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Dev Sha Corporation, Mumbai v. Shree Ram Mills Ltd., Mumbai .

Bombay High Court
Mar 24, 2009
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.A. Bobde, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal is preferred by the plaintiffs against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 17-6-2005 which set aside an ex parte decree passed in their favour in a suit brought under Order 37, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Procedural timeline and material facts as stated in the opinion:

  • The plaintiffs sued the respondents for Rs. 5,94,597.99. Summons for judgment were served on 14-1-2002.
  • On 3-6-2003 the trial court granted conditional leave to the respondents to defend the suit on deposit of Rs. 5,94,597.99 within four weeks.
  • On 6-2-2004 an ex parte decree was passed against the respondents for failing to deposit the amount.
  • On 31-7-2004 a warrant of attachment issued; it was stayed on 30-8-2004 when respondents deposited Rs. 21,91,675/-.
  • The respondents filed a notice of motion seeking to set aside the order granting conditional leave dated 6-3-2003 and the ex parte decree dated 6-2-2004. The Trial Judge declined to set aside the conditional-leave order but did set aside the ex parte decree and granted extension of time to deposit the amount as ordered earlier.
  • The plaintiffs (appellants) filed the present appeal against the Trial Judge's order of 17-6-2005.
  • The Trial Judge imposed costs of Rs. 15,000/- on the respondents when setting aside the ex parte decree. The respondents tendered a cheque dated 27-6-2005 received by the appellants with a letter dated 28-6-2005. The appellants retained the cheque and filed the appeal about two months later (17-8-2005). The appeal was admitted on 1-12-2005. After an objection was raised that acceptance of the cheque amounted to approbation and reprobation, the appellants returned the cheque by letter dated 29-11-2005. The respondents apparently sent the cheque back and the appellants retained it thereafter.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order setting aside an ex parte decree under Order 37, Rule 4 of the CPC is appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court (i.e., whether it is a "judgment" for purposes of appeal to a larger Bench), given that such an order is not appealable under the provisions of Order 43, Rule 1 CPC.
  2. Whether the appellants' acceptance (receipt and retention) of the cheque for costs imposed in the order constitutes receiving a benefit under the order such that they are precluded from maintaining the appeal on the principle against approbation and reprobation (with reliance on Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Shri Joshi)

  • Preliminary objection 1: There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure, including Order 43, for an appeal from an order setting aside a decree in a summary suit; and the order setting aside such a decree is not a "judgment" within Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, so no appeal lies under that clause.
  • Preliminary objection 2: The appeal is not tenable because the appellants have accepted the benefits of the order setting aside the ex parte decree by accepting costs imposed on the respondents; accordingly, they are precluded from maintaining the appeal by the law stated in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh (AIR 1961 SC 1327 as cited in the opinion).

Appellants' Arguments (as presented by Shri Sen)

  • The appellants contended that merely accepting a cheque does not amount to receiving the benefits under the order; they argued that benefits would be received only if the cheque were encashed (i.e., actual payment rather than mere receipt of a cheque).

Other Factual/Procedural Points Raised

  • Sequence of events concerning receipt, retention, and return of the cheque was relied upon by both sides to establish whether the appellants had, in fact, accepted the benefit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania ((1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786) Holds that an order setting aside an ex parte decree is a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and hence is appealable though it may not be appealable under Order 43, Rule 1 CPC. The court relied on this authority to conclude that an order setting aside a decree under Order 37, Rule 4 amounts to an interlocutory judgment within Clause 15 and is appealable to a larger Bench.
Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh (as reported in AIR 1961 SC 1327 in the opinion) Principle that a party who takes a benefit under an order (e.g., receives costs) cannot thereafter challenge that order; the doctrine against approbation and reprobation. The court applied the observations in Bhau Ram to conclude that appellants who accepted the cheque for costs received the benefit of the order and are precluded from maintaining the appeal.
Tinkler v. Hilder ((1849) 154 ER 1176) English authority cited as foundational for the principle that one cannot accept part of an order and repudiate another when the order is intended to take effect in its entirety. Referenced (through Bhau Ram and subsequent Indian cases) as part of the line of authorities establishing the approbation-and-reprobation principle which the court applied.
Banku Chandra v. Marium Begum (21 Cal WN 232 : AIR 1917 Cal 546 (SB)) Indian decision following Tinkler's principle regarding adoption of parts of orders and repudiation of others. Used by the Supreme Court (in Bhau Ram and related decisions) to support the approbation-and-reprobation doctrine; relied upon in the chain of authority applied by this Court.
Ramendramohan v. Keshabchandra (ILR 61 Cal 433 : AIR 1934 Cal 554) Indian authority in the line of cases cited for the principle that a party cannot take a benefit under an order and then challenge it. Referenced as part of authorities underpinning the approbation-and-reprobation rule applied by the court.
Mani Ram v. Beharidas (AIR 1955 Raja 145) Another Indian decision cited among cases that follow the Tinkler principle. Included in the list of authorities illustrating the approbation-and-reprobation doctrine relied upon by the court.
Veeraswami Pillai v. Kalyanasundaram Mudaliar (AIR 1927 Mad 1009) Indian authority cited in support of the approbation-and-reprobation principle. Part of the cluster of cases relied on for the rule that a party who accepts benefits under an order cannot challenge it.
Venkatarayudu v. Rama Krishnayya (AIR 1930 Mad 268) Contains an explanation (by Venkatasubba Rao, J.) of the underlying principle — when an order is intended to take effect in its entirety, a person cannot adopt one part and repudiate another; cites Halsbury on the doctrine. The Court quoted and relied on this exposition to explain the reasoning behind prohibiting approbation and reprobation in the present facts.
Pearce v. Chaplin ((1846) 115 ER 1483) English authority cited among the historical decisions supporting the approbation-and-reprobation principle. Referenced as part of the jurisprudential background for the rule that a party cannot accept part of an order and repudiate another part.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay South v. Messers Ogale Glass Works Ltd. (AIR 1954 SC 429) Illustrates the principle that a cheque, unless dishonoured on presentation, amounts to payment; “A cheque, unless dishonoured, is payment.” The court relied on this authority to hold that receiving a cheque for the costs on the Trial Judge's order amounted to receiving the payment (i.e., receiving the benefit) unless the cheque was dishonoured.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal analytical steps corresponding to the two preliminary objections raised by the respondents.

  1. Appealability of the order setting aside an ex parte decree:

    The court acknowledged that an order setting aside a decree under Order 37, Rule 4 is not appealable under Order 43, Rule 1 CPC. However, relying on the decision in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania ((1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786) the court accepted the reasoning that such an order vitally affects the plaintiff's valuable rights and therefore amounts to an interlocutory judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Consequently the court held that the order setting aside an ex parte decree is a "judgment" for purposes of Clause 15 and is appealable to a larger Bench. This resolved the first objection to maintainability in favour of the appellants' right to bring the appeal.

  2. Effect of accepting the benefit (costs) on maintainability of the appeal:

    The court then examined whether the appellants had, in fact, accepted benefits under the order in a manner that bars them from appealing. It found the following undisputed facts: the Trial Judge imposed costs of Rs. 15,000 while setting aside the ex parte decree; respondents tendered a cheque dated 27-6-2005 (received by the appellants with a letter dated 28-6-2005); the appellants retained the cheque without demur and filed the appeal on 17-8-2005 (about two months later). Although the appellants returned the cheque after an objection was raised, the court noted that they had previously retained it and had not taken immediate steps to repudiate the benefit.

    Applying the approbation-and-reprobation principle as articulated in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh and the line of authorities originating with Tinkler v. Hilder, the court observed that where an order is intended to take effect in its entirety a party cannot adopt one part (the benefit) and repudiate another (challenge the order). The court further applied the rule from Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messers Ogale Glass Works Ltd. that "a cheque, unless dishonoured, is payment," concluding that receipt and retention of the cheque amounted to receipt of the benefit unless dishonoured. On these bases the court concluded that the appellants had received the benefit of the order and were precluded from maintaining the appeal.

The court therefore concluded that, while the appeal was in principle maintainable as an appeal from a "judgment" under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the appellants' conduct in accepting the cheque for costs precluded them from prosecuting the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. (The opinion concludes: "Appeal dismissed." and states "There shall be no order as to costs.")

Implications and direct effects:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellants' appeal against the order setting aside the ex parte decree is dismissed because the appellants accepted the costs awarded in that order (by receiving and retaining a cheque) and are therefore precluded from challenging the order under the approbation-and-reprobation principle.
  • Costs: The court expressly ordered "no order as to costs".
  • Precedential effect: The court applied existing authorities (including Shah Babulal Khimji and Bhau Ram) to the facts. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general principle beyond application and reconciliation of the cited precedents to the facts before the court. (No broader new precedent is announced in the text of this opinion.)
Appeal dismissed.
Show all summary ...

S.A Bobde, J.:— This appeal is preferred by the plaintiffs against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 17-6-2005 setting aside the ex parte decree passed in his favour in a suit under Order 37, Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure.

2. Shri Joshi, the learned Counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection to the tenability of the appeal on two grounds (a) According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure including Order 43, for an appeal from an order setting aside a decree in a summary suit. Further, such an order not being a judgment, an appeal does not lie from it under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court. (b) the appeal is not tenable because the appellants have received the benefits of the order setting aside ex parte decree by accepting costs imposed on the respondents thereby and are therefore, not entitled to maintain the appeal in view of law, laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1327.

3. The appellants sued the respondents for a sum of Rs. 5,94,597.99. On 14-1-2002 the Summons for Judgment was served on them. On 3-6-2003, the Court granted conditional leave to the respondents to defend the suit on deposit of sum of Rs. 5,94,597.99, within a period of 4 weeks. On 6-2-2004 the Court passed an ex parte decree against the respondents on failure to deposit the amount.

4. On 31-7-2004 a warrant of attachment was issued. This was stayed on 30-8-2004, on the respondents depositing a sum of Rs. 21,91,675/-.

5. The respondents then took out the notice of motion for setting aside the order granting conditional leave to defend the suit dated 6-3-2003 and ex parte decree dated 6-2-2004. The learned Trial Judge declined to set side the order granting conditional leave to defend the suit but however granted the other prayer and set aside the ex parte decree and granted extension of time to deposit the amount as ordered earlier. The plaintiffs have filed the present appeal against this order.

6. As regards the first objection to maintainability there is no doubt that the order setting aside a decree under Order 37, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not appealable under Order 43, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code. However, it appears that such an order setting aside a decree under Order 37, Rule 4 has been held to be a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, reported in (1981) 4 SCC 8 : AIR 1981 SC 1786. The Supreme Court observed as follows:

“Similarly, suppose the trial Judge passes an order setting aside an ex parte decree against the defendant, which is not appealable under any of the clauses of Order 43, Rule 1 though an order rejecting an application to set aside the decree passed ex parte falls within Order 43, Rule 1, clause (d) and is appealable, the serious question that arises is whether or not the order first mentioned is a judgment within the meaning of Letters Patent. The fact, however, remains that the orders setting aside the ex parte decree puts the defendant to a great advantage and works serious injustice to the plaintiff because as a consequences of the order, the plaintiff has now to contest the suit and is deprived of the fruits of the decree passed in his favour. In these circumstances, therefore, the order passed by the trial Judge setting aside the ex parte decree vitally affects the valuable rights of the plaintiff and hence amounts to an interlocutory judgment and is therefore, appealable to a larger Bench. Though the aforesaid observation are in respect of an order under Order 9, Rule 13 we are of the view that they apply with equal force to an order setting aside the decree under Order 37, Rule 4. We therefore, hold that an order setting aside a decree whether on the ground that it is ex parte or otherwise is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent of this Court and is therefore appealable under that clause.

7. This takes us to the next objection pertaining to tenability viz. that the appeal is not tenable because the appellants have received the benefits under order setting aside the ex parte decree and are therefore, not entitled to file this appeal. There is no dispute that the learned Judge imposed costs of Rs. 15,000/-while setting aside an ex parte decree and extending the time to deposit the amount. The order was passed on 17-6-2005. The respondents tendered a cheque dated 27-6-2005 under a letter dated 28-6-2005. There is no dispute that the letter along with the cheque has been received by the appellant. The appellants retained the cheque without demur and without raising any objection and filed an appeal on 17-8-2005 i.e after a period of about two months. The appeal was placed before a Division Bench of this Court. The Court admitted the appeal on 1st December, 2005. Apparently, since an objection was raised by the respondents that the act of accepting the cheque and filing the appeal amounts approbation and reprobation the appellant returned the cheque under letter 29-11-2005. Apparently the cheque was sent back by the respondents and the appellants have retained the cheque since then. Shri Joshi, the learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that it is a settled law that it is not permissible to approbate or repprobate by adopting one part of the order and refusing another part, when the order is intended to take effect in its entirety. The Supreme Court in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1324, observed as follows:—

“In support of his contention, learned Counsel has relied upon the well-known case of Tinkler v. Hilder, (1849) 154 ER 1176 and other cases which follow that decision or which proceed on the same reason as that in Tinkler's case, (1849) 154 ER 1176. Those decisions are: Banku Chandra v. Marium Begum, 21 Cal WN 232 : (AIR 1917 Cal 546 (SB)), (AIR 1917 Cal 546)(SB); Ramendramohan v. Keshabchandra, ILR 61 Cal 433: (AIR 1934 Cal 554); Mani Ram v. Beharidas, (S), AIR 1955 Raja 145; Veeraswami Pillai v. Kalyanasundaram Mudaliar, AIR 1927 Mad 1009; Venkatarayudu v. Rama Krishnayya, AIR 1930 Mad 268 and Pearce v. Chaplin, (1846) 115 ER 1483.

“The two English decisions just referred to and some of the Indian decisions were considered in AIR 1930 Mad 268. Dealing with them Venkatasubba Rao, J., observed as follows:

“What is the principle underlying these decisions? when an order shows plainly that it is intended to take effect in its entirety and that several parts of it depend upon each other, a person cannot adopt one part and repudiate another. For instance, if the Court directs that the suit shall be restored on the plaintiff paying the costs of the opposing party, there is no intention to benefit the latter, except on the terms mentioned in the order itself. If the party receives costs, his act is tantamount to adopting the order…….. According to Halsbury this rule is an application of the doctrine ‘that a person may not approbate and reprobate’ (13 Halsbury, para 508)….In other words, to allow a party, who takes a benefit under such an order, to complain against it, would be to permit a breach of faith”.

It may be noted that Their Lordships held in that case that the benefit that was received by the appellants was of withdrawing the pre-emption price and that such a benefit was not de hors the decree and therefore, the appellant could not be denied the statutory right to appeal. However, there is no doubt that Their Lordships approved the statement of law that parties are not entitled to take a benefit such as receiving costs which would tantamount to adopting the order and then challenging the order.

8. Shri Sen the learned Counsel for the appellants, submitted that the appellants cannot be said to have received the benefits under the order, merely because they have accepted the cheque. According to the learned Counsel the appellants, could be said to have received the benefits only if they had encashed the cheque, apart from accepting. It is not possible to accept the contention of Shri Sen. The intention of the parties in such a matter is crucial. It is clear that the respondents paid the costs imposed on them by way of a cheque which the appellants accepted and retained without demur. There was absolutely no attempt on the part of the appellant to return the said cheque. In fact, they proceeded to file an appeal about two months after receiving the costs by way of cheque. It is obvious that the appellants intended to receive the benefits, and in fact did so, under the order setting aside the ex parte decree. That apart, there seems to be little doubt that receiving a cheque amounts to a conditional acceptance of payment. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay South v. Messers Ogale Glass Works Ltd., reported in AIR 1954 SC 429, the Supreme Court relied on Byles on Bills, 20th Edition P. 23 and the position is summarised pithily as follows:—

“A cheque, unless dishonoured, is payment”. Accordingly their Lordships concluded as follows:—

“In the case before us none of the cheques has been dishonoured on presentation and payment cannot, therefore, be said to have been defeated by the happening of the condition subsequent, namely dishonour by non-payment and that being so there can be no question, therefore, that the assessee did not receive payment by the receipt of the cheques”.

The payment thus takes effect from the delivery of the cheque but may be defeated for failure of the condition i.e, non-payment on maturity. We thus have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the appellants have received the benefits of the order and by accepting the cheque towards the costs of Rs. 15,000/- from the respondents and therefore, are not entitled to maintain the appeal in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Sing, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1327.

9. In the result the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.