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Sangavarapu Anjaneyulu v. Parankusam Rangacharyulu And Others
Summary of Judicial Opinion (Chandra Reddy, J.) — Construction of Order 21 Rule 2 C.P.C.
Factual and Procedural Background
A petition (O.P. 17 of 1940) was filed by the trustee of the Sri Chennakesava Swamy temple at Perna Nitta for recovery of possession of temple land, and a decree was obtained. While executing that decree the trustee and the hereditary archakas entered into a compromise dividing the properties into seven shares (four allotted to the archakas for remuneration and services, three retained for the institution), evidenced by Exhibit B-1. The compromise was not certified to the court. Before full satisfaction of the decree could be reported, the trustee who made the compromise was removed by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board (on the ground that he acted to the detriment of the institution), and an interim-trustee (the present appellant) was appointed. The interim-trustee proceeded with execution of the decree. The respondents (the hereditary archakas) pleaded the compromise in bar of execution. The District Judge of Guntur accepted that objection and dismissed the execution petition. The interim-trustee appealed against that order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the adjustment/compromise in this case falls within the mischief of Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether a compromise not certified to the court can be pleaded in bar of execution).
- Whether Order 21 Rule 2 C.P.C. applies only to decrees containing a direction for payment of money (including complex decrees that include a money payment) or to all kinds of decrees irrespective of whether money is payable.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)
- Submitted by Sri Subrahmanyam on behalf of the appellant: because the adjustment/compromise was not certified to the court, the trial court should have ignored it and proceeded with execution of the decree.
- He urged that Order 21 Rule 2 applies to every decree irrespective of its nature, and thus any out-of-court adjustment not certified should not be recognised by the executing court.
Respondents' Position (as recorded)
- The respondents, the hereditary archakas, pleaded the compromise/agreement as a bar to execution of the decree.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narayanaswami Naidu v. Rangaswami Naidu, I.L.R. 49 Mad 716 | Held that Order 21 rule 2 applies only to decrees which contain a direction for payment of money (even if the decree includes other reliefs). | The court treated this as the leading decision and held that its doctrine is sound and should be followed; it reaffirmed that rule 2 requires a direction for payment of money before it can be invoked. |
| Abdul Lutiff v. Bahala Bibi Ammal (cited with Narayanaswami) | Embodied a similar principle: rule attracted to decrees under which money was payable, including complex decrees. | Cited by the court as reinforcing the Narayanaswami principle; treated as supporting the view that money-payment is an essential condition. |
| Sethurama Sahib v. Chotta Raja Sahib, 1917 M.W.N. 327 | Followed the same principle as the Madras rulings (applicability where money payable). | Referred to as a subsequent decision that followed the Madras line; used to show continuity of that approach. |
| Kelu Nair v. Meenakshi, 25 M.L.J. 586 | Earlier view (among judges) that Order 21 rule 2 did not apply to relief of possession of immovable property. | Cited as part of the historical development; one judge (Sadasiva Iyer) later went back on this view in subsequent decisions noted by the court. |
| Sankaram Nambiar v. Kumara Kurup, I.L.R. 22 Mad. 182 | Decision under earlier Code (sec. 258 of 1882): held that insofar as relief of possession of immovable property was concerned, it fell outside the scope of the provision. | Used to illustrate earlier Madras reasoning that limited the rule to money decrees; part of the chain the court relied on in upholding the Narayanaswami approach. |
| Mazumdar Ramakrishna v. Mazumdar Balakrishna, I.L.R. 43 Mad. 476 | Ruled that Order 21 rule 2 would govern partition decrees that provide for payment of money as well as other reliefs (i.e., complex decrees including money payment). | Cited as an instance where the Madras bench applied the principle to complex/partition decrees that included money obligations. |
| Chava Seetha Ramayya v. Kadiyala Pattayya | Considered whether an un-certified adjustment (relating to dismantling a wall and delivery of a plot) could be pleaded in execution; also held that an award of costs would not bring the decree within the ambit of rule 2. | The court noted this recent following of the Madras approach: it was taken as support that adjustments not certified can nevertheless be gone into when relevant and that mere costs do not convert a decree into one governed by rule 2. |
| Charry v. Gowrya | Took the contrary view that Order 21 rule 2 was not restricted to money decrees but extended to any decree. | Cited as an example of the opposite line of decisions; the court observed limited discussion in that case and did not adopt this view. |
| Shadi v. Ram Ditta (Lahore High Court, single judge) | Expressed preference for Charry v. Gowrya (i.e., broader application to any decree). | Noted by the court as following the wider view, but the judge did not give detailed reasons; court treated this line as less persuasive. |
| Devidas v. Kanhaiyalal | Similar in nature to the broader view: interpreted the decree to mean a decree of any kind. | Mentioned as part of the inconsistent authority outside Madras; the court found such cases not very illuminating and not persuasive enough to depart from Madras rulings. |
| Shaik Niamat v. Shuikh Jalyl (Calcutta High Court) | Held that Order 21 rule 2 was not confined to money decrees but applied to every kind of decree; relied on Baba Mohamed v. Webb. | Cited as the principal example of the Calcutta line which the court considered and ultimately rejected as inconsistent with the statutory language and legislative intent. |
| Baba Mohamed v. Webb, I.L.R. 6 Cal. 786 | Decision under Sec. 258 of the earlier Code; treated by Calcutta court as foundational for the broad view. | The court noted that Baba Mohamed was relied upon by Calcutta but observed historical/contextual differences in wording and concluded that the later statutory language did not change the meaning to support Calcutta's broader reading. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by setting out the language of Order 21 rule 2(1) and identifying the precise contention: whether the rule applies to all decrees or only to those which direct payment of money.
The court conducted a doctrinal and historical analysis:
- It identified Narayanaswami Naidu v. Rangaswami Naidu as the leading Madras decision holding that rule 2 applies only where the decree contains a direction for payment of money, even if accompanied by other reliefs.
- The court surveyed a sequence of Madras decisions (including Abdul Lutiff, Sethurama Sahib, Mazumdar) which follow the same principle, and it noted earlier decisions (e.g., Sankaram Nambiar, Kelu Nair) and subsequent changes in judicial positions by some judges.
- The court acknowledged that other High Courts (Calcutta, Lahore and others) have taken a contrary view — that the rule extends to every kind of decree — and it explicitly examined the authorities relied upon for that broader interpretation (including Shaik Niamat and Baba Mohamed v. Webb).
- Turning to legislative history, the court traced the provision back to Sec. 206 of the Code of 1859 and to Ss. 257–258 of the Code of 1877 and observed how the language developed (the later insertion of the words "of any kind"). The court analysed the grammar and structure of the provision: the clause begins "where any money payable under a decree of any kind is paid out of court, or the decree is otherwise adjusted..." and the court read the definite article "the decree" and the disjunctive "or" to tie both clauses to the concept of a decree under which money is payable.
- On that textual and purposive reading the court concluded that the addition of the words "of any kind" was intended to extend the rule to complex decrees that include a money payment (i.e., not exclusively money decrees), but not to convert the rule into one applicable to pure non-money decrees. The court reasoned that the Calcutta and other broader interpretations render parts of the clause redundant and are inconsistent with the principle underlying the provision.
- Consequently the court held that the Narayanaswami doctrine (money-payment as an essential condition) is sound and should be followed; the court therefore rejected the broader view adopted by some High Courts.
- From this conclusion the court drew the immediate legal consequence that an out-of-court adjustment (even if not certified) can be pleaded as a defence to the executability of a decree when the adjustment falls within the ambit of rule 2 as interpreted (i.e., where a money payment direction is involved).
Finally, the court applied these conclusions to the facts: it agreed that the trial court was entitled to consider the compromise as a defence to execution (i.e., the trial court's conclusion on that specific point could not be impugned). However, the trial court had not examined other issues—whether the compromise was beneficial to the institution, whether the trustee acted bona fide, and the extent to which the compromise bound the temple. Because those matters remained undecided, the court set aside the order and remitted the case for consideration of those outstanding questions.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The court reaffirmed that Order 21 rule 2 C.P.C. requires, as an essential condition, a direction for payment of money before it can be invoked; the doctrine of Narayanaswami Naidu v. Rangaswami Naidu is sound and should be followed. The court therefore upheld the position that the rule applies to decrees which contain a direction for payment of money (including complex decrees that include such a direction) but does not extend to pure non-money decrees.
Disposition: The court set aside the order of the trial court insofar as the trial court had not considered other relevant questions and remitted the case for consideration of those outstanding issues. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs in this court and in the court below. (Case remitted.)
Practical implications:
- The court reaffirmed existing Madras authority rather than creating a new precedent that departs from that line; it followed and fortified the Narayanaswami line of cases.
- An out-of-court adjustment may be pleaded in bar of execution when the decree contains a money-payment direction and the adjustment falls within Order 21 rule 2, even if it was not certified — but courts must also examine collateral questions such as whether the compromise was bona fide and beneficial to the institutional interest (as relevant in this case).
- The decision clarifies that mere inclusion of an award of costs in a decree does not by itself bring the decree within the ambit of rule 2 (as noted by reference to Chava Seetha Ramayya v. Kadiyala Pattayya), but the court’s principal ruling remains tied to the presence of a money-payment direction.
- No departure from Madras precedent was made; thus this opinion reaffirms and applies existing principles rather than establishing a novel test beyond what is stated above.
Outcome for the parties: The trial court's order was set aside and the matter remitted for further consideration of outstanding questions (including whether the compromise was beneficial to the institution and whether the trustee acted bona fide). Each party will bear its own costs in this court and below.
K.S.R
Chandra Reddy, J.:— This appeal raises a point about the construction of Order 21 rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The material facts may be set out briefly:—
2. A petition O.P 17 of 1940 was filed by the trustee of the temple of Sri Chennakesava Swamy situated at Perna Nitta for recovery of possession of land belonging to the institution and a decree was obtained. While the decree was being executed the trustee and the hereditary archakas of the temple entered into a compromise by and under which the properties were divided into seven shares out of which four shares were allotted to the archakas for their remuneration and performance of Nitya Naivedyam and Paditharam services, while the other three were kept for the institution. This is evidenced by Ex. B-1. This could not be reported to the court and full satisfaction of the decree entered as meanwhile he was removed by the Hindu Religious Endowments Board as it was felt that in entering this compromise he acted to the detriment of the institution. The present appellant was appointed as interim-trustee and he took out execution of the decree. In bar of execution the respondents, the hereditary archakas of the temple, pleaded the above-said compromise. Accepting this objection, the District Judge of Guntur dismissed the execution petition. Aggrieved by that order, the interim-trustee has brought this appeal.
3. In support of this appeal, it is urged by Sri Subrahmanyam that as the adjustment was uncertified the trial court should have ignored it and proceeded with the execution petition. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the adjustment in this case would come within the mischief of Order 21 rule 2 C.P.C
4. In order to appreciate the contentions arising in this appeal, it is convenient to set out the terms of rule 2 of Order 21. It recites:
“2(1) Where any money payable under a decree of any kind is paid out of court, or the decree is otherwise adjusted in whole or in part to the satisfaction of the decree-holder, the decree-holder shall certify such payment or adjustment to the court whose duty it is to execute the decree, and the Court shall record the same accordingly.
5. The stress of the argument on behalf of the appellant is that every decree irrespective of its nature is governed by this rule and any adjustment outside the Court will not be recognised if it is not certified to the Court.
6. This provision of law has been the subject of judicial scrutiny. The leading case on the subject is Narayanaswami Naidu v. Rangaswami Naidu . I.L.R 49 Mad 716. It was laid down there that Order 21 rule 2 C.P.C would apply only to decrees where money was payable irrespective whether it included other reliefs or not. There, a compromise decree was passed which provided that in case one of the defendants paid to the decree-holders a stated sum of money at a particular time the property would be reconveyed to one of the defendants, but if there was a default in such payment the decree-holders themselves would be entitled to enjoy the properties with absolute rights. Contrary to this, the plaintiffs-decree-holders entered into an agreement with another defendant for relinquishing their interest in the property for a lesser sum. The second plaintiff applied to the lower Court for execution of the decree. The trial court held inter alia that the decree was adjusted by the subsequent arrangement and therefore they were not entitled to execute the decree. Thus the question arose whether the rule would apply to all kinds of decrees or confined to only decrees where money was payable whether there were other reliefs granted or not. The answer of the Bench consisting of Devadoss and Waller, JJ. was that in order to bring it within the perview of rule 2 it was essential that the decree should contain a direction for payment of money even if there were other reliefs.
7. Sri Subrahmanyam, the learned counsel for the appellants invites us to hold that the law as laid down in this decision is not correct and that it requires reconsideration as this was dissented from by some of the High Courts. It may be stated here that this ruling is preceeded by other decisions of that court.
8. Abdul Lutiff v. Bahala Bibi Ammal embodies the same principle as in Narayanaswami Naidu v. Rangasami Naidu . I.L.R 49 Mad. 716. It, was held there that this provision of law is attracted to a decree of any kind under which money was payable including complex decrees. This was followed by another Bench of the same Court in Sethurama Sahib… v. Chotta Raja Sahib…. . 1917 M.W.N 327.. There, one of the learned Judges who was a party to it, justice Sadasiva Iyer, went back upon his view in Kelu Nair v. Meenakshi . 25 M.L.J 586. where he and Spencer Justice held that Order 21 rule 2 C.P.C did not apply to the relief of possession of immovable property given by a decree, relying upon Sankaram Nambiar v. Kumara Kurup . I.L.R 22 Mad. 182. which was a decision rendered under sec. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882. In the last mentioned case, the decree was of a complex nature including payment of money and yet it was laid down that so far as the relief of possession of immovable property was concerned it would fall outside Order 21 rule 2 C.P.C It was Abdul Lttiff v. Bahula Bibi Ammal that was responsible for this change. Another instance of the same principle is to be found in Mazumdar Rmakrishna v. Mazumdar Balakrishna . I.L.R 43 Mad. 476. where it was ruled by Old-field and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ. that Order 21 rule 2 C.P.C would govern also partition decrees which provide for payment of money as well as other reliefs such as partition of immovable property and to adjustments with regard to such property. It is interesting to note that Justice Seshagiri Aiyar felt that “if the matter was Res Integra he would have some hesitation in holding that the words in Order XXI, rule 2 clause (1) or the decree is otherwise adjusted in whole or in part” related to portions of a decree in respect of which “money is not payable”. However, for the sake of uniformity in procedure, he followed two later decisions Sethurama Sahib… v. Chotta Raja Sahib…. Sahib.
9. It was submitted by Sri Subrahmanyam that these decisions were not followed in Madras subsequent to 1926 and therefore the view expressed in this case should be regarded as obsolete. We do not think we can give effect to this contention. It is novel to suggest that merely because there was no occasion for a court to follow the precedent of the same court for some time those decisions should be treated with no respect and should be disregarded. That apart, this was followed recently in Chava Seetha Ramayya v. Kadiyala Pattayya. The question that posed itself before the learned Judge was whether an adjustment of a decree for dismantling of a wall and the delivery of a plot on which the wall stood could be effectively pleaded in an execution petition though such adjustment was not certified by the court and this was answered in the affirmative. The learned Judge also opined that a mere award of a sum of money by way of costs in the decree would not prevent that arrangement being gone into; in other words, a decree for payment of costs would not make any difference and would not bring it within the ambit of Order 21 rule 2 C.P.C
10. It is true that an opposite view was taken by some of the High Courts. The contrary opinion is illustrated by Charry v. Gowrya. The learned Judges Sir Norman Maclead, C.J and Justice Shah took the view that the provisions of Order 21 rule 2 C.P.C were not restricted to money decrees but extended to any decree. It may be noticed that there is no discussion in the case about the decisions bearing on the question, nor is there any pointed reference to the language of the section. A single Judge of the Lahore High Court in Shadi v. Ram Ditta expressed his preference to Charry v. Gowrya. The learned Judge after referring to both Narayanaswami Naidu v. Rangaswami Naidu and Charry v. Gowrya said that the objection of the appellant was therefore untenable and could not be entertained. He has not chosen to give any reason for his preference. Devidas v. Kanhaiyalal is of the same nature. The learned Judge after noticing the difference of opinion between Madras and other courts observed that it appeared to him that the decree referred to a decree of any kind. So, it is manifest that these two cases are not very illuminating.
11. We may now turn to a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Shaik Niamat v. Shuikh Jalyl. There, the learned Judges were of opinion that Order 21 rule 2 was not confined to money decrees only but applied to every kind of decree. The foundation for this ruling was Baba Mohamed v. Webb . I.L.R 6 Cal. 786. which was a judgment given under Sec. 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877. We may here point out a slight error on the part of the Judge who thought that Baba Mohamed v. Webb was decided under the Code of 1882. The learned Judges felt that Baba Mohamed v. Webb still held the field notwithstanding the change in the language of the relevant provision of law, namely “of any kind” and that the amendment was brought about with a view to bring it into conformity with the view of the Calcutta High Court.
12. On a careful consideration of the various authorities and the plain language of Order 21 rule 2, we have come to the conclusion that the doctrine of Narayanaswami Naidu v. Rangaswami Naidu which is fortified by the earlier decisions of the same court is sound and does not require reconsideration. In our judgment, the words “or is otherwise adjusted” have reference only to the decree where money is payable. Thus, an essential condition to be satisfied before rule 2 could be invoked is a direction for payment of money although there might be other reliefs granted under the decree. We may here state that the words “of any kind” did not occur in the earlier Codes.
13. The provision of law in this behalf as embodied in Sec. 206 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1859, applied to all decrees as seen from the wording of it
“All monies payable under a decree shall be paid into court whose duty it is to execute the decree unless such court or the Court which passed the decree shall otherwise direct.”
14. No adjustment of a decree was recognised by the court unless such adjustment be made through court or was certified to the court by the person in whose favour the decree was made or to whom it was transferred. In the subsequent Code of 1877 this section was split into two and they took the shape of Ss. 257 and 258. The latter part of S. 206 of the old Code corresponds to Sec. 258 and Sec. 258 ran as follows:—
“If any money payable under a decree is paid out of Court, or the decree is otherwise adjusted in whole or part to the satisfaction of the decree-holder, or if any payment is made in pursuance of an agreement of the nature mentioned in section 257A, the decree-holder shall certify such payment or adjustment to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree.”
15. In the succeeding Code of 1882 this Section was retained. In construing the words of Sec. 258 of Act IV of 1882 the Madras High Court in Sankaram Nambiar v. Kumar Kurup held that it was restricted to money decrees and it could not be extended to other types of decrees. It is to resolve this conflict that the Legislature inserted the words “of any kind”. The question for consideration is whether the addition of these words altered the scope of the provisions so as to apply to every kind of decree irrespective of its nature. In our opinion, these words cannot bear the construction put by the Calcutta High Court. If the view expressed in this case were correct, the clause “where any money payable under a decree of any kind is paid out of court” is redundant and the Legislature would have used simple language in order to convey such a meaning as “where any decree is adjusted in whole or in part out of court”. We think the intention as could be gathered from the words as used in the rule is to confine it to decrees where one of the reliefs granted is payment of money. Therefore, by the addition of these words, the scope of this rule was extended to any kind of decrees even complex decrees, even if other reliefs were granted, so long as there was a provision for payment of money. The disjunctive “or” (before the words “the decree is otherwise adjusted”) denotes an adjustment other than payment out of court. The use of the definite Article in “the decree” relates to the decree that precedes it. Both the clauses only talk of mode of adjustment where money is payable under the decree so that the only difference between the old provision and the new one is while in the latter the decree is not required to be exclusively for a payment of money and it applies to complex decrees partly for payment of money and partly for other reliefs, in the earlier one it was confined to money decrees only. We feel that the interpretation placed by the Calcutta and other High Courts is opposed to the plain language of the Section and is not in conformity with the principle underlying that provision. We do not feel that there are any grounds for departing from the rulings of Madras High Court and we think that Narayanaswami Naidu v. Rangaswami Naidu is good law. As a corollary it follows that the adjustment could be pleaded as a defence to the executability of the decree. It follows that the conclusion of the trial court cannot be impugned in that behalf. The learned Judge, however, had not considered the other aspects of the matter, namely, whether it was a compromise benefical to the institution and whether the trustee acted bona fide in entering into the compromise and how far it binds the temple. We therefore, set aside the order of the trial court and remit it for consideration of other outsanding questions. The parties will bear their own costs here and in the court below.
K.S.R
16. Case remitted.
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