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Pralhad Sheonarayan Chokhani v. Damodhar Ramkaran Vaishnao
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the dismissal of his suit by the trial Court. The dispute concerns immovable property left by one Mahadeo (described in schedules A to C of the plaint). The plaintiff is the son of Mahadeo's daughter Anchi and claims to be the next reversioner on the death of all Mahadeo's daughters. Defendant No. 2, Jainarayan, claims the property under (a) an alleged oral will of Mahadeo and (b) as Mahadeo's adopted son. Several other defendants support Jainarayan's claim (including Rukhminibai and Damodhar), while some defendants are tenants only and do not claim title.
Common facts: Mahadeo died on the night of October 13, 1930, leaving three daughters (Narbada, Saraswati and Anchi). All three daughters had died before the institution of the suit on August 15, 1945. It is common ground that the suit properties were Mahadeo's separate property and that the family belongs to the sect described as “Vaishnao Bisa Agarwal.”
Trial Court outcome: The trial Court found (inter alia) that (i) an oral will in favour of the daughters (two houses) and in favour of Jainarayan (in connection with his adoption) was made; (ii) Mahadeo had directed that Jainarayan be adopted and that his pagdi (turban) be tied to Jainarayan; (iii) the deed dated October 28, 1930 (executed by the daughters and Jainarayan) was valid and not the result of fraud; and (iv) the customary law of the sect allowed the form of adoption relied on by the defendants. On these findings the trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit except in respect of his one-third share in the property given by Mahadeo to his daughters. The plaintiff appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Was an oral will made by Mahadeo on October 13, 1930, giving certain house property to his daughters and the rest of the property to Jainarayan?
- Did Mahadeo on the same day nominate Jainarayan for being adopted as a son to him and instruct that his turban (pagdi) be tied on Jainarayan's head?
- Did the family of Mahadeo originally belong to Agroha in Hissar district of Punjab and migrate thereafter to Jaipur (Marwar) and then to Berar (Yeotmal)?
- Was Mahadeo's family governed, in matters of adoption, by the customary law alleged by the defendants (the customary law of Agarwal Banias / Punjab origin)?
- Was Jainarayan validly adopted according to the alleged custom?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The plaintiff argued the family was governed by the Benares school of Hindu law (as the family had migrated from Jaipur to Berar) and therefore daughters had only limited interests and the plaintiff (son of Anchi) became full owner after the daughters' deaths, entitled to separation and possession of half the suit property.
- The plaintiff denied the alleged oral will in favour of Jainarayan and denied the factum of adoption of Jainarayan; challenged the validity of the deed dated October 28, 1930, as a fabrication or executed under coercion or ignorance of legal rights.
- The plaintiff contended the adoption, if any, was invalid because Jainarayan was an orphan and a married man at the time of the alleged adoption (asserting invalidity under Hindu adoption rules), and argued that if adoption occurred after Mahadeo's death it could not divest daughters' vested rights.
- The plaintiff urged that the oral evidence for the respondents was fabricated or unreliable (characterised as “got-up”), and that Mahadeo's failure to adopt Jainarayan during his lifetime undermined any claim of intention to adopt.
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- The defendants pleaded that the family originally belonged to Agroha (Hissar, Punjab) and migrated to Jaipur and later to Yeotmal; therefore their personal law/customs (Agarwal customary law) governed adoption and succession, not the Benares school.
- Under the alleged customary law: daughters and their issue are excluded from inheriting the father's property; the gaddi (family succession) should be continued by a male member; there is a custom of nominating a successor by the deceased or by relatives/panchas; tying a turban (pagdi) on the nominee confers the status of adopted son / successor and adoption can be effected even after the death of the nominator; an orphan or a married man can be so nominated or adopted.
- The defendants relied on oral testimony (including defendant No.2 Jainarayan and several defence witnesses) and on the deed dated October 28, 1930, which they said recorded and implemented Mahadeo's wishes and the pagdi-tying ceremony.
- They pleaded that Mahadeo made an oral will (on the morning of October 13, 1930) disposing two houses to his daughters and the remainder to Jainarayan as his adopted son, and that the deed of October 28, 1930 reflected this distribution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Baboo Beer Pertab Sahee v. Maharajah Bajender Pertab Sahee (1867 12 M.I.A 1, 28) | That the burden of proving an oral will rests very heavily on the proponent; spoken words of a deceased person must be alleged and proved with precision and detail. | The court invoked this authority to emphasise the heavy burden on respondents to prove the oral will and to examine the oral evidence accordingly. |
| Govindram v. Sheoprasad | Referenced as a Division Bench approval for the article on adoption among Marwari Agrawals (supporting the secular nature of adoption among Agarwals). | The court noted that Lala Chiranjilal Agarwal's article (describing Agarwal adoption practices) had been cited with approval in this case, supporting the view that adoption among Agarwals is a secular affair requiring minimal ceremony. |
| Chiman Lal v. Bari Chand | Judicial Committee affirmed that, in the class to which parties belonged, Hindu law adoption rules did not apply and that an unequivocal declaration and subsequent treatment sufficed for adoption (including adoption of an orphan). | The court relied on this case to show that customary adoption among some Agarwal Bania groups permits adoption of an orphan by declaration and subsequent treatment; the Privy Council affirmed such a rule in that context. |
| Chiman Lal v. Hari Chand (1913 I.L.R 40 Cal. 879 at p. 882) | Support for the proposition that the restriction against the adoption of orphans under orthodox Hindu law may not apply to Jains / certain Agarwal communities. | The court cited this decision (via Parshottam Ganpat) as part of authorities showing acceptance of orphan adoption among Agarwal/Jain communities. |
| Parshottam Ganpat v. Venichand Ganpat | Discussed that restrictions against orphan adoption under orthodox Hindu law need not apply to Jains; recognition of adoption of orphans among Agarwal Jains was supported by earlier decisions. | The court relied on this decision for the proposition that adoption among Agarwal Jains is a secular institution and that orphan adoption has been judicially recognised in related decisions. |
| Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho (1878 I.L.R 1 All. 688, P.C.) | Cited as one of the decisions recognizing forms of secular/customary adoption among certain communities. | Used to support the general line of authority that secular/customary adoption practices (including pagdi-tying) have been recognized in earlier jurisprudence. |
| Asharfi, Kunwar v. Rup Chand (1908 I.L.R 30 All. 197) | Referenced among authorities concerning adoption and customary practices. | Noted by the court as another authority in the line of cases addressing adoption customs among communities related to Agarwals/Jains. |
| Manak Chand v. Munna Lal (1909 4 I.C. 844) | Example of a decision upholding adoption of an orphan among Jains of Delhi belonging to the Agarwala sect. | Cited as supportive authority for the proposition that orphan adoption has been judicially upheld among Agarwal Jains. |
| Harnabh Pershad v. Mandil Dass (1899 I.L.R 27 Cal. 370) | Held that judicial decisions recognizing a disputed custom among Jains of one place are relevant as evidence of the same custom among Jains of another place, unless shown different. | The court cited this decision to justify treating judicial recognition of custom in one locality as relevant to another locality for the Agarwal/Jain community. |
| Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal | Privy Council decision examining sufficiency of evidence to establish a custom among Jain Marwadi caste; held the plaintiff failed to prove the custom on the evidence before them. | The court explained that this decision did not hold impossibility of such a custom existing; rather it showed the custom was not proven on the facts of that case and therefore it was not authority to disprove the existence of the custom generally. |
| Ramdayal v. Chaturbhujlal | A case dealing with adoption among Yaishnava Agarwals and the relevance (or lack) of customs of origin when local custom at the domicile was relied upon; court found it not relevant here. | The present court held this decision had no relevance to the issue of custom of origin relied upon by defendants in the instant case. |
| Dhanraj Joharmal v. Soni Bai (and related report regarding adoption by pagdi-tying) | Discussed adoption where tying a turban and giving a feast constituted the secular/customary adoption ceremony; the Privy Council treated such a ceremony as sufficient for secular adoption but not necessarily for full Brahminical adoption with collateral succession rights. | The court cited this decision (and its exposition of what the pagdi-tying ceremony effected) to support that pagdi-tying constituted a secular adoption sufficient to give succession to the adoptive father's estate. |
| Shrinivas Krishnarno v. Narayan Devji | Authority on the doctrine that adoption may be treated as relating back to the date of the death of the adoptive father (adopted son considered posthumous) for succession to the adoptive father's estate. | The court distinguished and applied this principle: it held the doctrine supports a posthumous effect when claim relates to the adoptive father's estate (as here), and thus adoption after death could relate back for purposes of succession to Mahadeo's estate. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise manner, addressing the enumerated points for determination and the evidence adduced.
- On the oral will: The court reiterated the heavy burden on the proponent of an oral will (citing Baboo Beer Pertab Sahee). It reviewed witness testimony and the deed dated October 28, 1930. The court concluded that the evidence showed Mahadeo had made an oral disposition of two houses (shops) to his daughters but had not disposed of other property to Jainarayan independently of Jainarayan's capacity as an adopted son. The court relied on the language of the deed (exh. P-1) to show Mahadeo intended Jainarayan to receive property only on acceptance of adoption (continuance of Mahadeo's name/line) and to allow daughters to reclaim property if Jainarayan did not continue the name.
- On nomination/adoption instructions: The court accepted that Mahadeo had nominated Jainarayan for adoption and had given directions that his pagdi be tied to Jainarayan (and that there was abundant evidence Mahadeo called people to his bedside and left instructions). The court rejected the appellant's contention that lack of adoption during Mahadeo's lifetime negated intention, reasoning that the alleged custom permitted posthumous tying of the pagdi and nomination by the deceased and thus adoption during the nominee's presence after death was consistent with that custom.
- On family origin and governing law: After reviewing evidence, the court agreed with the trial Court that Mahadeo's family originally belonged to Agroha (Hissar district, Punjab) and then migrated to Jaipur and later to Berar. Applying the established legal principle that personal law follows origin unless there is renunciation or conformity to local law, the court held that the family's personal law in matters of adoption should be determined by the law prevailing in their place of origin (Hissar) so far as it varied from the law of domicile.
- On customary law of the Agarwal sect and its content: The court examined authoritative commentary (Sir W.H. Rattigan) and an article by Lala Chiranjilal Agarwal (approved by a High Court decision) and surveyed relevant case law. The court concluded that among Agarwals (both Vaishnavas and Jains) adoption is largely secular: the essential ceremony is pagdi-tying (or distribution of coconuts/sweets), no formal giving-and-taking or religious rites are necessary, and an orphan or married man could be adopted. The court found prior decisions (including Chiman Lal, Parshottam Ganpat and others) recognized such customary adoption practices in related communities.
-
On sufficiency of evidence and application of custom to facts: The court found (and upheld trial Court findings) that:
- Mahadeo's pagdi was tied on the 13th or 14th day after his death in the presence of daughters and panchas;
- a deed executed on October 28, 1930, recorded distribution consistent with Mahadeo's wishes and was executed with sufficient publicity and registration;
- since the pagdi-tying and deed were publicly performed and recognized, Jainarayan was treated and recognized as adopted son and had been managing property and paying debts under that status;
- there was sufficient customary and evidential foundation to conclude the pagdi-tying ceremony effected adoption according to the relevant custom.
- On the temporal effect of adoption: The court addressed the appellant's contention that adoption thirteen or fourteen days after death could not divest daughters' already vested rights. The court relied on authority (Shrinivas Krishnarno) and explained the doctrine that an adoption effected by custom can be treated, as a legal fiction, to relate back to the date of death of the adoptive father (placing the adopted person in the position of a posthumous son) where the claim relates to succession to the adoptive father's estate. The court held this principle applied here because the dispute concerned Mahadeo's estate itself (not collateral succession).
The court therefore concluded the oral will vested only the two houses in the daughters; Jainarayan's entitlement to the remaining property depended on establishing valid adoption according to the customary law of the Agarwal sect, which the court found had been sufficiently proved and applied to the facts.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Implications:
- The appeal by the plaintiff fails and is dismissed with costs (the trial Court's decree in favour of the defendants is upheld on the contested points).
- The court held that Mahadeo's oral will disposed two houses to his daughters but did not give other property to Jainarayan except in his capacity as an adopted son; Jainarayan's adoption by pagdi-tying (posthumously performed in accordance with the customary law) was validated on the facts of the case, entitling him to succeed to Mahadeo's estate as adopted son.
- Direct consequence: the plaintiff's claims for the larger reversionary title were rejected except in relation to the one-third share in property given to the daughters (as found by the trial Court).
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying recognized authorities on customary adoption; the court applied existing precedent and customary-law analysis to the facts rather than announcing new precedent.
Tambe, J.:— This appeal of the plaintiff is directed against the dismissal of his suit by the trial Court.
2. The dispute now relates to the immovable property left by one Mahadeo as described in schedules A to C of the plaint. No dispute was raised before us in respect of the movable property shown in sch. D of the plaint. The contest chiefly lies between the plaintiff, the son of the deceased Mahadeo's daughter Anchi on the one hand, who claims to be the next reversioner on the death of all the daughters of Mahadeo, and defendant No. 2 Jainarayan on the other, who claims the property under the oral will of Mahadeo and also as his adopted son. The claim of Jainarayan is supported by defendant No. 14 Rukhminibai, who is the daughter of Mahadeo's deceased daughter Narbada, and also by defendant No. 1 Damodhar, who is the son of Mahadeo's another deceased daughter Saraswati. Defendants Nos. 5, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12 are only the tenants of the portion of the suit properties. They plead that they have taken this portion from defendant No. 2 and claim no interest in the suit property. They have also stated that they are willing to deliver possession of the portion in their respective possession to the person held entitled thereto. Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 are transferees of defendant No. 2 Jainarayan and they support Jainarayan's case. They also support the sale in their favour on the ground of legal necessity. Defendant No. 10 was discharged during the pendency of the suit. It is not clear from the plaint why defendants Nos. 8 and 13 were joined as parties to this suit. No contest, however, is raised on their behalf before us. The following genealogical tree will be helpful in appreciating the dispute raised in the case.
3. It is common ground that Mahadeo was separate in mess and estate from his brothers and the property in dispute is his separate property. Mahadeo died on the night of October 13, 1930, leaving behind three daughters, Narbada, Saraswati and Anchi, and the suit property. All the three daughters were married prior to his death and had died before August 15, 1945, when the suit was instituted. The family of Mahadeo belongs to the sect known as “Vaishnao Bisa Agarwal.”
4. The plaintiff's case was that the family of Mahadeo belonged to Jaipur in Rajputana (Marwar) and has migrated from there to Berar and is thus governed by the Benares school of Hindu law. On Mahadeo's death, his daughters succeeded to his property but had only a limited interest therein. Out of these daughters Narbada died last, and on her death, the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 Damodhar became the full owners of the property left behind by Mahadeo, owning equal shares therein. The plaintiff, therefore, claims separation and possession of his half share in the suit property. He also claims accounts from defendant No. 2 of the income of the suit property which is in his possession. Plaintiff also denies the alleged oral will of Mahadeo and the adoption of defendant No. 2 by Mahadeo under which he claims to be in possession of the property. Plaintiff also challenges the deed dated October 28; 1930, executed by defendant No. 2 Jainarayan and the daughters of Mahadeo under which separate items of Mahadeo's property have been allotted to each of the three daughters of Mahadeo and to Jainarayan. The plaintiff pleads that the contents of the document are pure inventions. According to him, the document is merely a device to divide the property amongst defendant No. 2 and the three daughters of the deceased Mahadeo. Also according to him the document was not executed by the daughters of their free will and that they were merely tools in the hands of designing persons including defendant No. 2. In the alternative, the plaintiff pleads that the document was executed by the daughters in ignorance of their lawful rights. On these grounds the plaintiff pleads that the document is not binding on him. It is also pleaded on behalf of the plaintiff that the adoption, if any, of Jainarayan was not valid in law as he was an orphan at the time of the adoption and a married man. The factum of adoption also was denied.
5. The defence raised was as follows: That the family of Mahadeo originally belonged to Agroha in Hissar district of Punjab. From there it migrated to Jaipur in Rajputana and from there it came to Yeotmal in Berar. In matters of succession and adoption, the family is not governed by the Benares school of Hindu law but by the customary law prevailing in the sect of Agarwal Banias to which Mahadeo belonged. According to the customary law, daughters and their issues are excluded from inheriting the property of their father. The principle underlying is that the gaddi of the deceased should be taken and continued by a male member of the family and should not go in the daughter's family. There is also a custom of nominating a successor to the property in order that the gaddi should not remain vacant. Such a successor is generally selected and nominated by the deceased himself during his ??? from out of the male members of his family. In case where the decease is unable to nominate his successor, one is appointed by the relatives of the deceased and/or panchas after the latter's death. After such nomination or appointment a turban is tied to the nominee even after the death of the person nominating. On tying the turban, such a nominee or appointee becomes a legally adopted son or at any rate a legal heir and successor of the deceased, even apart from his adoption, and is recognised as such. Even a married man or an orphan can be so nominated. In accordance with this custom, Mahadeo had on October 13, 1930, expressed his last wish in the presence of his daughters and others nominating defendant No. 2 as his successor and had given a direction that paydi be tied to Jainarayan, defendant No. 2. In accordance with this direction, Mahadeo's paydi was tied to Jainarayan on the 13th or 14th day of the death of Mahadeo, Defendant No. 2 had thus become the adopted son of Mahadeo and in that capacity was entitled to Mahadeo's property as his adopted son or at any rate in his capacity as the successor as nominated by Mahadeo. It was also pleaded that Mahadeo had made an ova will on the 13th morning whereunder he had given certain house property to his daughters and rest of his property to defendant No. 2. According to these wishes, the property given to the ??? was put in their possession and the rest of the property was taken possession of by Jainarayan. The property so given to the daughters and ??? is mentioned in the document dated October 28, 1930, validly and properly executed by the daughters of Mahadeo and Jainarayan. Defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 14 thus claim ownership of the property under the will also of the items of the properties in their respective possession.
6. The trial Court held that the family of Mahadeo originally belonged to Agroha in Hissar district in Punjab. From there it migrated to Jaipur in Rajputana (Marwar) and thereafter it migrated to Berar. In matters of adoption it was not governed by the Benares school of Hindu law but by the customary law prevailing among the sect to which Mahadeo belonged. According to this customary law, adoption of a married ??? and an orphan was permissible. No particular ceremony was required to be performed for adoption,— but the tying of a turban was sufficient to constitute a valid adoption. This tying of the turban could be performed even ??? the death of the adoptive father if be had left behind instructions to adopt any person as a son to him. The trial Court, however, held that the defendants have failed to prove the custom which excludes the daughters from inheritance and the custom which permits even the panchas or eastemen to nominate a successor to the deceased. The trial Court further held that Mahadeo had made a valid oral will disposing of his property as pleaded by the defendants. It further held that Mahadeo had given a direction that Jainarayan should be adopted as his son and in pursuance of this direction Mahadeo's pagdi was tied to Jainarayan on October 28, 1930, and thereby he had become a validly adopted son of Mahadeo. The trial Court has also held that the document dated October 28, 1930, was executed by the daughters of Mahadeo knowing Full well their legal rights and was not a result of any fraud or misrepresentation practised on them by Jainarayan or any other person. On the findings the trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit except in respect of his one-third have in the property given by Mahadeo to his daughters. Hence this appeal.
7. The findings of the trial Court regarding the factum of tying Mahadeo's pagdi to Jainarayan on October 28, 1930, and the ??? of the deed of October 28, 1930, are not disputed before us. All other adverse findings are challenged by the appellant. On behalf of the respondents the decree in their favour is supported before us on the following grounds:
(1) An oral will by Mahadeo on October 13, 1930, bequeathing a portion of his property to his daughters and the remainder to Jainarayan, and
(2) The adoption of Jainarayan to Mahadeo according to the aforesaid customary law.
8. The following points for determination, therefore, arise in this appeal:
(1)(a) Was an oral will made by Mahadeo on October 13, 1930, giving certain house property to his daughters and the rest of the property to Jainarayan?
(b) Did Mahadeo on the same day nominate Jainarayan for being adopted as a son to him and instruct that his turban be tied on Jainarayan's head?
(2) Did the family of Mahadeo originally belong to Agroha in the Hissar district of Punjab and from there did it migrate to Jaipur in Rajputana (Marwar) and thereafter to Berar?
(3) Was Mahadeo's family governed by the alleged customary law in matters of adoption?
(4) Was Jainarayan validly adopted according to the said custom?
9. As regards the first question, reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the oral evidence of defendant No. 2 Jainarayan, Mohanlal (2 D.W 11), Jethibai (2 D.W 14), Kanhayalal (2 D.W 19) and defendant No. 14 Hukhminibai, and the document dated October 28, 1930. It is not in dispute that it was permissible under law to Mahadeo to dispose of his property by an oral will. The Indian Succession Act was not made applicable to Berar even on the date of Mahadeo's death, and he was, therefore, capable in law to dispose of his property by an oral will. It is, however, to be remembered, as observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council, that in dealing with the case of an oral will it is beyond doubt that the burden of proving an oral will rests very heavily on the person who is desirous of propounding the oral will. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Baboo Beer Pertab Sahee v. Maharajah Bajender Pertab Sahee . 1867 12 M.I.A 1, 28. observed that he who rests his title on so uncertain a foundation as the spoken words of a man, since deceased, is bound to allege as well as to prove, with the utmost precision, the words on which he relies, with every circumstance of time and place. Now, the plea raised is that this oral will was made by the deceased Mahadeo on the morning of; October 13, 1930, and he also gave instructions for adopting Jainarayan is a son to him. There is abundant evidence in this case that Mahadeo had called a number of people to his bedside on that morning, as he was then feeling uncertain about his health, and had left behind certain instructions in their presence. But the real question is what were these instructions. None of the witnesses extent two, have deposed to the words said to have been uttered by the deceased Mahadeo at that time. [After referring to the evidence of these witnesses his Lordship proceeded:]
10. We see no reason to discard the testimony of these two witnesses in respect of the instructions given by Mahadeo on the morning of October 13, 1930, on this ground.
11. But, in our view, these instructions do not amount to a disposition by an oral will of any property to Jainarayan, though it amounts to a disposition of his two houses by way of an oral will in favour of his three daughters. It is to be noted that when these instructions are taken as a whole, it is clear that Mahadeo was not desirous of giving any property to Jainarayan independently of, his capacity as an adopted son i.e malik of his gaddi. The property directed to be given to him was given only in his capacity as an adopted son. It is to be noted that he had not only declared that Jainarayan would become the owner of the property other than the two shops given to the daughters, but he had also directed that Jainarayan should pay his dues and should the his pagdi and he had also given instructions that his pagdi should be tied to Jainarayan a the was desirous of adopting him. Further the document which was executed both by the daughters as well as by Jainarayan on October 28, 1930, shows that the instruction left behind by Mahadeo mating Jainarayan owner of his property other than the two houses was not independent of his capacity as an adopted son. The following two relevant portions from this deed make the position clear:—
“And, it was the desire of his heart that Jainarayan should get some of his estate, and that he should continue his name as his father. And, therefore, he gave instructions about the disposition of his estate…
In case Jainarayan does not continue the name Jainarayan son of Mahadeo (Mahadeo Jainarayan according to Marwadi style), then Nos. 1-2-3 daughters of Mahadeoji have got full authority to demand back by right of inheritance Mahadeoji's estate given to him.”
12. Thus, it is clear that what Mahadeo intended to give Jainarayan was only an estate by way of inheritance on his accepting the position of an adopted son of Mahadeo by tying his pagdi. The other oral evidence on which reliance is placed on behalf of the respondents does not take the case any further than the evidence of Kanhayalal and Rukhminibai. Disagreeing with the finding of the trial Court, we hold that Mahadeo, by an oral will, had given only two houses, known as shops, to his daughters. He had not given any property to Jainarayan irrespective of his accepting the position of an adopted son of Mahadeo by tying his pagdi. He had also nominated Jainarayan for being adopted as son to him and for that purpose had given instructions that his pagdi be tied to Jainarayan. This property which is given to the daughters is shown in the deed dated October 28, 1930 (exh. P-1), which is item No. 1 of sch. A of the plaint. No dispute as regards the identity of this property was raised before us if the oral will was upheld by us. Defendant No. 2, therefore, can succeed in this case only if he is able to establish that he is the validly adopted son of Mahadeo in accordance with the custom prevailing amongst Agarwal Banias.
13. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that this evidence should not be accepted. According to the learned counsel, the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of Jainarayan shows that Mahadeo wanted to adopt Jainarayan since a long time before his death; that if really this was so, Mahadeo would have adopted him during his lifetime; that Jainarayan also was not residing with Mahadeo; and that this shows that Mahadeo never intended to adopt him. He characterizes the evidence put forward on behalf of defendant No. 2 as a got-up one. In our view this contention has no force. If there is a custom as alleged by Jainarayan that a person can nominate his successor and if he does so, his turban can be tied on the head of the nominee even after his death and the nominee thereby becomes his adopted son, then it is easy to understand why the adoption is not made during the lifetime of the person making the nomination. This conduct of Mahadeo, therefore, in not adopting Jainarayan during his lifetime does not militate against the probative force of the evidence of these witnesses.
14. This brings us to the second question. As already stated, according to the plaintiff, Mahadeo's family belonged to Jaipur in Rajputana (Marwar), while, according to the defence, the family originally belonged to Agroha in Hissar district of Punjab and from there it first migrated to Jaipur and then to Berar. [After discussing the evidence his Lordship proceeded]:
We, therefore, agreeing with the trial Court, hold that the family of Mahadeo originally belonged to Agroha in Hissar district in Punjab and therefrom it migrated first to Jaipur in Marwar and then to Berar.
15. Now, it is well settled that if nothing is known about a person except that he lived in a certain place, it will be assumed that his personal law is the law which prevails in that place, but if more is known, then in accordance with that knowledge his personal law must be determined unless it can be shown that he has renounced his original law in favour of the law of the place to which he has migrated. In other words, when such an original variance of law is once established, the presumption arises that it continues and the onus of making out lies on those who assert that it has ceased by conformity with the law of the new domicile. Now, in the instant case it is not the plea of the plaintiff that on migration to Jaipur or Yeotmal the family of Mahadeo, or, Agarwals in general, had conformed in its religious and social usages, to the locality in which it had settled. As already stated, we have found that Mahadeo's family originally belonged to Agroha and from there it migrated. The family, therefore, will, in the matter of adoption, be governed by the law prevailing in Hissar district so far as it is in variance from the law of the domicile.
16. This brings us to the consideration of the custom alleged by the defendants in support of their case. In our opinion, the rest of the points for determination i.e Nos. 3 and 4, can conveniently be considered together. Sir W.H Rattigan at page 492 of his book “A Digest of Customary Law in the Punjab”, 13th edn., observes:
“In the Punjab adoption under customary Law is different from adoption under Hindu Law in many respects. The latter is founded on a spiritual idea, varying from the belief that a son is necessary to save a man's soul from the ‘Hell called Pat’, to the very natural feeling of regret that your line should become extinct; that there should be no one to represent you in the family gatherings and offer the pind. The essence of the Hindu adoption being true, sonship, all the rules regarding it are intended to give effect to this idea. The person adopted must be a mere infant; his mother must be a person whom the adoptor could have married; there is a formal transfer of the patria potestas from the natural to the adoptive father; there is the same religious ceremony as at the birth of a son; in short, the only difference between the adopted and the natural son is the one which cannot be obliterated the birth itself…
As has already been observed, adoption under customary law in the Punjab is quite distinct from adoption under Hindu Law. Adoption under custom is no more than a customary appointment of an heir, and consequently religious rights are not necessary to constitute a valid adoption even among Hindus of non-agricultural classes. The really important thing is the unequivocal intention and treatment.
Thus one of the essential requirements for the validity of an adoption is that it should be made public. And this can be effected either by a formal declaration before the clans men, or by a written declaration, either preceded or followed by some treatment consistent with a deliberate appointment, or by a long course of treatment, ‘evidencing an unequivocal intention to appoint the specified person as heir.’” (Italics are by us).
17. At p. 528 it is further observed that under the customary law adoption of an orphan is generally not considered invalid.
18. The aforesaid book of Rattigan is a well-known authoritative publication on the Customary Law of Punjab. It is true that the custom even in Punjab varies from tribe to tribe and from one locality to another. It is, therefore, necessary to see how far the aforesaid custom prevails amongst the Agarwals. In an article “Adoption among Marwari Agrawals”, Lala Chiranjilal Agarwal observes (p. 83) that an adoption among the Agarwals is purely a secular affair, not being regarded as an act of any religious sanctity; that no ceremony is necessary for adoption except tying of turban on the head of the adoptee or distribution of cocoanuts and sweets; that there is not much difference between Vaishnavas and Jains and whatever difference there might he between them in rituals of worship there does not appear to be any in the rules relating to the adoption recognised by the caste as a whole; and that there is no bar of marriage or age for the purpose of adoption. (Italics are by us). This article of Mr. Agarwal has been cited with approval by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Govindram v. Sheoprasad.2
19. Thus it is clear that amongst Agarwals, either Vaishnavas or Jains, adoption is purely a secular affair. No ceremony is necessary for an adoption except tying of turban on the head of the adoptee or distribution of cocoanuts.
20. It is next necessary to consider how far an adoption of an orphan is accepted among the Agarwal sect, who has migrated from Punjab. In Chiman Lal v. Bari Chand the dispute was raised regarding the adoption of an orphan in an Agarwal Bania family of Zira in Punjab. The validity of the adoption depended upon whether they were governed by customary law or by Hindu law. The case went up before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Courts below had concurrently found that in the class to which the parties belonged the rules of Hindu law as to adoption did not apply, and that-by the customary law applicable to that class an unequivocal declaration by the adopting father that a boy had been adopted, and the subsequent treatment of that boy as the adopted son was sufficient to constitute a valid adoption. The Courts below further held that, according to the custom, the plaintiff who was an orphan at the time of his adoption was validly adopted. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee affirmed this decision. They, however, owing to the limited nature of the evidence tendered in that case as to the custom among Agarwal Banias of Zira, confined the effect of their decision to that particular case.
21. The question again came up before this Court in Parshottam Ganpat v. Venichand Ganpat wherein the adoption of an orphan was upheld. The parties were Agarwal Jains then residing in Western India. At page 763 it is observed:
“…But if the recognition of the different standpoint that governs adoption in the case of Jains from that applying in the case of orthodox Hindus cannot go so far as is suggested in the passages I have just quoted, yet it seems to me that in this case the Court may legitimately give due weight to the fact that the restriction against the adoption of orphans imposed by Hindu law would not naturally operate in the case of Jains. That restriction follows from the rule of Hindu law that only a father or mother can give in adoption and that there must be a giving and taking of the adopted son. But, as among the Jains adoption is purely a secular institution, the reason for such a restriction disappears; and the ceremony of giving and taking may be dispensed with; Chiman Lal v. Hari Chand . 1913 I.L.R 40 Cal. 879 at p. 882. We have the further fact that in the last mentioned case an adoption of orphans has been recognized as valid in the case of Agarwala Banias by the Chief Court of the Punjab and the Privy Council. As pointed out in the judgment of the lower Court, it is quite clear that the Agarwalas there referred to are Jains; and such Agarwala Jains figure also in Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho . 1878 I.L.R 1 All. 688, P.C and Asharfi, Kunwar v. Rup Chand . 1908 I.L.R 30 All. 197, at pp. 210, 211, 212. Another case in which an orphan adoption has been judicially upheld is that of Manak Chand v. Munna Lal . 1909 4 I.C 844. where the parties were Jains of Delhi belonging to the Agarwala sect. As remarked by the District Judge in the first judgment of the lower Court, it is not improbable that the Jains of Idar State, whence the parties in this suit come, would follow the customs of Delhi rather than those obtaining in Southern India. Steele, in his Law and Custom of Indian Castes, page 97, states that the Jains in the Southern Mahratta Country came originally from near Delhi. These decisions, therefore, support the customs alleged in this case. The Jains are a scattered community and in Harnabh Pershad v. Mandil Dass . 1899 I.L.R 27 Cal. 370, 399. it was held that Judicial decisions recognizing the existence of a disputed custom amongst the Jains of one place are very relevant as evidence of the existence of the same custom among the Jains of another place, unless of course it is shown that the customs are different. This applies with considerable force to the present case in view of the probability that the Southern Mahratta Jains originally came from the vicinity of the locality where the alleged custom has been held to exist. Also so far as public policy affects the matter, there ran be no question that it favours the adoption of an orphan.” (Italics are by us).
22. In view of the aforesaid two decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council we do not propose to discuss the other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. They also do not relate to an adoption of an orphan in Agarwal sect though in those decisions an adoption of an orphan was upheld amongst other communities residing in or migrated from Punjab.
23. The learned counsel for the appellant relies on the decisions in Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal, Dhanraj Joharmal v. Soni Bai and Ttmndayal v. Chaturbkujlal in support of his contention that amongst Agarwals there is no custom recognizing an adoption of an orphan. In our opinion, the aforesaid decisions do not support his proposition. In Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal (supra) the parties to the suit professing Jain religion were at the material time residing at Ahmadnagar in Bombay Presidency. One Tejmal had three sons who survived him. Of these Laehimandas was the eldest. He died in 1867 without issue, but leaving a widow Hirabai, who survived him and died in September 1868. The two other sons of Tejmal—Ganeshdas and Bhagvandas—were the defendants in the case. Some time previous to her death Hirabai, widow of Tejmal, was desirous of adopting a son. In her last illness she decided to adopt Rajmal, the son of Ganeshdas, but she died without adopting him. Ganeshdas, Bhagvandas and some other persons appeared to have given, with certain ceremonies, Rajmal as adopted son to his uncle Laehimandas and aunt Hirabai. On the same day a deed purporting to be a deed of adoption was executed by Bhagvandas. Rajmal brought that suit to establish his sole right to the property left by Laehimandas and Hiratbai as their adopted son. He, in support of his adoption, relied upon a custom of Jain Marwadi caste, as well in Marwad, as in Ahmadnagar. Rajmal's natural father Ganeshdas did not question the validity of the adoption. Bhagvandas, however, contended that the adoption was invalid under Hindu law. Their Lordships of the Privy Council dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground of the insufficiency of evidence tendered in that case on behalf of the plaintiff. At page 264 of the report it is observed:
“There are, then, but three perfect instances established in proof, and of these, the most remote happened less than quarter of a century ago. It is impossible to regard such cases as proof of an ancient, still less of an immemorial, custom, unsupported, as they are, by a single text from any book of authority amongst the Jainas themselves or amongst the Hindus at large, or by any pandit, yati, priest, or other expert. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of any such deviation from the Hindu law of this Presidency as he has asserted.”
24. All that their Lordships held was that the custom could not be said to have been established on the evidence adduced in the case before them. They did not hold that there could be no such custom to all. The aforesaid remarks were considered by another Division Bench of this Court in Parshotam Ganpat v. Venichand Ganpat. Macleod C.J observed (p. 759):
“…These remarks would appear to me most pertinent, but from the later cases which have come before the Courts on which it was sought to establish a custom, it seems to be no longer considered that the evidence of modern instances, which alone can be proved by oral evidence, cannot establish the custom, unless the Court is satisfied by the evidence of texts or experts that those instances have occurred in pursuance of a recognised custom, in order to link the present with the past.”
25. After considering certain decisions, the learned Chief Justice at page 760 further observed:
“If, then, the evidence shows that for a certain number of years, and some cases appear to lay down as a useful guide a period of twenty years, there have been a number of instances in which the alleged custom has been recognized, the presumption arises that the parties concerned have acted in that manner, not from the desire to set up a new custom, but because they are acting in accordance with the tradition of immemorial usage… and as long as texts are not cited and experts called to negative the alleged custom, it is unnecessary to cite texts or call experts to support it.”
26. We are, therefore, of opinion that the decision in Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajiml is no authority for holding that there is no custom amongst the Agarwals under which an adoption of an orphan is recognized.
27. In Ramdayal v. Chaturbhujlal, no doubt, the dispute related to the validity of the adoption of an orphan of Yaishnava Agarwals who were calling themselves as Delliwala Agarwals. However, the plea raised was that the parties, on their migration to Berar about 200 years back, had adopted the custom of Berar where they resided since about 200 years ago. An attempt was made at the appellate stage before the High Court to support the adoption with the and of the customary law of the original place from which the parties claimed to have migrated. This was not allowed to be done. The learned Judges in para. 16 of their judgment observed:
“Actually the defendants did not rely on the law of origin or on any custom in that law as empowering the widow to make an adoption without proof of authority from her husband. The adoption was sought to be maintained solely on the ground of adoption of custom prevailing in Berar and West Khandesh and not because of any custom in Punjab or any custom governing the caste as such without reference to the locality.”
28. This decision, therefore, has no relevance for the issue under consideration.
29. The third decision on which reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant, in our view, not only does not support the appellant but supports the respondents. The relevant facts as stated in the report in brief are: The suit was brought by Sonibai, daughter of one Ramdhan, for a declaration that she was entitled, by inheritance, to the estate of her father Ramdhan, who died in Amravati in Berar on June 14, 1914. This Ramdhan resided and carried on business at Khanapor in Amravati district while his brother Joharmal lived in Chandur Bazar, another township in Amravati district. Both were Agar-wals by caste. Joharmal died in September 1912 and the defendant Dhanraj claimed to be adopted by this Joharmal some years before his death. He took possession of the estate of Ramdhan on his death in 1914 and claimed to be entitled to Ramdhan's property as an adopted son of Joharmal. In order to establish his right of succession to Ramdhan's estate in opposition to the claim of Ramdhan's rightful heir, Dhanraj alleged that he had been adopted in accordance with the rules prescribed by Hindu law and that the essential rites were duly performed. He further alleged that Joharmal and Ramdhan were joint and undivided. Plaintiff Sonibai's case, on the other hand, was that in the year 1908 when the formal adoption of Dhanraj was alleged to have taken place, he was an orphan and as such could not be validly adopted under the Hindu law. She further denied that Joharmal and Ramdhan were joint. According to her, Joharmal and Ramdhan were separate in caste, and consequently Dhanraj, even if he had been adopted, could not claim the estate of Ramdhan. To the allegation of the plaintiff that in 1908 both the defendant's parents were dead and, therefore, he could not have been validly adopted the defendant Dhanraj averred that in the year 1903 his mother who was alive at that time gave him in adoption to Joharmal although the usual ceremonies and the document connected with the adoption were completed in 1908. He further contended that Ramdhan was estopped by his conduct from impugning the validity of the adoption and consequently the plaintiff was affected by the said estoppel. The trial Court found that the adoption had taken place. On appeal the Judicial Commissioner's Court held that Dhanraj had failed to prove giving and taking in 1903, as alleged by him, as was required to be established under the Hindu law. Neither Ramdhan nor the plaintiff was estopped from impugning the validity of defendant's adoption.
30. Considering the question about the alleged giving and taking, their Lordships came to the conclusion that what had happened was not giving of Dhanraj in adoption by his mother to Joharmal in 1903 but only tying of a turban by Joharmal on Dhanraj's head in 1908 and giving a feast to the vanchas. Considering the auestion of estonpel raised by Dhanraj against Ramdhan and his daughter Sonibai, at page 493 to 495 it is observed:
”…Assuming, however, that such a status can be established by applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel embodied in section 115, so as to affect the rights of persona other than the adopter, it is necessary to consider in the first place what actually happened in 1908, and what were the acts and representations of Ramdhan which created the estoppel. He is said to have brought the boy to Chandur Bazar from his native village, to have become a witness to the deed of adoption; allowed him to perform the cremation ceremony of Joharmal; and at the time of his marriage represented him to be the adopted son of Joharmal.
The parties to this litigation belong to the caste or sect of Agarwallas. These Agarwallas, as has been pointed out in the case of Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal generally adhere to Jainism and repudiate the Brahminical doctrines relating to obsequial ceremonies, the performance of Sraddha, the offering of oblations for the salvation of the soul of the deceased, nor do they believe that a son, either by birth or by adoption, confers spiritual benefit on the father.
The Agarwallas are said to be divided into a number of sub-castes or sects…
Among the Agarwallas the qualifying age for adoption extends to the 32nd year; and the only ceremony consists in tying a turban round the head of the young man who is being adopted, in the presence of the principal men of the community (the panchas) and giving them, a feast. Accordingly to the document D. 63, as well as the agreement D. 62, this was the only ceremony performed in 1908, and it is exactly the ceremony referred to in Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho.
Their Lordships have, no doubt on the evidence that the story about a regular Hindu or, rather, Brahminical adoption in 1903 was invented with the object of giving to an ordinary Agaruialla adoption, the rights of collateral succession,…
If the Brahminical fringe is taken off, the whole of the evidence in the present case points to a secular adoption in 1908, and so far as the representation and acts of Ramdhan are concerned, they only relate to that adoption.”
31. Thus it will be seen that, in the opinion of their Lordships of the Privy Council, the adoption of an orphan by tying a turban on his head is sufficient to constitute a secular adoption, but that is not sufficient to constitute a regular Hindu or Brahminical adoption, entitling him to a collateral succession. An adopted son in this form may not be entitled to succeed to the agnates of the adoptive father. But their Lordships have nowhere held that he was not entitled to succeed to the estate of his adoptive father. Further, the facts found in that case show that Dhanraj's adoption in this form was recognized by the brother of Ramdhan. This authority, therefore, is of no assistance to the appellant's case, but, on the other hand, goes to a great length in supporting the plea raised by the respondents about the existence of the custom.
32. We will now turn to consider the oral evidence tendered in the case. [His Lordship after considering the oral evidence proceeded:]
33. This instance of adoption of Nagarmal as a son to Banumandas by pagditying ceremony in pursuance of the wishes expressed by Hanumandas goes to fully support the custom pleaded by the defendants. Out of these witnesses Gangadhar (2 D.W 4) and Nathmal (2 D.W 9) also generally depose to the aforesaid custom of adoption by pagdu tying ceremony and also of an orphan amongst the Agarwal Baniyas.
34. We will now proceed to consider the evidence tendered on behalf of the plaintiff in rebuttal of this custom. [After referring to that evidence His Lordship proceeded:]
35. It is beyond donbt that on the 13th or 14th day of Mahadeo's death his pagdi was tied on the head of Jainarayan. At that time all his daughters were present. On that day a deed was executed whereunder distribution of the property was effected between the daughters and Jainarayan according to the wishes of Mahadeo. This deed mentions that Mahadeo had expressed a desire that Jainarayan should continue his line and name. It is signed by two of his daughters, Saraswati and Anchibai (mother of the plaintiff). It also bears the thmnbmark of his third daughter Narbada. It was duly registered. It is clear that this deed was executed with sufficient publicity. It was not challenged till the date of suit by any person. The trial Court has found that since the tying of the pagdi, Jainarayan has been recognised as an adopted son of Mahadeo. He has been styling himself as Jainarayan son of, Mahadeo, and has been managing his property and has also paid off his debts. These findings had not been challenged before us. Had the adoption of Jay narayan been contrary to the custom prevailing amongst the Agarwal Baniyas, one would have naturally expected a challenge to the claim of Jainarayan as an adopted son of Mahadeo at a much earlier stage. Further, it is to be noted that defendant No. 1 Damodhar, who stands equally to gain along with the plaintiff, is not challenging Jainarayan's claim as an adopted son.
36. For reasons stated above, in our opinion, suffice it to say that for purposes of this case there was sufficient evidence and material before the trial Court to come to the conclusion that amongst Agarwals the adoption is a secular affair. The only essential ceremony of adoption is the tying of a turban of the person nominating to the nominee. No giving and taking as such is necessary. The tying of the pagdi ceremony could be performed even after the death of the person nominating. The nominee can be an orphan and a married man. We, therefore, uphold the finding of the trial Court.
37. As already stated before, it is not in dispute that Jainarayan, as a matter of fact, tied the turban of Mahadeo on the 13th or 14th day of Mahadeo's death in the presence of his daughters and Panchas. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that this was because Jainarayan performed the last rites and obsequies of Mahadeo, and the evidence on record shows that a person who performs the last rites and obsequies of the deceased, ties his turban on the 13th or 14th day of his death, but in the instant case this was not the only reason. Besides the fact that Jainarayan had performed the last rites and obsequies of Mahadeo, Mahadeo also had nominated Jainarayan as a successor to him and had directed that for this purpose his pagdi be tied on his head. This direction of Mahadeo, coupled with the fact that Jainarayan tied Mahadeo's pagdi on the 13th or 14th day of Mahadeo's death, gave him the status of an adopted son of Mahadeo according to the customary law prevailing in that community.
38. It is next necessary to consider one more contention raised on behalf of the appellant.
39. It is urged that even if Jainarayan had been validly adopted as a son to Mahadeo, he was adopted 13 or 14 days after Mahadeo's death; the inheritance opened up on the death of Mahadeo could not be held in abeyance; the property of Mahadeo on his death had vested in his daughters; the adoption of Jainarayan, therefore, had no effect of divesting the estate of Mahadeo which had already vested in his daughters. Reliance is placed on the decision, Shrinivas Krishnarno v. Narayan Devji. In our opinion, this contention also has no force. What is held in this case is that the ground on which an adopted son is held entitled to take in defeasance of the rights acquired prior to his adoption is that in the eye of law his adoption relates back, by a legal fiction, to the date of the death of his adoptive father, he being put in a position of a posthumous son. It applies only when the claim made by the adopted son relates to the estate of his adoptive father. The theory on which this doctrine is based is that there should be no hiatus in the continuity of the line of the adoptive father. Their Lordships in explaining the scope of this principle have observed that this doctrine has application only when the question relates to the succession of the property of the adoptive father and not when it relates to the succession of the property of his collaterals. It is to be noted that in the instant case we are concerned only with the property left behind by the adoptive father Mahadeo. The dispute does not relate to any property of Mahadeo's collaterals.
40. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
41. Appeal dismissed.
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