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T. Siva Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Three petitioners, appointed as conductors in the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC), were initially appointed to Hyderabad City Division (first petitioner on 16 March 1963; second and third on 1 September 1963). Their services were regularized and they were confirmed as conductors in April 1965.
In 1976 the petitioners opted for transfer to Karimnagar Division; by proceedings dated 13 September 1976 the Chief Personnel Manager (second respondent) permitted the option and they were transferred. While in Karimnagar they were promoted to Assistant Depot Clerks.
The petitioners requested re-transfer to Hyderabad City Division and agreed to be reverted to their substantive posts of conductors. The second respondent issued orders dated 8 October 1976, 16 April 1977 and 23 August 1977 transferring them back to Hyderabad as conductors but expressly protecting their seniority — stating that their seniority in Hyderabad City Division would be reckoned from the dates of their first appointment in the City Division.
Subsequently the first and second petitioners were promoted as Controllers on 8 August 1977 and the third petitioner on 15 September 1977 (promotions given on the basis of the protected seniority). On 12 October 1977 the Divisional Manager (third respondent) reverted the petitioners from Controllers to Conductors. The respondents justified this by reference to a letter of the second respondent dated 30 September 1977 directing that the petitioners' seniority as conductors in Hyderabad City Division should be reckoned only from the date of their re-transfer from Karimnagar (i.e., not from their original 1963 appointment), effectively causing a loss of about four years' seniority.
The petitioners challenged the reversion and the altered reckoning of seniority by filing the writ petition which is the subject of this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Corporation may, after giving re-transfer orders that protected the petitioners' seniority, subsequently alter the reckoning of that seniority (by counting it from the re-transfer date) and thereby revert the petitioners from their promoted posts.
- Whether assurances given by the Corporation in the re-transfer orders can be set aside in reliance upon an earlier Circular (dated 29 September 1975) or on the ground that the petitioners had opted voluntarily to return.
- Whether a clause in the promotional orders permitting reversion of a temporary promotee "at any time without assigning any reason" can override constitutional protections governing public employment (specifically Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution).
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Ananda Rao)
- The petitioners had opted to come back to Hyderabad of their own volition and for their own benefit; therefore they should not complain about any resultant loss of seniority.
- Reliance was placed on a Circular dated 29 September 1975, under which the petitioners were said to have to forego their earlier seniority and become junior-most in the City Division.
- The promotional orders contained a clause permitting any temporary promotee to be reverted at any time without assigning any reason; therefore reversion was permissible in terms of the promotion.
Petitioners' Position (as reflected in the opinion)
- The petitioners relied on the re-transfer orders which expressly protected their seniority from their original dates of appointment; promotions were given on that basis.
- The petitioners challenged the subsequent reversion and the re-counting of seniority as contrary to the assurances given and as causing an unjust loss of seniority and promotional advantage.
- The petitioners' position invoked principles of promissory estoppel and constitutional protections applicable to public employment (Articles 14 and 16).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The Manager, Government Branch Press v. D.B. Belliappa, 1979 Lab. I.C. 1946 | Illustrates constitutional limitations on State action in employment matters and the requirement that public employment cannot be subject to arbitrary or discriminatory grounds (supporting application of Articles 14 and 16). | The court cited this authority to reinforce that a State Corporation is bound by constitutional limitations and cannot circumvent them by contractual terms or arbitrary reversion; it supports the court's view that reasons are required for termination/reversion and that arbitrary reversion would undermine Article 16. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through the following analytical steps based on the material before it:
- Factual foundation: The court noted that the re-transfer orders explicitly protected the petitioners' seniority from the date of their first appointment and that promotions to Controllers were given on that basis. The respondent did not deny that at the time of re-transfer their seniority had been counted from the original appointment date; this fact was positively admitted in the counter-affidavit.
-
Assessment of the respondents' pleas: The court found the respondents' three principal contentions unsatisfactory:
- The voluntariness argument (that petitioners chose to return and thus cannot complain) was rejected — the court observed that seeking to promote one's own interests does not justify suffering a detriment unless the law prescribes it.
- The reliance on the Circular dated 29 September 1975 was treated as unavailing: the counter-affidavit admitted that seniority had been counted from the original appointment when the re-transfer occurred and promotions followed on that basis; the court declined to allow a later "realisation" to defeat earlier assurances.
- The contention that a temporary promotee may be reverted without reasons because the promotional order so permitted was rejected as failing to account for constitutional obligations of a State Corporation.
- Promissory estoppel and assurances: The court applied the legal principle of promissory estoppel. It reasoned that where an employer (the Corporation) assured employees that their seniority would be counted from their original appointment and acted on that assurance (including effecting transfers and promotions), the employer cannot subsequently depart from that undertaking to the prejudice of the employees. The court characterized the Corporation's later conflicting pleas as unjust and unacceptable.
- Intra vires and effect of Circulars: Even if the re-transfer orders arguably contradicted the 1975 Circular, the court held that the re-transfer assurances were within the powers of the Corporation and therefore enforceable. The presence of a Circular did not permit the Corporation to renege on lawful promises that were given and acted upon.
- Constitutional constraints on public employment: The court emphasized that a State Corporation is subject to constitutional limits (Articles 14 and 16). It stated that public employment is a guaranteed right under Article 16 and the effect of that guarantee cannot be nullified by contract or managerial discretion. The court observed that allowing arbitrary reversion or permitting a senior to be reverted while keeping juniors intact would violate Articles 14 and 16. It relied on established authority to show that reasons are required for termination/reversion so that courts can test whether the reasons are constitutionally sustainable.
- Conclusion of analysis: The court found that the real basis for the reversion was the altered counting of seniority from the re-transfer date — a legal non-existing ground inconsistent with the prior assurances and with constitutional protections. Applying promissory estoppel and constitutional principles, the court rejected the Corporation's contentions.
Holding and Implications
WRIT PETITION ALLOWED.
Direct effect on the parties:
- The writ petition filed by the three petitioners is allowed.
- The court awarded costs and fixed the advocate's fee at Rs. 250.
The opinion grounds the decision on promissory estoppel and constitutional protections (Articles 14 and 16). The court did not purport to create a novel rule of law; it applied existing principles and precedent (including the cited authority) to the facts before it. No broader novel precedent beyond applying these established principles was articulated in the text of the opinion.
1. The petitioners are three in number. All the three petitioners were appointed as conductors in the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation. The first petitioner was appointed on 16th March, 1963 and the second and the third petitioners on 1st September, 1963. All their initial appointments where in Hyderabad City Division. Their services as conductors were regularized in April, 1965 and they were also confirmed in the posts of conductors.
2. In the year 1976, the petitioners had opted for Karimnagar Division and the Chief Personnel Manager of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, the second respondent herein, in his proceedings dated 13th September, 1976 permitted the petitioners to opt for Karimnagar Division and accordingly, the petitioners were transferred to Karimnagar Division as conductors. There, while the petitioners were working as conductors were promoted as Assistant Depot Clerks. The petitioners while working in their promotional posts appear to have made a request to the Chief Personal Manager of the Corporation and the General Manager, respondents 2 and 1 respectively, to re-transfer them to Hyderabad City Division. The petitioners' request was agreed to on condition that the petitioners would be reverted to their substantive posts of conductors.
3. Accordingly, in the proceedings of the second respondent dated 8th October, 1976 and 16th April, 1977 and 23rd August, 1977, the petitioners were transferred from Karimnagar Division to the Hyderabad City as conductors but protecting their seniority. The orders of transfer were; given effect to and the petitioners came back to City. In these orders of transfer it is clearly stated that their seniority in Hyderabad City Division would be reckoned from the dates of their first appointment in the City Division. In other words, their seniority was assured from the year 1953 although they suffered reversion from their promotional posts.
4. Subsequently, the first and second petitioners were again promoted in the Hyderabad City Division in the next higher post as controllers in the scale of Rs. 260-10-460 by the third respondent, the Divisional Manager, City Division, by his proceedings dated 8th August, 1977. These orders were admittedly issued on the basis of the petitioners' seniority which stood protected by the aforesaid transfer orders. The third petitioner was also promoted as Controller on the same basis by third respondent on 15th September, 1977. Now the third respondent herein by the impugned proceedings dated 12th October, 1977 reverted the petitioners from the posts of controllers to that of conductors. It was said for the respondents that this order of the third respondent was in pursuance of the orders given by the second respondent on 30th September, 1977. By that letter dated 30th September, 1977, the second respondent directed that the seniority of the petitioners as conductors in the Hyderabad City Division should be reckoned from the date on which they were re-transferred back from Karimnagar. In other words, it amounts to counting of the petitioners' seniority not from the date of their first appointment as conductors but only from the date of their re-transfer from Karimnagar to Hyderbad. This would naturally involve the petitioners in a loss of about four years of service in seniority. These orders of reversion of the petitioners from the posts of controllers to that of conductors and counting of their seniority not from the year 1963 but from the year 1976-77 are challenged in this writ petition.
5. Unless there is clear law sanctioning this loss of seniority both commonsense and justice dictate that this Court should not sustain these orders. In support of these impugned orders, all that has been said by Mr. Ananda Rao is that the petitioners had opted to come back to Hyderabad on their own volition and for their own benefit and therefore, they should not be heard to complain about the loss of their seniority. This is clearly not the law No one who seeks to promote his own interests need suffer detriment and pay a penalty unless the laws provide for it. Mr. Ananda Rao had placed reliance on a Circular dated 29th September, 1975 under which the petitioners had to forego their seniority and become junior-most in the City Division. But in para. 3 of the counter-affidavit the fact that on the date of transfer from Karimnagar to the Hyderabad City Division, their seniority was counted from the date of the first appointment was not denied and it is positively admitted. What is more, they were given promotion as controllers on that basis. But it appears that subsequent realization had dawned upon the respondents that the petitioners had to forego their seniority in view of the Circular issued on 29th September, 1975. In addition to the above, Mr. Ananda Rao has trotted the usual but wholly unsustainable plea that any temporary promotee can be reverted without assigning any reason and their reversion is in accordance with the terms of their promotion.
6. I cannot find any justification in any one of the pleas set up by the Corporation. I am inclined to say that the widely opened mouth of the Corporation must be shut from taking these conflicting and varying pleas from time to time to the prejudice of its employees. If an employee had been assured in the years 1976-77 by his employer that his seniority would be counted from the date of his appointment and if on that basis he suffered not only a transfer but also loss of a promotional post, I cannot conceive of any legal principle which can be so unjust as to sanction a subsequent departure by the employer from the previous undertaking given by the employer. If the petitioners had continued in Karimnagar, probably in their promotional posts they would have been regularized. Applying the legal principle of promissory estoppel, I reject this contention of the Corporation.
7. Mr. Ananda Rao said that the orders of transfer dated 8th October, 1976; 16th April, 1977 and 23rd August, 1977 were contrary to the Circular dated 29th September, 1975. There is no foundation for this argument laid in the counter affidavit of the Corporation nor in the elaboration of the argument advanced by Mr. Ananda Rao. Even assuming that the re-transfer orders are contrary to the Circular, I do not think that I am justified in denying the petitioners the benefit of the assurances given to them by the Corporation two or three years back. The assurances contained in the re-transfer orders from Karimnagar to Hyderabad are clearly not ultra vires of the powers of the Corporation. So long those assurances are within the powers of the Corporation, Circulars or no Circulars the Corporation should be held to their promises. That is law as well as justice.
8. The argument that the orders of promotion of the petitioners as controllers after their re-transfers contain a clause that they can be reverted at any time without assigning any reason whatsoever and that therefore, the petitioners cannot a complaint against their reversion effected in terms of their promotional order, is an argument which does not take full account of the constitutional obligations of a State Corporation like the A.P State Road Transport Corporation in relation to its employees. The State Corporation like the State of Andhra Pradesh is not free to do many a thing which a private employer may be free to do. A private employer may hire or fire a person by accepting bribe in the form of a premium or by acting on the basis of caste or recommendation. Clearly, a State cannot do that Public employment is a guaranteed right to the Indian citizen under Article 16 of the Constitution. The effect of that guarantee cannot be whittled away or destroyed by any law made by the State or a contract forced upon a citizen. This is the meaning of saying that a State should act intra vires or the citizen cannot waive his fundamental rights, it should be realized that neither the State nor the Corporation belongs to those who happen to manage their affairs for the time being. They come and go but the State and Corporation go on. It is therefore not open for the Corporation to act in violation of the mandate of Article 16. What applies to appointment would also apply to termination. Where an employer is so free as to terminate the services of any its employees on any ground whatsoever or on no ground at all. Article 16 of the Constitution would be reduced to a total ineffectiveness The Constitution and more particuarly Articles 14 and 16, therefore, require reasons for the termination of the services of an employee so that the Courts may see whether the real reasons for the termination are constitutionally capable of sustaining the termination orders. As said above, the Mate cannot for example terminate the services of its employees on the basis of caste or religion or on the ground of nepotism and corruption. These are constitutional limitations which operate on the whole range of State activities. See The Manager, Government Branch Press v. D.B Belliappa . 1979 Lab. I.C 1946. Those limitations which the Constitution impose cannot be got over under the guise of contract. In this case, the persons who have joined the Hyderabad City Division subsequent to the year 1963 but earlier to the years 1976-77 are continuing in the higher posts of controllers on the basis of their being counted as seniors to the petitioner It is now well settled that you cannot revert a senior while keeping his juniors intact without violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The real reason for the petitoners' reversion in this case is the wrong counting of their seniority from the date they had been re-transferred from Karimnagar. It follows the petitioners are made to suffer a legal injury by reason of a legally non-existing ground. The petitioners rights are qeing sported away by the Corporation at the whims and fancies of those who come to occupy from time to time responsible posts of the Corporation.
9. I allow this writ petition with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 250.
10. A.B.K
11. Writ petition allowed.
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