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Kalawatibai v. Gopala Ganpati Bhanarkar

Bombay High Court
Dec 12, 1984
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are the legal heirs of the deceased tenant Lokumal Sindhi. They challenged an order dated 25-8-1983 passed by the Competent Authority under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 ("the Slum Areas Act"). The impugned order granted permission under Section 22(1) to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to continue the suit previously filed by them for ejectment of the petitioners from premises in their possession. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had applied for permission on 23-2-1983, after the suit had already been filed; they also maintained, "without prejudice", that the house did not fall within a slum area and thus no permission was necessary. The Competent Authority (the City Engineer, Nagpur) granted permission both to continue proceedings in the pending suit and to institute proceedings for eviction. The petitioners challenged the order on two grounds: (i) that permission to continue a suit already instituted without prior permission under Section 22(1) cannot be granted; and (ii) that the Competent Authority failed to take into account the factors specified in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 22 when granting permission.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Competent Authority could lawfully grant retrospective permission to continue a suit which had already been instituted without prior written permission under Section 22(1) of the Slum Areas Act.
  2. Whether the Competent Authority was obliged to take into account the factors enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sub‑section (4) of Section 22 when deciding an application for permission under Section 22(1), and whether those factors are conditions precedent (i.e., mandatory) to the grant of permission.
  3. Whether the petitioners' remedy was by way of an appeal under Section 35 (or Section 23) of the Slum Areas Act, or whether they could invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when the impugned order was alleged to be illegal or ultra vires.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners (through learned counsel Shri Mehadia) contended that an appeal against an order under Section 22 should be under Section 23 and not under Section 35; and since Section 23 permits appeal only against refusal of permission, there was no statutory appellate remedy available to challenge an order granting permission—leaving the writ jurisdiction of this Court as the appropriate remedy.
  • The petitioners challenged the Competent Authority's order on the ground that retrospective permission to continue a previously instituted suit was not permissible under the plain terms of Section 22(1).
  • They also contended that the Competent Authority failed to consider the factors specified in Sub-section (4) of Section 22 (Clauses (a)–(c)), which should have informed the decision to grant or refuse permission.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (through learned counsel Shri Manohar) argued that the petition was not maintainable because the petitioners had not availed themselves of the alternative statutory remedy of appeal provided by Section 35 of the Slum Areas Act.
  • Respondents further contended that the factors in Clauses (a) and (b), and any factors prescribed under Clause (c) of Sub-section (4), were not conditions precedent to granting permission under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 22(1). Thus, non‑consideration of those factors would not be fatal to an order granting permission; even if the Competent Authority concluded those factors were not satisfied, it would still be competent to grant permission.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Howard v. Bodington (1877) 2 P.D. 203 Principle for determining whether a provision is mandatory or directory — examine the subject matter, importance of the provision disregarded, and its relation to the general object of the Act. The Court relied on the observations quoted from Howard v. Bodington to support the conclusion that Sub-section (4) of Section 22 is mandatory rather than merely directory, because the factors in Sub-section (4) are vitally related to the Act's object of protecting slum occupiers from eviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a textual and purposive analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and the Act's object. The reasoning unfolded in these discrete steps:

  1. Interpretation of Section 22(1): The Court read the language of Section 22(1) plainly and concluded that the "previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority" is required prior to the institution of a suit after the commencement of the Act. The phraseology contemplates permission before instituting a suit; therefore retrospective or post-facto permission to allow continuation of a suit already filed without prior permission is not authorized. On that basis, the part of the Competent Authority's order permitting continuation of the already-filed suit was held to be illegal and beyond jurisdiction.
  2. Availability of statutory alternative remedies vs. writ jurisdiction: The Court analysed Sections 23 and 35. It acknowledged that Section 23 provides a specific appeal to the Tribunal against refusal of permission under Section 22(1), and that Section 23 does not confer an appeal to the Tribunal against an order granting permission. However, Section 35(1) confers a general right of appeal to the Administrator against any notice, order or direction of the Competent Authority within thirty days. The Court held that, therefore, a person aggrieved by an order granting permission can still appeal under Section 35(1). Notwithstanding the availability of this alternative statutory remedy, the Court emphasised that availability of an alternative remedy does not automatically preclude the High Court from exercising its Article 226 powers where the impugned order is on its face illegal and beyond jurisdiction. The Court found the present case to fall within that exception.
  3. Construction and effect of Sub-section (4) of Section 22: The Court set out Sub‑section (4) (Clauses (a)–(c)) and noted that the Competent Authority's order contained no indication that these factors had been considered. Respondents had not pleaded facts about availability of alternative accommodation or that the eviction was in the interest of slum improvement and clearance.
  4. Mandatory or directory: The Court considered the argument that Sub-section (4) merely requires the Competent Authority to "take into consideration" the listed factors but does not make them conditions precedent. Applying purposive interpretation and examining the Act's preamble (which stresses improvement/clearance of slums and protection of occupiers from eviction), the Court concluded that giving Sub-section (4) a purely directory meaning would frustrate the Act's object of protecting occupiers. The Court invoked principles from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (quoted in the opinion) about modifying language to effect legislative intent where plain words would lead to absurdity or defeat the object, and cited Howard v. Bodington to support the test for whether a provision is imperative or directory.
  5. Conclusion on Sub-section (4): The Court held that Sub-section (4) is mandatory. The Competent Authority is required to take into account the factors in Clauses (a)–(c) and must refuse permission where alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would not be available upon eviction or where the eviction is not in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area. The duty to consider these factors is not a formal or empty exercise; it is integral to the protection the Act is designed to provide.
  6. Application to the present facts: Because the Competent Authority neither considered nor recorded any findings on the relevant factors, and because retrospective permission to continue the suit was not permissible, the impugned permission was unlawful and ultra vires.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was allowed. The Court quashed the Competent Authority's permission to continue the pending civil suit as being without jurisdiction, and also quashed the permission to institute a new suit. The matter was remitted to the Competent Authority to decide any future application for permission to institute a new suit in light of the Court's observations. There was no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The permission previously granted to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to continue the pending ejectment suit is set aside; permission to institute a new suit is also set aside; respondents must approach the Competent Authority afresh, and the Competent Authority must consider and record findings on the factors set out in Sub-section (4) of Section 22 before granting or refusing permission.
  • Legal principle affirmed in this opinion: The Court held that Sub-section (4) of Section 22 is mandatory in operation; the Competent Authority has an obligation to take the enumerated factors into account and must refuse permission if the required protective conditions are not satisfied. The Court also held that retrospective permission to continue a suit already filed without the prior written permission required by Section 22(1) is not permissible.
  • Procedure and remedies: While the Court recognised that an aggrieved person may have a statutory appeal under Section 35(1) to the Administrator against orders of the Competent Authority (even orders granting permission), the availability of that alternative remedy does not bar the High Court from entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 where the impugned order is plainly illegal or beyond jurisdiction.
Petition allowed.
Show all summary ...

1. The petitioners, who are the legal heirs of deceased tenant Lokumal Sindhi, seek to challenge the order dated 25-8-1983 passed by the Competent Authority under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Slum Areas Act’), granting permission to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 22(1) of the said enactment to continue the suit filed by them against the petitioners for evicting them from the premises in their possession.

2. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 applied for permission on 23-2-1983 long after filing the suit for ejectment. They filed an application without prejudice to their contention that the house in question does not fall in a slum area within the meaning of the Slum Areas Act and hence no permission under Section 22(1) is necessary. The competent authority viz. the City Engineer, Nagpuar, granted the permission to continue suit/proceedings and to institute suit/proceedings for obtaining decree/order for eviction of the tenants, present petitioners.

3. The impugned order is challenged on two grounds viz., that no permission for continuation of the suit filed without previous permission can be granted, and secondly, in granting permission the Competent Authority did not take into account the factors enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-section (4) of section 22 of the Slum Areas Act.

4. Shri Manohar, learned advocate for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 contended that the present petition is not maintainable because the petitioners have not availed of the alternative remedy by way of an appeal provided by Section 35 of the Slum Areas Act.

5. Section 35(1) of the Slum Areas Act lays down that except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, any person aggrieved by any notice, order or direction issued or given by the Competent Authority may appeal to the Administrator within a period of thirty days from the date of issue of such notice, order or direction. According to Shri Mehadia, learned advocate for the petitioners, an appeal against am order under S. 22 can be filed only under Section 23 and not under Section 35, and as Section 23 makes the remedy of appeal available only to a person aggrieved by an order refusing to grant permission, there was no remedy, to the petitioners except by way of a writ petition to this Court.

6. Section 23 no doubt lays down that any person aggrieved by an order of the Competent Authority refusing to grant the permission referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 22 may, within thirty days of the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final. It is therefore, clear that a person who is aggrieved by an order granting the permission cannot file an appeal to the Tribunal under Section 23. There is no other provision which enables a person aggrieved by an order granting the permission under Section 22(1) to prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. But, Section 23 does not take away the general remedy by way of an appeal available to a person aggrieved by any order passed under the Act to prefer an appeal to the Administrator within, a period of 30 days from the date of the order. Hence, even if a person aggrieved by an order granting the permission cannot file an appeal to the Tribunal under Section 23, he can prefer an appeal to the Administrator under Section 35(1) and in that sense an alternative remedy is available even to such a person. But an alternative remedy does not necessarily prevent this Court from exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution if the impugned order or action is on the face of it illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the authority passing the order. The present case is one such a case.

7. Section 22(1) of the Slum Areas Act, under which the impugned permission is granted reads as follows:

“22(1) Notwithstandnig anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority,

(a) institute, after the commencement of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of any occupier from any building or land in a slum area; or

(b) where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or proceeding instituted before such commencement for the eviction of an occupier from any building or land in such area, execute such decree or order, or

(c) apply to any Judge or the Registrar of the Small Cause Court, under Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, in its application to the State of Maharashtra, or to any Court of Small Causes under Chapter IV-A of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, in its application to the State of Maharashtra, for a distress warrant for arrears of rent against any occupier of a house or premises in a slum area.”

8. A plain reading of this provision makes it clear that previous permission contemplated is for instituting a suit after commencement of the Slum Areas Act. Permission must be obtained before instituting the suit. No post foci permission can be granted. Section 22(1) does not empower the Competent Authority to grant retrospective permission allowing continuation of a suit which was filed without permission, in writing of the Competent Authority. Hence, that part of the order which permits respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to continue the Suit already filed without permission is illegal and without jurisdiction.

9. This brings me to the second challenge viz., that the competent authority while passing the order did not take into consideration the factors enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of Sub-section (4) of section 22 of the Slum Areas Act. Sub-section. (4) reads as follows:

“(4) In granting or refusing to grant permission under Clause (a) or (b) of Sub-section (1), the Competent Authority shall take into consideration the following factors namely:

(a) whether alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would be available to him, if he were evicted;

(b) whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area;

(c) any other factors, if any, as may be prescribed.”

10. It is apparent from the order passed by the Competent Authority that he did not take any of these factors into consideration. There is not even a whisper about it in the order passed by the Competent Authority. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 also have not averred in the petition that alternative accommodation within the means of the petitioners would be available to them if they are evicted, nor have they stated that eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area. Shri Manohar contended that the factors in Clauses (a) and (b) or the factors prescribed under Clause (c) are not conditions precedent to the granting of permission under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 22(1) and hence non-consideration of these factors would not be fatal to the order granting permission. According to him, even if the Competent Authority comes to the conclusion that no alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would be avail able to him if he were evicted or that the eviction of the occupier is not necessary in the interest of the improvement and clearance of the slum area, the Competent Authority would be competent and justified in granting the permission under Clause (a) or (b) of Section 22(1).

11. No doubt, the opening clause of sub-section (4) is capable of being interpreted to mean that the Competent Authority is only expected to take into consideration the factors enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) and nothing more. The relevant provision also does not specifically lay down that no permission under clause (a) or (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 22 can be granted unless alternative accommodation within the mean of the occupier would be available to him, if he were evicted and the eviction of the occupier is in the interest of the improvement and clearance of slum area. But, to hold otherwise, would be to defeat the very purpose of the enactment. As stated in the preamble, the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 is enacted to make better provision for the improvement and clearance of slum areas in the State and for their redevelopment and for the protection of occupiers from eviction and distress warrants and for matters connected with the purposes aforesaid. It is to give concrete shape to the object of affording protection from eviction to the occupiers of the slum areas that the provisions contained in section 22 are incorporated. Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of section 22 bars institution of any suit, after commencement of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, and also any proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of any occupier from any building or land in a slum area, while Cl. (b) bars execution of a decree or order for eviction obtained in a suit or proceeding instituted before the commencement of the Act, without previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority. These provisions which make the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts subject to the previous permission of the Competent Authority are incorporated in order to afford protection to the occupiers of the slum areas from being evicted. Granting of permission, therefore is not an empty formality and considering the object of the Act the Competent Authority would be obliged to refuse the permission if the authority comes to the conclusion that no alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would be available to him if he were evicted or that the eviction is not in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area. These two factors have nexus to the purpose for which the provision about permission is incorporated viz., to afford protection to the slum dwellers from eviction. Hence, even though it is not specifically stated that the Competent Authority shall refuse permission unless alternative accommodation is available to the occupier and the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area, the factors mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) are conditions precedent to the grant of permission under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 22(1). Sub-section (4) enjoins a duty on the Competent Authority to take into account the factors mentioned in clauses (a) to (c). The obvious interpretation, therefore, is that the Competent Authority must refuse permission if alternative accommodation is not available to the occupier or if the eviction is not in the interest of the improvement and clearance of the slum area.

12. I would like to quote the observations from the treatise ‘Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes’; on modification of the language to meet the intention of the legislature in Chapter ‘Exceptional Construction’ (Chapter 11, 12th Edition, page 228).

“Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest Contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature Could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule: ‘the canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution’.”

13. As observed above, the object of the enactment is to make better provision for the improvement and clearance of slum areas and their redevelopment and to afford protection to occupiers from eviction and distress warrants. The eviction of an occupier of the premises falling in slum area must, therefore, be in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area. Further if the object of the enactment is to give better protection to occupiers of the premises situated in slum areas than the protection afforded by the relevant legislations governing relationship of landlord and tenant, then the factor whether alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would be available to him if he were evicted assumes equally decisive character and the Competent Authority would be bound to refuse permission if alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would not be available to him or if the eviction is not in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum area. The main object of the enactment would be reduced to a nullity if sub-section (4) is interpreted to mean that the finding either way on the factors enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) would not affect the grant of permission and the only thing the Competent Authority is expected to do is to consider these factors before passing the order. Sub-section (4) of section 22 lays down that the Competent Authority shall take into account the factors enumerated in clauses (a) to (c). This provision is not merely directory as is sought to be urged, because as observed above, it has vital relation to the general object intended to be secured by the Act. Looking to the subject matter, importance of the provision cannot be disregarded. In this context, the observations of Lord Penzance in Howard v. Bodington . 1877 2 P.D 203. quoted on pages 314 and 315 of ‘Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes’ may be fruitfully reproduced:

“I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safety go further than that; in each case you must look to the subject-matter consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded, and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory.”

14. In my view, therefore, Sub-section (4) of section 22 is mandatory and hence the Competent Authority must take into consideration the factors enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) of the said sub-section white considering an application for permission under Sub-section (1) of Section 22, and grant permission only if it comes to the conclusion that alternative accommodation within the means of the occupier would be available to him if he is evicted and that the eviction is in the interest of the improvement and clearance of the slum area.

15. In the result, the petition is allowed. The permission granted to continue the pending civil suit is quashed, being without jurisdiction. Permission to institute a new suit is also quashed and the matter is remitted back to the Competent Authority to decide the question about granting pen mission for instituting a new suit in the light of the observations made above. No order as to costs.

Petition allowed.