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Bhagwan Das Arora v. 1St Additional District Judge

Allahabad High Court
Apr 9, 1982
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Factual and Procedural Background

A suit for a money decree was filed by Smt. Savitri Devi (respondent No. 3) against the petitioner (defendant in the suit). An ex parte decree was passed on 6 August 1977. On 8 August 1977 the petitioner applied for permission to give security prior to moving to set aside the ex parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.). The trial court directed the petitioner to deposit in cash the amount he admitted and to furnish security for the balance.

On 31 August 1977 the petitioner filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C., attaching a document purporting to be the security bond (a surety undertaking). The court's Munsarim reported on 21 September 1977 that the bond had not been given on properly stamped paper (it bore a court-fee stamp of Rs. 2 and the office thought it required stamping under the Stamp Act). The court ordered the correct stamp to be supplied within a week. A fresh security bond stamped under the Stamp Act was filed on 5 October 1977.

The trial court rejected the application under Order IX, Rule 13 on the ground that there was no properly stamped security bond on 31 August 1977 when the application was moved (a properly stamped bond was filed only on 5 October 1977). The petitioner filed a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, which was dismissed by an order dated 11 January 1980. The petitioner then filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Counsel for both sides were heard.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the security bond furnished pursuant to the court's order under the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was chargeable only to court-fees under Article 6 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act (and thus not to stamp duty), or whether it was chargeable to stamp duty under the Indian Stamp Act (notably Article 57).
  2. Whether a security bond which was not duly stamped when filed with the application (but which was later replaced by a duly stamped bond after the period of limitation) could be treated as accepted by the court once notice had been issued, or whether non-compliance with the proviso to Section 17(1) (in relation to stamping) justified rejection of the application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Sri B.D. Madhyan)

  • The provisions of Article 6 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act apply: a bail bond or other instrument of obligation given in pursuance of an order made by a court under the Code (C.P.C.) is dealt with by that article and not by the Stamp Act.
  • Relied on Kalapati Peda Pitchamma v. Chiruvella Pedamuneyya (AIR 1935 Mad 380, Full Bench) as supporting the proposition that the bond would be covered by Article 6 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act rather than by an article of the Stamp Act.
  • Secondly, argued that once the court had issued notice, the court could not reject the security bond and it should be treated as having been accepted as sufficient. For this proposition he relied on a number of authorities listed in the opinion (including Ram Bharose v. Ganga Singh; Stamp Reference (Jagnilal); Ahmad Yar Khan v. Kheyali; Kirpa Shanker v. Brahmanand; and others).

Respondent No. 3's Arguments (Sri J.D. Pradhan)

  • Relied on the Division Bench decision in Kasemali v. Ajoyendu Paul (AIR 1956 Cal 375) (which in turn relied upon Baburao Keshavrao Malkapure v. Kalavatibai Amrutrao Khase (AIR 1940 Bom 275)) and other authorities to support the view that the bond was not to be treated as covered by Article 6 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act but was chargeable to stamp duty under the Stamp Act.
  • Placed reliance on a set of authorities (listed in the opinion) in opposition to the petitioner's contentions on the acceptance-of-security point, including Lala Mool Chand v. Niranjan Singh; Hira Lal v. Cheda; Mt. Sonkali v. Mahabir Dube; and Khetra Dolai v. Mohan Bissoyi.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kalapati Peda Pitchamma v. Chiruvella Pedamuneyya, AIR 1935 Mad 380 (Full Bench) Held that an order under the proviso to Sec. 17(1) Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is also an order under the Civil Procedure Code and that the security bond submitted under that proviso would be covered by Article 6, Schedule II of the Court-fees Act (and not by Article 15 of the Stamp Act). The petitioner's counsel relied on this Madras Full Bench view. The court reviewed it but expressly preferred the contrary Calcutta decision (Kasemali) and distinguished the Madras view for reasons explained in the opinion.
Kasemali v. Ajoyendu Paul, AIR 1956 Cal 375 (Division Bench) Held that the bond given in accordance with the proviso to Sec. 17(1) Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is not a bond given under the Civil Procedure Code and therefore did not require a court-fee stamp; the bond could be proper when written on stamp paper pursuant to the Stamp Act. The court preferred and followed the Calcutta Division Bench decision over the Madras Full Bench view on the question whether Article 6 of the Court-fees Act applied. The opinion accepts the Calcutta view as to the proper characterization of the bond.
Baburao Keshavrao Malkapure v. Kalavatibai Amrutrao Khase, AIR 1940 Bom 275 (Special Bench) Was relied upon by Kasemali's case (in relation to characterization of bonds under the relevant statutes in that factual context). The opinion notes that Kasemali relied upon this Bom. decision. The present court considered the Calcutta view (which relied in part on this decision) preferable to the Madras view for the issues in the present case.
Krishan Kumar v. Hakim Mohammad Umar, (1978) 4 All LR 541 : 1978 All LJ 738 Cited as supporting the contention that a security bond furnished under the proviso to Sec. 17(1) Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is chargeable to duty under the Stamp Act. The court cited Krishan Kumar as supportive authority for holding that the security bond in question was chargeable to stamp duty under the Stamp Act.
Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, (1980) 2 SCC 378 : AIR 1980 SC 892 Recognized that the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is in the nature of a self-contained code and that applicability of the Civil P.C. is restricted or qualified in the trial of suits in Small Cause Courts. The court held that this recent Supreme Court decision strengthens the view that the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is self-contained and supports the conclusion that Article 6 of the Court-fees Act was not attracted in the present case.
Hindustan Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1972 All 8 (Special Bench) Referenced by respondent's counsel; the specific rule cited in submissions was not detailed in the opinion. The court stated that this authority was not applicable to the facts of the present case.
Ram Bharose v. Ganga Singh, AIR 1931 All 727 (Full Bench) Cited by petitioner in support of the proposition that once notice is issued the court should not reject the security and a party should not suffer for court's mistake. The court observed that many of the cases relied upon for this proposition either dealt with law before certain amendments or concern different facts; it concluded these cases were not applicable to the instant facts where the bond was unstamped when filed and thus found inapplicable.
Stamp Reference (Jagnilal), AIR 1931 All 189 (Full Bench) Cited on issues relating to stampability and acceptance of documents. The court noted the citation but held the authorities relied upon on the acceptance point were not applicable to the present facts and need not be discussed in detail.
Ahmad Yar Khan v. Kheyali, AIB 1933 All 933 Cited concerning acceptance of security instruments and not penalizing parties for court mistakes. The court found that many of these acceptance-related authorities were not applicable to the present circumstances (unstamped bond beyond limitation), and therefore did not apply them to uphold the petition.
Kirpa Shanker v. Brahmanand, AIR 1945 All 282 Cited in the context of acceptance-of-security jurisprudence. The court did not apply this authority to the facts, noting in general that the present case differed (unstamped bond and Section 35 Stamp Act consequences).
Marimuthu Goundar v. Ponnammal, AIR 1956 Mad 422 Cited on the acceptance-of-security point by the petitioner. The court indicated the cited cases on that point were not applicable to the facts here and therefore did not rely on them.
Dullab Prasad v. Smt. Rajeshwari Bibi, AIR 1977 All 151 Cited in relation to the acceptance-of-security principle. The court did not find these authorities compelling on the facts of the present case and did not apply them to grant relief.
Kiran Koomar Banerji v. Baijnath, AIR 1928 All 607 Cited for the proposition that parties should not suffer for court mistakes. The court distinguished such authorities on the ground that here the security was defective for want of proper stamping and Section 35 Stamp Act prevented acting upon the unstamped instrument.
Mahabir v. Sheo Saran, AIR 1936 Oudh 407 Cited in the context of the acceptance-of-security authorities. The decision was listed among many authorities the court found not directly applicable to the present facts.
Azmatullah Khan v. Ahmad Ali, AIR 1925 All 379 Cited on the acceptance/forgiveness-for-court-mistake theme. Not applied to the facts; the court considered the case distinguishable.
State Bank of Hyderabad v. Kotha Papi Reddy, AIR 1975 Andh Pra 25 Cited by petitioner among several authorities on acceptance of document despite irregularities. The court did not accept these authorities as applicable in the circumstances of the present case.
Chargeability of Stamp Duty Reference, AIR 1935 All 558 Referenced in relation to stamp duty questions. Listed among authorities cited; the court did not rely on it to alter its conclusion that stamp duty under Article 57 applied and was not paid in time.
Barkat Ram v. Suggar Electric Stores, Ludhiana, AIR 1936 Lah 140 Cited on related procedural or stamp/acceptance points. The court included it in the list of authorities but did not find them determinative for the present petition.
Lala Mool Chand v. Niranjan Singh, AIR 1922 All 265 Cited by respondent in opposition to the petitioner's acceptance argument. The court considered the respondent's authorities but held the present facts required applying Section 35 of the Stamp Act and related principles; these cases did not change the outcome.
Hira Lal v. Cheda, AIR 1948 Oudh 41 Cited by respondent on acceptance-of-security issues. Not applied as controlling; the court found the present facts distinct.
Mt. Sonkali v. Mahabir Dube, AIR 1935 All 379 Cited by respondent concerning earlier precedents on acceptance/forgiveness for court error. The court concluded the listed authorities did not govern the present facts and were not determinative.
Khetra Dolai v. Mohan Bissoyi, AIR 1961 Ori 37 Cited by respondent in opposition. Not held to be applicable to the facts before the court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a statutory and precedential analysis limited to the material before it:

  1. The court examined whether the security bond filed pursuant to the trial court's direction under the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was governed by Article 6 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act (which applies to instruments given in pursuance of an order made under sections of the Codes) or whether the instrument was chargeable under the Indian Stamp Act (notably Article 57).
  2. The court reviewed competing authorities. The Madras Full Bench decision in Kalapati Peda Pitchamma had held such bonds would be covered by Article 6 of the Court-fees Act, on the footing that an order under the proviso to Section 17(1) is an order under the Civil Procedure Code and the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is supplemental to the Civil P.C. The Calcutta Division Bench decision in Kasemali took the opposite view: the proviso to Section 17(1) is not embodied in the Civil Procedure Code and the bond is not thereby a bond given under the Code.
  3. The court stated its preference for the Calcutta decision in Kasemali over the Madras Full Bench view. The court distinguished the Madras approach and accepted the Calcutta reasoning that the proviso to Section 17(1) is not in the Civil Procedure Code and that the fiction of treating it as such was not acceptable.
  4. The court then considered the Stamp Act. It observed that Article 57 of the Stamp Act (concerning security bonds or mortgage deeds executed by way of security or by a surety to secure performance/discharge of liability) does not except the Court-fees Act. Consequently, where Article 57 applies, duty is payable under the Stamp Act regardless of the Court-fees Act. The court also referred to Section 77 of the Indian Stamp Act which explains that nothing in the Stamp Act is to be taken as affecting duties chargeable under enactments relating to court-fees, highlighting that both obligations can coexist.
  5. The court concluded that Article 57 was applicable to the instrument in question and that stamp duty under Article 57 was therefore payable. The admitted chronology was that the ex parte decree was on 6 August 1977, the application under O.9 R.13 (with the initial bond) was moved on 31 August 1977, but a properly stamped bond under the Stamp Act was filed only on 5 October 1977, after the relevant period. Thus stamp duty had not been paid within the period required.
  6. The court rejected the petitioner's primary contention (that Article 6 Schedule II of the Court-fees Act applied) on two main grounds: (a) it held Article 6 was not attracted because the order directing security was made under the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and not under the Civil P.C., and (b) even if Article 6 were applicable, Article 57 of the Stamp Act applied and required duty to be paid under the Stamp Act as well.
  7. Regarding the petitioner's secondary contention (that once notice had been issued the court could not reject the security bond and it should be treated as accepted), the court noted that many cited authorities dealt with law prior to the 1935 amendment to the proviso to Section 17(1) and emphasized that in numerous cases courts declined to penalize parties for the court's mistake. However, the court found the present facts different: on 31 August 1977, when the application under O.9 R.13 was moved, the security bond was not duly stamped under the Stamp Act, and a fresh duly stamped bond was filed only long after the expiry of the period of limitation. The court therefore held the lower courts were correct to conclude there was non-compliance with the proviso to Section 17(1).
  8. The court also relied on Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, which expressly provides that an instrument not duly stamped shall not be admitted in evidence or acted upon. The court held that the unstamped bond could not be acted upon and it was not a case where the petitioner had suffered due to any mistake of the court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The trial court's order rejecting the application under Order IX, Rule 13 was upheld and the revision dismissal was sustained — the petitioner’s challenge failed. The opinion concludes with dismissal of the petition and records that there will be no order as to costs.
  • Statutory and precedential impact: The court preferred the Calcutta view (Kasemali) over the Madras Full Bench decision on characterizing the nature of the order under the proviso to Section 17(1). The court also relied on the Stamp Act (Article 57 and Section 35) to hold that stamp duty was payable and that an unstamped instrument could not be acted upon. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader novel principle beyond its application to the facts before it.

This summary is strictly confined to the material and statements contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arises out of the proceedings in a suit in the Court of Judge Small Causes Courts, Rampur.

2. The facts, in brief, are these. A suit was filed by Smt. Savitri Devi, respondent No. 3 claiming a money decree against the petitioner, who was the defendant in the suit. It was decreed ex parte on 6th Aug., 1977. On 8th Aug., 1977 an application was moved by the petitioner for permission to give security before filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree under O. 9, R. 13, C.P.C, on the said application the petitioner was directed to deposit in cash the amount admitted by him and to give security for the balance. Thereafter, on 31st Aug., 1977 the petitioner filed an application under O. 9, Rule 13, C.P.C along with a document which purported to give the security which was directed to be furnished by him by the court by its earlier order dated 8th Aug., 1977. A true copy of the said document is Annexure 1 to the supplementary affidavit of the petitioner. The document is reproduced below:—

“Security Bond.

Whereas B.D Arora defendant in the abovenoted case has been directed to give security for the net admitted decretal amount in court which comes to Rupees 2873.25 p. according to the defendant.

I, Syed Tahir Ali son of Sayed Amjad Ali resident of Mahu Nagar Tahsil Swar, District Rampur do hereby undertake that in the event of the suit being decreed, I shall be liable to pay a sum of Rs. 2,873.25 in Court for which I stand security.

Executed this day of Aug., 1977 at Rampur.

Executant.”

3. On 21-9-1977, the Munsarim of the Court reported that the security bond had not been given on a properly stamped paper. It seems that the document bore a court-fee stamp of Rs. 2. The court's office thought that the document needed to be stamped under the Stamp Act. On the said report the court ordered that the correct stamp be supplied within a week. Thereafter on 5-10-1977 the petitioner filed a fresh security bond stamped under the Stamp Act. However, the trial court rejected the application under Order 9, R. 13, C.P.C on the ground that there was no properly stamped security bond on 31st Aug., 1977 when the said application was moved. Properly stamped security bond according to the court was filed on 5-10-1977. The petitioner felt aggrieved with the order of the trial court, a true copy of which is Annexure 3 to the petition. He accordingly filed a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act against the said order. The revision,. however, was also dismissed by the impugned order dated 11-1-1980 a true copy of which is Annexure 4 to the petition. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri B.D Madhyan, learned counsel for the petitioner and in opposition, Sri J.D Pradhan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 has made his submissions.

4. Sri Madhyan contended that the courts below were wrong in thinking that the documents needed to be stamped under the Indian Stamp Act and not under the Court-fees Act. Article 6 of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act provides as follows:

“Bail bond or other instrument of obligation given in pursuance of an order made by a court or Magistrate under any section of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 or the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and not otherwise provided for by this Act.”

5. Learned Counsel contended that the aforesaid Article was attracted in the instant case. He placed reliance on the following case:

6. Kalapati Peda Pitchamma v. Chiruvella Pedamuneyya (AIR 1935 Mad 380) (FB), on the other hand the learned counsel for the aforesaid respondent placed reliance on the Division Bench pronouncement reported in Kasemali v. Ajoyendu Paul (AIR 1956 Cal 375) which in its turn relied upon Baburao Keshavrao Malkapure v. Kalavatibai Amrutrao Khase (AIR 1940 Bom 275). The learned counsel also placed reliance on Krishan Kumar v. Hakim Mohammad Umar ((1978) 4 All LR 541) : (1978 All LJ 738).

7. In the aforesaid Madras Full Bench Case it was held that an order passed under the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is also an order passed under Civil Procedure Code and the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is only supplemental to the Civil Procedure Code. On this basis it was held that the security bond executed by a surety submitted under the proviso to Sec. 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act would be covered by Art. 6, Sch. II of the Court-fees Act and not by Article 15 of the Stamp Act. This view was expressly dissented from in Kasemali's case (AIR 1956 Cal 375) (supra) where the Court observed as follows:—

“With great respect to the learned Judges of the Madras High Court, I am of opinion that the view that the bond given in accordance with the provision of the Sec. 17, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, is a bond given under the Code of Civil Procedure is not correct. Whether the procedure laid down in the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act can be correctly called supplemental to the Civil Procedure Code or not is of little consequence.

The fact remains that the proviso as enacted in Sec. 17(1) Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is not in the Civil Procedure Code. Order 9, R. 13, Civil Procedure may properly be said to be a section of the Civil Procedure Code. If O. 9, R. 13 had provided for any order for a bond, the bond might have been considered to have been given under an order passed under the Civil Procedure Code.

Order 9, R. 13 however does not contain any such provision. The plain and simple fact is that the provision of law under which the order directing a security bond to be given is passed is embodied in the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act; and I can see no reason why I should accept the fiction that such an order is passed under the Civil Procedure Code, in place of the fact that it is given under the provisions of S. 17, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.

My conclusion, therefore, is that the law does not require this security bond to be affixed with any court-fee stamp and consequently having been written on stamp paper in accordance with Stamp Act, the bond was proper and sufficient in so far as the matter of stamps was concerned.”

8. As stated above in the said Kasemali's decision reliance wag placed upon AIR 1940 Bom 275 (Special Bench) though in the said case the bond given was under the Guardians & Wards Act. In my view the Calcutta decision is to be preferred to the Madras case. Further it should be seen that in the Madras case the controversy was examined with reference to Art. 15 of the Stamp Act which deals with bonds and lays down that the said Article will be applicable when it is not otherwise provided for by the Stamp Act or by the Court-fees Act. In other words Art. 15 is a residuary Article and expressly excepts Court-fees Act. However, in the instant case Art. 57 will be applicable which lays down as follows:—

“57 Security Bond or Mortgage Deed executed by way of security for the due execution of an office, or to account for money or other property received by virtue thereof, or executed by a surety to secure the due performance of a contract of the due discharge of a liability—

(a) When the amount secured does not exceed Rs. 1,000; The same duty as a Bond (No. 15) for the amount secured. (b) in any other case. Thirty seven rupees seventy five paise.”

9. This article unlike Art. 15 does not except the Court-fees Act. It is, therefore, clear that even if Art. 6 of Sch. II of the Court-fees Act were to be held to be applicable still, if Art. 57 is also held to be applicable then duty would be payable both under the Court-fees Act as well as under the Stamp Act. This has been made clear in Sec. 77 of the Indian Stamp Act which lays down as follows:—

“77. Having as to court-fees.— (Except the provisions as to copies contained in S. 6-A) nothing in this Act contained shall be deemed to affect the duties chargeable under any enactment for the time being in force relating to court-fees.”

10. It has not been shown to me why Art. 57 will not apply to the document in question. Therefore, Stamp Duty was payable under this Article and admittedly it was not paid within the period of limitation. It has already been stated above that the ex parte decree was passed on 6-8-1977 and the fresh surety bond was filed on 5-10-1977 which was duly stamped under the Stamp Act.

11. The first contention of Sri Madhyan is, therefore, rejected on two grounds firstly because I have already held that the Art. 6 of the Sch. II of the Court-fees Act was not attracted to the instant case inasmuch as the security was furnished in pursuance of an order made by a court, not under the Civil P.C but under the proviso to Sec. 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. I have already expressed my preference for the aforesaid Calcutta view in comparison to the aforementioned Madras view which I have also otherwise distinguished. The recent Supreme Court decision in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad ((1980) 2 SCC 378 : AIR 1980 SC 892) also strengthens the view that the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is in the nature of self contained Code and the applicability of the Civil P.C is restricted or qualified to the trial of the suits in the courts of Small Causes, Lastly Krishan Kumar v. Hakim Mohammad Umar ((1978) 4 All LR 541) : (1978 All LJ 738) also supports the contention that the security bond furnished under the proviso to Sec. 17(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is chargeable to duty under the Stamp Act.

12. A reference was also made by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 to Hindustan Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P (AIR 1972 All 8) (Special Bench). In my view the same is not applicable to facts of this case.

13. Sri Madhyan's next contention, that once the notice has been issued by the Court then the Court cannot reject the security bond and the same should be treated as having been accepted as sufficient. He placed reliance upon the following cases?

1. Ram Bharose v. Ganga Singh, AIR 1931 All 727 (FB);

2. Stamp Reference (Jagnilal), (AIR 1931 All 189 (FB);

3. Ahmad Yar Khan v. Kheyali, AIB 1933 All 933;

4. Kirpa Shanker v. Brahmanand, AIR 1945 All 282;

5. Marimuthu Goundar v. Ponnammal, AIR 1956 Mad 422;

6. Dullab Prasad v. Smt. Rajeshwari Bibi, AIR 1977 All 151;

7. Kiran Koomar Banerji v. Baijnath, AIR 1928 All 607 (2);

8. Mahabir v. Sheo Saran. AIR 1936 Oudh 407;

9. Azmatullah Khan v. Ahmad Ali, AIR 1925 All 379;

10. State Bank of Hyderabad v. Kotha Papi Reddy, AIR 1975 Andh Pra 25.

11. Chargeability of Stamp Duty Reference, AIR 1935 All 558.

12. Barkat Ram v. Suggar Electric Stores, Ludhiana, AIR 1936 Lah 140;

14. On the other hand Sri Pradhan placed reliance on the following cases:

1. Lala Mool Chand v. Niranjan Singh, AIR 1922 All 265 (1);

2. Hira Lal v. Cheda, AIR 1948 Oudh 41;

3. Mt. Sonkali v. Mahabir Dube, AIR 1935 All 379;

4. Khetra Dolai v. Mohan Bissoyi. AIR 1961 Ori 37.

15. It is not necessary to discuss the aforesaid cases in detail because they will not be found to be applicable in the facts of the instant case. Many of the cases had to deal with the law as it stood before the amendment in the proviso to S. 17(1) which was affected by the Provincial Small Cause Courts (Amendments) Act IX of 1935. In many of the aforesaid cases the point was emphasised that a party should not suffer on account of the mistake of the court. It should be seen that in the instant case the clear position was that on 31st Aug. 1975, when the application under O. 9, R. 13, C.P.C was moved, the security bond was not duly stamped under the Indian Stamp Act. Long after the expiry of the period of limitation a fresh security bond was filed which was duly stamped under the Stamp Act. In such circumstances in my view the courts below correctly held that there was no compliance with the proviso to S. 17(1) of the Act. Unlike many of the cases referred to above, in the instant case the court did not accept the security offered. The security bond was found to be defective inasmuch as it was not properly stamped.

16. Section 35 of Indian Stamp Act clearly lays down that such an instrument shall not be admitted in evidence for any purpose and shall not be acted upon unless it is duly stamped. It is not a case where it can be said that the petitioner suffered because of any mistake of the Court.

17. This petition, accordingly, fails and is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.

18. Petition dismissed.