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Mathu v. Cherchi

Kerala High Court
Dec 11, 1989
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Factual and Procedural Background

Mother filed a suit seeking cancellation of Ext. A2 sale deed executed in favour of her son for Rs. 10,000/- relating to 68 cents of land and a building. The sole ground was that she executed the document under the belief, induced by the son’s representations, that it was only a chitty hypothecation bond for Rs. 10,000/-. The mother testified as PW1 that she was made to execute the document believing it was for the son’s trade purposes. The suit was decreed in her favour and the decision was confirmed on appeal. The defendant son filed a second appeal against the decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale deed (Ext. A2) executed by the mother in favour of the son can be cancelled on the ground of mistake of fact or fraudulent misrepresentation that it was only a chitty hypothecation bond.
  2. Whether the presumptions under Sections 16 of the Indian Contract Act and 111 of the Evidence Act apply to shift the burden of proof regarding the validity of the deed.
  3. The applicability and scope of the defence of non est factum in cases of alleged mistake in written contracts.
  4. The evidentiary value of registration and possession of the original document in proving the nature and validity of the deed.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent (Mother)

  • Executed the document believing it to be a chitty hypothecation bond for Rs. 10,000/- based on the son’s assurances.
  • Claimed to be illiterate and unaware of the true nature of the document.
  • Asserted that the document was executed as surety for the son to enable him to draw a prize amount in a chitty.
  • Alleged mistake of fact and fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the nature of the document.

Appellant (Son)

  • Contended that the transaction was a bona fide sale and not a hypothecation bond.
  • Pointed to the relationship of mother and son, adequacy of consideration, payment of tax by the mother, and possession of the original sale deed by her as facts supporting validity of the sale.
  • Denied the respondent’s claims of mistake and misrepresentation.
  • Produced evidence including attesting witnesses and registration details to prove the voluntary and informed execution of the deed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gangamoyi Debi v. Troiluckhya Nath Chowdhry, I.L.R 33 Calcutta 537 P.C Presumption of due and proper registration of documents in presence of Registrar. Established that registration is a solemn act and presumed duly performed unless fraud is proved.
Sumathi Amma v. Kunjulekshmi Amma & Another, 1964 K.L.T 945 Proof of execution and registration of documents under Evidence Act and Registration Act. Supported the sufficiency of registration certificate and presumption under Section 114 Illustration (e) of Evidence Act.
Kunhamina Umma v. Special Tahsildar, I.L.R 1976 (2) Kerala 678 Presumption arising from registration and proof of execution. Reinforced the evidentiary weight of registration and possession in validating deeds.
Martin Cashin v. Peter J. Cashin, A.I.R 1938 P.C 103 Doctrine of non est factum and its narrow application. Clarified limits on the defence of non est factum and emphasized burden of proof on the person asserting it.
Saunders v. Anglia Building Society, 1970 (3) A.E.R 961 Requirement of care and narrow scope for non est factum plea. Supported the principle that the plea is rarely available and must be strictly proved.
Ladli Parshad Jaiswal v. The Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., A.I.R 1963 S.C 1279 Requirement of specific plea and proof of active confidence or fiduciary relationship to shift burden of proof. Emphasized necessity of pleading and proving position of active confidence for burden to shift under Section 111 Evidence Act.
Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib, A.I.R 1967 S.C 878 Similar to Ladli Parshad Jaiswal on burden of proof and fiduciary relationship. Reinforced the requirement of specific pleadings to invoke presumptions under Section 111.
Afsar Shaikh v. Soleman Bibi, (1976) 2 SCC 142 : A.I.R 1976 S.C 163 Burden of proof in cases involving undue influence and fiduciary relationships. Clarified conditions under which burden of proof shifts to person in dominating position.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the evidence and legal principles as follows:

  • The mother voluntarily executed the document (Ext. A2) after being informed and in the presence of the Sub Registrar, who performed his official duties properly, eliciting admission of receipt of consideration.
  • Evidence from attesting witnesses (DWs 2 and 3) showed the mother knew the contents before execution and registration, disproving claims of ignorance or illiteracy.
  • Presumptions under Section 114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act arise from registration, further supporting validity of the deed.
  • Inadequacy of consideration, payment of tax, and possession of the original document by the mother were not pleaded as grounds and thus not determinative.
  • The mother’s claim that the document was a chitty hypothecation bond was found to be artificial and unsupported by evidence, especially given her admission of receipt of money before the Sub Registrar.
  • The defence of non est factum was considered inapplicable since the mother was of full capacity, had opportunity to understand the deed, and no fraudulent misrepresentation was proved.
  • The court emphasized that burden of proof shifts only when a position of active confidence or dominating influence is pleaded and proved, along with unconscionability of the transaction, none of which were sufficiently established.
  • The courts below erred by decreeing the suit based on a misunderstanding of the legal and factual positions, particularly by not applying the correct burden of proof principles under Sections 16 of the Contract Act and 111 of the Evidence Act.

Holding and Implications

The second appeal is allowed. The decrees and judgments of the lower courts are set aside, and the suit is dismissed. No costs are awarded.

The direct effect is that the sale deed in favour of the son stands validated, and the mother’s suit for cancellation is rejected. The opinion does not set any new precedent but clarifies the application of burden of proof and evidentiary presumptions in cases involving alleged mistake or undue influence in familial transactions.

Show all summary ...

1. Mother sued to cancel Ext. A2 sale deed for Rs. 10,000/- in favour of the son relating to 68 cents and a building on the sole ground that she executed the document to benefit the son believing his word that it is only a chitty hypothecation bond (for Rs. 10,000/-. The only evidence is her testimony as PW1 that she was made to execute the document saying that he wants money for his trade purposes. The suit was decreed and the decision was confirmed in appeal. Second appeal is by the defendant son.

2. Rejecting the contention that what is involved is a bona fide ale, the courts below decreed the suit on the grounds of relationship as mother and son, inadequacy of consideration, payment of tax by the mother after sale and possession of the original sale deed by her. Even after giving the most liberal interpretation what would come out from the plaint and evidence of PW 1 is only a mistake of fact or a fraudulent misrepresentation. Section 16 of the Contract Act or Section 111 of the Evidence Act were not relied on by the respondent or the courts below, but the decisions seen to be presumably under those sections. Voluntary execution of the document thinking that it is a chitty hypothecation bond for Rs. 10,000/- is admitted. It is also admitted that the document was executed to benefit the appellant and she told the Sub Registrar, at the time of registration, that she received Rs. 10,000/-. Such a statement she could have made to the Sub Registrar only when, asked by him. If so, it is clear that the Sub Registrar must have properly discharged his official duty eliciting voluntary execution and receipt of consideration. Though respondent claims to be illiterate, it is proved otherwise. She has experience in execution of documents and conduct of cases also. DWs 2 and 3 are the scribe and attestor to Ext. A2. Their evidence show that contents of Ext. A2 were known to the respondent before execution and registration. The mere fact that DW2 was declared hostile on some other answer given by him does not make the above version unacceptable. Along with these aspects, there is also the presumption under Section 114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act arising out of the registration of the document.

3. Registration of a document is a solemn act to be performed’ in the presence of the Registrar, whose duty is to attend to the parties during registration and see that proper persons competent to act are present, and they are identified to his satisfaction; and all things done before him in his official capacity and verified by his signature, will, unless it is shown that some deliberate fraud was successfully committed on him, be presumed to be done duly and in order (Gangamoyi Debi v. Troiluckhya Nath Chowdhry, I.L.R 33 Calcutta 537 P.C). Though Ext. A2 is a document required to be attested, examination of attesting witness in proof of execution is necessary under Section 68 of the Evidence Act only when execution is denied. In this case, execution is admitted. If so, under Section 67 of the Evidence Act, proof can be by any evidence. The evidence furnished by the registration certificate under Section 63 of the Registration Act coupled with the presumption under Illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act supported by the admission of the respondent and the depositions of DWs 2 and 3 will be more than sufficient Sumathi Amma…* v. Kunjulekshmi Amma & Another…, 1964 K.L.T 945 and Kunhamina Umma v. Special Tahsildar, I.L.R 1976 (2) Kerala 678).

4. Inadequacy of consideration, payment of tax and possession of Ext. A2 are not grounds pleaded. Simply because the appellant said that consideration represents the market value but the market value is seen to be higher, the document cannot go on that ground DW 1 is the wife of the appellant. They were residing with the respondent along with their children. Appellant is the eldest son of the respondent. He was managing the family affairs Sisters were given away in marriage by him. Dispute is only whether he met the expenses single handed or not. Ext. B3 is a release deed executed by one of the sons in favour of the respondent relinquishing rights in her properties for a consideration of Rs. 10,000/-. The amount was paid by the appellant. In these circumstances, the mother selling the property to the son for a reduced value is not improbable or unconscionable. Admittedly, after Ext. A2 in 1980, appellant fell seriously ill. He was paralysed and he completely lost his speech. It was even feared that he will collapse. Even now he is an invalid. His case is that in this situation, the mother filed the suit at the instance of the other children. Possibility cannot be ruled out. Suit was within two years of Ext. A2 in 1982 when appellant continued to be speechless and paralytic. The original document was got back from the Sub Registrar by the person authorised for that purpose. It was in the common box of the appellant in the house and all children ware placing their documents in it. If it was intended as a chitty hypothecation bond, as contended by the respondent, the document must have been in the possession of the person to whom it was executed and not in the possession of the appellant or respondent. If the respondent got back the document from the Sub Registrar and kept with her, she cannot say she was unaware of the contents. Possession of the original and payment of tax in such a situation, especially when they are not grounds relied on, cannot be of any use.

5. Case of the respondent is that she came to know of the real nature of the document on verification when during a quarrel DW 1 asserted ownership. That contention is denied and DW 1 gave evidence. Case of the respondent in this respect appears to be artificial. Her case that what she executed is a chitty hypothecation bond could be only as surety for the appellant to enable him to draw prize amount in a chitty. Her case itself is that she executed the document to benefit her son to get money for business. There must be a chitty for that amount which was prized. There is no such case. It must be in favour of a chitty foreman. There is no explanation. If it is such a document, how can she admit receipt of money before the Sub Registrar. These are all circumstances indicating that chitty hypothecation bond is an artificial story and what was intended was a sale itself.

6. Plea of mistake of fact is peculiar to the law of written contracts due to the existence of the common law defence of non-est-factum, which permits one who has signed a document, which is essentially different from what he intended to sign, to plead that, notwithstanding his signature, it is not “his deed in contemplation law”. The defence of being too lazy or too busy to read is not available. The plea must be kept within narrow limits in order to avoid confusion and uncertainty in the field of contract if a man is permitted to disown his signature simply by asserting that he did not understand what he signed. He must show that the transaction which the document purports is essentially different in substance or kind from the transaction intended. In a case where the person executing the deed is not blind, infirm or otherwise incapacitated and no fraudulent misrepresentation is made to him and he had opportunity of reading the deed, the plea of non-estfactum is not available. It is immaterial whether he read or not. He is bound by the deed because it operates as a conclusive bar against him not because he read or understood, but because he has chosen to execute it. That is so in equity as at law except in special cases where there is an equitable ground (Martin Cashin v. Peter J. Cashin, A.I.R 1938 P.C 103). The plea can rarely be established by a person of full capacity. Though it is not confined to blind or illiterate alone, any extension of the scope of the plea will have to be kept within specified limits. The plea must be proved by the person setting it up. He must show that he acted with care (Saunders v. Anglia Building Society, 1970 (3) A.E.R 961). The plea of non-est factum is not available in this case. When vitiating circumstances are there, the rule has no application also.

7. Law presumes, prima facie, in favour of deeds being duly executed. Burden of proving vitiating factors is on the person woh alleges them. Major exceptions to this rule are those provided under Section 111 of the Evidence Act and Section 16(3) of the Indian Contract Act. The last part of Section 16 of the Contract Act says that the section will not affect Section 111 of the Evidence Act. Section 16(3) and Section 111 both operate on the realm of burden of proof alone. The ordinary initial burden in such cases is shifted to the person who supports the document. That is on account of the position of “active confidence” affecting good faith. When good faith is challenged and position of active confidence is alleged, Section 111 and when dominating position is alleged and established. Section 16 will apply. For the applicability of Section 16(3), one more factor is necessary. The transaction must also appear on the face of the deed or on the evidence adduced to be unconscionable. Those exceptions to the general rule of burden of proof flow either from the extra ordinary physical or mental condition of the executant or the peculiar relationship between him and the person in whose favour the deed is executed. Allegation and proof of the existence of the relationship of “active a confidence” or “fiduciary relationship” or “the dominating position” is a condition precedent to the shift of burden. Plea of bad faith is also necessary under Section 111. Then only burden to prove good faith will shift. Mere allegation of a blood relationship or other relationship is not sufficient. Position of active confidence is necessary. Possibility of exercise of domination and influence must exist. In such cases, under Section 111, there is a presumption against the deed unless good faith is proved by the person who holds the position of active confidence. But the burden of proof under Section 16(3) of the Contract Act is shifted to the person who is in a dominating position only when the deed also appears or proved to be unconscionable.

8. In view of Order VI Rule 4 read with Rule 2, specific plea is necessary. Modification of the rule of evidence is only on allegation and proof of existence of certain conditions to prevent failure of justice in such cases. The position of ‘active confidence’ under Section 111 of the Evidence Act or dominating position under Sec. 16 of the Contract Act could be proved by evidence or by the presumption arising under Section 16(2) of the Contract Act in cases where that presumption is available. Such a presumption of active confidence or dominating position is available only when the authority or fiduciary relationship is proved to exist or contract is made with a person whose mental capacity is affected by reason of age, illness, etc. Section 16(1) of the Contract Act defines undue influence. Sub section (2) narrates areas where dominance is presumed and Sub-section (3) deals with the conditions required for shifting the burden. Plea and proof regarding the position of confidence and trust enabling undue influence is necessary. A vague or general plea may not be sufficient. The rule is evolved to narrow the issue and protect the party charged with improper conduct from being taken by surprise (Ladli Parshad Jaiswal v. The Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., A.I.R 1963 S.C 1279 Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib, A.I.R 1967 S.C 878 and Afsar Shaikh v. Soleman Bibi, (1976) 2 SCC 142 : A.I.R 1976 S.C 163). The normal rule of burden of proof is not applicable in cases involving paradanashim ladies or illiterate or old or infirm persons also. In such cases also, burden is on the person who supports the document when such persons did not have the opportunity of extraneous help. The person who supports the deed will have to establish not only that the deed was executed, but was explained to and was really understood by the grantor, that the deed was not signed under duress, but arose from the free and independent will of the grantor. None of these conditions are satisfied in this case. Here the allegation and evidence is the maximum only of a fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the nature of the document which itself is disproved by the defence. The position of active confidence or dominance of will and unconscionable nature of the transaction are not alleged and proved in order to give notice to the appellant to take up the burden. Even if such allegations are also accepted to be there, sufficient rebuttal evidence is given. Illustration (b) to Section 111 of the Evidence Act itself indicates that burden of proving good faith is shifted not on account of the relationship as mother and son or the like, but on account of the position of active confidence subsisting enabling domination and influence. Here, it is a case of the mother executing a document in favour of the son. Mistake or fact or fraudulent misrepresentation alleged are not proved but disproved. There is no need for a remand as requested. Both the courts decreed the suit on a misunderstanding of the legal and factual positions.

9. Second appeal is allowed. Decrees and judgments are set aside. Suit is dismissed. No costs.