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Padmanabha Talkies v. Gowthami Pictures
Judgment Summary — Revision under Section 115 C.P.C. (I.A. No. 3602 of 1968)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff instituted O.S. No. 140/67 in the District Munsif's Court, Vijayawada, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from screening any picture other than "Nirdhosi" for a period of 100 days and during any period the daily collections from that picture did not fall below Rs. 250 per day for two consecutive days in fair weather. Along with the plaint the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 267/67 for a temporary injunction. An interim order preserving the status quo was passed and ultimately the Munsif's Court granted a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from screening any other picture.
The defendants (petitioners before the High Court) appealed to the High Court against the temporary injunction and succeeded in obtaining an interim suspension of that injunction. In pleadings and affidavits the defendants contended that money compensation would afford adequate relief and that injunction was not the proper remedy. It was also alleged that the defendants had disobeyed the interim order and stopped screening "Nirdhosi", taking up another picture "Alu Magalu".
Because the defendants' conduct allegedly created a new state of facts, the plaintiff applied by I.A. No. 3602/68 to amend the plaint to include a claim for damages (valued at Rs. 12,500 with a court fee of Rs. 935). The District Munsif held that allowing the amendment would take the suit beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction and accordingly returned the plaint for presentation to the proper court. The plaintiff presented the plaint and the amendment application to the Subordinate Court (Sub-Court), Vijayawada. The Sub-Court considered the amendment and allowed it, holding that the amendment was necessitated by events caused by the defendants and that damages were an appropriate alternative relief under Section 40(2) of the Specific Relief Act. The defendants filed this revision under Section 115 C.P.C. challenging the Sub-Court's allowance of the amendment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a court (the District Munsif) which finds that an amendment would take the suit beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction is required to dismiss the suit or may return the plaint (with the amendment application) for presentation to the proper court.
- Whether a Court that apparently lacks jurisdiction can allow an amendment of the plaint so as to bring the suit within its jurisdiction.
- Whether the Sub-Court had jurisdiction to consider and allow the amendment, given that the un-amended plaint would fall below its pecuniary jurisdiction, but the plaint together with the amendment would fall within its jurisdiction.
- Whether the proposed amendment (claim for damages based on events subsequent to institution of the suit) altered the character of the suit so as to make the amendment impermissible, and whether the proviso to Section 40(2) of the Specific Relief Act permitted such an amendment at any stage.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments
- The learned District Munsif, having found that the amendment would take the suit beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction, ought to have dismissed the suit rather than returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court.
- The Sub-Court had no jurisdiction to consider and allow the amendment which, if allowed, would bring the suit within its pecuniary jurisdiction because the plaint as un-amended was below the Sub-Court's pecuniary jurisdiction.
- Relied upon Madras High Court decisions (Govinda Raja Naicker v. Khasim Saheb and Mutyalamma v. Narayanaswamy) and other rulings for the proposition that a court not having jurisdiction cannot allow an amendment so as to bring the suit within its jurisdiction.
Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The District Munsif correctly returned the plaint together with the amendment application for presentation to the proper court rather than dismissing the suit; reliance was placed on the Division Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Lalji v. Narottam.
- The District Munsif could not have allowed the amendment because allowing it would have ousted his jurisdiction.
- Under the proviso to Section 40(2) of the Specific Relief Act, where damages were not claimed in the plaint the Court may, at any stage, allow amendment to include such claim, and therefore amendment for damages is permissible; whether damages are ultimately recoverable is for later adjudication.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Govinda Raja Naicker v. Khasim Saheb | Cited by petitioners' counsel to support the proposition that a court not having jurisdiction cannot allow an amendment so as to bring the suit within its jurisdiction. | The Court recorded that the petitioners relied on this Madras High Court decision, but the Court rejected the petitioners' contention that the District Munsif should have dismissed the suit rather than return the plaint; it did not accept petitioners' reliance as dispositive. |
| Mutyalamma v. Narayanaswamy | Cited by petitioners' counsel for the proposition that a court not having jurisdiction cannot allow an amendment so as to bring the suit within its jurisdiction. | The Court acknowledged the reliance but held that returning the plaint for presentation to the proper court was the correct procedure in the circumstances and therefore did not follow the petitioners' suggested remedy of dismissal. |
| Lalji v. Narottam (Nagpur High Court, Division Bench: Hidayatullah, J. and Kaushalendra Rao, J.) | When an amendment, taken with the original claim, exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, the proper procedure is to return the plaint together with the application for amendment for presentation to the court which has jurisdiction to entertain both claims together. | The Court relied on this Division Bench decision as correctly stating the principle and applied it directly to uphold the District Munsif's decision to return the plaint with the amendment application and to validate the Sub-Court's subsequent consideration of the plaint and amendment together. |
| C. Singara Mudaliar v. M. Govindaswamy Chetty | Cited for the settled principle that a court cannot allow an amendment which would take the suit out of its jurisdiction. | The Court cited this authority (among others) to support the conclusion that the District Munsif was not competent to allow the amendment himself because it would oust his jurisdiction. |
| K. Nagutha Mohamed Nainar v. Vedavalli Ammal | Cited for the principle that a court cannot allow an amendment which would take the suit out of its jurisdiction. | Referenced to establish the settled rule and to support the finding that the District Munsif could not allow the amendment but could return the plaint for presentation to the proper court. |
| E.R.R Memorial High School Committee v. P. Atchayya | Cited as part of the authorities for the principle that a court cannot allow an amendment which would take the suit out of its jurisdiction. | Used to support the general proposition relied upon by the High Court in determining jurisdictional competence regarding amendments. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a step-by-step manner:
- The Court began from the settled legal proposition (supported by cited authorities) that a court cannot allow an amendment which would take the suit out of its jurisdiction. Therefore the District Munsif could not have allowed the amendment himself.
- The Court considered what procedural step the District Munsif should have taken upon finding that the proposed amendment would oust his pecuniary jurisdiction. The petitioners argued that the learned District Munsif should have dismissed the suit; the Court rejected that contention. The reason given was that the plaint as originally presented was within the District Munsif's jurisdiction, and dismissal of the suit would be improper or invalid because dismissal would deprive the plaintiff of a valuable right when the original plaint was properly instituted.
- Instead of dismissal, the Court held that returning the plaint (together with the application for amendment) for presentation to the proper court was the correct and logical procedure. The Court endorsed the approach taken in Lalji v. Narottam, quoting Hidayatullah J.'s reasoning that, because amendments relate back to the presentation of the plaint and adding a new relief exceeding pecuniary jurisdiction effectively amounts to trying a suit beyond jurisdiction, the proper step is to return the plaint with the application so that the court having jurisdiction can consider the original and amended claims together.
- The Court addressed the petitioners' contention that the Sub-Court had no jurisdiction to consider the amendment because the plaint as un-amended would be below the Sub-Court's pecuniary jurisdiction. The Court answered that the correct question is whether the Sub-Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original claim and the amended claim together. Since taken together the claims fell within the jurisdiction of the learned Subordinate Judge's Court, the Sub-Court properly had jurisdiction to consider the amendment and to allow it.
- The Court considered the contention that the amendment amounted to a new cause of action occurring after institution of the suit and that it altered the character of the suit. The Court observed that the original suit sought an injunction under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act and that Section 40 permits a plaintiff in such a suit to claim damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction. Section 40(2) states that no relief for damages shall be granted unless the plaintiff has claimed it in the plaint, but the proviso allows the Court at any stage to permit amendment to include such claim on just terms.
- The Court did not find it necessary to decide definitively whether the proviso to Section 40(2) was strictly applicable in the instant case at that stage, but it emphasized that the alleged events giving rise to the damage claim were brought about by the defendants. The Court noted that both the injunction and the claimed damages flow from the same underlying contract between the parties and that allowing the amendment did not alter the essential character or basis of the suit. As there was no question of limitation raised, and since the amendment was necessitated by altered circumstances caused by the defendants, the Court found no hardship or prejudice to the defendants by allowing the amendment.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The High Court dismissed the revision petition. The Court ordered that the revision is dismissed with costs. The core ruling can be stated succinctly as:
Revision dismissed (the Sub-Court's allowance of the amendment stands).
Implications:
- Direct effect: The Sub-Court's order allowing the amendment of the plaint to include a claim for damages (I.A. No. 3602/68) is upheld and remains in force; the revision challenging that order is dismissed with costs.
- No broader precedent beyond the application of established principles was created by this decision. The Court applied existing authorities (including Lalji v. Narottam and other cited cases) to conclude that where an amendment would oust the jurisdiction of the court where the plaint was originally presented, the proper procedure is to return the plaint with the amendment application for presentation to the court having jurisdiction to consider both claims together; and that a court which, when considering the original and amended claims together, finds itself competent, may allow the amendment.
This summary is derived exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that source.
1. This is a petition under Section 115 C.P.C for revising an order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada in I.A No. 3602 of 1968, in an unnumbered suit allowing an amendment of the plaint.
2. The facts in brief are as follows:
3. Defendants 1 and 2 are the petitioners herein. The plaintiff is the sole respondent. I shall refer to take ranks of the parties as plaintiff and defendants for convenience sake.
4. The plaintiff filed O.S No. 140/67 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Vijayawada against three defendants for a permanent injunction restraining them from screening any picture other than ‘Nirdhosi’ during the period of 100 days and also the period during which the daily collections from the said picture did not fall below the hold over figure of Rs. 250/- per day for two consecutive days in fair weather. Along with the said plaint, the plaintiff filed I.A No. 267/67, for the grant of a temporary injunction. Aninterim order was passed directing that status quo should be maintained. Subsequently a final order was passed granting a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from screening any other picture. As the Subordinate Judge's Court was closed during the summer vacation, the defendants preferred an appeal to the High Court against the said final order and moved for suspension of the temporary injunction. This Court directed that the appeal should be received and retransmitted and passed an interim order of suspension of the temporary injunction. One of the main objections raised by the defendants to the grant of temporary injunction by the Munsif Court in the Counter affidavit filed in I.A No. 267/67 as well as the affidavit filed in support of the suspension of the injunction and in the written statement is that the compensation in money, would afford adequate relief to the plaintiff and that the grant of injunction was not necessary or proper in the circumstances of the case. It was alleged that even before the final orders were passed in I.A No. 267/57 by the District Munsif's court, the defendants disobeyed the interim order passed by that Court and terminated the screening of the picture ‘Nirdhoshi’ and took up the screening of another picture by name ‘Alu Magalu”. In view of the defence taken by the defendants that the injunction was not the proper remedy and that compensation in money would afford adequate relief and inasumuch as the defendants had by their act of terminating the screening of the picture ‘Nirdhoshi’ and taking up the screening of the other picture, brought about a new state of facts, the plaintiff filed an application I.A No. 3602/68, for amendment of the plaint for including a prayer for damages for breach of the suit contract committed by the defendants. The relief of damages was valued at Rs. 12,500/- and a Court fee of Rs. 935/- was paid thereon. This application for amendment was opposed by the defendants on various grounds. Inasmuch as the amendment would take the suit out of the jurisdiction of the District Munsif Court the learned District Munsif returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. Thereafter the plaintiff presented the plaint along with the application for amendment to the Sub-Court, Vijayawada. The Sub-Court took up the application for amendment for consideration in the first instance even before the suit was numbered and held that the amendment was necessitated by an event brought out by the defendant themselves, that the relief of damages claimed as an alternative relief was warranted by statutory provisions of Section 40(2) of the Specific Relief Act and that the amendment would not introduce any new or inconsistent case and accordingly allowed the application for amendment as prayed for. The defendants have now come up in revision to this Court.
5. Sri T. Anantha Babu, learned counsel for the petitioners before me raised a new point namely that the learned District Munsif having found that the amendment prayed for would take the suit out of its jurisdiction was not competent to return the plaint but should have dismissed the suit and that the Sub-Court also had no jurisdiction to consider the application for amendment, which if allowed, would bring the suit within its jurisdiction. In support of his contention Sri T. Anantha Babu relied upon two decisions of the Madras High Court - Govinda Raja Naicker v. Khasim Saheb(1) and Mutyalamma v. Narayanaswamy(2). Sri Ananta Babu also cited rulings in support of the proposition that a Court, not having jurisdiction cannot allow an amendment so as to bring it within its jurisdiction. Sri Y.B Tata Rao learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff on the other band submits that the District Munsif having found that the amendment if allowed take it beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction rightly directed the return of the plaint along with the application for amendment for presentation to the proper court and he strongly relies upon a decision of a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court consisting of Hidavatullah, J. (as he then was) and Kaushalendra Rao J., in Lalji v. Narottam(3) Sri Tata Rao further submits that the learned District Munsif could not have allowed the application for amendment which would take it beyond its jurisdiction.
6. It is now well settled that a court could not allow an amendment which would take it out of its jurisdiction. See, C. Singara Mudaliar v. M. Govindaswamy Chetty(4) and K. Nagutha Mohamed Nainar v. Vedavalli Ammal(5) and E.R.R Memorial High School Committee v. P. Atchayya(6). The application for amendment of the plaint for including a prayer for damages was made to the District Munsif's Court, and allowing the amendment would take the suit out of its jurisdiction. The District Munsif was therefore not competent to allow the amendment. The only question is as to what is the procedure that the learned District Munsif could adopt in such cases. Sri T. Anantha Babu submits that the learned District Munsif should have dismissed the suit and he should not have returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. I am unable to agree with this contention. It will be seen that the plaint as presented would be within the jurisdiction of the District Munsif and therefore the dismissal of the suit would not be proper or valid. The learned District Munsif could have dismissed only the application for amendment as the amendment, if allowed, would take the suit beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction. But such a course would re-suit in depriving the plaintiff of a valuable right. In those circumstances, the only course that the learned Munsif could adopt was to return the plaint along with the application for amendment for presentation to the proper court. This procedure could not cause any hardship to the parties and would also effectuate the ends of justice, I think the principle has been correctly stated, if I may say so with great respect, by the Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Lalji v. Narottam. In the said case, the facts are as follows:—
7. The plaintiff in the said case brought a suit for partition in the court of the Additional Sub-Judge, first Class Yeotmal. The plaint as presented initially was within the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court, but by subsequent amendments the claim exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court trying it. The amendments were allowed by the learned Additional Sub Judge, First Class and when the learned Judge found that the suit as amended would exceed his pecuniary jurisdiction, he ordered the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. The question that arose for consideration was whether the learned Additional Sub-Judge could allow the amendment which would oust the jurisdiction of that Court. The learned Judges came to the conclusion that the learned Additional Sub Judge could not have allowed an amendment of the plaint which would have the effect of taking the suit out of his jurisdiction. Dealing with the problem as to what a Court should do when it is faced with an application for amendment, which would take it beyond its jurisdiction, Hidayatullah J. as he then was, who spoke for the Bench, observed as follows:
“When the Court is faced with the question of allowing an amendment which taken together with the original claim exceeds its pecuniary jurisdiction, it is in effect trying a suit beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction. By adding the new relief which the plaintiff claims, the court in effect amends the plaint as presented, because it is also well settled, that all amendments relate back to the presentation of the plaint. This clears the difficulty because the Court is thereby rendered incompetent to entertain the claim for amendment at all. In such a situation, because the plaintiff cannot ask for the return of the plaint, nor can the Court cause the amendment, the logical procedure to follow would be to return the plaint together with the application for amendment for the consideration of that court which has jurisdiction to consider the original claim and the claim sought by the amendment not taken separately but together.”
8. In that view their Lordships directed that the learned Additional Sub Judge should not have directed the amendment of the plaint but should have returned the plaint together with the application for amendment for presentation to the proper court. In the circumstances of this case, the learned District Munsif having found that the application for amendment, if allowed, would take it beyond its jurisdiction directed the return of the plaint along with the application for amendment for presentation to the proper Court. It is not disputed that the Sub-Court, Vijayawada to which the plaint along with the application for amendment has been presented is not the proper Court. Sri Anantha Babu further seeks to submit that the Sub-Court had no jurisdiction over the suit inasmuch as the plaint as un-amended would be below its pecuniary jurisdiction and therefore the application for amendment should not have been considered by the Sub-Court and allowed so as to bring it within its pecuniary jurisdiction. This argument cannot be upheld. The question to be considered is whether the Sub-Court had jurisdiction to consider the original claim and the claim sought by the amendment not taken separately but together as held by the Nagpur High Court in Lalji v. Narottam. If the original claim made in the plaint and the claim sought by the amendment are taken together, there is no doubt that the suit would be within the jurisdiction of the Court of the learned Subordinate Judge. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Sub Court had no jurisdiction to allow the amendment has therefore to be rejected.
9. Another submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the cause of action for the amendment is an event which happened subsequent to the suit, and that the claim for damages is based on an altogether different cause of action and it totally alters the character of the suit. It has to be remembered that the suit as originally framed was for an injunction falling within Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act. Under Section 40 of the Act a plaintiff in a suit for perpetual injunction under section 38 may claim damages either in addition to, or in substitution for, such injunction and the court may, if it thinks fit, award such damages and sub-section (2) of Section 40 provides that no relief for damages shall be granted under that section unless the plaintiff has claimed such relief in his plaint. But there is a proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 40 to the following effect:
“Provided that where no such damages have been claimed in the plaint, the Court, shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including such claim.”
10. Sri Tata Rao, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent relying upon this proviso states that under that proviso there is a statutory duty on the Court to allow the amenment for including the claim for damages in cases covered by Section 38 of the Act. Whether or not the plaintiff would be entitled to damages in the circumstances of the case is not a question which can be decided at this stage. All that has to be considered at this stage is whether the plaintiff could ask for the amendment of the plaint and seek relief of damages. It is unnecessary for me to decide at this stage whether the above proviso is applicable to the instant case. What is however clear is that by reason of a subsequent event which was brought about by the defendants, the original relief claimed in the plaint is no longer available to the plaintiff and that the amendment had become necessity in view of the altered circumstances brought about by the defendants. The basis of the claim is one and the same namely the original contract between the parties. The relief of injunction as claimed in the plaint as well as the relief of damages claimed by way of amendment are both traceable to the suit contract. It cannot be said in the circumstances of the case that there is any alteration in the character and nature of the suit. Both the relief of injunction and the relief of damages flow out of the same contract which was the basis of the claim. The lower Court was therefore justified in allowing the amendment. There being no question of limitation involved, I do not see any hardship or prejudice caused to the defendants by reason of the allowing of the amendment.
11. For the foregoing reasons, this revision is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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