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The State v. Mahomedkhan Navrangkhan
Case Summary: State of Bombay v. Mahomedkhan Navarangkhan
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal was filed by the State of Bombay against an order of acquittal made by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ankleshwar, in Criminal Case No. 996 of 1957. The prosecution alleged that the respondent, Mahomedkhan Navarangkhan, was a national of Pakistan who had obtained a Pakistani passport on June 9, 1952, and a category 'C' visa from the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan dated July 3, 1956. The visa was stated to be valid for three months from the date of entry. The respondent entered India on July 12, 1956.
The District Police Superintendent of Broach served a notice on the respondent on June 22, 1957, directing him to quit India within one month, alleging illegal stay beyond the visa period. After the respondent did not leave, a complaint was filed on July 31, 1957, alleging that he was a "foreigner" under s. 2(a) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, and that he breached r. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, and s. 13 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, thus committing an offence under s. 14 of the Act.
The Magistrate framed a charge alleging contravention of r. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948 and s. 13 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, for remaining in India beyond the permitted period. The respondent contested the charge, asserting that he was an Indian citizen (born at Ankleshwar, formerly employed as a Talathi) and that, if he had obtained Pakistani documentation, this was for the purpose of temporary travel and not indicative of permanent migration. On appreciation of evidence the Magistrate found that the respondent was a natural-born British subject and a citizen of India under art. 5 of the Constitution, and acquitted him on November 30, 1957. The State appealed to the Court (this opinion).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent was a "foreigner" as defined by s. 2(a) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, at the time he entered India on July 12, 1956.
- Whether the prosecution had proved that the respondent contravened para. (rule) 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, or s. 13 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, so as to constitute an offence under s. 14 of the Act.
- Whether a notice issued by the District Police Superintendent of Broach on June 21, 1957, amounted to a "direction given in pursuance of" a valid order made under s. 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (or under authority delegated under s. 12), such that non-compliance could be prosecuted under s. 13.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State / Government Pleader)
- Contended that the respondent's migration from India to Pakistan had been proved by his own statements, and that "migration" need not mean permanent settlement but could mean leaving to pursue a normal avocation in another country.
- Argued that, pursuant to rule 3 in Schedule III of the Citizenship Rules, 1956 (under s. 18 of the Citizenship Act, 1955), the respondent's obtaining a Pakistani passport on June 9, 1952, was conclusive proof that he had voluntarily acquired Pakistani citizenship prior to that date, and thus could not claim Indian citizenship.
- Relied on the respondent's declarations in his visa application (stating he was a Pakistani national and that he had migrated from India in August 1948) as evidence that he was not an Indian citizen unless he could show fraud or misrepresentation induced those declarations.
- Pointed to s. 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, submitting that the onus of proving that one is not a foreigner lies upon the respondent, and that in the absence of relevant evidence he must be held a foreigner.
- Suggested that the notice from the District Police Superintendent was given pursuant to a valid order of the State Government under the powers delegated by the Central Government and that non-compliance with that notice constituted an offence under s. 13.
Respondent
- Denied being a Pakistani national and asserted Indian citizenship: born at Ankleshwar, served as a Talathi until 1951, thereafter engaged in business and briefly went to Karachi seeking employment—not to migrate permanently.
- Explained that he obtained a Pakistani passport and visa only because he was told he needed such documentation to return to India, and alleged that an agent had prepared or filled in forms without his informed knowledge; he claimed he did not knowingly declare himself a Pakistani national.
- Maintained that he intended to return to India shortly and did not migrate with intent to settle in Pakistan.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Hasanali, 1954 56 Bom. L.R. 552 | Held that the Foreigners Act, 1946 did not authorise externment of all non-citizens; only a person who was a "foreigner" as defined by the Act could be externed. It acknowledged that one might be not a citizen yet also not a "foreigner" under the Act. | The Court relied on this principle to support its conclusion that a person could be a natural-born British subject (and thus not a "foreigner" under s. 2(a)(i)) even if not a citizen of India; this helped justify the respondent's acquittal under the statutory definition in force when he entered India. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court framed its decision around statutory definitions and the specific elements of para. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, and s. 13 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. It proceeded through the following steps of analysis, drawn strictly from the opinion's text:
- Statutory focus on the charge: The complaint and charge relied on contravention of para. (rule) 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, and s. 13 of the Foreigners Act. Section 13 applies only to failure to comply with a direction given in pursuance of an order made under s. 3 (or an order made by a subordinate authority under s. 12). Thus the Court asked whether there was any order whose contravention was alleged.
- Content of para. 7: The Court analyzed para. 7, which requires (i) that the person be a foreigner who entered India on a visa issued under the Indian Passport Act, 1920, (ii) that he obtain from the Registration Officer a permit indicating the period he is authorised to remain, and (iii) that he depart before the permit's expiry. The Court emphasized that para. 7 refers expressly to the period "indicated in the permit."
- Definition of "foreigner" as of the date of entry: The Court examined s. 2(a) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, as it stood when the respondent entered India (July 12, 1956). That definition included three clauses; clause (i) covered natural-born British subjects. The Court accepted the Magistrate's findings that the respondent was a natural-born British subject within s. 2(a)(i).
- Effect of the respondent's status: Because the respondent was a natural-born British subject under s. 2(a)(i) as then worded, he was not a "foreigner" under the Act at the time of entry. The Court rejected the Government Pleader's construction that any non-citizen must be deemed a foreigner even if captured by clauses (i) or (ii).
- Amendment of the definition irrelevant: The Court noted that s. 2(a) was later amended by the Foreigners Laws (Amendment) Act, 1957, which deleted clauses (i) and (ii), but this amendment took effect on January 19, 1957—after the respondent's entry. The applicable definition is the one in force when he entered.
- Absence of essential factual basis for para. 7 contravention: Even if the respondent had been a foreigner, the prosecution did not allege failure to obtain a permit from the Registration Officer (the first requirement of para. 7). The prosecution relied instead on the respondent remaining beyond the visa's period. The Court concluded that "the said period" in para. 7 refers to the period indicated in a permit (which must be obtained after entry), not the period mentioned in the visa; in absence of any charge or evidence that no permit was obtained, the alleged breach could not be sustained on that ground.
- Visa-period vs permit-period distinction: The Court explained that the visa's three‑month validity is tied to date of entry, but that para. 7 imposes an independent obligation to obtain a permit indicating the authorised period computed from the date of entry. Therefore, non-departure before a visa's expiry, standing alone and without the permit context, was not shown to contravene para. 7.
- On the notice and delegation issue: The Court considered whether the District Police Superintendent's notice dated June 21, 1957, was a "direction given in pursuance of" a valid order under s. 3 (or under powers delegated by s. 12). It acknowledged that the Central Government could delegate powers under s. 3 and that Notification S.R.O. No. 1562 purported to entrust functions to the State Government subject to conditions. However, the prosecution produced no State Government order or other evidence showing that the notice was issued pursuant to any such order. The notice, complaint and charge made no reference to any State order; thus the Court could not treat the notice as a direction under s. 13.
- Decision to resolve appeal on these grounds: The Court observed it was unnecessary to consider other submissions (e.g., conclusive proof under Citizenship Rules, onus under s. 9) because the appeal could be disposed of by the conclusions that (a) the respondent was not a foreigner when he entered India under the applicable definition, and (b) the prosecution had not proved any contravention of para. 7 or of s. 13 based on a direction under a valid order.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Acquittal confirmed; appeal dismissed.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the respondent's acquittal by the Magistrate is upheld and the State's appeal fails.
- The Court's ruling rests on the application of the statutory definition of "foreigner" as it stood when the respondent entered India and on the prosecution's failure to prove the essential elements of para. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, and any direction given under a valid order for the purposes of s. 13.
- The opinion does not purport to set a broader novel precedent beyond applying the existing statutory definitions and the record before the Court; the outcome is the reversal of the prosecution's case on the facts and law presented, with no new legal rule expressly announced beyond this application.
Note: This summary reproduces and organizes only the information contained in the provided opinion. No facts, arguments or legal propositions have been added beyond those present in the source text.
Datar, J.:— This is an appeal filed by the State of Bombay against the order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ankleshwar, in Criminal Case No. 996 of 1957.
2. The case of the prosecution was that the present respondent Mahomedkhan Navarangkhan is a foreigner being a national of Pakistan. As such national he obtained a passport from the Government of Pakistan at Karachi on June 9, 1952, which was valid up to June 9, 1957.
3. On July 3, 1956, he applied for visa for India to enable and authorise him to enter the Indian territory to see his father and other relatives in the State of Bombay. The High Commissioner for India in Pakistan granted him visa of the category ‘C’ being No. 49900 and dated July 3, 1956. It was stated in the visa that it was valid for three months from the date of entry, which meant that the respondent, in whose favour it was issued, was to remain in India for a period of three months from the date of his arrival on the Indian territory. The respondent entered India on July 12, 1956, and accordingly he was allowed to stay in India till October 11, 1956. But he did not leave India even after October 11, 1956. On June 21, 1957, the District Police Superintendent, Broach, gave him a notice stating that in spite of the last date of the visa obtained from the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan, he was illegally staying in Bharat, and he was therefore ordered to quit Bharat within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice, failing which legal steps would be taken against him in a Court of law and thereafter he would be deported from India. This notice was served upon the respondent on June 22, 1957.
4. Even after the period mentioned in the notice expired, the respondent did not leave India. Hence, the Police sub-inspector of Ankleshwar filed a complaint on July 31, 1957, against the respondent stating that he was a foreigner under s. 2(a) of Foreigners Act of 1946 and that he had not left Bharat in spite of the notice served on him on June 22, 1957, and had continued to stay in Ankleshwar (Bharat) illegally in spite of the expiry of the notice and had therefore committed a breach of r. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, and s. 13 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, and thus committed an offence punishable under s. 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946.
5. The Judicial Magistrate, before whom the case came up for trial, framed a charge against the respondent as follows:—
“That you on or about the 25th day of July 1957 at Ankleshwar being a foreigner entered into India under the authority of ‘C’ Visa No. 49900 dated July 3, 1956 on July 12, 1956 and were permitted to stay in India upto October 11, 1956 but you did not leave India even after the D.S.P Broach gave you notice which was served on you on June 22, 1957, and thereby contravened r. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948 and also s. 13 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, and thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946.”
6. The respondent resisted the charge. His defence was that he was not a national of Pakistan but was a citizen of India. He was born at Ankleshwar and was officiating as Talathi till 1951 when he resigned from his office. Then he started business, but due to loss in the business he had to stop it in a short time. Thereafter he could not secure a good job or any good business and in search of good service and for a short time he went to Pakistan (Karachi). He did not go to Pakistan permanently. He had no reason, except for service, in going to Pakistan. After going to Pakistan, he found that it was not suitable for him to stay there. He intended to come back to Bharat in a short time; and when he made movements to return to Bharat, he was informed that it was impossible to return to Bharat, unless he obtained the passport of Pakistan for returning to Bharat. At last he obtained the passport from Pakistan. Thereafter, he applied for visa. He further says that he was not informed that he would be considered as national of Pakistan when he obtained the passport and the visa from his agent in Pakistan. The agent had taken his signature on the blank forms and he filled up all the particulars according to his (agent's) wish and he was not made aware of the particulars written by the agent and if it was stated that he was a national of Pakistan in the application for visa, that fact was mentioned in the application without his know-pledge and no such declaration was ever made by him.
7. The learned Magistrate, on appreciation of the evidence led before him, held that the respondent was born in India in 1921 or 1922, that he served as a Talathi from 1944 till 1951 in the District of Broach and that he left India either towards the end of 1951 or in early 1952. He also held that the prosecution had not proved that the respondent migrated from India to Pakistan with, the intention of residing and settling in Pakistan and that therefore art. 7 of the Constitution did not apply and in view of art. 5 of the Constitution, the respondent was a citizen of India and not a foreigner. Accordingly, on November 30, 1957, he acquitted the respondent of the offence with which he had been charged.
8. The State has now come to this Court in appeal against the order of acquittal.
9. The learned Government Pleader, who appears for the State, contended that even from what had been stated by the respondent in his defence at the trial, the migration of the respondent from India to Pakistan had been more than amply proved. According to the learned Government Pleader ‘migration’ did not mean leaving one country for another, with a view permanently to reside and settle in the other country. But it only meant leaving one country for another with a view to pursue any normal avocation in the other country. The second contention that was raised by the learned Government Pleader was that in view of r. 3 specified in Sch. III of the Citizenship Rules, 1956, made under s. 18 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, the fact that the respondent (though originally a citizen of India) had obtained a passport on June 9, 1952, from the Government of Pakistan shall be conclusive proof of his having voluntarily acquired the citizenship of that country before that date, and therefore it was not now open to the respondent to contend that he still retained the citizenship of India. The learned Government Pleader also drew our attention to the declaration made by the respondent in his application for visa before the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan, wherein he had stated that he was a Pakistani national and that he had migrated from India in August 1948. In view of these solemn declarations in the application, contended the learned Government Pleader, the respondent could not be regarded as a citizen of India, but was only a foreigner so long as no attempt had been made by him to show that he had been induced to make those declarations either because of some fraud or misrepresentation. The learned Government Pleader also pointed out that in view of the provisions of s. 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, the onus of showing that he was not a foreigner was entirely upon the respondent, and in the absence of any relevant evidence in that behalf, it must be held that the respondent was a foreigner and therefore guilty of the offence with which he was charged.
10. In our view, it is not necessary to consider any of these submissions made by the learned Government Pleader, as this appeal can be disposed of on the ground that the respondent was not a foreigner when he entered India on July 13, 1956, as defined in the Act as it then stood and that the facts proved by the prosecution in this case do not at all make out any case of the contravention of r. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, or s. 13 of the Act, for which the respondent was charged in the trial Court. We have set out the entire charge as framed by the learned Magistrate. Indeed it appears the learned Magistrate while framing the charges relied upon the averments and the allegations made by the sub-inspector in his written complaint filed on July 31, 1957. Both the charge and the written complaint refer to the contravention of r. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, and also s. 13 of the Foreigners Act. Section 13, so far as material, states that any person who fails to comply with any direction given in pursuance of any such order (made under the provisions of the Act) shall be deemed to have contravened the provisions of the Act. The orders referred to in s. 13 are those orders which the Central Government may make in the exercise of their power conferred upon them by s. 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. Section 3(1) of the Act says that
“The Central Government may by order make provision, either generally or with respect to all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner…for prohibiting, regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners into India or their departure therefrom…
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, orders made under this section may provide that the foreigner…
(c) shall not remain in India or in any prescribed area therein…”
11. Under s. 12 of the Act, it seems, the Central Government has been authorised to delegate its powers under s. 3 to any authority sub-ordinate to it. Section 12 reads:
“Any authority upon which any power to make or give any direction, consent or permission or to do any other act is conferred by this Act or by any order made thereunder may, unless express provision is made to the contrary, in writing authorise, conditionally or otherwise, any authority sub-ordinate to it to exercise such power on its behalf…”
12. From the wording of s. 13 mentioned above, it is clear that it refers to the non-compliance of a direction given in pursuance of any order made by the Central Government under s. 3 or by any authority sub-ordinate thereto under s. 12 of the Act. It is for this reason that the learned Government Pleader relied more upon the reference to the contravention of r. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, than upon the reference to s. 13 in the charge. It is only when there is an order of a competent authority under the Act that the question of any direction being given in pursuance thereof can arise. Therefore, the only question that falls to be considered is whether there was any order the contravention of which amounted to an offence punishable under s. 14 of the Act. The prosecution, as is clear from the complaint and the charge, relies upon the contravention of only para, (rule) 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948. The Foreigners Order, 1948, was made by the Central Government in the exercise of its powers conferred by s. 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. Paragraph 7 (mentioned as r. 7 in the charge) of the Foreigners Order states that:
“Every foreigner who enters India on the authority of a Visa issued in pursuance of the Indian Passport Act, 1920 (XXXIV of 1920) shall obtain from the Registration Officer having jurisdiction,… a permit indicating the period during which he is authorised to remain in India and shall, unless the period indicated in the permit is extended by the Central Government, depart from India before the expiry of the said period; and at the time of foreigner's departure from India the permit shall be surrendered by him to the Registration Officer having jurisdiction at the place from which he departs.”
13. The wording of this paragraph makes it clear that before there could be any contravention of the provisions thereof it must be shown that the person who entered India was a foreigner and that having entered India he failed in the first instance to obtain a permit from the requisite authority indicating the period during which he was authorised to remain in India and thereafter failed to depart from India before the expiry of the said period. If so, then the question arises, was the respondent a foreigner on July 12, 1956, when he entered India? As s. 2(a) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, stood on that date, “foreigner” was defined as meaning a person who
“(i) is not a natural-born British subject as defined in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 1 of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, or
(ii) has not been granted a certificate of naturalisation as a British subject under any law for the time being in force in India, or
(iii) is not a citizen of India.”
14. It is not disputed, and indeed it cannot be disputed in view of the evidence on the record and the finding of the learned Magistrate, that the respondent was at the material time a natural born British subject within the meaning of s. 2(a)(i) of the Foreigners Act of 1946. Therefore, even assuming that the respondent was not a citizen of India, still he was not a foreigner as defined in the Act inasmuch as he was a natural born British subject within the meaning of s. 2(a)(i) of the Act.
15. The learned Government Pleader tried to construe the three clauses of the definition as meaning that if a person was not a citizen of India, then even though he was a natural born British subject or had obtained a certificate of naturalization as required by cl. (i) or by cl. (ii) of s. 2(a) of the Act, he must nevertheless be deemed to be a foreigner. We do not think that it is possible to put any such construction upon the three clauses mentioned in the definition. In Union of India v. Hasanali . 1954 56 Bom. L.R 552. it was held that the Foreigners Act, 1946, did not authorise the Government to extern all non-citizens and the only person who could be externed under the provisions of the Act was a person who was a foreigner as defined-by the Act. In the course of the judgment the learned Chief Justice observed that it is possible for a person not to be a citizen and yet not to be a foreigner within the meaning of the Act.
16. It may be noted that s. 2(a) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, was amended by the Foreigners Laws (Amendment) Act, 1957, which came into force on January 19, 1957. By this Amendment Act, cls. (i) and (ii) in s. 2(a) were deleted and “Foreigner” was defined as meaning only a person who was not a citizen of India. But this Amendment Act came into force long after the respondent entered India. We have to determine whether the respondent was a foreigner by reference to the definition as it was in force when he entered India; and in view of the undisputed position that he was a natural born British subject within the meaning of s. 2(a), cl. (i), of the Act, it must be held that he was not a foreigner and therefore not obliged to comply with the provisions of para. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948. Further even assuming that the respondent was a foreigner on the date of his arrival in India, it is not clear in what respect there has been any contravention of para, (rule) 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948. It is not the prosecution case that the respondent contravened the provisions of para, (rule) 7 in that he failed to obtain from the Registration Officer a permit indicating the period during which he was authorized to remain in India. It is also not the gravamen of the charge. It is also not disputed that there was no permit ever obtained by the respondent from the Registration Officer. The learned Government Pleader suggests that there was a failure on the part of the respondent to depart from India before the expiry of the said period as mentioned in para, (rule) 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, and therefore there was a contravention of the provisions of the said paragraph. We cannot accept this suggestion. The words “the said period” occurring in the paragraph must refer to the period indicated in the permit. When there was no permit and when failure to obtain such permit was never made the ground of the present complaint, we do not see how any failure to depart from India before the expiry of the period indicated in such permit could ever occur and could be made the basis of the complaint as suggested by the learned Government Pleader.
17. The learned Government Pleader further suggested that even though it was true that no permit had been obtained by the respondent from the requisite authority and failure to obtain such permit had not been made the subject-matter of the present complaint or the charge, all what para, (rule) 7 mentioned was that the foreigner should depart from India before the expiry of the period mentioned in the visa itself. In other words, the contention of the learned Government Pleader was that the “period” referred to in the paragraph was the period mentioned primarily in the visa and that such period had only to be restated in the permit. If, therefore, there was no departure from India before the expiry of the period mentioned in the visa, there was contravention of the provisions of para. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, which was made punishable under s. 14 of the Act. We do not think that this contention is right. The paragraph expressly refers to the period indicated in the permit and not to the period mentioned in the visa. The visa only mentions that it is valid for three months from the date of entry in India. The date of the issue of visa and the date of entry in India cannot in most cases be the same. It is only when a foreigner enters India, that para. 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, makes it incumbent upon him to approach the Registration Officer and obtain a permit from him indicating the period during, which he is authorised to remain in India. This period obviously has to be computed from the date of his entering India which is known only after he arrives in India.
18. Then it was further argued that the notice which was issued by the District Police Superintendent of Broach on June 21, 1957, was in the nature of a direction given in pursuance of a valid order and the contravention thereof was contravention of the provisions of the Act in view of s. 13 of the Act. It is true that the Central Government could delegate its powers under s. 3 to any authority sub-ordinate to it. The Notification S.R.O No. 1562 issued by the Government of India, so far as material, states that in exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (i) of art. 258 of the Constitution, the President with the consent of the Government of Bombay hereby entrusts to that Government the functions of the Central Government in making orders of the nature specified in cl. (c) of sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946) in respect of foreigners other than enemy foreigners as defined in the Enemy Foreigners Order, 1939, subject to the following conditions namely:—
“(1) that notwithstanding this entrustment the Central Government may itself exercise the said function either generally or in any particular case or class of cases, and
(2) that the State Government shall not exercise the said function in a manner inconsistent with any orders which have been, or may hereafter be, issued by the Central Government under the said Act.”
19. In view of this Notification we can proceed on the basis that the State Government has got the power of making appropriate order under s. 3(2)(c) of the Act.
20. But so far as the record of the present case stands, we do not find any such order produced on behalf of the prosecution. The learned Government Pleader contends that inasmuch as a notice was issued to the respondent by the District Police Superintendent of Broach that notice must have been given only in pursuance of a valid order of the State Government. It is not possible to accept this contention. In the first place, there is no reference to any such order in the notice given by the District Police Superintendent of Broach; nor is there any mention of any such order either in the written complaint or in the charge. What is mentioned in the charge is only the notice of the District Police Superintendent. In the absence of any reference to any order of the State Government in the evidence of the present case, it is impossible to hold that the State Government had passed the requisite order and had further given directions to the District Police Superintendent of Broach to give the notice which he issued on June 21, 1957. Besides, the evidence on record does not show and the complaint and the charge do not even mention that the order of the State Government (if it existed) was brought to the notice of the respondent before he was charged with contravention thereof or of any direction given in pursuance thereof. It must, therefore, be held that the respondent was neither guilty of any contravention of the provisions' of para, (rule) 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948, nor of the provisions of s. 13 of the Foreigners Act, 1946.
21. The learned Government Pleader made a grievance that the points upon which we are disposing of the appeal were entirely new and we should not, therefore, consider and give effect to them for the first time in appeal.
22. But it may be noted that these points suggested themselves to us as we proceeded to hear the arguments of the learned Government Pleader and were also urged by the learned advocate on behalf of the respondent. These points could be considered and disposed of on the facts already proved and admitted in the case and the respondent in an appeal against acquittal could support the order of acquittal on any grounds available to him if those grounds did not necessitate any further investigation into facts.
23. The result is that the order of acquittal is confirmed and the appeal fails and must be dismissed.
24. Appeal dismissed: acquittal confirmed.
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