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Rajesh Pachauri v. State Of U.P And Others
Judicial Opinion Summary — Division Bench (G.C. Mathur, J. for self and K.N. Seth, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The reference arose from a challenge to Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act (U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973) and its interaction with other provisions of the U.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (the Principal Act) and subsequent amendments (including U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975). The procedural posture is that questions were referred to the Division Bench for opinion after consideration by a learned Single Judge.
The central factual issue concerns the legal effect of Section 5(6) (which directs that certain transfers of land made after 24 January 1971 be ignored for purposes of determining ceiling area) together with Section 12-A(d) (which governs determination of surplus land and how transfers are treated in that determination). The contention before the Single Judge was that ignoring genuine transfers under Section 5(6) can reduce the tenure-holder's effective retained land below the ceiling limit and result in acquisition of land held in personal cultivation without payment of compensation at not less than market value, thereby violating the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution. The State (and/or proponents of the legislation) defended the Acts on the basis that their placement in the Ninth Schedule (Article 31-B) and protection under Article 31-C immunize them from this challenge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the acquisition of land held under personal cultivation as surplus, when that acquisition follows from ignoring a sale/transfer under Section 5(6) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, is violative of the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution?
- Whether ignoring transfers made after 24 January 1971 (except those excepted by the proviso to Section 5(6)) in determining ceiling and surplus areas would amount to acquiring any portion of land under personal cultivation within the ceiling limit applicable to a person under the ceiling law in force?
- Whether inclusion of the Principal Act and its two Amending Acts (U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973 and U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975) in the Ninth Schedule pursuant to Article 31-B removes the restriction placed by the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) — i.e., whether Article 31-B validates executive acquisitions that would otherwise contravene the second proviso?
- Whether protection under Article 31-C (laws giving effect to certain Directive Principles) for U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973 and U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975 negates the need to comply with the second proviso to Article 31-A(1)?
Arguments of the Parties
Argument Challenging Sub-section (6) and the Amending Acts
- Sub-section (6) of Section 5 authorizes the Prescribed Authority to ignore transfers of land made after 24 January 1971. The challenger contended that when genuine transfers are ignored, the ceiling calculation may result in some land that is under personal cultivation and within the applicable ceiling limit being effectively acquired by the State without payment of compensation at not less than market value, in contravention of the second proviso to Article 31-A(1).
- The practical effect asserted is that ignoring valid transfers can lower the tenure-holder's effective retained area below the ceiling and cause the State to acquire land that is within the ceiling limit and under personal cultivation.
Argument in Defence of the Acts (State / Proponents)
- The Principal Act and the Amending Acts have been placed in the Ninth Schedule, and therefore, as argued, are immune from attacks for inconsistency with Part III by virtue of Article 31-B.
- It was also urged that Article 31-C protects the Amending Acts (U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973 and U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975) insofar as they purport to give effect to Directive Principles (clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39), and thus such protection should negate the complained-of inconsistency with the second proviso to Article 31-A(1).
- The learned Advocate General argued that the second proviso effectively places a restriction on legislative action because executive action conformable to a valid law could not be declared unlawful; therefore, the proviso must be read as affecting the validity of laws too.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court approached the constitutional and statutory issues in a structured way. It first identified the conditions under which the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) would be attracted to an acquisition:
- The acquisition is under a law which makes provision for the acquisition of any estate;
- The land sought to be acquired is comprised in an estate and is under the personal cultivation of the tenure-holder;
- The land sought to be acquired is within the ceiling limit applicable to the tenure-holder under the law; and
- The law does not provide for payment of compensation at a rate not less than the market value of the land sought to be acquired.
The court observed that conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) applied to the U.P. Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (and its amendments), but the dispute turned on whether condition (iii) — that land sought to be acquired is within the ceiling limit applicable to the tenure-holder — also obtained in particular cases when transfers are ignored under Section 5(6).
The court analyzed Section 5(6) (which requires ignoring transfers after 24 January 1971 unless falling within specified exceptions) together with Section 12-A(d). It explained how Section 12-A(d) directs the Prescribed Authority, as far as possible, to include transferred land within the ceiling area retained by a tenure-holder, and that if surplus land must include transferred land, the transfer in respect of the surplus portion is to be deemed always void for that portion, with consequent rights (refund, charges, reopening of partition).
Using statutory language and two concrete illustrations provided in the opinion, the court demonstrated the mechanical effect of ignoring genuine transfers:
- Illustration 1: A tenure-holder with a pre-amendment 40 acres transfers 5 acres and is in actual possession of 35 acres. If the transfer is ignored for ceiling determination, the tenure-holder is deemed to have 40 acres; the ceiling (after amendment) being 18 acres, those 18 acres may include the 5 transferred acres. Because the transfer remains binding inter se, the tenure-holder effectively retains only 13 acres. Consequently, the State acquires not only the surplus based on actual possession but also 5 acres that fall within the ceiling limit (i.e., land under personal cultivation within the ceiling is effectively acquired without market-value compensation).
- Illustration 2: A tenure-holder with 20 acres transfers 2 acres and retains 18 (the ceiling). If transfer is ignored, he is deemed to have 20 acres; his ceiling of 18 acres will include the 2 transferred acres and the surplus will be taken from land that he actually retains, resulting in the State acquiring 2 acres that are within the ceiling limit and in personal cultivation.
From these statutory constructions and examples, the court concluded that ignoring genuine, effective transfers will, in practice, result in acquisition by the State of land within the ceiling limit that is under personal cultivation — a situation covered by the second proviso to Article 31-A(1). Because the ceiling legislation does not provide for compensation at not less than market value for such land acquired within the ceiling limit, the acquisition would contravene the second proviso.
Turning to the constitutional protection claimed for laws placed in the Ninth Schedule, the court analyzed Article 31-B. It noted that Article 31-B validates laws placed in the Ninth Schedule against inconsistency with Part III only to the extent that such inconsistency is a restriction upon legislative power. The court then examined the language and purpose of the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) and concluded that the proviso operates as a restriction on executive acquisition activity rather than a restriction on legislative competence:
- The main portion of Article 31-A lifts fetters on legislation contained in Articles 14, 19 and 31; the first proviso deals with presidential assent for State laws. The court reasoned that the second proviso, by its language, addresses the lawfulness of acquisition by the State (i.e., executive action) when a law exists and does not expressly operate to invalidate legislative action that creates acquisition powers.
- The court rejected the learned Advocate General's submission that the second proviso must be read as a restriction on legislative power because it is conceivable that executive action conforming to valid law could not be labeled unlawful. The court found the plain language of the second proviso pointed to executive action and that there was no authority provided for the proposition that lawful executive action under a valid law cannot be rendered unlawful by a subsequent constitutional provision or explanation.
The court also relied on the explanatory insertion to the Ninth Schedule made by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, which declared that acquisitions made under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act in contravention of the then-introduced second proviso would be void to the extent of the contravention. The court read this explanation as showing that Article 31-B validates laws themselves but does not necessarily validate executive action under those laws where the second proviso (directed at executive acquisitions) is contravened.
Consequently, the court held that placement of the U.P. Ceiling Act and its amending Acts in the Ninth Schedule does not remove the restriction in the second proviso on acquisitions by the State in the specific circumstances described, and Article 31-C (which saves laws giving effect to certain Directive Principles) similarly does not relieve compliance with the second proviso.
Holding and Implications
The Division Bench answered the referenced questions in the affirmative.
Core rulings:
- Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Amending Act, by directing that certain transfers after 24 January 1971 be ignored, can operate so as to result in the State acquiring land held in personal cultivation that falls within the applicable ceiling limit. Where this happens and the law does not provide for compensation at not less than market value for such land, the acquisition contravenes the second proviso to Article 31-A(1).
- Inclusion of the Principal Act and the Amending Acts in the Ninth Schedule (Article 31-B) does not negate the restriction placed by the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) with respect to executive acquisition; Article 31-B validates laws against inconsistency with Part III but does not validate executive action that contravenes the second proviso's protection.
- Article 31-C's protection for laws said to give effect to certain Directive Principles (Article 39(b) and (c)) does not dispense with compliance with the second proviso to Article 31-A(1).
Implications and immediate effect:
- The practical effect is that where genuine transfers are ignored under Section 5(6) and the tenure-holder is thereby deprived of land within the ceiling that is under personal cultivation, such acquisition by the State is constitutionally impermissible unless compensation is provided at not less than market value.
- The Division Bench directed that the case be listed again before the learned Single Judge with the Division Bench's opinion; the opinion resolves the referred questions against the validity of such acquisitions absent market-value compensation.
The opinion does not purport to set out an extended rule of general application beyond the answers to the referred questions; the direct practical consequence is the invalidity of executive acquisition in the specified circumstances unless compensation at not less than market value is provided.
Disposition: All four referred questions answered in the affirmative; matter to be listed again before the learned Single Judge with the Division Bench's opinion.
G.C Mathur, J.:— (for self and for K.N Seth, J.)— The following four questions have been referred to us for opinion:
2. Whether the acquisition of land under personal cultivation as surplus after ignoring sale-deed under Section 5(6) of the U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act is violative of second proviso to Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution? Whether ignoring transfers made after January 24, 1971, other than those excepted under Proviso to Section 5(6) of the Act, both in relation to the determination of ceiling and surplus area, would amount to acquiring any portion of land under personal cultivation within the ceiling limit applicable to a person under the ceiling law for the time being in force?
3. Whether, inspite of the protection afforded by Article 31-B of the Constitution by virtue of inclusion of U.P Act I of 1961 and the two Amending Acts, namely, U.P Act No. 18 of 1973 and U.P Act No. 2 of 1975, in the IX Schedule to the Constitution, compliance would still be necessary of the provisions of second Proviso to Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution?
4. Whether, inspite of protection having been given under Article 31-C of the Constitution to U.P Act No. 18 of 1973 and U.P Act No. 2 of 1975 by virtue of a declaration made in Section 2 of each of these Acts that these Acts are for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution, is it still necessary to comply with the provisions of the Second Proviso to Article 31-A(1) of the Constitution?
5. The U.P Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, came into force on January 31, 1961. The Act, as originally enacted (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), laid down in Section 4(2) that the ceiling area of a tenure-holder shall be 40 acres of the fair quality land. If the family of the tenure-holder consisted of more than five members, the ceiling area was to be 40 acres plus 8 acres for each additional member of the family subject to a maximum of 24 such acres. The Principal Act was placed in the IX Schedule to the Constitution by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. It thereupon became immune from all attacks on the ground of inconsistency with any provision contained in Part III of the Constitution. The Act was amended several times but we are not concerned with all the Amending Acts. Substantial amendments were introduced by the U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment”) Act, 1972 (U.P Act No. 18 of 1973). A number of sections of the Principal Act were substituted by new sections by this Amending Act. Sub-section (3) of the substituted Section 5 provides that, in the case of a tenure-holder having a family of not more than five members, the ceiling area shall be 7.30 hectares of irrigated land. It then provides for addition to the ceiling area for additional members of the family. In substance, the Amending Act lowered the ceiling area from 40 acres to about 18 acres. Some more amendments were introduced by the U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974 (U.P Act No. 2 of 1975) but the ceiling area was not further lowered. Both these Amending Acts were placed in the IX Schedule by the Constitution. (Thirty-nineth Amendment) Act, 1975,
6. Clause (1) of Article 31-A of the Constitution saves five categories of laws from being declared void on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 or 31. The second proviso to this clause reads thus:—
“Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”
7. The contention before the learned Single Judge was that Sub-Section (6) of Section 5 of the Amended Act, which empowers the Prescribed Authority to ignore and not to take into account certain transfers of land made after January 24, 1971, results, in some cases, in lowering the ceiling area of tenure-holders below the ceiling limit. Since the amended Act does not provide for the payment of compensation at a rate not less than the market value of the land for the portion of the land acquired within the ceiling limit, the acquisition of such land was in contravention of the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) and was void. This contention was sought to be met on the ground that, since the Principal Act as well as the Amending Acts have been placed in the IX Schedule, they are immune from the attack on the ground of violation of any provision of Part III including the second proviso to Article 31-A(1). It also seems to have been urged before the learned Single Judge that Article 31-C also saves these laws from an attack on the ground of violation of the second proviso to Art. 31-A(1). It is these rival contentions which have led to this reference.
8. The first two questions referred can conveniently be dealt with together. The prohibition of the second proviso to Art. 31-A(1) is attracted to the acquisition of land by the State if the following conditions obtain:
(i) That the acquisition is under a law which makes provision for the acquisition of any estate;
(ii) That the land sought to be acquired is comprised in an estate and is under the personal cultivation of the tenureholder;
(iii) That the land sought to be acquired is within the ceiling limit applicable to the tenure-holder under the law; and
(iv) That the law does not provide for the payment of compensation at a rate which is not less than the market value of the land sought to be acquired.
9. The U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, is a law in which conditions Nos. (i), (ii) and (iv) obtain. Questions Nos. (1) and (2) are directed towards finding out whether condition (iii) also obtains under this Act or not. In other words, the question is whether, in particular cases, some land of the tenure-holder within the ceiling limit will be acquired and whether thereby the tenure-holder will be left with land below the ceiling limit.
10. Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the amended Act is in the following terms:
“5(6) In determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, which, but for the transfer, would have been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account;
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to—
(a) a transfer in favour of any satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a Benami transaction or for the immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holders or other members of his family.
Explanation I—For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression ‘transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971’, includes—
(a) a declaration of a person as a co-tenure-holder made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, in a suit, irrespective of whether such was pending on or was instituted after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971;
(b) any admission, acknowledgement, relinquishment or declaration in favour of a person to the like effect, made in any other deed or instrument or in any other manner.
Explanation II—The burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit.”
11. This sub-section affects all transfers made after January 24, 1971, which are not covered by the proviso. All such transfers have to be ignored and not taken into account in determining the ceiling area. If there are any sham transfers, they do not really amount to transfers and ignoring them does not affect the area of the land in possession of the tenure-holder or the determination of the ceiling area; but where a genuine transfer, under which property has passed, is ignored on the ground that it was not made in good faith, or on the ground that it was for inadequate consideration, it is bound to result in the acquisition of some land of the tenure-holder within the ceiling limit applicable to him. This consequence flows from the provisions of clause (d) of Section 12-A. Section 12-A is in these words:—
“12-A. In determining the surplus land under Section 11 or Section 12, the Prescribed Authority shall, as far as possible, accept the choice indicated by the tenureholder to the plot or plots which he and other members of his family, if any, would like to retain as part of the ceiling area applicable to him or them under the provisions of this Act, whether indicated by him in his statement under Section 9 or in any subsequent proceedings:
Provided that—
(a) ………………..
(b) ………………..
(c) ………………..
(d) where any person holds land in excess of the ceiling area including land which is the subject of any transfer or partition referred to in sub-section (6) or sub-section (7) of Section 5, the surplus land determined shall, as far as possible, be land other than the land which is the subject of such transfer or partition, and if the surplus land includes any land which is the subject of such transfer or partition, the transfer or partition shall, in so far as it relates to the land included in the surplus land, be deemed to be and always to have been void, and—
(i) it shall be open to the transferee to claim refund of the proportionate amount of consideration, if any, advanced by him to the transferor, and such amount shall be charged on the compensation payable to the transferor under Section 17 and also on any land retained by the transferor within the ceiling area, which shall be liable to be sold in satisfaction of the charge, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 153 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950;
(ii) any party to the partition (other than the tenure-holder in respect of whom the surplus land has been determined) whose land is included in surplus land of the said tenure-holder shall be entitled to have the partition re-opened.”
12. Under this provision, the Prescribed Authority has to include, the land, which is the subject of transfer, as far as possible, in the ceiling area to be retained by the tenure-holder and only when, even after that inclusion some land out of the land transferred remains, it is to be included in the surplus area. Thus if the ceiling limit of the tenure-holder is 18 acres, it will include either all or part of the land which is the subject of the transfer. It is important to note that the transfers, which are ignored, have not been declared to be void, except to the exent of the land comprised therein which falls in the surplus areas. Therefore, the transfer in respect of the land, which is included in the ceiling area of the tenure-holder, remains a good and effective transfer and the transferee thereof remains the owner or tenure-holder thereof. This means that, in effect, the tenure-holder is really left with an area of land which is 18 acres minus the land included in his ceiling area out of the transferred land. Two illustrations will clarify the position. Suppose a tenure-holder, under the Principal Act, was left with 40 acres of land. He, after the relevant date, transfers 5 acres of land. He is thus left with 35 acres. If this transfer is ignored, then the land in his possession will be deemed to be still 40 acres, the surplus land will be 22 acres and the ceiling area will be 18 acres. These 18 acres will include the five acres which were the subject of the transfer. Since the transfer is still binding between the tenure-holder and the transferee the tenure-holder will really get only 13 acres of land. The result is that the State will acquire not only the 17 acres surplus (35 acres actually in the possession of the tenure-holder minus 18 acres, the ceiling limit) but also another 5 acres within the ceiling limit. Take a second case: suppose the tenure-holder has 20 acres of land. He transfers, after the relevant date, two acres of land, thereby retaining with him 18 acres of land which is just the ceiling limit. If this transfer is ignored, then the tenure-holder will be deemed to be still possessed of 20 acres of land. He will be given 18 acres as his ceiling area which will include the two acres transferred by him. The surplus land will consist of two acres of land taken from the 18 acres which he actually had in his possession. Clearly two acres of land within the ceiling limit will be acquired by the State as a surplus land. The same result inevitably follow in every case where a genuine and effective transfer is ignored.
13. Since the Act does not provide for the payment of compensation at a rate which is not less than the market value of the land acquired within the ceiling limit, the acquisition will be violative of the second proviso to Article 31-A(1). The first two questions referred have to be answered in the affirmative.
14. The third question is whether the inclusion of the Act in the IX Schedule removes the restriction placed by the second proviso to Article 31-A(1). Article 31-B, which gives protection to law placed in the IX Schedule, is in these terms:—
“31-B. Validation of certain Acts and Regulations—Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31-A, more of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions there shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provisions is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Act and Regulations shall subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend, it, continue in force.”
15. The protection afforded by this Article to laws placed in the IX Schedule is only in respect of inconsistency with other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. A law can be inconsistent only with a provision which places restrictions on legislative power. Therefore, Article 31-B protects laws placed in the IX Schedule from restrictions placed upon the legislative action by any provision contained in Part III. If the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) places any restriction on legislative action, then the provisions of Article 31-B may protect the law from invalidity on the ground of violation of that restriction. Upon a plain reading of the second proviso it appears that it is directed only against executive action and not against legislative action. It prohibits the acquisition of land of the Executive in certain circumstances. It does not purport to place any restriction upon the power of the legislature.
16. The main part of Article 31-A(1) lifts the ban placed by Articles 14, 19 and 31 upon legislative action in respect of the categories of laws specified in clauses (a) to (e) thereof. The first proviso lays down that such a law if made by a State Legislature can be saved by Article 31-A only if it has received the assent of the President. The second proviso is not at all concerned with the saving of any laws and as such is not a real proviso to Article 31-A(1). It is a provision according protection to persons in respect of acquisition of their land by the State within the ceiling limit. The provision was made to give some protection to holders of land in view of the validation of the Ceiling laws by Article 31-B and of the enlargement of the definition of the word ‘estate’ in clause (2) of Article 31-A. The language of the second proviso does not manifest any intention, after the lifting of the bans of Articles 14, 19 and 31 by the main, provision, to impose a new ban on legislative power. If Parliament had intended to put a new ban on legislative power, the second proviso would have run somewhat as follows:—
“Provided further that no law making provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation shall authorise the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force unless it provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.”
17. The learned Advocate General has, however, contended that the second proviso does, in effect, place a restriction on legislative action. According to him, it is inconceivable that executive action taken in consonance with the provisions of a valid law should be ‘unlawful’. A provision, which seeks to make such executive action unlawful, in reality and in effect, makes the law itself unlawful. He has further contended that Article 31-A deals with the saving of laws and the second proviso carves out an exception to the main provision in that a law not providing for compensation at market value shall not be valid. We are unable to accept these contentions. The language of the second proviso is plain and admits of only one interpretation. It places restriction only upon the executive action of acquiring certain land and not upon legislative action. The word ‘State’, which has been used twice in the second proviso, means in the context the ‘Executive’. This proviso assumes the existence of a valid law and, under such valid law, it prohibits acquisition of certain land if the law does not provide for payment of compensation at the rate of market value. Merely because this provision has been introduced as a proviso to Article 31-A(1), it cannot be held to deal with legislative power. Article 31-A(1) is not a provision placing fetters on legislative power but is a provision removing such fetters. A proviso in such a provision cannot be construed to place fetters on legislative power unless the language compels that construction. The language, as we have indicated earlier does not support the contention that the second proviso places restrictions upon legislative power. Further, we are not aware of any legal principles upon which it can be held that, if executive action in consonance with a valid law is rendered unlawful, the law itself must be held to be unlawful. No authority has been cited in support of such a proposition.
18. The explanation added to the IX Schedule by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, also belies the contention of the learned Advocate General. It has to be kept in mind that the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) was also introduced by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. This Amending Act placed the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act III of 1955) in the IX Schedule. It then added the following explanation at the end of the IX Schedule:—
“Any acquisition made under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act III of 1955) in contravention of the second proviso to clause (i) of Article 31-A shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.”
19. Before the enactment of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act when the second proviso had not been introduced in Article 31-A(1), acquisition of land under the Rajasthan Act could not be said to have contravened the second proviso. On its language, the second proviso is prospective. Therefore, acquisitions of land made under the Rajasthan Act before the 17th Amendment were unaffected by the second proviso but the explanation makes these acquisitions void on account of inconsistency with the second proviso. What is important to notice is that the Rajasthan Act has by being placed in the IX Schedule, been validated from its inception and that executive action taken under it of acquiring land in consonance with its provisions has been invalidated by the explanation. This cuts across the argument of the learned Advocate General that executive action in consonance with a valid law cannot be unlawful.
20. On its language, the explanation also relates to executive action and indicates that the second proviso does likewise. It virtually extends the prohibition of the second proviso to executive action taken under the Rajasthan Act at a time when the second proviso was not even enacted. It thus appears that the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) places restriction only on executive action and not upon legislative action. Article 31-B validates laws placed in the IX Schedule but not the executive action taken under those laws. The placing of the U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, and the Amending Acts in the IX Schedule does not affect the restrictions placed by the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) on the power of the State to acquire land in the circumstances set out therein. The third question has also to be answered in the affirmative. The fourth question is easily answered. Article 31-C provides:—
“31-C—Saving of laws giving effect to certain Directive Principles—Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy:
Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this Article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.”
21. It protects laws which violates the provisions of Articles 14, 19 and 31 if they have been made to give effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39. This Article is not concerned with giving any protection against the violation of the provisions of the second proviso to Article 31-A(1). That being so, even if the Acts have the protection of Article 31-C the provisions of the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) will remain operative and it will still be necessary to comply with its provisions.
22. All the four questions referred are answered in the affirmative. The case will now be listed again before the learned Single Judge with our opinion.
23. Questions answered.
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