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Carona Ltd. v. Sitaram Atmaram Ghag And Others

Bombay High Court
Mar 7, 2000
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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner-employer invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge an order dated 9 September 1999 passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) Nos. 377 to 557 of 1998 filed by individual workmen. The petitioners advanced multiple grounds to set aside that order, including that a recognised union had earlier filed Complaint No. 285 of 1998 which had been disposed of on 17 November 1999, alleged lack of jurisdiction in directing payment of both VRS compensation and wages, and asserted exclusivity of remedy under the Payment of Gratuity Act for gratuity claims.

The petition recites the background facts concerning a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) offered by the company by letter dated 7 August 1996 setting out components of legal dues, VRS compensation, and mode of payment. A clarification dated 16 August 1996 stated that if the VRS amount was not paid by 31 January 1997, the resignation letters submitted under the scheme would stand revoked and the workmen would be entitled to wages from September 1996 until it was declared that VRS could not be paid. A subsequent circular dated 24 July 1997 revalidated VRS cheques with conditions; many cheques were thereafter dishonoured and holders filed complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which are pending in criminal court.

The petitioners applied to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (B.I.F.R.) in early 1998 and were declared a sick industry by an order dated 18 May 1998. The High Court examined whether proceedings before the Industrial Court were barred by Section 22 of the S.I.C. (S.P.) Act, and considered related authorities and factual material (including B.I.F.R. minutes dated 16 July 1999). The High Court admitted the petition on a limited issue and passed an interim order staying recovery of wages from September 1996 subject to the petitioners depositing the VRS amount, gratuity and interest within eight weeks, with liberty to respondents to apply for withdrawal if amounts were deposited.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Industrial Court's order dated 9 September 1999 (in Complaint Nos. 377–557 of 1998) should be set aside on the ground that a recognised union had earlier filed a complaint (Complaint No. 285 of 1998), thereby precluding individual workmen from maintaining separate complaints.
  2. Whether the Industrial Court acted without jurisdiction in directing payment of both VRS compensation and wages (i.e., whether payment of VRS precludes payment of back wages or other dues).
  3. Whether the Industrial Court erred in directing payment of gratuity when the Payment of Gratuity Act, which creates the right and provides a specific remedy, exists.
  4. Whether the Industrial Court improperly awarded interest without considering if interest was due and/or the appropriate rate (and whether such an award discloses non-application of mind).
  5. Whether proceedings before the Industrial Court were barred by the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (S.I.C. (S.P.) Act), specifically Section 22, given that the petitioners had been declared a sick industry and an application was registered before B.I.F.R.
  6. Whether the respondents (alleged ex-workmen) were precluded from maintaining complaints because their relationship with the employer had terminated (i.e., whether they remained 'workmen' within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Appellant's) Arguments

  • A recognised union had already filed Complaint No. 285 of 1998 which was disposed of on 17 November 1999; therefore individual complaints by workmen were not maintainable when a recognised union had first filed a complaint.
  • The Industrial Court acted without jurisdiction in directing payment of both VRS compensation and wages; once VRS wages were directed payment of back wages should not arise, and many respondents had accepted the VRS by depositing cheques.
  • The Industrial Court could not direct payment of gratuity because gratuity is governed exclusively by the Payment of Gratuity Act and recovery must proceed under that Act; the Industrial Court's direction amounted to excess jurisdiction.
  • The Industrial Court awarded interest without adequate consideration of whether interest was due and at what rate; the direction therefore reflects non-application of mind.
  • Proceedings were barred by the S.I.C. (S.P.) Act because the petitioners had been declared a sick industry and an application was before B.I.F.R., invoking the protection/constraints of Section 22.
  • The respondents were ex-workmen and thus no complaint was maintainable as the dispute did not pertain to dismissal, termination or similar individual disputes.

Respondents' Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The respondents acted on the VRS scheme and were given benefits; many deposited the VRS cheques; due to dishonour of cheques they filed complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which are pending in criminal courts.
  • The clarification dated 16 August 1996 indicated that if VRS amounts were not paid by 31 January 1997, resignation letters would stand revoked and the workmen would be entitled to wages from September 1996 until the VRS amount could not be paid; based on this, respondents claimed wages in addition to VRS dues.
  • Proceedings before the Industrial Court were initiated under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act (M.R.T.U & P.U.L.P. Act), alleging unfair labour practice under item (9) of Schedule IV; accordingly, the Industrial Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate and to issue directions under Section 30 of that Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hindustan Antibiotics, Ltd. v. Kirloskar Investments and Finance, Ltd. [1995 (5) S.C.R. 264] Criminal proceedings (such as those under provisions like Section 48 of the MR.T.U & P.U.L.P. Act) are not suspended by Section 22 of the S.I.C. (S.P.) Act; S.22 restraint does not extend to criminal proceedings. The Court relied on this authority to support the view that proceedings under Section 48 (which can lead to criminal conviction) are not barred by S.22 and thus such proceedings may be initiated despite an application pending before B.I.F.R.
Mardia Copper Products, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1999 Vol. 101 (1) B.L.R. 848] Interpretation that certain proceedings are not covered by S.22, consistent with distinction between civil execution/recovery and other forms of proceedings. The Court cited this decision as supporting the proposition that S.22 does not necessarily bar all proceedings and to treat criminal or non-execution proceedings as outside the scope of S.22.
Kusum Inputs Alloys, Ltd. v. Pannar Peterson Securities, Ltd. [JT 2000 (2) SC 390] Affirmed the view that certain proceedings are not affected by S.22; reinforced distinction drawn in earlier cases. The Court noted that the Apex Court in this case upheld the position that criminal proceedings and similar actions are not subject to the restraint of S.22.
Indian Plywood Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Labour, Karnataka (2000 (2) L.L.N. 677) Consideration of applicability of S.22 to execution/attachment proceedings under Section 33C(1); Karnataka High Court rejected contention that S.22 barred the attachment and sale notice. The Court reviewed this authority, observed that an appeal (SLP) was pending before the Apex Court, and distinguished it because it involved proceedings in execution; the Court noted that the Board in the present matter had chosen not to stay the proceedings.
Tata Davy Ltd. v. State of Orissa [(1997) 6 SCC 669 : A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 2928] Arrears of tax sought to be recovered were held to be proceedings in recovery subject to S.22 restraint; proceedings for recovery cannot be proceeded with without Board's consent. The Court distinguished Tata Davy on the ground that the present proceedings were not proceedings for recovery of tax or analogous recovery proceedings; thus Tata Davy did not apply to bar the Industrial Court proceedings here.
State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur [1980 (1) L.L.N. 39] Held that proceedings for recovery of gratuity due under the Payment of Gratuity Act must be taken under that Act and not under other statutes (e.g., S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act). The Court cited and quoted this authority but distinguished it: the present case concerned complaints under Item (9) of Schedule IV (unfair labour practice) under the M.R.T.U & P.U.L.P. Act and directions under Section 30 to abate unfair labour practices, which the Court held are not equivalent to proceedings for execution/recovery under the Payment of Gratuity Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded stepwise to address the contentions raised by the petitioners, adhering closely to statutory text and precedent cited in the opinion.

  1. Applicability of S.22 of the S.I.C. (S.P.) Act:

    The Court analysed Section 22, reproduced the provision, and emphasised the distinction between suits/proceedings in execution or for recovery and complaints under the M.R.T.U & P.U.L.P. Act. It held that a complaint under the M.R.T.U & P.U.L.P. Act is not a 'suit' in the sense contemplated by civil procedure and that Section 60 of the M.R.T.U & P.U.L.P. Act ousts civil court jurisdiction for such complaints. The Court noted that item (9) of Schedule IV (failure to implement award, settlement or agreement) has been interpreted to include dues under the Act or under an agreement, and that Section 30 empowers the Industrial Court to declare unfair labour practices and direct abatement and affirmative measures.

    The Court observed that orders under Section 30, if not complied with, can lead to proceedings under Section 48 (criminal proceedings), which are not subject to S.22; it relied on authorities (Hindustan Antibiotics, Mardia Copper, Kusum Inputs) to support that criminal proceedings are outside S.22 restraint. The Court further noted Section 50 (recovery as arrears of land revenue) but held that the issue of S.50 was not necessary for decision. The minutes of B.I.F.R. (16 July 1999) showed that B.I.F.R. had not chosen to intervene or stay the proceedings. On these facts the Court concluded S.22 did not bar the Industrial Court proceedings and rejected the petitioners' argument on that point.

  2. Maintainability of complaints by individual workmen (Section 28 of M.R.T.U & P.U.L.P.):

    The Court held that the mere fact that a recognised union had filed a complaint did not extinguish the independent statutory right of an individual workman to file a complaint under Section 28. It reasoned that to interpret Section 28 or item (9) to deny an individual the right to maintain a complaint in respect of personal rights would unjustly deprive the individual of a forum without his consent. The Court referred to decisions upholding an individual's right to maintain a complaint and rejected the petitioners' contention.

  3. Whether the complainants were 'workmen' and whether VRS election ended the master-servant relationship:

    The Court observed the petitioners had themselves issued a clarification on 16 August 1996 providing that if VRS amounts were not paid by 31 January 1997, the resignation letters would stand revoked until an understanding was reached and the workmen would be entitled to wages. The Court held it was too late for petitioners to contend that the workers were no longer 'workmen' when the VRS was not implemented; to accept the petitioners' argument would perpetuate injustice given the petitioners' own assurances. The Court rejected this contention.

  4. Interest on dishonoured cheques (Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act):

    The Court noted that cheques had been issued and there was no rate of interest stipulated in the instrument. It applied Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which prescribes 18% per annum when no rate is specified, from the date the amount ought to have been paid until tender or realisation or such date as the Court directs. The Court found no jurisdictional error in the Industrial Court's award of interest and rejected the contention that the interest direction disclosed non-application of mind.

  5. Direction to pay gratuity — exclusivity of remedy under Payment of Gratuity Act:

    The petitioners relied on the principle in State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur that gratuity recovery should be pursued under the Payment of Gratuity Act and not under other statutes. The Court reproduced the relevant paragraph of that decision but distinguished it: in that case the relief sought was recovery under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (i.e., proceedings in execution/recovery). In the present case the Industrial Court was adjudicating whether there had been an unfair labour practice under item (9) of Schedule IV and issuing directions under Section 30 to abate the practice. The Court held such directions are not proceedings for execution or recovery of gratuity dues and therefore the ratio of State of Punjab did not apply; accordingly the Industrial Court's direction regarding gratuity was not an exercise in excess of jurisdiction on that ground.

  6. Whether both VRS and wages could be directed:

    The Court acknowledged that this question required further consideration and could not be rejected at the threshold. It observed that the petitioners' clarification suggested entitlement to wages if VRS was not paid, and therefore the matter needed fuller adjudication on the admitted facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The High Court admitted the petition only on a limited issue — whether workers who had sought to recover VRS dues by filing complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can claim that they are entitled to be paid wages — and made an interim order. Specifically, the Court ordered a stay of recovery of wages only from September 1996, subject to the petitioners depositing the other dues (the VRS amount, gratuity, and interest thereon) within eight weeks from the date of the order. If the petitioners deposited the amounts, the respondents were given liberty to apply for withdrawal. The Court rejected the principal contentions of the petitioners on jurisdictional grounds, maintainability of individual complaints, applicability of the Payment of Gratuity Act as a bar, and the interest award under Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: a limited interim stay on recovery of wages from September 1996 was granted, conditioned on deposit of VRS amounts, gratuity and interest by the petitioners within eight weeks; respondents may seek withdrawal if amounts are deposited. Respondents waived service of the proceedings.
  • The Court declined to find that Section 22 of the S.I.C. (S.P.) Act barred the Industrial Court proceedings on the facts before it, and upheld the maintainability of individual complaints under Section 28 of the M.R.T.U & P.U.L.P. Act.
  • The Court applied Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (18% p.a. where no rate is specified) to validate the interest award and distinguished the Payment of Gratuity Act authority relied on by the petitioners as inapplicable to unfair labour practice proceedings under the M.R.T.U & P.U.L.P. Act.
  • No broader or sweeping precedent was announced beyond the legal reasoning applied to the facts of this petition; the order operates as an interim decision limited to the specific issues admitted for consideration.

Order formalities: the Court directed parties to act on an ordinary copy of the order authenticated by the Associate of the Court and certified that a copy be expedited.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner-employer has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to impugn the order, dated 9 September 1999, passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint (ULP) Nos. 377 to 557 of 1998, by individual workman.

2. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the said order is liable to be set aside amongst others on the following grounds:

(a) that a complaint had been filed by the recognised union being Complaint No. 285 of 1998, which has been disposed of by another member of the Industrial Court by judgment and order, dated November 17, 1999. Once the recognised union has filed a complaint another complaint at the instance of individual employees would not be maintainable, more so considering that it was the recognised union which had first filed a complaint;

(b) it is next contended that the Industrial Court acted without jurisdiction in directing the petitioners to pay both VRS compensation as also wages as set out in the order Once VRS wages was directed to be paid, it is contended that the question of payment of back-wages for any particular period would not arise. In the instant case most of the respondents have by depositing the cheques invoked the VRS scheme and consequently the question of wages for any period would not arise;

(c) at any rate it is contended that the Industrial Court could not have directed payment of gratuity. It is contended that gratuity is a payment under the Payment of Gratuity Act. That Act, it is contended, has created the right and provided the remedy for its enforcement. Once it is so on failure to pay gratuity due under the Act it is recovery of gratuity would only be under the Act. In this context the Industrial Court by exercising jurisdiction under the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act acted without jurisdiction. It is also pointed out that in another complaint filed by the recognised union the other member of the Industrial Court, has correctly not directed payment of gratuity, but has directed the union therein to move the authorities for payment under the Payment of Gratuity Act;

(d) in so far as interest is concerned, it is contended that the Industrial Court merely proceeded to grant the interest without considering whether interest was due and payable and/or at which rate. In the other case it is contended that interest has been directed to be paid at 12 per cent per annum. Therefore, it is contended that direction for payment of interest would disclose non-application of mind and consequently the order to that extent is liable to be set aside; and

(e) it is contended that the Industrial Court would have had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint as proceedings under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, S.I.C (S.P) Act for short, has been filed and the petitioners have already been declared to be a sick industry by an order, dated 18 May 1998, by B.I.F.R In these circumstances it is contended that the order of the Industrial Court is without jurisdiction; and

(f) it is also contended that the respondents being ex-workmen, no complaint is maintainable as the dispute does not pertain to their dismissal, termination or like, i.e, the dispute is not an individual dispute.

3. Before I proceed to deal with the contentions and whether the petitioner has made out a prima facie case for admission, let me briefly advert to the facts, which may be relevant for the purpose of considering the issues that arise in the petition. The petitioners by letter, dated August 7, 1996, forwarded to the Carona Employees Union a Scheme for voluntary retirement along with an appeal, dated 7 August 1996. The scheme provided amongst others as under:

1. “All his/her legal dues such as:

I. Wages for the days worked in the month in which he/she submits his/her application for the SCHEME.

II. Gratuity as per the Gratuity Act, the service period above six months will be treated as one completed year and below six months will be ignored for the computation of Gratuity.

III. Provident fund.

IV. Other legal dues such as payment of pre-LTA, encashment of balance privilege till the date of service, payment of pro rated casual leave, wherever applicable, if not already availed.

V. Bonus for the extended financial year 1994-95 at 8.33 per cent and advance against bonus for the pro rated period 1995-96 at 8 per cent of salary/wages to be adjusted whenever bonus is declared for the year, subject to deduction of tax.

2. Voluntary Retirement Scheme Compensation.—Eligible employees whose application has been accepted by the company will get the following compensation:

I. Three months last drawn salary/wages for each completed year of service.

II. Last drawn salary multiplied by the balance months of service whichever is higher subject to the maximum amount of Rs. 1,50,000 in either case.

For the purpose of calculation of VRS compensation fraction of years of service of fraction of balance months of service rendered will be ignored.

3. Mode of payment:

(a) Amount of wages for August 1996 and balance months with ex gratia amount arising out of settlement, dated April 4, 1995, which was in arrears will be paid by cheque on or before September 15, 1996.

(b) Dues in respect of Bonus for the years 1994-95 and pro rated period of 1995-96, leave encashment, pro rated Medical and Leave Travel Assistance shall be paid by post dated cheques on or before October 15, 1996

(c) Dues in respect of Gratuity will be paid by post, dated cheques by October 31, 1997 on the date when the first instalment as per (a) above would be paid.

Retiring employees shall also be assisted to comply with the procedure for obtaining settlement of Provident Fund dues.”

4. Acting on the said scheme the respondents before this Court applied for and were given the benefits of the VRS Scheme. Further as-there were some doubts about the scheme the company issued a clarification, dated August 16, 1996. It will be necessary to reproduce the said clarification:

Clarification:

“This is to clarify in respect of some doubt raised by some of the workmen regarding VRS amount payable by January 31, 1997, as per the VRS Scheme displayed on the notice-board. The management would like to reiterate that in case the VRS amount is not paid by January 31, 1997 the letter of resignation submitted to the company by the workmen under this scheme shall stand revoked till an understanding is reached between workers and the management in this respect and that the workmen would be entitled for wages salary for the period September 1996 till the date it is declared that VRS amount cannot be paid to the workmen. Thereafter the workmen would start earning their wages.”

It seems that thereafter the petitioners realised that they were not in a position to honour the cheques on the due date. As a result thereof a circular was issued, dated July 24, 1997. In this letter reference is made to the earlier letter of the company whereby the respondents were informed that the earlier letter it has been directed to hold on the cheques for the VRS amount till further clearance by the management. The management in spite of its efforts was unable to arrange funds during the validity period of the cheque. As concern had been expressed by the representatives of the VRS opted employees as also by the union it had been agreed to revalidate the cheques with the clear undertaking that the cheque would not be deposited without the consent of the management. The cheques thereafter were revalidated. It also appears from the record that before the expiry of the last date of the cheque many deposited the cheques, the cheques were dishonoured and consequent thereto the holders of the cheques have filed complaint under S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which are pending before the Criminal Court. With the above background the contentions as raised on behalf of the petitioners may be dealt with.

5. I first propose to deal and dispose of the contention in so far as stay of proceedings consequent to company being declared as sick company under S.I.C (S.P) Act is concerned. The Industrial Court relying on the judgments of this Court has taken the view that in matter of Payment of Wages, etc. S.I.C (S.P) Act 1985, would not apply. However, considering the arguments advanced at the bar on behalf of the petitioners and reliance placed on an interim order passed by the Apex Court in a S.L.P filed from the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Indian Plywood Manufacturing Company, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Labour, Karnataka reported in 2000 (2) L.L.N 677, the true scope and effect of an order passed under S.I.C (S.P) Act, needs to be examined, I propose to once again consider the said submission, though on an earlier occasion I have had occasion to consider and decide the same in so far as wages are concerned.

6. The petitioners applied to B.I.F.R, the Board constituted under the S.I.C (S.P) Act some time early 1998. The exact date is not available on record. Considering the law as laid down by the Apex Court it can be considered that the provisions of the Act would apply the moment an application is registered before B.I.F.R Taking that into consideration, will the provisions of S. 22 of SIC. (S.P) Act apply?

6A. Section 22 as it now stands reads as under:

“22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. — (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under S. 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under S. 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under S. 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the Industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the appellate authority.”

6B. In the instant case we are not concerned with any proceedings under the Companies Act. We are also not concerned with any suit for the recovery of money or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advances granted to the industrial company. The proceedings was under the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. Can it be said to be a suit or proceedings in execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the Industrial Company and/or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company. A complaint is not a suit. A suit will contemplate a proceeding in a civil Court under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code or other provisions applicable to a suit.

6C. The complaint filed by the respondent is under the provisions of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act for short) alleging unfair labour practice under item (9) of Sch. IV of M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. The complaints under the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act cannot be the subject-matter of a civil suit as S. 60 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act will oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court.

7. Can it be said to be a proceeding for execution, distress or the like item (9) of Sch. IV of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act reads as under:

“9. Failure to implement award, settlement or agreement.”

By a catena of judicial decisions item (9) has been held to includes dues under the Act as under an agreement. Under S. 28 any union or employee is entitled to maintain a complaint. By virtue of S. 21, in so far as the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned, no employee is entitled to file a complaint, where there is a recognized union, under items (2) and (6) of Sch. IV of the Act. On a complaint being filed by virtue of S. 30, the Court, i.e, the Industrial or Labour Court if it comes to the conclusion that any person named in the complaint is engaged or engaging in any unfair labour practice, it may declare that as an unfair labour practice and direct such person to cease and desist from such unfair labour practices and take such affirmative action which in the opinion of the Court is necessary to effectuate the policy of the Act.

7A. Once an order is passed under S. 30, in the event a person against whom the order is issued, fails to comply with the order, proceedings can be initiated under S. 48 of the Act. These proceedings can lead to conviction of the person concerned for a period of 3 months or with fine which may extent to Rs. 500 or both. Section 50 is the provision whereby any moneys due under an order can be recovered as arrears of land revenue. In the instant case all that has happened is that the Industrial Court has disposed of the complaint in terms of S. 30 of the Act. Once such a complaint is disposed of two things can follow (1) proceedings can be initiated under S. 48 which are in the nature of criminal proceedings. Criminal proceedings are not subject to S. 22. This view has been taken in Hindustan Antibiotics, Ltd. v. Kirloskar Investments and Finance, Ltd., [1995 (5) S.C.R 264]; and Mardia Copper Products, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1999 Vol. 101 (1) B.L.R 848]. This view has been upheld by the Apex Court in Kusum Inputs Alloys, Ltd. v. Pannar Peterson Securities, Ltd. [JT 2000 (2) SC 390]. The only exception carved out in a case of an offence under S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is, when an order is made under s. 22a of s.i.c (s.p) act it is observed considering the policy of the Act that during the period of the restraint, no complaint can be filed. The other aspect is S. 50. When recovery is sought to be made as arrears of land revenue, then possibly it could be argued that they are proceedings in execution or distress. However, the issue does not arise here for determination. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed before me the proceedings before B.I.F.R specially the minutes of 16 July, 1999. The minutes in so far as the petitioners unit at Para. 8 reads as under:

“The Bench observed that certain litigations were continuing between the company and the workers regarding payment of the latter's dues. The Bench did not find it appropriate to intervene in the process initiated by the competent Courts. The Bench directed the company not to surrender any more tenancy rights without its consent. Further, the company's application for orders under S. 22(3) of the Act would be considered on receipt of full facts of the matter, as directed elsewhere in this order.”

7B. The effect of S. 22 is that proceedings contemplated therein, cannot be proceeded with except with permission of the B.I.F.R In the instant case assuming for a moment the proceedings fell under S. 22, which in my opinion are not, on the facts of the present case as they now stand, B.I.F.R has not interfered with the proceedings pending before the Competent Court. Therefore, to my mind considering that, even if S. 22 is held to be attracted, on the facts of the present case there is no bar in proceeding with the petitioner in proceeding before the Industrial Court.

7C. We may now deal with the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel in the case of Tata Davy, Ltd. v. State of Orissa [(1997) 6 SCC 669 : A.I.R 1998 S.C 2928]. In that case the arrears of tax were sought to be recovered. It is in that context that the Apex Court held that those would be proceedings in recovery which cannot be proceeded with without first obtaining the consent of the Board. In the instant case there are no proceedings for recovery and apart from that the Board itself was fully aware and has chosen not to stay the proceedings.

7D. We may now address ourselves to the judgment of the Karnataka High Court as an appeal by way of S.L.P is pending before the Apex Court. In the case of Indian Plywood Manufacturing Company, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Labour, Karnataka, in Appeal No. 488 of 1997, reported in 2000 (2) L.L.N 677, were proceedings under. S. 33C(1). It was contended before the Karnataka High Court that as the provisions of S. 22 of S.I.C(S.P) Act were made applicable the notice and certificate for attachment and sale of the assets should be quashed. The Karnataka High Court rejected the said contention. The Karnataka High Court further proceeded to hold that S. 22 of the Act was no bar to initiate proceedings for the amount payable to the workmen. That matter is before the Apex Court. Again it may be seen that these were proceedings in execution, which is covered by S. 22.

7E. What is involved herein are the wages and other legal dues of the workers. To my mind considering the various judgments including that of four High Court referred to by the Industrial Court it is impossible to conceive a situation where Parliament, fully knowing the true import of Art. 21 of the Constitution would be deemed and presumed to have taken a view that the wages and terminal benefits to which the workers are entitled to are not payable until permission is obtained from the Board Wages and terminal benefits to which the workers are entitled, must constitute and deemed to be part of their right to life. They are the minimum required for their sustenance and of their families. It is impossible in these situation to consider that for the purpose of rehabilitation of an industry workers must be denied their legitimate dues. Even in a case of winding up, Parliament realising the need to protect the workers has made them pari passu charge holders with secured creditors by introducing S. 529A and amending Ss. 529 and 530 of the Companies Act. In these circumstances workers cannot be put in a worse position than that of a company which is being wound up.

7F. For all the aforesaid reasons I am of the considered view that in the instant case, apart from the fact that S. 22 is not attracted, the wages and terminal benefits which the workers are entitled to cannot be placed on the same footing as taxes of the Government or dues of other commercial venture or dues to corporate or like others. Considering the above the first contention, therefore, must be rejected.

8. That leaves us with the second contention namely whether the complaint at the instance of an individual workman is maintainable. VRS dues are the dues of a worker. Section 28 deals with right to maintain a complaint. The mere fact that a recognised union has filed a complaint, by itself cannot take away the independent right of the workmen to file a complaint, conferred by S. 28 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. In the instant case the recognised union is no doubt espousing any industrial dispute as understood in industrial law. However, that is not a complaint under items (2) and (6) of Sch. IV of the Act. A workman merely because a union has filed a complaint cannot be told that he has no right to maintain a complaint in respect of his individual dispute because a recognised union in which he may have no faith, has filed a complaint. In matters of individuals disputes this right cannot be taken away without the consent of the individual worker. He cannot be told that he has no forum or remedy wherein he can ventilate his grievances personally. Such a reading of S. 28 and more so of item (9) of Sch. IV will lead to denial of an individual his right to maintain a complaint in so far as his personal rights are concerned. The right of an individual to maintain a complaint has been upheld by judgments of this Court. That contention must, therefore be rejected.

9. The third contention is that in order to maintain the complaint the person must be a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the ID Act. There should be no severance of relationship of master and servant save and except to the limited extent of “individual disputes.” The petitioners had solemnly informed those who had opted for the VRS, by clarification of August 16, 1996 that in the event the VRS amount is not paid by January 31, 1997 the letter of resignation submitted to the company under this scheme shall stand revoked till an understanding is reached between the workers and the management in this respect. It is too late for the very same petitioner to come before this Court and contend that since the workers had availed of VRS Scheme they are not workmen within the meaning of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This argument at the instance of the petitioners could have been considered if the VRS Scheme had been implemented and the workers had been paid their benefits. Even there prima facie it is devoid of merit. Article 226 of the Constitution is not to be exercised like in the case of the present petitioners to perpetuate injustice. Article 226 is a constitutional power, conferred on a constitutional Court to exercises its extraordinary jurisdiction to set right the violation of deprivation of fundamental rights and/or breach of any other statutory rights. It is not a power to be exercised at the instance of employer who has filed to fulfill the solemn promise that had been given to the workers, to induce them to resign from their jobs. This contention on the part of the petitioners must be rejected.

10. With that, we come to the next contention as to whether the interest as awarded can be sustained in law. Admittedly, a cheque for the amount due was issued by the petitioner to the respondents. Under S. 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act when no rate of interest is specified in the instrument, interest on amount due thereon shall, notwithstanding any agreement relating to interest between any parties to the instrument, be calculated at the rate of 18 per centum per annum, from the date at which the same ought to have been paid by the party charged, until tender or realisation of the amount due thereon, or until such date after the institution of a suit to recover such amount as the Court directs The amount was paid by cheque. There was no interest stipulated in the instrument and consequently S. 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would apply. Once that being the case there is no jurisdictional error committed by respondent 177, nor does the order disclose any error of law apparent on the face of the record. That contention, therefore, also must be rejected.

11. With that we may now come to deal with the contention whether the order of the Court below directing payment of gratuity would amount to an error of jurisdiction and consequently liable to be set aside. It may be pointed out that on behalf of the petitioners, their learned counsel has drawn my attention to the another order which is the subject-matter in writ petition lodging No. 477 of 2000, wherein the member of the Industrial Court therein has directed the recognised union to move the appropriate authority for payment under Payment of Gratuity Act. Apart from that on behalf of the petitioners, learned counsel contends that recovery of gratuity can only be under the Payment of Gratuity Act. It is contended that gratuity is payable pursuant to a right created under the Act. A remedy has been provided under the Act and consequently no other authority except the Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act would have jurisdiction to recover gratuity payable under Payment of Gratuity Act. In support of the contention learned counsel has, relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur, [1980 (1) L.L.N 39]. It will be gainful to reproduce the observations of the Apex Court, in Para. 9, at page 43:

“Upon all these considerations, the conclusion is inescapable that Parliament intended that proceedings for payment of gratuity due under the Payment of Gratuity Act must be taken under that Act and not under any other. That being so, it must be held that the applications filed by the employees respondents under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act did not lie, and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of them….”

From the above observations what is clear that the subject-matter was an application under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for recovery of the gratuity. The Apex Court held that S. 33C(2) would not be attracted considering the scheme of Payment of Gratuity Act. The ratio of that judgment would not apply to the facts of the present case. In the instant case the parties approached the Court on the ground that the petitioners had committed an unfair labour practice under item (9) of Sch. IV of the M.R.T.U and PULP. Act. This is, therefore, not a case of execution and/or recovery What the Court under the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act is deciding is whether there was unfair labour practice committed by the petitioners. Once the Court comes to the conclusion that an unfair labour practice has been committed it is entitled to issue directions under S. 30, to abate the unfair labour practice. These directions for abatement cannot be said to be proceedings for recovery of payment of gratuity dues. Once this distinction is clear, namely, that these are not proceedings for execution for recovery of gratuity dues, the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur (vide supra) would, not apply. The ratio of that judgment must be restricted to those cases where parties seek to initiate proceedings for execution for recovery of gratuity dues. That is because the Payment of Gratuity Act itself has provided mechanism for recovery of gratuity. In my opinion, therefore, the order of the Labour Court cannot also be faulted on that count.

12. That leaves us with the last question namely whether the Labour Court could have directed payment of both VRS and wages. On behalf of the respondents it is contended that considering the clarification by the petitioners themselves as reflected in their clarification, dated August 16, 1996, the workmen would be entitled for the salary for that period. To my mind that question will require consideration and cannot be rejected at the threshold.

13. Considering the above, the petition is admitted only on the limited issue, as to whether the workers who had sought to recover VRS dues by filing complaints under S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, can claim that they are entitled to be paid wages. Rule.

14. Pending the hearing and final disposal of the petition, there would be a stay of recovery of wages only from September, 1996 subject to the petitioners depositing the other dues namely VRS amount, gratuity, and interest thereon within eight weeks from today. If the amount is deposited liberty to the respondents to apply for withdrawal. Respondents waive service.

15. All parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court.

Certified copy expedited.