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Amarnath v. Smt. Champa Devi
High Court Opinion Summary — Saxena, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion.
The plaintiff filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant (the present revisionist), claiming the defendant was a tenant of a house at a monthly rent of Rs. 10 and that the plaintiff needed the house for her own use. The plaintiff asserted she had obtained permission under Section 3 of the erstwhile U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (referred to in the opinion as the "old Act") on August 4, 1970, and that prior administrative remedies (a revision to the Commissioner and a representation under Section 7-F to the State Government) were rejected. The plaintiff served a notice to quit which was returned with an endorsement of refusal; the plaintiff then sued for ejectment.
The defendant contested the suit on several grounds, including that the plaintiff alone was not the landlord, that no notice to quit had been served, and that the permission granted under Section 3 of the old Act was illegal.
Procedurally, the suit was originally instituted in the court of the Munsif, Gorakhpur. On the coming into force of the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, the case was transferred to the Court of Small Causes. The Small Causes Court concluded that (i) the defendant had not defaulted in payment of rent; (ii) the notice to quit was served by refusal; (iii) the plaintiff alone was entitled to sue; but it held the permission granted under Section 3 of the old Act was not valid and therefore dismissed the suit.
The plaintiff filed a revision to the District Judge, who agreed with the trial court on factual findings except he held that the permission under Section 3 was valid. The District Judge therefore decreed ejectment and granted the defendant two months to vacate. The defendant filed the present revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code to the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the transfer of the suit from the Munsif's court (and subsequent transfer route) to the Small Causes Court was lawful after the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 came into force.
- Whether the officer who granted permission under Section 3 of the erstwhile U.P. Act III of 1947 (S.P. Sharma, the District Supply Town Rationing Officer) was competent and authorized to grant that permission.
- Whether the notice to quit was validly served on the defendant (i.e., whether the registered post, returned with endorsement "refused", constituted service or whether that presumption was rebutted).
- Ultimately, whether the decree for ejectment passed by the District Judge was sustainable in law given the above points.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant-Revisionist's Arguments
- The transfer of the plaint from the Munsif to the Small Causes Court was illegal; the plaint should have been returned for presentation to the proper court or the District Judge should have used Section 24, C.P.C. to transfer it.
- The permission purportedly granted under Section 3 of the old Act by Sri S.P. Sharma was invalid because he was not duly authorised (i.e., he lacked competence to grant such permission).
- No valid notice to quit was served on the defendant; the endorsement of refusal on the registered post does not establish service when the defendant stated on oath that he did not receive or refuse the notice.
Plaintiff's (Opposite Party's) Position
- The plaintiff maintained she had obtained permission under Section 3 of the old Act and was therefore entitled to eject the defendant; the District Judge agreed that the permission was valid.
- The plaintiff relied on the registered post returned with endorsement "refused" to establish service of the notice to quit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mudan Lal v. Kali Prasad, A.I.R. 1950 Alld. 108 | Principle that the power of delegation to the District Magistrate is attached to the office/functionary and not to the individual by name; orders by a person in the office bind successors until changed by the successor. | The court applied this principle to hold that the District Magistrate's delegation to the District Supply Town Rationing Officer (Ex. 6) rendered S.P. Sharma competent to grant permission under Section 3; therefore the permission was not illegal on competence grounds. |
| N. G. Gavete v. State of Maharashtra, 1977 (1) S.C.C. 133 | Affirms that presumptions (of law or fact) are rebuttable and must be weighed against the totality of evidence; presumptions do not replace the final weighing of all evidence. | The court relied on this principle to explain that the presumption of service arising from a registered post returned "refused" can be rebutted by evidence (for example, the defendant's unchallenged oath denying receipt), and such rebuttal must be considered in the overall evidence balance. |
| P. V. Rao v. C. V. Ramane, 1976 S.C. 869 | Where a registered post is returned with "refused", a defendant's unshaken oath denying receipt may repel the presumption of service, particularly if the party relying on service does not produce the postman or others who could corroborate the manner of refusal. | The court found the present facts analogous: neither the plaintiff nor the postman was produced to corroborate the alleged refusal in the plaintiff's presence; the defendant's unchallenged sworn denial therefore rebutted the presumption of service and led to the conclusion that service was not proved. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the contentions point by point and applied statutory provisions and cited precedent where relevant.
1. Transfer to Small Causes Court: The court rejected the contention that transferring the suit to the Small Causes Court was illegal. It relied on Section 9 of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act (as cited in the opinion) which, the court explained, provides that all suits pending in regular courts on the date that Act came into force shall stand transferred to the court of small causes unless recording of evidence has started. Because of this statutory provision, the questions of returning the plaint to present it to another court or of using Section 24, C.P.C. to effect a transfer did not arise; the statutory transfer was automatic and proper.
2. Competence to Grant Permission under Section 3: The court examined the evidence of delegation. The record showed an order dated September 20, 1972 delegating District Magistrate functions to the District Supply Town Rationing Officer (Ex. 6). Applying the principle from Mudan Lal v. Kali Prasad, the court stated that the delegation attaches to the office (functionary) rather than to the individual by name and that a successor in office need not reissue the same delegation for the predecessor's order to remain effective. Given that S.P. Sharma was the District Supply Town Rationing Officer when he granted permission, the court concluded he was competent and the permission could not be held illegal on the ground of lack of authority.
3. Service of Notice to Quit: The court considered the evidentiary position regarding service. The notice (Ex. 4) was sent by registered post to the correct address and was returned with an endorsement of refusal dated September 17, 1971. Ordinarily, such a return gives rise to a presumption of service. However, the court emphasized that presumptions are rebuttable (citing N. G. Gavete) and must be weighed against the totality of evidence.
The defendant gave sworn testimony denying that anyone had come to deliver the notice or that he had refused it. Crucially, the defendant was not cross-examined on this point. The court found the lower courts erred in merely remarking that the defendant's simple statement was insufficient without analyzing or discrediting that testimony. The Evidence Act does not require that a witness's testimony be corroborated to be believed. The court further relied on P. V. Rao v. C. V. Ramane where a similar factual situation led to the conclusion that an unshaken oath denying receipt could repel the presumption of service, especially where the plaintiff did not produce the postman or any witness who saw the refusal.
On the facts here—registered post returned "refused", correct address, but the defendant's uncontradicted sworn denial and absence of corroboration by the plaintiff (no postman or other witness produced)—the court held that the presumption of service was rebutted. Because service of notice was not proved, the plaintiff failed to establish a necessary element to obtain the ejectment decree.
4. Overall Application to Relief Sought: Given that the plaintiff failed to prove service of the notice to quit (a required precondition for ejectment in this case), the court concluded that the decree for ejectment could not stand despite the validity of the administrative permission under Section 3.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision is allowed. The judgment and decree dated August 24, 1976, passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur, are set aside. Costs were imposed on the parties.
Implications: The direct consequence of this decision is that the ejectment decree in favor of the plaintiff is vacated and the defendant's challenge succeeds on the ground that service of the notice to quit was not proved. The court affirmed that (a) statutory transfer under the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 was effective; and (b) the administrative permission under Section 3 was valid because the delegation attached to the office-holder. However, on the critical factual issue of service, the court held the presumption arising from a registered post returned "refused" had been successfully rebutted by the defendant's uncontradicted testimony, and therefore the plaintiff did not meet the burden required to obtain ejectment. The opinion does not state that a new legal precedent is being created; it applies established principles and precedent to the facts of the case and sets aside the impugned decree on the evidentiary failure regarding service.
Saxena, J.-
This is a defendant's revision application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
The plaintiff opposite party filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant-revisionist from a house on the basis of permission obtained under Section 3 of the erstwhile U.P. Act III of 1947. It was alleged that the defendant was her tenant in the disputed house at Rs. 10\- per month: that she needed the house for her own use and obtained permission from the District Magistrate on August 4, 1970 and filed a suit for ejectment; that the defendant filed a revision, against the said order before the Commissioner which was rejected and the representation made by him under Section 7-F of the Act was- also rejected by the State Government. Thereafter she gave a notice to quit to the defendant, which was received back with the endorsement of refusal. Hence that suit.
The defendant-revisionist contested that suit, inter alia, on the grounds that the plaintiff alone was not the landlord and not entitled to SUB; that no notice to quit was served on him and that the permission granted by the District Magistrate was illegal.
The suit was originally instituted in the court of the Munsif, Gorakhpur, and on coming into force of the Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, was transferred to the Court of Small Causes. The learned Judge Small Causes Court came to the Conclusion that the defendant had not committed any default in the payment of rent; that the notice to quit was served on him by refusal; that the plaintiff alone was entitled to sue but the permission granted under Section 3 of the old Act was: not valid. The suit was accordingly dismissed.
The plaintiff filed a revision and the learned District Judge agreed with the findings of the trial court except on the validity of the permission. In his opinion the permission granted under Section 3 was valid. The plaintiff's suit for ejectment of the defendant was decreed and the latter was given two months' time to vacate the house. The defendant has now come up in revision to this Court.
The first point urged in the memo of revision is that the suit was instituted in the court of Munsif, Gorakhpur and from that court it was transferred to the court of IV Additional Munsif from where it was sent to the court of Judge Small Causes which was illegal. According to the revisionist, the plaint should have been returned for presentation to the proper court or the learned District Judge should have passed an order under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code transferring it to the Small Cause Court, This contention carries absolutely no force because Section 9 of the Civil Law (Amendment) Act makes it clear that all suits pending in regular courts on the date that Act came into force shall stand transferred to the court of small causes unless recording of evidence has started. Therefore, the question of returning the plaint for presentation to the proper court or of an order of transfer under Section 24, C.P.C. did not arise.
The second contention is that Sri S.P. Sharma who granted permission under section 3 of the old act was not competent to do so as he was not duly authorised. The material on the record shows that on September 20. 1972, the then District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, had authorised the District Supply Town Rationing Officer to perform all the functions under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. Copy of this order (Ex. 6) was filed. The contention that the succeeding district Magistrates had not passed a similar order authorising Mr. S.P. Sharma carries absolutely no force. In Mudan Lal v, Kali Prasad (A.I.R. 1950 Alld. 108) this question was discussed at length and it was held that the power of delegation has been given to the District Magistrate as a functionary and not to the person by name. This functionary is permanent and there is a permanent succession to this office. An order passed by any particular individual in his capacity as District Magistrate shall, therefore, be deemed to be an order passed by his successors-in-office when he was succeeded by another person and it is not necessary that a successor should pass a fresh order to give effect to the previous order of his predecessor. It is for the successor to change the order of his predecessor if he wants but so long as the order is not changed it shall continue to be effective until it is changed by his successor. In the instant case there is no denying the fact that the District Magistrate had delegated his powers under the Act to the District Supply Town Rationing Officer. There is also no denial that Sri S.P. Sharma was the District Supply Town Rationing Officer on the date he granted permission and will be deemed to have authority to do so. Therefore, the permission cannot be held to be illegal.
The third point which has aroused some interest is regarding the service of notice to quite. The notice of ejectment (Ex. 4) is dated September 16, 1971. It was sent to the defendant-revisionist by registered post and was received back with the endorsement of refusal dated September 17, 1971. The address given on the envelop was correct and the defendant admitted that the letters sent at this address are ordinarily delivered to him. There can be no manner of doubt that when a letter is sent by registered post at correct address and is received back with an endorsement of refusal the presumption is service of that letter. In the instant case also both the lower courts were right in holding that the presumption would be of service of notice on the defendant. As held in the case of N. G. Gavete v. State of Maharashtra (1977(1) S.C.C. 133) presumptions, whether of law or of fact, are always rebuttable. In other words, the party against which a presumption may operate can and must lead evidence to show why the presumption should not be given effect to. If, for example, the party which initiates a proceeding or comes with a case to a court offers no evidence to support it, the presumption is that such evidence does not exist. And. if some evidence is shown to exist on a question of issue, but the party which has it within its powar to produce it, does not, despite notice to it to do so, produce it, the natural presumption is that it would, if produced, have gone against it. Similarly a presumption arises from failure to discharge a special or particular onus. The result of a trial or proceeding is determined by a weighing of the totality of facts and circumstances and presumptions operating in favour of one party as against those which may tilt the balance in favour of another. Such weighment always takes place at the end of a trial or proceeding which cannot for purposes of the final weighment, be split up into disjointed and disconnected parts simply because the requirements of procedural regularity and logic embodied in procedural law, prescribe a sequence, a stage and a mode of proof for each party tendering its evidence. What is weighed at the end is one the end is one totality against another and not selected bits or scraps of evidence against each other.
Coming back to the case before me the position is that notice (Ex. 4) was sent to the defendant revisionist by registered post. Correct address of the defendant was given on it. It was received back with an endorsement of refusal. In the eye of law the presumption would be of service of the notice unless rebutted. In the instant case the defendant examined himself and stated on oath that 'none had come to deliver any notice to him nor he had refused to take the notice (Ex. 4). It is interesting to note that he was not at all cross-examined on this point. The trial court and the learned lower revisional courts have not at all analysed the statement of the defendant-revisionist or discredited him on any satisfactory ground. The learned lower revisional court has simply remarked that the simple statement of the defendant on this point is not enough. The Evidence Act nowhere prescribes that the testimony of a witness cannot be believed unless corroborated. In the instant case the defendant had stated on oath that no notice was delivered to him nor he had refused to take any notice. If a witness makes a statement on oath the presumption is that it is correct unless proved otherwise. In this case when the defendant was not at all cross-examined or there existed any such circumstances on the record on the basis of which his statement could be discredited, there is no reason why the learned lower revisional court should have held that his statement was not enough to rebut the presumption of service.
In this connection it will not be out of place to refer to the case of P. V. Rao v. C. V. Ramane (A.I.A. 1976 S.C. 869) in which a similar question arose. A writ of summons sought to be served by registered post had been returned with the endorsement 'refused'. The Bombay High Court held that the presumption of service had been repelled by the defendant's statement on oath that he had not refused it as it was never brought to him. In this state of evidence it was held that unless the post man was produced the statement of the defendant on oath that must prevail. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that on the facts found in that case the view expressed could not be held to be incorrect. In the instant case neither the plaintiff came forward to depose that he had accompanied the post-man and it was in his presence that the defendant had refused to take the notice nor the postman was examined. No other person in whose presence the defendant-revisionist may have refused to take the notice was produced. Therefore, there is no reason why the statement on oath of the defendant, which could not be shaken in cross-examination, should not have been believed to rebut the presumption of service. In my judgment the learned lower courts erred in holding that the presumption was not rebutted. In my view it was amply rebutted by the statement of the defendant with the result that the plaintiff-opposite party failed to prove service of notice on the defendant-revisionist and a decree for ejectment could not be passed.
The revision application is allowed and the judgment and decree dated August 24, 1976 passed by the learned First Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur, are set aside. Costs on parties.
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