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Pathumma & Ors. v. K.S.E.B & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Opinion by Narayana Kurup, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The applicants in Indigent Original Petition No. 35 of 1991 before the Subordinate Judge, Tirur, are the appellants in this appeal. They are the legal heirs of one Marakkar. The substantive suit is against the Kerala State Electricity Board for recovery of Rs. 2,29,360 as compensation for the death of Marakkar by electric shock. The first appellant is the widow and appellants 2 to 8 are the children of the deceased.
The appellants filed Indigent O.P. No. 35 of 1991 requesting permission to sue as indigents, stating they lacked sufficient means to pay the court-fee of Rs. 15,130. The learned Sub Judge dismissed that application, holding the appellants had sufficient means to pay the court-fee and were not indigent. The present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal (C.M.A.) challenges that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellants possess "sufficient means" to pay the court-fee of Rs. 15,130, such that they are not entitled to indigent status and exemption from payment of the fee.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The government report shows 74½ cents of land in the name of the deceased, but the appellants say 42½ cents (Survey Nos. 50/10, 20/1 and 50/9) are "Oru Pooval" nilam in the possession of the deceased's brother (evidence: PW-2). After deducting that, the appellants assert they actually possess only 32 cents of land.
- The plaint schedule property contains the residential house and is co-owned by eight persons (including the widow and children, two of whom are minors). All co-owners require space to construct residential accommodation.
- If accommodation for eight persons must be constructed on the available land, there may be no portion of the property reasonably available for sale to raise the court-fee.
- Implicitly, the appellants contend that their property is not immediately and conveniently realisable into cash to meet the court-fee and that they therefore lack "sufficient means".
Position of the Court Below (learned Sub Judge) as Described in the Opinion
- The learned Sub Judge held that if the appellants transferred six cents of land out of their possession they could raise the necessary amount to pay the court-fee.
- The Sub Judge also held the appellants were not entitled to exemption under Clause (c) of Section 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, reasoning that the exemption applies only to an existing residential building and the site appurtenant thereto and does not extend to property where a building could be constructed in the future.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Janakykutty v. Varghese (1969 KLT 953) (Krishna Iyer, J.) | The capacity to raise money turns on the immediate convertibility of the property into cash. | Used to support the proposition that "sufficient means" depends on whether property can be immediately converted into cash; the court applied this test to the appellants' 32 cents and found immediate convertibility lacking. |
| Xavier v. Kuriakose (1987 (1) KLT 176) | "Sufficient means" refers to means sufficient to pay the court-fee after meeting basic needs of life; an indigent need not be bereft of all possessions. | Employed to show that possession of some property does not automatically negate indigent status; the court relied on this to reject the lower court's approach. |
| A. Prabhakaran Nair…Revision v. K.P. Neelakantan Pillai… (1987 (2) KLT 376) | Order 33 Rule 1 CPC: "sufficient means" means possession of sufficient realisable property within the immediate reach of the plaintiff(s) which can be immediately converted into cash; debts due or remote assets are excluded. | Applied to emphasize that only immediately realisable property can be counted for calculating sufficient means; the court found the appellants' land not shown to be immediately realisable. |
| Sanyukta v. Prem Kumar Madan (AIR 1974 Punjab & Haryana 203) | The relevant inquiry is not whether a person possesses sufficient property generally but whether he has sufficient means specifically to pay the prescribed fee. | Used to reinforce the correct focus of the inquiry on available means to meet the court-fee, applied in concluding appellants lacked such means despite land ownership. |
| Dulhin Suraj Mukhi Devi v. Jokhu Raj (AIR 1972 Patna 313) | Same principle: the test is sufficiency of means to pay the fee, not mere property ownership. | Cited for the same proposition and relied upon to demonstrate established precedent supporting the appellants' position. |
| Virapakshiah v. Shivalingaiah (AIR 1960 A.P. 540) | When property is not cash, the test is whether, in the concrete circumstances, money can be raised substantially on the properties; evidence is necessary to judge that question. | Quoted and applied to conclude that evidence was lacking to show that money could be raised on the appellants' land; thus it should not be counted as sufficient means. |
| P.M. Ashwathanarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka (1989 Supp (1) SCC 696 : AIR 1989 SC 100) | Referenced in the context of policy commentary against burdensome court-fee scales and supporting measures like suitors' funds; supports a policy of reducing oppressive court-fees. | Relied upon in the opinion's policy discussion to underline that high court-fees may be indefensible and to support the broader view that access to justice should not be unduly restricted by fees. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying the central legal standard: the enquiry is not merely whether the appellants possess property but whether they possess "sufficient means" — i.e., the capacity to raise money to pay the court-fee. The opinion emphasizes that the crucial factor is the immediate convertibility of the property into cash.
The court reviewed the factual assertions: (a) although a government report indicated 74½ cents in the deceased's name, the appellants alleged that some portion (42½ cents) was in the brother's possession and that, after deduction, they actually possess only 32 cents; (b) the plaint schedule property contains the residential house and is co-owned by eight persons, including two minors; (c) the land is needed to construct residential accommodation for the co-owners.
The judgment criticizes the Sub Judge's approach as unsound and not pragmatic: the lower court's conclusion that the appellants could raise the fee by selling six cents of land failed to address the immediate-realizability test and ignored practical difficulties. The court explained the legal tests through multiple precedents — namely that:
- The test is immediate convertibility into cash (Janakykutty v. Varghese; A. Prabhakaran Nair…Revision).
- "Sufficient means" is to be assessed after accounting for basic needs, and possession of some property does not automatically disqualify indigent status (Xavier v. Kuriakose).
- When property is not cash, evidence is required to show whether substantial money can be raised given the concrete circumstances (Virapakshiah v. Shivalingaiah).
Applying these principles to the facts before it, the court found several practical and evidentiary gaps the Sub Judge did not address:
- No evidence as to the exact location of the house on the 32 cents was produced; if the house is centrally located, no convenient portion could be severed and sold without defeating the residential character of the property.
- Two co-owners being minors would complicate sale and reduce marketability.
- The need for vacant land to provide residential accommodation to the co-owners is a relevant factor militating against treating the land as freely realisable.
- The family comprises a widow and children who have lost their breadwinner and have no shown alternate livelihood beyond the meagre income from the land.
The court also situated the legal analysis within a broader constitutional and policy framework: it invoked Article 39A and various authoritative commentaries to stress that access to justice should not be denied by reason of economic disability, that the operation of court-fees as an access barrier must be scrutinized, and that the law should not demand that indigent persons sell essential shelter or be driven to severe measures to pay fees.
On the facts and in light of the cited authorities, the court concluded that the possession of 32 cents could not be treated as establishing sufficient means to pay the required court-fee because the land was not shown to be immediately realisable in the concrete circumstances of this family.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the Subordinate Judge. In the court's words, the appellants should be treated as persons "having no sufficient means to pay the court fee required to be paid in the appeal." Accordingly, the appellants are permitted to file the suit as indigent persons.
APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER SET ASIDE; APPELLANTS GRANTED LEAVE TO SUE AS INDIGENT PERSONS.
Immediate consequences for the parties: the appellants may prosecute their suit without paying the contested court-fee; the order of the Sub Judge is quashed. The court directed that parties will bear their respective costs.
Broader implications: the opinion reiterates and applies established principles concerning the "immediate convertibility" test for determining whether a litigant has "sufficient means" to pay court-fees and underscores constitutional and policy concerns about access to justice. The opinion does not state that it is laying down a novel legal rule; rather, it applies and synthesizes existing authorities and policy commentary to the facts at hand.
Narayana Kurup, J.:— Applicants in Indigent Original Petition No. 35 of 1991 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tirur are the appellants. They are legal heirs of one Marakkar and the suit is laid against the Kerala State Electricity Board for realisation of a sum of Rs. 2,29,360/- as compensation due to the death of the said Marakkar by electric shock. The first appellant is the wife and appellants 2 to 8 are the children of the deceased Marakkar. Appellants filed Indigent O.P 35 of 1991 before the court below for permission to sue as indigents alleging that they have no sufficient means to pay the court fee of Rs. 15,130/-. However, the court below by the impugned order dismissed the application holding that the appellants have sufficient means to pay the court fee and they are not indigent persons. Hence this C.M.A
2. The question that arises for consideration is whether the appellants are possessed of sufficient means to pay the court fee. No doubt, the report of the Government will show that an extent of 74½ cents of land stood in the name of the late Marakkar, the predecessor of the appellants. But then, the appellants have a case that 42½ of land in Survey Nos. 50/10, 20/1 and 50/9 are “Oru Pooval” nilam in the possession of the brother of the deceased Marakkar, who was examined as PW-2 and after deducting, that extent, they are actually in possession of only 32 cents of land. The appellants have a further case that the plaint schedule property is the property where their residential house is situated and it belonged in co-ownership to 8 persons including two minors being the wife and children of the deceased and all the 8 persons require residential houses to be constructed over the land. If residential houses for 8 persons are constructed over the 32 cents of land, no portion of the property will be available for sale for raising the amount for payment of court fee. However, this contention did not find favour with by the learned Sub Judge who held that if the appellants transferred six cents of land out of the land possessed by them, they could raise the amount necessary for payment of court fee. According to the learned Sub Judge, the appellants are also not entitled to exemption under Clause (c) of Section 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure since the exemption under that provision applies only to residential building and site appurtenant thereto and it does not exclude the property where a building could be constructed in future. In short, according to the learned Sub Judge, the appellants are liable to raise the amount for payment of court fee by selling six cents of land from plaint A schedule property. We do not think that the reasoning of the court below is either sound or pragmatic. The question to be considered is not mere possession of property by the appellants, but sufficient means, that is the capacity to raise money to pay court fee and it is incumbent upon the court to come to a finding on that point. The capacity to raise money is the crux of the matter and this turns on immediate convertability of the property into cash (Krishna Iyer, J. in Janakykutty v. Varghese (1969 KLT 953)). Viewing the matter from a practical stand-point, it has to be held that an indigent person need not be bereft of all material possessions. The C.P.C confers the benefit on persons without “sufficient means”. It refers not to a person without any means. On the other hand, the expression used is “sufficient means” which is, means sufficient to pay court fee after meeting the basic needs of life. (Xavier v. Kuriakose (1987 (1) KLT 176). The possession of “sufficient means” in Order 33 Rule 1 CPC means possession of sufficient realisable property within the immediate reach of the plaintiff(s) which can be immediately converted into cash. Debts due to be realised or assets not within the immediate reach of the plaintiff(s) to be converted into cash cannot therefore, be taken into consideration for calculating sufficient means. (A. Prabhakaran Nair…Revision v. K.P Neelakantan Pillai…. (1987 (2) KLT 376)). Reference can also be made to the decision reported in Sanyukta v. Prem Kumar Madan (AIR 1974 Punjab & Haryana 203) wherein it is stated that “what is to be seen is not whether a person possesses sufficient property which can enable him to pay the prescribed fee but whether he has sufficient means for this purpose”. To the same effect also is a ruling of the Patna High Court reported in Dulhin Suraj Mukhi Devi v. Jokhu Raj (AIR 1972 Patna 313). In like vein is the observation of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision reported in Virapakshiah v. Shivalingaiah (AIR 1960 A.P 540). At paragraph 8, it has been held as follows:—
“………. When the property does not consist of cash, the test is not whether a person has a power in the abstract of raising money, but whether, in the concrete circumstances of the case, he could succeed in raising anything substantial by exercising that power. In each case evidence would be necessary to enable one to judge whether money could be raised on the properties.”
3. In other words the person concerned should possess the potential to raise cash. If the requirement of law is that, a person has to sell whatever little he possesses in this world or beg, borrow or steal to raise money for payment of court fee, that will be too harsh an approach to the problem resulting in manifest injustice cutting at the very root of the basic values and ideals of administration of justice in a welfare-State. While stating so we are only reminding ourselves of the constitutional obligations of the State to administer justice within its realm and the Directive Principles of State Policy in Article 39A which enjoins the State to ensure that opportunities of securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The laws’ delays and expenses of litigation are the notorious twin spokes on the wheels of legal system and administration of justice. If the social and economic change is to be achieved through peaceful means, then, their realisation and effectuation which are directly linked to the availability and efficacy of expeditious and cheap legal remedies must receive top priority on the constitutional agenda.
4. The public importance of the question and the public interest the policy of court-fee evokes are reflected in the trenchant humour of A.P Herbert's “More Uncommon Law” from the words of the Judge in the fictional Hogby v. Hogby:
“That if the Crown must charge for justice, at least the fee should be like the fee for postage; that is to say, it should be the same, however long the journey may be. For it is no fault of one litigant that his plea to the King's judges raises questions more difficult to determine than another's, and will require a longer hearing in Court. He is asking for justice, not renting house-propert”’.
5. There is also in the following exchange between the Attorney General and the Judge the echo of the argument that State whose primary duty is to administer justice should do so out of public revenues and not put justice up for sale:
The Attorney-General; As to that, Milord, may I suggest one possible line of thought? The Crown, in this connection, means the whole body of tax-payers. Would it be fair and equitable if the general taxpayer had to provide all the facilities of the Courts for the benefit of the litigant?
6. The Judge: why not? Everybody pays for the police, but some people use them more than other. Nobody complains. You don't have to pay a special fee every time you have a burglary, or ask a policeman the way. I don't follow you, Sir Anthony. I will go further. I hold that the Crown not merely ought not, but is unable, to act in this way, by reason of the passage in the Great Charter which I have quoted. The Rules of Court, then, which propose to impose these charges are ultra vires, unconstitutional, and of no effect: and Mr. Hogby may continue to decline to pay them”.
7. The fortieth clause of the Great Charter of Runnymede declared that Justice shall not be sold, denied or delayed: “Nulli Vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum aut justiciam.” What was implicit in the need for this promise was that Royal Justice was, otherwise, popular; but the complaint was that it was too dear and it was slow in coming, the subsequent course of history of the administration of justice in England shows that the Magna-Carta did not wholly stop the evils of delays in, the expensiveness of, Royal Justice but it did, after all, do something, perhaps something substantial, to cheapen justice and stop the abuses which were rampant in King John's Reign: (See History of English Law 57-58).
8. Dr. R.M Jackson - Machinery of Justice in England “Fifth Ed., 324 - points out the dependence of Royal Justice in England in part at least, on the profits of its administration earned;
“In the past the growth of Royal Justice was partly due to the profits that accrued from exercising jurisdiction. The early itinerant justices were more concerned with safeguarding the King's fiscal rights than with the trial of ordinary actions. A law Court was expected to pay for itself and show a profit for the King. It is sometime since justice has been a substantial source of income, but the old idea survives in the idea that the Courts ought not to be run at a loss.”
9. The Court-fee as a limitation on access to justice is inextricably interwined with a “highly emotional and even evocative subject stimulating visions of a social order in which justice will be brought within the reach of all citizens of all ranks in society, both those blessed with affluence and those depressed with their poverty”. It is, it is said, like a clarion call to make the administration of civil justice available to all on the basis of equality, equity and fairness with its corollary that no one should suffer injustice by reason of his not affording or is deterred from, access to justice. The need for access to justice, recognises the primordial need to maintain order in society as disincentive of inclinations towards extra-judicial and violent means of settling disputes. On this a learned author “Access to Justice” by Cappellbtti, Vol. 1, Book 1, 419 says:
“The need for access to justice may be said to be two fold; first, we must ensure that the rights of citizens should be recognised and made effective for otherwise they would not be real but merely illusory; and secondly we must enable legal disputes, conflicts and complaints which inevitably arise in society to be resolved in an orderly way according to the justice of the case, so as to promote harmony and peace in society, lest they foster and breed discontent and disturbance. In truth, the phrase itself, “access to justice”, is a profound and powerful expression of a social need which is imperative, urgent and more widespread than is generally acknowledged”.
10. The stipulation of court-fee is undoubtedly a deterrent to free “access to justice”, but one of the earlier avowed objects of court-fee was stated to be - as was done in the preamble of the Bengal Regulation which in 1795 imposed high court - fees - discouragement of litigation, particularly the speculative and the frivolous variety. Lord Macaulay called that preamble “the most eminently absurd Preamble, that was ever drawn”. The view of Macaulay “The Crisis of the Indian Legal System” by Upendra Baxi, 54 on the subject are worth recalling:
“If what the Courts administer be justice, is justice a thing which the Government ought to grudge to the people?……………….. It is undoubtedly a great evil that frivolous and vexatious suits should be instituted. But it is an evil for which the Government has only itself and its agents to blame, and for which it has the power of proving a most efficient remedy. The real way to prevent unjust suits is to take care that there shall be just decision. No man goes to law except in the hope of succeeding. No man hopes to succeed in a bad cause unless he has reason to believe that it will be determined according to bad laws or by bad judges. Dishonest suits will never be common unless the public entertains an unfavourable opinion of the administration of justice. And the public will never long entertain such an opinion without good reason………… (The imposition of court-fees neither makes the pleadings clearer nor the law plainer, nor the corrupt judge purer, nor the stupid judge wiser. It will no doubt drive away the honest plaintiffs who cannot pay the fee. But it will also drive away dishonest plaintiffs who are in the same situation.
11. The Krishna Iyer Committee on Legal Aid also said:
“Something must be done, we venture to state, to arrest the escalating vice of burdensome scales of court-fee. That the State should not sell justice is an obvious proposition but the high rate of court-fee now levied leaves no valid alibi is also obvious. The Fourteenth Report of the Law Commission, the practice of 2 per cent in the socialist countries, and the small standard filing fee prevalent in many western countries make the Indian position indefensible and perilously near unconstitutional. If the legal system is not to be undemocratically expensive, there is a strong case for reducing court-fees and instituting suitors fund to meet the cost directed to be paid by a party because he is the loser but in the circumstances cannot bear the burden.” (See in this connection P.M Ashwathanarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka - 1989 Supp (1) SCC 696 : AIR 1989 SC 100).
12. In the light of the principles laid down by the various decisions of the courts referred to above and the opinion expressed by noted Jurists quoted above, we do not think that the learned Judge has either approached the question in the proper perspective or taken a correct decision in accordance with the legal principles applicable in the matter. Approaching the problem in the correct perspective and applying the relevant legal principles, we are of the view that possession of 32 cents of land by the 8 appellants (petitioners in IOP 35 of 1995) cannot be treated as a ground for holding that they are not indigent persons. The mere fact that they are holding 32 cents of land cannot be held to be a basis for holding that they have sufficient means to pay the court fee or have enough potential to acquire sufficient funds to pay the court fee required to be paid in the suit. We say so because first of all the said property is a property wherein the residential house is situated. There is nothing on record to show that any portion of the property can be conveniently separated so that such portion can be sold for realisation of the required fund for payment of court fee. No effort has been made to find out the exact location of the house in the property. If the house is situated at the centre of the 32 cents of land, the entire property can only reasonably be treated as land appurtenant to the building and necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the residential house. Secondly, it is important to note that two of the co-owners of the property are minors and it may be difficult to find out a purchaser for such property or part of it. Thirdly, the requirement of the vacant land for putting up of additional residential accommodation for co-owners is also a very relevant factor which should have gone into the mind of the court while deciding the issue. There is nothing on record to show that that aspect was taken note of by the learned Judge while passing the order. Lastly, it is also relevant to note that the petitioners are the members of a family consisting of a widow and her children who have lost their only bread winner all on a sudden as a result of electric shock for which they are claiming compensation in the suit. There is nothing on record to show that the widow and unmarried children have any other source of livelihood other than the meagre income which they may be getting at present from the 32 cents of land which is in their possession. Taking note of the above important aspects of the case, we are of the firm view that it is a fit case where the appellants should be treated as persons having no sufficient means to pay the court fee required to be paid in the appeal. Accordingly, we would allow them to file the suit as indigent persons while setting aside the order of the learned Sub Judge. In the result, the appeal will stand allowed. The order appealed against will stand set aside. Parties will bear their respective costs.
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