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Kunwar Singh (Dead) ... v. Sri Thakur Ji Mahara...
Structured Summary of the Opinion (G.P. Mathur, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal by the defendants challenges the judgment and decree dated 3.12.1976 of the IInd Additional District Judge, Bareilly, which allowed the plaintiff's appeal and decreed the suit for cancellation of a sale deed dated 27.5.1969 and for possession.
The suit (O.S. No. 60 of 1971) was instituted by Sri Thakurji Maharaj (through Baba Sant Ram Das, Chela Baba Narain Das) against Kunwar Singh and others seeking cancellation of a sale deed executed by Baba Jagannath Das in favour of the defendants and possession of the land in village Gauntia Mazra Dhamipur (Tehsil Nawabganj, District Bareilly). The plaintiff's case: Thakur Jodha Singh had, by a registered waqf/waqf-like deed dated 24.10.1934, endowed zamindari property in favour of the temple/deity (Sri Thakurji Maharaj) with a condition prohibiting sale or mortgage; the land was thereafter recorded and managed for the temple. Jagannath Das, who at one time acted as Mahant/servarakar under a compromise arising from compensation proceedings under Section 240-G U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act, subsequently recorded the land in his name and executed a sale deed in 1969.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit (judgment dated 30.4.1974) on findings that Jagannath Das had acquired sirdari/adhivasi rights and that, during consolidation, his name was recorded as sirdar (invoking Sections 27 and 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act) and other grounds including limitation and bona fide purchase. The plaintiff's first appeal was allowed by the IInd Addl. District Judge, who found that the land was trust property, that the compromise in the 240-G proceedings made Jagannath Das Mahant with no right to sell/mortgage, that compensation proceedings had not extinguished the plaintiff's rights, and that the sale deed was void; the appellate court therefore set aside the trial court's decree and decreed the suit for cancellation and possession.
The present judgment disposes of the defendants' appeal against the appellate court's decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit for cancellation of the sale deed instituted by the deity (Sri Thakurji Maharaj) through its Mahant/Shebait is maintainable in a civil court.
- Whether the compromise entered into in proceedings under Section 240-G U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act (compensation proceedings) had the effect of extinguishing the plaintiff's rights and conferring adhivasi/sirdari/bhumidhari rights on Jagannath Das.
- Whether entries made in consolidation proceedings (C.H. Form 45) and the operation of Sections 27 and 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act bar the civil suit.
- Whether the civil court lacks jurisdiction under Section 331 U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act because the issues require revenue adjudication (i.e., whether cancellation of the sale deed was within revenue jurisdiction).
- Whether the suit is barred by limitation or by the doctrine of adverse possession given the period between alleged wrongful acts and the suit.
- Whether the defendants qualify as bona fide purchasers for value and/or can claim protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act (ostensible ownership/consent of real owner).
- Whether documents/certificates and other material sought to be admitted as additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC should be admitted at the second-appeal stage.
- Whether bhumidhari sanad and summary revenue proceedings (Sections 134/137/137-A U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act) conclusively affect title in a regular civil suit for cancellation of sale deed.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff-Respondent's Arguments (as set out in the plaint and advanced below)
- The property was endowed by Thakur Jodha Singh to the temple/deity by a registered waqf deed dated 24.10.1934 and was therefore trust/temple property that was inalienable; no person could sell or mortgage it.
- Jagannath Das had managed the land as Mahant/servarakar and any revenue entries obtained by him were fraudulent; he had no authority to execute the sale deed.
- A compromise in the 240-G proceedings gave Jagannath Das management rights as Mahant but expressly prohibited his right to sell or mortgage the property; hence any sale by him is void.
- The defendants are not bona fide purchasers for value because no ostensible ownership or consent from the deity exists to validate the sale.
- Attempts by defendants to rely on consolidation entries, compensation proceedings or bhumidhari sanad do not extinguish the deity's rights because statutory formalities (compensation roll, signing/sealing) were not complied with and the deity was not a party to certain summary proceedings.
Defendant-Appellants' Arguments (as set out in written statement and on appeal)
- Jagannath Das was in personal possession of the land as sirdar/adhivasi and recorded as such in C.H. Form 45 during consolidation; therefore Sections 27 and 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act bar the civil suit.
- Jagannath Das acquired bhumidhari sanad by depositing required amounts and thereby obtained title enabling him to execute the sale deed to the defendants.
- The civil court lacked jurisdiction because the matter involved declaration of title and revenue forum alone could adjudicate (invoking Section 331 U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act and related precedents).
- The suit was barred by limitation/adverse possession because the relevant acts and consolidation entries occurred well before the suit.
- The defendants contend they are bona fide purchasers for value and rely on Section 41, Transfer of Property Act, to protect their title.
- They sought to admit additional documentary evidence (certificates of payments under an Adhivasi Scheme and other materials) under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to show compensation/payment and other official action that would support their title.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Awadesh Singh v. Bikarma Ahir, AIR 1975 All. 324 | Compensation/adhivasi proceedings extinguish landholder's rights only upon preparation of compensation assessment roll and signing & sealing of same. | The court applied this principle to conclude that, absent evidence of a duly prepared & signed compensation roll or of payment of compensation to the landholder, the rights of the landholder (the plaintiff) were not extinguished by the 240-G proceedings and Jagannath Das did not thereby become sirdar/adhivasi/bhumidhar. |
| Surendra Krishna Ray v. Shre Shree Ishwari Bhubaneshwari Thakurani (citation in text) | Principle that a Shebait (manager) who accepts the office is in a fiduciary position and cannot assert a hostile title against the deity; adverse possession is inapplicable where the manager holds in fiduciary capacity. | The court relied on this doctrine to hold that Jagannath Das, as Mahant/Shebait, could not claim adverse possession or an independent title against the deity and therefore could not validly execute a sale deed in his personal favour. |
| Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed (Supreme Court) | Holds that a suit by a co-sharer to challenge deletion of name in consolidation proceedings based on fraud is not barred by Section 49 U.P.C.H Act. | The court invoked this authority to distinguish and to hold that Section 49 would not bar the present suit where the Mahant (who might have failed to object in consolidation) acted in a fiduciary capacity and where fraud/usurpation was alleged. |
| Smt. Prabhawati v. Kashi, 1983 RD 196; Mohd. Ahmad v. Allah Rabbul Alewin, 1984 RD 321 | Supportive authorities holding consolidation bar (Section 49) does not operate in certain cases (e.g., minors, waqf property where mutawalli got own name recorded). | Used by the court as supporting precedent for the proposition that Section 49 does not necessarily bar a suit where the recorded entries arose from actions by fiduciaries/managers or in circumstances akin to fraud/usurpation. |
| Smt. Dularia Devi v. Janardan Singh | Authority holding a suit to set aside a sale deed instituted while consolidation proceedings were pending was barred by Section 49 U.P.C.H Act (distinguishable). | The court distinguished this authority on the factual basis that in that case the suit had been filed during pendency of consolidation proceedings; the present case did not have that timing and involved issues of fiduciary conduct/temple property. |
| Chandrika Misra, Indra Pal v. Jagannath; Ram Padarath v. IInd Addl. District Judge (full bench) | Authorities cited on the question whether civil court jurisdiction is ousted in favour of revenue forum for certain title disputes. | The court noted these authorities but relied instead on the Supreme Court decision in Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad and the decision Indra Dev v. Ram Pyari to hold that a suit for cancellation of a sale deed is not necessarily barred by Section 331 and civil court jurisdiction was appropriate in the circumstances. |
| Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad, 1989 ALJ 1335 (Supreme Court) | Holds that cause of action for cancellation of sale deed pertains to the execution of the deed itself and may be within civil court jurisdiction; approved Indra Dev v. Ram Pyari. | The court relied on this Apex Court decision to reject the appellants' jurisdictional challenge under Section 331 U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act and to uphold the civil court's competence to try the cancellation suit. |
| Indra Dev v. Ram Pyari, 1982 LJ 1308 | Authority approving that cancellation of a sale deed focuses on the execution of the deed as cause of action allowing civil jurisdiction. | The court cited this decision (as approved by the Supreme Court in Bismillah) to support the conclusion that the civil court could entertain the suit for cancellation of the sale deed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds by addressing (a) the legal effect of the compromise in the 240-G compensation proceedings, (b) the effect of consolidation entries and Sections 27/49 U.P.C.H Act, (c) jurisdictional objections under Section 331 U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act, (d) limitation and adverse possession contentions, (e) the defendants' reliance on Section 41 Transfer of Property Act, and (f) the admissibility of additional evidence.
-
Effect of the compromise under Section 240-G:
- The court examined the compromise (Ex. 7) entered in proceedings under Section 240-G and reproduced its terms. The compromise expressly made Jagannath Das the Mahant with the duty to manage the temple and the cultivation, provided that he had no right to sell or mortgage the land, and that the income would be spent on temple expenses. The public reserved the right to remove the Mahant for mismanagement.
- On this basis the court held Jagannath Das' possession — if any — was as Mahant (manager/Shebait) and not in a personal capacity. Therefore he could not claim adverse possession or independent ownership against the deity.
-
Whether 240-G proceedings extinguished rights (adhivasi/sirdari/bhumidhari):
- The court noted there was no evidence that compensation was paid to Ganga Nandan in conformity with the statutory scheme (no evidence of compliance with Sections 240-J, 240-D, 240-E, or preparation/signing/sealing of a compensation assessment roll).
- Relying on Awadesh Singh v. Bikarma Ahir (Full Bench), the court stated rights are extinguished only upon preparation and signing/sealing of the compensation assessment roll. Because the lower appellate court had found no evidence of payment/roll, the court concluded that the plaintiff's rights were not extinguished and Jagannath Das did not become adhivasi/sirdar by those proceedings.
- Further, even if some payments to Ganga Nandan under an "Adhivasi Scheme" were shown by certificates later tendered, the court rejected them as inadmissible additional evidence (Order 41 Rule 27 CPC) and found them not sufficiently connected to the disputed land or the compensation scheme required by statute.
-
Consolidation entries and Sections 27 & 49 U.P.C.H Act:
- The court considered the defendants' contention that C.H. Form 45 recorded Jagannath Das as sirdar and that Section 49 barred the suit. The court held that a deity's property must be represented through its manager/Shebait and that where a manager (here Jagannath Das) accepts fiduciary office and acts as Mahant, he cannot assert a hostile title against the deity.
- Relying on Supreme Court precedent (Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed) and other local decisions, the court concluded the bar under Section 49 does not apply where the recorded entries result from conduct by a fiduciary/manager who abused his position or where fraud/usurpation is alleged. Thus the consolidation bar did not preclude the present suit on the facts before the court.
-
Jurisdiction - civil court vis-à-vis revenue court (Section 331):
- The court addressed the submission that Section 331 ousted civil jurisdiction. It reiterated binding authority (Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad; Indra Dev v. Ram Pyari) that a suit for cancellation of a sale deed is based on the execution of the deed itself and is not necessarily barred by Section 331. The court therefore refused to entertain the jurisdictional objection.
- The court also observed that the defendants raised this ground for the first time in the second appeal and, in any event, they did not demonstrate failure of justice resulting from trial by the civil court.
-
Limitation and adverse possession:
- The court rejected the argument that the suit was barred by limitation or that Jagannath Das perfected title by adverse possession because Jagannath Das had possession in a fiduciary capacity as Mahant. In fiduciary contexts of Shebaits/Mahants managing deity property, adverse possession principles are inapplicable to defeat the title of the deity.
-
Section 41, Transfer of Property Act (ostensible ownership):
- The court held the defendants failed to plead or prove that Jagannath Das was an ostensible owner with express or implied consent of the real owner (the deity). Because the deity could not give such consent, Section 41 did not assist the defendants.
-
Admissibility of additional evidence (Order 41 Rule 27 CPC):
- The defendants sought admission of certificates showing payments to Ganga Nandan in 1957–1960. The court applied the statutory criteria and refused to admit the certificates: (a) they were issued in November 1978 and could have been tendered earlier; (b) they were not necessary for pronouncing judgment in the second appeal; (c) they did not specifically relate to compensation for the disputed land (silent on the land/village); and (d) because the plaintiff (deity) was the real landholder, payments to Ganga Nandan even if proved would not alter the plaintiff's title. The court therefore rejected the application for additional evidence.
-
Effect of bhumidhari sanad and summary revenue proceedings:
- The court observed that proceedings for grant or cancellation of bhumidhari sanad are summary in nature and could not conclusively determine title in a regular suit for cancellation of sale deed. Also, the objections in those proceedings were not instituted by the real owner (the deity) so such orders could not bind the plaintiff in the civil suit.
-
Conclusion of analysis:
- Weighing the compromise terms, absence of statutory formalities in compensation proceedings, inapplicability of adverse possession to a fiduciary, lack of evidence of ostensible ownership/consent, and inadmissibility of additional documentary evidence, the court found no merit in the defendants' appeal challenging the appellate court's decree.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct effect on parties:
- The defendants' appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellate court's decree in favour of the plaintiff (decree for cancellation of the sale deed dated 27.5.1969 and for possession of the land in suit) stands upheld by this court.
- The court clarified that the owner of the land in suit is the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj (the deity) and not Baba Sant Ram Das (through whom the suit was filed), nor any current or future Mahant/servarakar or pujari who may act for the deity in future.
Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles regarding the fiduciary position of Shebaits/Mahants, the statutory requirements for extinguishment of landholder rights in compensation proceedings (preparation/signing/sealing of compensation rolls), and limits the conclusiveness of summary revenue actions and consolidation entries where fiduciaries have acted to usurp property. The court did not state that it was laying down new law; it applied existing authorities to the facts at hand.
Disposition
Appeal dismissed with costs. (Final line of the opinion: "Appeal Dismissed.")
G.P Mathur, J.:— This is a defendants appeal against the judgment and decree dated 3.12.1976 of IInd Addl. District Judge, Bareilly, by which the appeal preferred by the plaintiff was allowed and the suit for cancellation of the sale deed dated 27.5.1969 and for possession was decreed.
2. Sri Thakurji Maharaj, Birajman Mandir, Gauntia Mazra Dhamipur through Baba Sant Ram Das Chela Baba Narain Das filed O.S No. 60 of 1971 against Kunwar Singh and seven others for cancellation of the sale deed executed by Jagannath Das in favour of the defendants on 27.5.1969 and for possession over the land in suit situate in village Gauntia, Mazra Dhamipur, Pargana and Tehsil Nawabganj, District Bareilly. The case of the plaintiff was as follows: One Thakur Jodha Singh resident of village Gauntia Mazra Dhamipur Pargana Nawabganj, District Bareilly was a Zamindar and he constructed a temple in his village and installed a deity of Sri Thakurji Maharaj in it after performing all religious ceremonies. Thakur Jodha Singh had no issues and in his life time, he endowed his entire Zamindari property in favour of the plaintiff and created a public trust by means of a registered waqf deed dated 24.10.1934 for the maintenance and upkeep of temple and for “arti and bhog” expenses etc. One of the conditions of the waqf deed was that no person shall have any right to sell or mortgage the property endowed in favour of the temple. He remained the manager of the temple till his life time and after his death Ganga Nandan Chela Brahma Nandan became the manager of the temple. The present Mahant and sarvarakar of the plaintiff is Baba Sant Ram Das and prior to him Jagannath Das was acting as Mahant and sarvarakar. Jagannath Das executed a sale deed of the endowed property measuring 33 bighas 18 biswas, details at the foot of the plaint, in favour of the defendants on 27.5.1969 for a sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/-. After the creation of the waqf the land in suit was recorded in the name of the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj in the revenue records and used to be cultivated by the manager and sarvarakar of the temple on its behalf. During the period Ganga Nandan was the sarvarakar, Jagannath Das who neither resided, in the Village where the land in suit is situate nor was in possession thereof got his name recorded over the same in the Khasra with the connivance of the Lekhpal. When Ganga Nandan came to know about it, he moved an application in the form of an objection before the S.D.O Nawabganj under Section 240-G of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act against Jagannath Das in compensation proceedings which was registered as case No. 157-A of 1957. In the said case, Jagannath Das appeared and a compromise was filed by the parties on 21.12.1957 wherein Jagannath Das admitted the title of the plaintiff and-further agreed to manage the land in dispute as Mahant of the temple without any right to sell or mortgage the property. The compromise was duly recorded and the proceedings were decided in terms thereof. The compromise was acted upon and Jagannath Das continued to be Mahant and sarvarakar of the plaintiff with effect from the date of the decision of the case and used to manage the land in suit of its behalf. Subsequently he became dishonest and any how he managed to get the land in suit recorded in his personal name in the revenue records fraudulently though it was a trust property. This position continued without the knowledge of anybody else and after obtaining bhumidhari sanad, he executed the impugned sale-deed in favour of the defendants. When the true facts came to light, Jagannath Das was removed from the Mahantship of the plaintiff by the Hindu public of the Village and Baba Sant Ram Das was appointed as the Mahant and sarvarakar thereof. Jagannath Das died in January, 1971. The property of the plaintiff by its very nature and in terms of original waqf deed is unalienable. Jagannath Das had no right, title or authority to execute the sale deed thereof.
3. The case of the defendants as set out in the written statement is as follows. There is a temple of Sri Thakurji Maharaj in Village Gauntia Mazra Dhamipur Pargana and Tehsil Nawabganj District Bareilly and that Thakur Jodha Singh was a zamindar. Jagannath Das was sirdar and in possession of the land in suit in his personal capacity and his possession was not on behalf of the plaintiff. During the consolidation proceedings he was declared as sirdar thereof and in C.H Form 45, his name was recorded as Sirdar which became final as no objection was filed by anybody else. Thus the suit is barred by Sections 27 and 49 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short U.P.C.H Act). Jagannath Das was not the sarvarakar of the temple and his possession was adverse. He acquired bhumidhari sanad by depositing the requisite amount and thereafter executed the sale deed in favour of the defendants. The Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as the issue involved was one for declaration of title which could be done by the revenue court alone. The suit was barred by limitation. Thakur Jodha Singh did not construct the temple nor could create waqf in favour of the temple. Mahant Sant Ram Das was not the Mahant or sarvarakar of the plaintiff and Jagannath Das also never acted as servarakar of the plaintiff. On the pleadings of the parties, a large number of issues were framed by the trial court. The learned Addl. Civil Judge after considering the evidence adduced by the parties recorded the following findings. The suit filed on behalf of Sri Thakurji Maharaj through Sant Ram Das was maintainable and was not barred by Section 91 or under Order 1 Rule 8 C.P.C Jagannath Das was never servarakar or manager of the plaintiff. Thakur Jodha Singh executed a waqf deed in favour of the plaintiff on 22.10.1934 and the plaintiff became owner of the property in suit. Sri Thakurji Maharaj was recorded as bhumidhar but subsequently Dheeram Das acquired adhivasi rights and became sirdar of the land in suit. On his death, Jagannath Das as his heir became the sirdar thereof. The deity cannot be regarded as minor by any stretch of imagination as contemplated by Section 157 of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act and its position was different. Ganga Nandan took compensation in proceedings under Section 240-G of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act and Jagannath Das became sirdar of the land in suit. During the consolidation operations, he was declared as sirdar and therefore the suit is barred by Sections 27 and 49 of U.P.C.H Act. Jagannath Das had therefore right and title to execute the sale deed in favour of the defendants. The suit was barred by limitation as plaintiff was not in possession within 12 years; The defendants were bona fide purchaser for value. On these findings the suit was dismissed on 30.4.1974
4. In the appeal preferred by the plaintiff the learned IInd Addl. District Judge recorded the following findings: The suit was maintainable on behalf of the deity Sri Thakurji Maharaj by Sant Ram Das. Dheeram Das did not acquire any adhivasi rights. Jagannath Das was not the Chela of Dheeram Das and his name had been fictitiously recorded in the revenue records, nor he was in possession over the land in suit. In proceedings under Section 240G of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act, a compromise was arrived at wherein it was agreed that Jagannath Das will act as Mahant and look after and manage the affairs of the temple including cultivation of the entire land but would have no right to sell or mortgage the same in the compromise Jagannath Das had given up his rights and title, if any, over the land in suit. Ganga Nandan had not received compensation. Jagannath Das had accepted to become Mahant of the temple. No compensation statement was prepared nor was it finalised as provided under Section 240-K of U.P.Z.A and LR. Act and therefore Jagannath Das was never declared as sirdar or adhivasi and consequently he had no right to acquire bhumidhari sanad or to become bhumidhar of the land in suit. Since Jagannath Das got the property as Mahant of the temple, he could not claim any adverse interest to the same. He had therefore no right or title to execute sale deed in favour of the defendants. The suit was not barred under Sections 27 or 49 of U.P.C.H Act. The land in suit is inalienable trust property and was not the private property of Jagannath Das. The suit was not barred by limitation. The defendants were not bona fide purchaser for value and cannot claim any benefit under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. On these findings, the appeal was allowed, the judgment and decree of the trial court was set aside and the suit was decreed for cancellation of the sale deed dated 27.5.1969 executed by Baba Jagannath Das in favour of the defendants and also for possession of the plaintiff after ejectment of the defendants.
5. I have heard Sri Subodh Kumar for the defendant-appellants, Sri G.N Verma for the plaintiff-respondent and have gone through the record. Before dealing with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, it will be convenient to first refer to the proceedings under Chapter IX-A of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act relating to conferment of Sirdari rights on adhivasis. Both the courts below have placed great reliance on these proceedings but have deferred as to the effect of the proceedings and also extinguishment of the rights of the parties. Ganga Nandan, the erstwhile Mahant and servarakar of the plaintiff, on coming to know about the entry of the name of Jagannath Das in the Khasra, moved an application in the form of an objection before the S.D.O Nawabganj, Bareilly in proceedings under Section 240-G of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act in compensation proceedings case No. 157 of 1957. In the said case, a compromise was filed by Baba Ganga Nandan Chela Sri Brahama Nandan and Baba Jagannath Das Chela Sri Narain Das. A certified copy of the compromise which is in Hindi was filed in the trial court and was Ex. 7 on the record. The compromise deed has been reproduced in the judgment of the learned Addl. District Judge as translated into English, which reads as follows:
“It is humbly submitted that parties have compromised. Ganga Nandan will have no objection if his case is rejected and if compensation is paid to Ganga Nandan in terms of the compromise as follows:—
(1) That Baba Jagannath Das will look after and manage the cultivation of the entire land, but would have no right to sell or mortgage it.
(2) That the entire income from cultivation shall be spent on the necessary expenses of the temple of Sri Raghunath Ji situated in Mauza Gauntia Dhamipur, Tehsil Nawabganj by Baba Jagannath Das and he shall properly look after and manage the temple in the capacity of its Mahant.
(3) That Baba Ganga Nandan the erstwhile sarvarakar of the temple would not object to the management and the Mahantship of Baba Jagannath Das who would have full control and right to manage the temple affairs.
(4) That the expenses of food and clothes of Sri Ganga Nandan would be the responsibility of Baba Jagannath Das and it would be his duty to see that in his old age Baba Ganga Nandan is not put to any trouble and is properly looked after during his sickness etc.
(5) That the public of Mauze Gauntia Dhamipur have the right to lawfully remove the Mahant and Sarvarakar in case of any mismanagement of the temple etc. by them.
6. The compromise shows in unequivocal terms that Baba Jagannath Das had agreed to look after the temple of Sri Ragunath Ji (plaintiff) in the capacity of its Mahant and to spend the entire income from cultivation on the temple itself. Baba Ganga Nandan has relinquished his rights as servarakar of the temple and Baba Jagannath Das was given the right to act its Mahant. He was given the right to look after and manage the cultivation of the entire land but no right to sell or mortgage was conferred upon him and he was specifically precluded from doing so. The public of the Village had been given further right to lawfully remove the Mahant and sarvarakar of the temple (plaintiff) in case of mismanagement. In view of this compromise, it is not at all open to the of defendant-appellant to contend that Jagannath Das had acquire any independent right by virtue of adverse possession or that he was adhivasi or sirdar of the land in suit and consequently he could not become bhumidhar so as to execute a sale deed of the disputed property. The possession of Baba Jagannath Das was merely in his capacity as Mahant of the temple as he was given right to look after and manage the property and his possession, if any, was not at all in a private or personal capacity. The possession over the land in suit was that of the deity namely Sri Thakurji Maharaj.
7. Regarding the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that Jagannath Das acquired adhivasi or sirdari rights in view of Section 240-A of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act and that the right, title and interest of the land holder namely the plaintiff ceased or extinguished, it may be noticed that the lower appellate court has recorded a finding that there is no evidence on record to show that compensation was paid to Ganga Nandan in accordance with Section 240-G of the Act. There is no evidence on record to show that the requirement of Section 240-J of the Act was complied with or that Form No. 101 in accordance with Rule 193(b) of U.P.Z.A and L.R Rules was ever prepared. Similarly, there is no evidence that compensation roll having been prepared was signed and sealed. It has been held by a Full Bench in Awadesh Singh v. Bikarma Ahir . AIR 1975 Alld. 324, that the right of the land holders are extinguished in compensation proceedings only upon preparation of compensation assessment roll and signing and sealing of the same. The question whether compensation assessment roll was prepared or not or whether compensation was paid to the land holder is a pure question of fact. The lower appellate court has recorded finding of fact that there is no evidence oh record to show that any compensation was paid to Ganga Nandan. In this view of the matter, it cannot be held that the right of ???he land holder extinguished or that ???agannath Das became adhivasi or sirdar ???f the land in suit. In this connection, it nay also be noticed that Ganga Nandan lad never claimed himself to be the land ???older but was merely acting as Mahant without claiming any independent right ???ver the property. There is no evidence on ???ecord to indicate that the name of the ???laintiff namely Sri Thakurji Maharaj who was the real land holder in view of he waqf deed executed by Thakur Jodha ???ingh in its favour on 24.10.1934 was ever ???ecorded in any compensation roll ???repared in accordance with Section 240-D ???f the Act or that any compensation was ???aid to it in accordance with Section 240-E f U.P.Z.A and L.R Act. Therefore in so ???r as the objection filed by Ganga Nandan ??? concerned its decision could not effect or ???xtinguish the rights of the plaintiff. ???owever Jagannath Das is bound by the ???dmission made by him in the compromise ???hich was filed by him.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant ???owever submitted that Jagannath Das ever entered into any compromise nor any ???ch compromise was filed by him. In my ???inion, it is not open to the appellants to ???ise such a contention at this stage. In the ???cond appeal, no such ground has been taken. On the contrary, grounds No. 4, 5, 7 and 8 show that existence of the compromise in proceedings under Section 240-G of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act is admitted but the effect of the order passed therein or the interpretation placed upon the compromise by the lower appellate court is challenged. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court have also placed great reliance upon the compromise which was arrived at in proceedings under Section 240-G U.P.Z.A and L.R Act but they have only deferred on the legal effect of the orders passed in these proceedings. The judgment of the two courts below do not show that it was ever contended on behalf of the appellants before them that Jagannath Das never entered into any compromise or no such compromise was filed. Thus the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that Jagannath Das never entered into any compromise or that no such compromise was filed cannot at all be accepted.
9. The appellants have moved an application on 11.1.1979 under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C praying that three certificates filed along with the application be admitted as additional evidence. On 26.2.1980 an order was passed that the application may be considered at the time of hearing of the appeal. The certificates show that Ganga Nandan was paid Rs. 129/- on 10.2.1958, Rs. 387/- on 14.8.1957 and Rs. 258/- on 2.2.1960 from Sub Treasury, Nawabganj under Adhivasi Scheme. In my opinion, the conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (aa) and (b) of sub-rule (1) of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C are not at all satisfied. Therefore the certificates filed along with the application cannot be admitted as additional evidence. The certificates show that they have been issued by Sub Treasury Officer, Nawabganj on 25.11.1978 If a Government Department can issue certificates in November, 1978 there was no difficulty for the defendants to have obtained the same and filed them when the suit was pending in the trial court or even before the lower appellate court. The certificates are not required by this Court for enabling it to pronounce judgment in the second appeal. The application dated 11.1.1979 is, therefore, rejected. That apart the certificates do not show that the compensation amount was paid to Ganga Nandan with regard to the land which is subject matter of dispute in the present case as they are conspicuously silent about the same. They merely mention that certain amount was paid under the head “Adhivasi Scheme”. Even the name of the Village where the land regarding which amount was paid is not mentioned. Thus the certificates cannot at all be connected with the land which is subject matter of dispute in this case. Another important aspect of the matter is that as already noticed, the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj was the land holder and not Ganga Nandan and therefore even assuming that any amount was paid to Ganga Nandan by way of compensation, it can have no bearing on the title of the plaintiff.
10. Shri Subodh Kumar has strenuously urged that in consolidation proceedings, no objection was filed by the plaintiff and in C.H Form No. 45 which is a final khatauni the name of Jagannath Das was recorded as sirdar and therefore in view of Section 49 U.P.C.H Act the Civil Court was debarred from going into the question of rights and title of parties. It is urged that the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj should have filed an objection in accordance with the provisions of U.P.C.H Act and it having not done so, the present suit which requires declaration and adjudication of its right cannot be entertained by the civil court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Smt. Dularia Devi v. Janardan Singh, wherein it was held that suit to set aside the sale deed instituted at time when consolidation proceedings were pending was barred by Section 49 of U.P.C.H Act. The authority cited by the learned counsel is clearly distinguishable as the suit therein had been filed during the pendency of the consolidation proceedings. Such is not the case here. For considering the submission made by the learned counsel, it is necessary to examine the character and position of dedicated or temple property. In the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust by B.K Mukherjee, it has been stated in Article 5.14 as under:
“…It is in an ideal sense that the dedicated idol property vests in an idol, and in the nature of things the possession and management of it must be entrusted to some person as Shebait or manager…the person so entrusted must, of necessity, be empowered to do whatever may be required for the service of the idol and for the benefit and preservation of its property, at least to as great as the manager of an infant heir. If this were not so, the estate of the idol might be destroyed or wasted, and its worship discontinued for want of necessary funds to preserve and maintain them. This human ministrant of the deity, who is its manager and legal representative, is known as Shebait………. He is a person entitled to speak on behalf of the deity on earth and is endowed with authority to deal with all its temporal affairs. As regards the temple property, the manager is in the position of trustee, but as regards the service of the temple and the duties that appertain to it he is rather in the position of the holder of an office of dignity.”
11. In Article 6.29 it has been stated as under:
“(1) An idol is a juristic person in whom the title to the properties of the endowment vests; but it is only in an ideal sense that the idol is the owner. It has to act through human agency and that agent is the Shebait, who is, in law, the person entitled to take proceedings on its behalf. The personality of the idol might, therefore, in one sense, be said to be merged in that of the Shebait.
(2) Where, however, the Shebait refuses to act for the idol, or where the suit is to challenge the act of the Shebait himself as prejudicial to the interests of the idol, then there must be some other agency which must have the right to act for the idol. In such cases, the law accordingly recognises a right in persons interested in the endowment to take proceedings on behalf of the idol.”
12. In Article 6.97 it has been stated as under:—
“……A Shebait who has accepted the office of a Shebait or acknowledged himself as such, is incapable of asserting any hostile title against the idol or setting up jus terii in others. This disability is, in law, implicit in any person who holds a fiduciary position in relation to another. Furthermore, unlike a human beneficiary, an idol cannot act except through a natural person, and normally, the personality of the idol is bound up with that of the Shebait. As was pointed out by Rankin, C.J, in Surendra Krishna Ray v. Shre Shree Ishwari Bhubaneshwari Thakurani, if after a Shebait has accepted the trust, there is a change in an intention with which he holds the deity's properties, and he applies the rents and profits of the property to his own purposes, the idol's title cannot be affected thereby. Any change of intention on the part of the Shebait can be brought home to the idol by means of the Shebait only, and the idol can react to it through the Shebait. Adverse possession in such circumstances is a notion wholly devoid of content….”
13. It is obvious that the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj could file objection in consolidation proceedings only through its Mahant or Shebait and if Jagannath Das who had become Mahant in the year 1957 did not file any objection on account of any oblique motive and for usurping the property, it cannot be said that the bar created by Section 49 of U.P.C.H Act will come into play. This is squarely covered by the dictum of the Supreme Court in Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed, wherein it has been held that suit by a co-sharer to challenge the deletion of her name in joint khewat in consolidation proceedings on the ground of fraud of co-sharers in possession was not barred under Section 49 of U.P.C.H Act. Similar view has been taken by our court in Smt. Prabhawati v. Kashi . 1983 RD 196. with regard to minor and in Mohd. Ahmad. v. Allah Rabbul Alewin . 1984 RD 321. with regard to waqf property where a mutawalli got his own name recorded. Thus I am clearly of the opinion that the bar created under Section 49 of U.P.C.H Act would not operate and the suit instituted by the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj is maintainable.
14. Learned counsel next urged that the relief claimed in the suit, in effect, amounts to declaration of plaintiff's title and according to the plaintiff's case the sale deed in favour of the defendants is void and in such circumstances, the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred under Section 331 U.P.Z.A and L.R Act and the revenue court alone had the jurisdiction to try the suit. In support of this submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on Chandrika Misra, Indra Pal v. Jagannath and a full bench decision in Ram Padarath v. IInd Addl. District Judge. In my opinion, it is not necessary to refer to the various authorities cited at the bar as the controversy has been concluded by a decision of Supreme Court in Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad . 1989 ALJ 1335., where the Apex Court approved the decision of this Court in Indra Dev v. Ram Pyari . 1982 LJ 1308., wherein it was held that the cause of action for cancellation of sale deed is not denial of plaintiff's title which may be said to be implicit in the execution of the sale deed by the defendant but the execution of the deed itself. The Apex Court held that where the party in her suit prima facie proceeded on the premise that she could not ignore the sales but that the sales require to be set aside before she is entitled to possession and other consequential reliefs, the suit would not be barred by Section 331 and the Civil Court would have jurisdiction to entertain it. That apart this ground has been taken for the first time in the second appeal and in view of Section 331(1-A), of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act unless the appellants show failure of justice, this ground cannot be entertained here. Learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to point out anything to show that on account of the suit being tried by the civil court, there has been a failure of justice. Thus the submission made by the learned counsel has no substance.
15. It is next submitted by the appellants that the compromise in proceedings under Section 240-G of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act was entered into and the orders in the said proceedings were passed in 1957 whereby the name of Jagannath Das was recorded in the revenue records but the suit was filed on 25.2.1971 and as such the same was barred by limitation. It is urged that the period of limitation for filing a suit for possession after ejectment of a trespasser under Section 209 of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act, at the relevant 1 time, was 12 years and as no such suit was filed, Jagannath Das perfected his title by adverse possession and the title of the plaintiff was extinguished. In my opinion, the contention raised is wholly misconceived. The question of filing a suit by the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj for ejectment of Jagannath Das did not at all arise as he was acting in the capacity of a Mahant of the plaintiff and in law governing the relationship of a Mahant or servarakar of the deity, there is no question of the former pleading any adverse title. The possession of Jagannath Das was on behalf of the deity Sri Thakurji. The present is a suit for cancellation of sale deed which was executed on 27.5.1969 and the suit having been filed in Feb. 1971, it is well within limitation.
16. Another contention based on Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act has equally no substance. In order to get the benefit of the aforesaid provision, the defendant appellant must show that their transferor namely Jagannath Das was the ostensible owner by the express or implied consent of the real owner namely Sri Thakurji. Neither such a case has been pleaded by the defendants nor there is any evidence on record to substantiate such a plea. In fact there was no question of deity giving such express or implied consent. Thus the defendants are not at all entitled to get benefit of Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act.
17. In the end, the learned counsel for the appellant also urged that Jagannath Das applied for being granted bhumidhari sanad on 27.5.1969 by depositing ten times of the land revenue in order to execute a sale-deed and an objection was filed by Baba Sant Das under Section 137-A of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act for cancellation of the bhumidhari sanad. This objection was rejected by the Tehsildar Nawabganj, Bareilly and the appeal preferred by Baba Sant Ram Das against the said order was abated by the Addl. Commissioner on 27.11.1971 on account of non substitution of the heir of Jagannath Das who has died on 8.1.1971 It is thus urged that the challenge to the grant of bhumidhari sanad to Jagannath Das having failed his right to execute sale-deed in favour of the defendants cannot be assailed now. The argument raised has hardly any merit. Firstly the proceedings for grant or cancellation of bhumidhari sanad are in the nature of summary proceedings which can have no bearing on a regular suit. Secondly the objection to the grant of bhumidhari sanad to Jagannath Das were not filed by Sri Thakurji Maharaj, the present plaintiff and the real owner of the property nor Sri Thakurji Maharaj was a party to the aforesaid proceedings. Thus any order passed in proceedings under Sections 134/137/137-A of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act can have no bearing in so far as the present suit for cancellation of sale-deed is concerned. The appellant have filed one more application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C on 27.1.1995 for bringing on record a questionnaire which shows that the file of case No. 137-A of 1957, Ganga Nandan v. Jagannath Das under Section 240-G of U.P.Z.A & L.R Act has been weeded out on 10.4.1975 This has been filed to show that the certified copy of the order passed by Tehsildar on 21.12.1957 which has been filed in this court could not have been obtained as the copy of the same purports to have been issued on 6.7.1984 I am of the opinion that no ground has been made out to admit any additional evidence at this stage. That apart the questionnaire merely shows that the file has been weeded out. It does not show that the final order passed by the Tehsildar has also been weeded out. Whenever any file is weeded out, the order passed in the case is retained and other document like pleadings evidence etc. only are weeded out. Secondly the copy of the order dated 21.12.1957 had been filed before the trial court as Ex. 7 and has been extensively referred to by both the trial court and the lower appellate court. Even accepting the date of weeding out mentioned in the questionnaire as correct, the same is after the suit had been decided by the trial court. Thus the questionnaire has absolutely no bearing. Before parting with the case, it may be observed that the finding of the lower appellate court is that the land in suit was owned by Thakur Jodha Singh and in view of the waqf deed executed by him, there could not be any sale of property. Jagannath Das could get the property only either by inheritance or by prescription or by loss of right by the deity. The case of the defendants is that Dheeram Das who was “Guru Dada” became adhivasi and Jagannath Das in his capacity as grand Chela inherited it. If he inherited the property as “Chela” it is obvious that it was a dedicated property of the deity Sri Thakurji Maharaj and Section 171 of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act can have no application. Thus, Jagannath Das could not inherit the property in his own right.
18. No other point was urged. The appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with cost. It is needless to clarify that it is the plaintiff Sri Thakurji Maharaj who would be the owner of the land in suit and not Baba Sant Ram Das through whom the said suit was filed or the present servarakar or pujari of the deity Sri Om Prakash who has been substituted after the death of Baba Sant Ram Das or anyone else who may act as servarakar or pujari of the deity in future.
19. Appeal Dismissed.
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