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Girdhar C. Nichani v. Rev. E.H Lewellen And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, a builder by profession, challenged an order dated 17-8-1990 passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner under section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The respondent No. 1, Alliance Ministries, is a registered Public Trust holding properties in Kodaikanal, Tamil Nadu. The Trust decided to sell these properties by inviting offers through public advertisement. The petitioner and respondent No. 3 submitted competing offers of Rs. 28 lacs and Rs. 29 lacs respectively, with the Trust accepting respondent No. 3's offer.
Subsequently, the Trust applied for permission to sell the property under section 36 of the Act. The petitioner filed an objection to the sale in favor of respondent No. 3, arguing it was not in the best interest of the Trust. The Charity Commissioner rejected the petitioner's objection and sanctioned the sale to respondent No. 3 by the impugned order dated 17-8-1990.
The petitioner filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India questioning the correctness of the Charity Commissioner's order. The Single Judge initially issued a rule and granted interim stay. The matter was later heard and decided by the Single Judge after considering whether the petition should be heard by a Single Judge or Division Bench.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the writ petition challenging the order passed under section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act can be heard and decided by a Single Judge or requires a Division Bench as per Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules.
- Whether the Charity Commissioner qualifies as a "Court" subordinate to the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution for the purposes of the said Rules.
- Whether the petitioner, a builder with no interest in the Trust, has the locus standi to challenge the Charity Commissioner’s order sanctioning the sale under section 36 of the Act.
- The scope and nature of proceedings under section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act and the rights of parties to object or participate in those proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The matter should be heard by a Division Bench because Rule 18 does not specifically include the Bombay Public Trusts Act under "local Acts" that a Single Judge can hear.
- The Charity Commissioner is not a Court nor subordinate to the High Court; hence, the matter should not be assigned to a Single Judge.
- The petitioner had a right to participate in the proceedings under section 36 and to challenge the Charity Commissioner’s order under Article 227, irrespective of his interest in the Trust.
- The petitioner was denied an opportunity to negotiate and could have offered a higher price.
- Not all trustees were present when accepting the higher offer, making the acceptance and sanction invalid or not in the Trust’s interest.
- The petitioner submitted a bona fide offer of Rs. 35 lacs in court.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The Charity Commissioner qualifies as a subordinate Court under Article 227 and thus the matter can be heard by a Single Judge under Rule 18(3).
- The petitioner, being a builder with no genuine interest in the Trust, is neither a necessary nor proper party under section 36 proceedings and has no locus to challenge the order.
- Even if there was any irregularity by the trustees, the petitioner’s remedy lies in claiming damages or compensation, not in challenging the Charity Commissioner’s sanction.
- The petitioner is litigating on behalf of Rahija Construction and not in his own interest, making the petition vexatious.
- The petitioner’s offer of Rs. 35 lacs at a late stage is not bona fide and cannot be entertained to destabilize a legally sanctioned transaction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| S.D Ghatge v. State, 1977 Mah LJ 406 : AIR 1977 Bom 384 | Definition of "Court" under Article 227 of the Constitution includes tribunals or authorities performing judicial functions and subject to High Court's jurisdiction. | Used to establish that the Charity Commissioner is a Court for purposes of Article 227 as it performs judicial functions with finality and is subject to High Court supervision. |
| Bapusaheb Balasaheb Patil v. State, 1974 Mah LJ 698 : AIR 1975 Bom 143 | Officer on Special Duty under a statute held to be a Court for Contempt of Courts Act. | Supported the proposition that statutory authorities exercising judicial powers can be treated as Courts. |
| V.A Chitale v. Vidya Vardhini Sabha, 1985 Cri LJ 359 | Charity Commissioner is subordinate to the High Court under Article 227. | Confirmed that the Charity Commissioner is a subordinate Court within the meaning of Article 227. |
| Arunodaya Prefab v. M.D Kambli, 1979 Mah LJ 104 | Only trustees are concerned in proceedings under section 36; uninvited bidders have no locus to challenge Charity Commissioner's order. | Applied to hold that petitioner, even if submitting an offer on invitation, does not acquire locus to question the Charity Commissioner's sanction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed whether the Charity Commissioner qualifies as a "Court" subordinate to the High Court under Article 227 for the purpose of Rule 18(3) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules. It held that the Charity Commissioner exercises judicial functions, issues final and binding orders, and is subject to the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Thus, the Charity Commissioner is a subordinate Court within the meaning of Article 227 and the Rules.
Regarding the petitioner’s locus standi, the Court examined the nature of proceedings under section 36 of the Act, which are not adversarial suits but statutory sanction processes concerning the Trust’s interest. The petitioner, a builder with no interest or beneficiary status in the Trust, cannot be considered a necessary or proper party. The right to challenge the Charity Commissioner's sanction under section 36 is limited to those having interest in the Trust or the sanctioned transaction.
The Court rejected the petitioner’s claim of being entitled to participate or challenge the order under Article 227, emphasizing that commercial interest alone does not confer locus to interfere with statutory sanction proceedings. The Court further noted that if the petitioner suspects irregularity or breach by trustees, appropriate remedies lie in civil claims for damages, not in challenging the statutory sanction.
Finally, the Court dismissed the petitioner’s belated higher offer as not bona fide and recognized the importance of preserving the sanctity and finality of legally sanctioned transactions, discouraging attempts to disrupt them through litigation motivated by commercial interests.
Holding and Implications
The Court DISMISSED the petitioner’s writ petition challenging the order of the Charity Commissioner sanctioning the sale of Trust property.
The petitioner, lacking any genuine interest in the Trust, was held to have no locus standi to question the Charity Commissioner’s order under section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The Charity Commissioner was affirmed as a subordinate Court under Article 227, justifying hearing by a Single Judge.
The decision upholds the principle that statutory sanction proceedings under section 36 are concerned primarily with the trustees and the Trust’s interest. Commercial bidders without interest in the Trust cannot disrupt such sanctioned transactions by writ petitions. The ruling reinforces finality and sanctity of transactions approved by the Charity Commissioner and discourages vexatious litigation motivated by commercial rivalry. No new precedent beyond these direct effects was established.
1. The petitioner a builder by business, has questioned the correctness of order dated 17-8-1990 passed by the Second Respondent. Joint Charity Commissioner, in exercise of power under section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act (hereinafter called as “the Act”).
2. The respondent No. 1 Alliance Ministries is a registered Public Trust under the Act. The respondent Trust amongst others held properties in question at Kodaikanal (Tamilnadu). The trust decided to dispose of the properties in question by sale, and by publication invited the offer. The petitioner respondent No. 3 amongst others submitted their offer. Correspondence was exchanged between the parties. The petitioner offered Rs. 28 lacs as a purchase price; whereas the respondent No. 3 offered Rs. 29 lacs. The respondent trust accepted the offer of respondent No. 3.
3. The respondent Trust, therefore, on 15-10-1987 applied to the respondent Charity Commissioner for grant of permission to sell in pursuance of section 36 of the Act. The petitioner on 18-6-1988 filed his objection to the sale in favour of respondent No. 3. According to him, the sale was not in best interest of the Trust. The respondent No. 2 by impugned order dated 17-8-1990 rejected the objection of the petitioner and granted sanction for the sale in favour of the respondent No. 3.
4. Correctness thereof has been questioned in this petition styled as one under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
5. The petition was heard by the Single Judge from time to time. On 13-11-1990 the learned Single Judge issued a rule returnable on 10-12-1990 and granted interim stay as prayed by the petitioner. Thereafter, matter was listed before me for final hearing.
6. I heard the matter for quite some time. Shri Deshpande, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised the question that this matter is to be heard and decided by a Division Bench. According to him. Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, does not include the writ petitions questioning the order passed under the Act to be dealt and decided by the Single Judge. I thereupon referred the matter to the Registry. It is certified on 12-4-1991 that the order impugned in the instant writ petition being one in the proceedings under the Local Act, as per sub-rule (3) of Rule 18, the matter can be heard by Single Judge.
7. Submission of Shri Deshpande is that by amendment to Rule 18 various local Acts have been incorporated. However, the amendment omits the Act for inclusion. As such, the order passed under the Act cannot be covered by a general entry of “local Act” as envisaged under sub-rule (3) of Rule 18 which was existing even prior to the amendment.
8. True, there is no specific inclusion of the Act. However, according to me inclusion of various Acts does not curtail the scope and ambit of the term “local Act” as referred to under sub-rule (3) of Rule 18.
9. Shri Deshpande then made a submission that sub-rule (3) refers to decrees or order passed by any subordinate Court in any suit or proceedings. According to Shri Deshpande, the Charity Commissioner is neither a Court nor subordinate to the High Court in hierarchy. According to him, it is an authority as defined under sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Act. Section 3 provides for the appointment of the Charity Commissioner. Chapters V and VI of the Act deal with the power of the Charity Commissioner. Section 50 authorised the Charity Commissioner to file a suit in the Court. As per section 26 decision in the civil suit is binding on the Charity Commissioner. As per section 72, orders of the Charity Commissioner can be questioned by presenting application before the District Court. Sub-section (4) of section 2 defines the Court which means “District Court”. The office of the Charity Commissioner thus possessed all characters of the authority.
10. It is further submitted that Rule 18(3) refers to suit or proceedings which leads to passing of decree. As such, the term “Court” as referred to under the rule has to be understood with a restricted meaning. According to him, Civil Courts which are established on regular basis and empowered under the Local Act to deal with the particular subject-matters are only covered under the relevant rule. Therefore, the sub-rule (3) of Rule 18 has no application to assign the instant petition to the Single Judge.
11. This Court in the case of S.D Ghatge v. State, 1977 Mah LJ 406 : AIR 1977 Bom 384, while explaining the meaning of the term “Court” with reference to Article 221 of the Constitution has observed:
“It follows that the High Court's power of judicial superintendence under the amended Article 227 certainly covers judgments of all Courts meaning thereby all regular civil and criminal Courts subject to its appellate or revisional jurisdiction but also extends to tribunals, bodies or authorities, whatever be their label provided two conditions are satisfied: (a) such tribunal, body or authority is basically a Court i.e it performs judicial function of rendering definitive judgments having finality and authoritativeness to bind the parties litigating their rights before it in exercise of sovereign judicial power transferred to it by the State and (b) such tribunal, body or authority is subject to High Court's appellate or revisional jurisdiction.”
12. If regular Civil Court in the hierarchy passes the order, then aggrieved party has a remedy under the Civil Procedure Code. The Court as referred to cannot be confined to the Courts in the hierarchy of the High Court.
13. The term “Court” is to be understood in common parlance in reference to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Other authorities with their outer appearance whether function as a Court is a pertinent question. Section 74 provides that all enquiries under the Act shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 73 provides:
“In holding inquiries under this Act, the officer holding the same shall have the same powers as are vested in Courts in respect of the following matters under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in trying a suit:—
(a) proof of facts by affidavits,
(b) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath,
(c) ordering discovery and inspection and compelling the production of documents,
(d) issuing of commissions.”
14. The Charity Commissioner under section 36 thus definitely discharges the judicial function. The order passed by the Charity Commissioner is determinative, having finality and authoritatively bind the parties. It exercises the power judicially as conferred by the Statute. The Charity Commissioner, therefore, possessed the necessary trapping of the Court for the purposes of Article 227 of the Constitution. In Bapusaheb Balasaheb Patil v. State, 1974 Mah LJ 698 : AIR 1975 Bom 143, an Officer on Special Duty appointed by State Government under section 3 of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, is held to be a Court for the purposes of Contempt of Courts Act.
15. The next question is whether the Charity Commissioner is a Court subordinate to the High Court. In V.A Chitale v. Vidya Vardhini Sabha, 1985 Cri LJ 359, it is held that the Charity Commissioner in exercise of power conferred under section 51 of the Act is under the judicial subordination of the High Court within the meaning of Article 227 of the Constitution. These authorities, therefore, are Court even within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act.
16. To ascertain the subordination, the authorities which assumed the character of a Court need not be one in the hierarchy. The question is, can Charity Commissioner decline to follow decision or direction of High Court? Answer to this by any logical conclusion cannot be in negative. I, therefore, record that the Charity Commissioner is a subordinate Court for the purposes of Article 227 of the Constitution as referred to in sub-rule (3) of Rule 18. I, therefore, hold that the matter is rightly allocated to the Single Bench in pursuance of Rule 18(3) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960.
17. The grievance of the petitioner is that he has not been granted an opportunity to negotiate. In case of such opportunity, he was anxious to offer the more price. In the Pursis before this Court, the petitioner has offered Rs. 35 lacs for the property in question. Another grievance is that all the trustees were not present while accepting the offer of respondent No. 3. Particularly Rev. Roth was absent in the meeting. As such, acceptance of the offer and subsequent sanction accorded thereto by the Charity Commissioner, are not in the interest of trust.
18. The basic question is, what is a locus of the petitioner to canvass the grievance. According to Shri Deshpande, right of a person to question the correctness of the order of Charity Commissioner does not depend on his having interest in the Trust. Moreover, the petitioner filed the objection in the proceedings under section 36 of the Act. He was thus a party to the proceedings and he has right to approach this Court being a party aggrieved.
19. Proceedings under section 36 of the Act are not a lis between the parties to adjudicate the contesting claim. Mandate of section 36 is that no transfer of the Trust property shall be valid unless approved by the Charity Commissioner with a previous sanction. The Charity Commissioner as per the scheme has to accord sanction, having regard to the interest or benefit of the trust. The Charity Commissioner in these proceedings after enquiry has to record a satisfaction in that behalf. Section 36 merely authorises the Charity Commissioner to ascertain as to whether the trustees acted in the best interest of the trust.
20. As per section 73-A any person having an interest in the Public Trust could be joined as a party in such proceedings on his application on such terms and conditions as the person holding enquiry may direct. The petitioner is a builder having no interest in the trust. His interest if any is commercial for the purposes of purchase of the trust property. He cannot even be objector much less even a proper party.
21. Sub-section (2) of section 36 provides for revocation of the sanction under certain condition. Sub-section (3) of section 36 provides that revocation would be made only after granting reasonable opportunity to a person in whose favour the sanction was accorded. Such person may be at liberty to question the correctness of revocation since it entails the civil consequence and affects his right by approaching this Court by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution. The petitioner, since neither a necessary or nor a proper party to the proceedings under section 36, cannot claim any entitlement to invoke Article 227 of the Constitution to canvass his grievance against the sanction accorded under sub-section (1) of section 36 of the Act.
22. According to Shri Deshpande, the respondent No. 1 invited the offer. In pursuance thereof, the petitioner has submitted the offer. However, the trustees have acted improperly in rejecting the offer of the petitioner and accepting the offer of the respondent. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to participate in the proceedings under section 36 of the Act and also can approach this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The submission is wholly erroneous. Even if there is an impropriety, irregularity or illegality on the part of trustee while finalising the transaction, the petitioner is at liberty to take such appropriate step to claim damages or compensation for such breach. However, he not being a person having interest in the trust cannot question the correctness of the order passed under section 36 of the Act.
23. The petitioner is a builder who is anxious to purchase and not being a person having interest in the trust or a beneficiary cannot question the correctness or legality of the order. The petitioner to succeed in his commercial deal under the guise of a guardian of the interest of a trust is prosecuting this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution which cannot be entertained. He is in reality prosecuting his personal commercial interest which cannot be permitted. In Arunodaya Prefab v. M.D Kambli, 1979 Mah LJ 104, it is observed that under section 36 of the Act read with rule 24, the Charity Commissioner is concerned only with the according or refusing sanction to particular sale which the trustees proposed to make. It is a proceeding which concerns only with the trustees. To decide whether the sale is in the interest of the trust, he is empowered to make such enquiries as deemed necessary. It is for the trustees to decide to whom they should sell the property subject to the sanction of the Charity Commissioner to the proposed sale. It is further held that the petitioners who have sent uninvited offer to the Charity Commissioner have no locus standi to challenge the order of the Charity Commissioner by writ petition on the ground of being higher-bidder. The Charity Commissioner is not obliged to associate with the petitioner into enquiry or to consider the offer made by the petitioner. Shri Deshpande tried to urge that in the instant case, the petitioner made an offer on invitation. Therefore, he is entitled to maintain this petition. I am unable to agree. The nature of the proceedings under section 36 and the scope is definite. Even if the offer was made by the petitioner on the invitation of the trustees, he does not acquire any right to question the legality or correctness of the order passed by the Charity Commissioner under section 36 of the Act.
24. It is specifically pointed out by the respondent No. 1 trustee that the interest of the petitioner was ostensible. He has no genuine interest even in purchase. The petitioner is litigating at the behest of Rahija Construction which was a bidder on the earlier occasion. The petitioner is admittedly a close relation of Chandu Rahija. It is specifically averred that the petitioner and Chandu Rahija has an office located at Kodaikanal which is a subject-matter of sale. The petitioner has no resources or commercial potentiality to purchase the property. He is making this venture on behalf of the Rahija Construction. It is further averred that the advertisement marked as Annexure A with the petition on which the claim is based has nothing to do with the petitioner. The petitioner had not submitted an offer in pursuance of the said advertisement. Rahija Construction Company was the bidder in pursuance of the said advertisement. It is further specifically averred that this petitioner filed an affidavit before the City Civil Court in Civil Suit No. 4531/87 supporting the claim of Rahija Construction. All these averments as made have not been refuted by any counter reply. It is thus apparent that the petitioner is indulging in this vexatious litigation. As such, it is apparent that the petitioner is indulging in this legal battle not for his own interest but making an endeavour to cherish the grievance of somebody else.
25. The petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.
26. The petitioner made an offer of Rs. 35 lacs. This is without any bona fide. To make such offer at the stage cannot be said to be in good faith. The submission of Shri Deshpande that such offer can be accepted even in Court. Such offer possibly could be accepted only when the petitioner is bona fidely litigating with a legal right to approach this Court. If it is merely an attempt to forestall the transaction, it is not expedient to encourage such litigants. Besides availing the highest offer in the interest of trust, sanctity to a transaction is a matter of paramount consideration. Transaction legally entered into between the parties and approved by the Charity Commissioner cannot be permitted to oscillate, according to commercial climatic condition. The petition is dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 5,000/- payable to respondent No. 1-Trust.
Petition dismissed.
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