutory presumption. Merely because the complainant did not file copy of income-tax return, one cannot jump to the conclusion that complainant who was businessman had no financial ability to advance hand-loan in the sum of Rs. 50,000/-. Further more, the accused alleged that complainants family indulged into illegal business of money-lending without licence. However, there was no evidence led by the accused nor any material could be elicited during the course of cross-examination of witnesses on behalf of the complainant to substantiate such defence contention. The accused cannot succeed to defeat the prosecution merely by raising such courageous but bald or baseless contention. For these reasons it appears that the trial Magistrate misled herself to believe that Bhattad family was doing business of money-lending. Such conclusion cannot be reached without any rational basis from record. Learned trial Magistrate ought to have considered that in fact the application was made on behalf of accused during the pendency of proceedings about having settled the case by express willingness to pay sum of Rs. 40,000/- out of which amount of Rs. 10,000/- was already acknowledged by the complainant. For all these reasons the impugned judgment and order is indefensible and has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Necessarily, therefore, impugned judgment and order will have to be set aside looking to the above ingredients which have been satisfied in the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence led on behalf of the complainant, the accused is liable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for dishonoured cheque in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- which remained unpaid despite demand notice in writing issued against the accused which the accused duly received, but continued to avoid payment as against the cheque. The accused is, therefore, found guilty for offence punishable under section 138 of the Act.
11. Learned Counsel for accused contends that this Court is sitting in appeal and, therefore, it should not allow the complaint only because another view is possible.
12. In (Arun Vs. State of Tamilnadu)5, reported in 2008 DGLS (soft) 1420 : (2009)3 S.C.C. (Cri.) 1097, the Apex Court has held as under :
It is true that Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded and its power to review and re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion is not controlled by any provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This Court is in more than one case cautioned that an Appellate Court, however, must always bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial Court, it ought not to be disturbed.
13. The Apex Court has also held in (Bhagwan Singh Vs. State of M.P.)6, reported in 2002 DGLS (soft) 360 : 2002 DGLS(Cri.) soft 103 : (2002)4 S.C.C. 85 that paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. The Apex Court further holds that where the trial Court has taken a view ignoring the admissible evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the purposes of ascertaining as to whether all or any of the accused has committed any offence or not. Probable view taken by the trial Court which may not be disturbed in the appeal is such a view which is based upon legal and admissible evidence. In the present case, I find that the trial Court has not taken a view which is based on legal and admissible evidence. View taken by the trial Court needs to be interfered with and acquittal of respondent/accused will have to be set aside.
14. In the result, accused is held guilty for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. On the point of sentence, it would not be just and proper to insist upon incarceration of accused in jail, but she shall suffer simple imprisonment until rising of the Court and pay fine in the sum of Rs. 60,000/- payable within two months from the date of this order, failing which the amount shall be recovered by learned trial Court by following procedure for recovery of fine. The amount of fine when recovered shall be paid to the complainant as compensation in view of section 357(3) Cri.P.C. The accused appear before learned Magistrate within two months and surrender herself to the custody of the Court to undergo simple imprisonment till rising of the Court on the date to be fixed by the trial Court. Appeal disposed off accordingly.
Appeal disposed off.
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