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Munni Lal v. Prescribed Authority, Agra And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (G.P. Mathur, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The tenant-petitioner (Munni Lal) filed a writ petition seeking quashing of the proceedings in P.A. Case No. 25 of 1983, Hari Bhagwan v. Munni Lal, pending before the Prescribed Authority at Agra.
The petitioner occupies part of residential house No. 9/201, Moti Katra, Agra, owned by Hari Bhagwan Bansal. On July 6, 1983 the landlord filed a release application under section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (the Act) claiming bona fide requirement of the premises; this was registered as P.A. Case No. 25 of 1983 and remained pending before the Prescribed Authority.
Subsequently, on September 9, 1991 the landlord filed another release application under Section 16(1)(b) read with Section 12 of the Act before the Rent Control & Eviction Officer. In that application the landlord asserted that the tenant had closed his business, removed all goods so the premises were lying vacant, and that the tenant had acquired another residential building No. 9/885, Gali Koliha, in a vacant state.
The petitioner contended that the allegations in the Section 16(1)(b) application made the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) non-maintainable and that both proceedings could not proceed simultaneously; he sought quashing of the Section 21(1)(a) proceedings before the Prescribed Authority.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act and proceedings under Section 16(1)(b) (read with Section 12) of the Act can be initiated or continued simultaneously against the same tenant.
- Whether the filing of an application under Section 16(1)(b) (alleging vacancy or deemed vacancy under Section 12) renders proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) non-maintainable.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner argued that because the landlord had alleged in the Section 16(1)(b) application that the premises were vacant (or deemed vacant) the earlier proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) had ceased to be maintainable.
- The petitioner contended that both proceedings could not run simultaneously and therefore sought quashing of the Section 21(1)(a) proceedings before the Prescribed Authority.
Landlord's Contentions (as reflected in the filings)
- By the July 6, 1983 application under Section 21(1)(a) the landlord asserted a bona fide requirement of the premises for personal use.
- By the September 9, 1991 application under Section 16(1)(b) read with Section 12 the landlord asserted that the tenant had closed his business and removed goods so the premises were vacant, and that the tenant had acquired another residential building in a vacant state—facts relied upon to treat the building as vacant or deemed to be vacant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Syed Majhar Mustafa Jafri v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer | That a landlord who has filed a suit for eviction can nevertheless participate in an inquiry under Section 12 to determine whether a building should be deemed vacant. | The court relied on this holding to support the conclusion that there is no legal impediment to a landlord initiating or continuing simultaneous proceedings under Section 21 and Section 16(1)(b) of the Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the statutory scheme of the Act and related provisions of the Transfer of Property Act (Section 106 as amended in U.P.) and proceeded step-by-step:
- The court noted that leases of immovable property are governed by Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act and described the basic rules about lease duration and notice (Section 106), then stated that after determination of a lease a lessor is ordinarily entitled to recover possession.
- It explained that the U.P. Urban Buildings Act imposes restrictions on a landlord's right to recover possession of buildings covered by the Act, and pointed to the Act's preamble emphasizing public interest and shortage of accommodation.
-
The court identified three separate statutory mechanisms under the Act by which a landlord can seek possession:
- Suit for eviction in the Court of Judge, Small Causes under sub-section (2) of Section 20 (grounds in clauses (a) to (g));
- Application to the Prescribed Authority under Section 21(1) (clauses (a) and (b) — bona fide requirement or dilapidation/reconstruction);
- Proceedings under Section 16(1)(b) (District Magistrate) applicable only where the building is vacant or deemed vacant under Section 12(4).
-
The court analyzed the substantive differences between the causes of action under these provisions:
- Section 20 suits are limited to specific offending acts by the tenant (clauses (a)–(g) of sub-section (2)).
- Section 21 applications require the landlord to prove a bona fide personal requirement or that the building is dilapidated and needs demolition and reconstruction; the authority must consider likely hardship to tenant vs. landlord (except as per relevant Explanation).
- Section 16(1)(b) proceedings presuppose actual vacancy or a legal fiction of vacancy created by Section 12(4); Section 12 lists acts (e.g., removal of effects, acquisition of another residential building in vacant state, admission of a non-family partner) that give rise to deemed vacancy.
- The court emphasized that the facts to be alleged and proved under Section 16(1)(b) (reliance on the legal fiction of Section 12(4)) are different from the facts under Section 21(1) (where tenant is in occupation and landlord admits that fact). Because the causes of action and factual matrices differ, there is no inter se conflict preventing simultaneous proceedings.
- The court further explained that Section 16 proceedings can be initiated by any aspirant or by the District Magistrate when deemed vacancy arises automatically by operation of law; even landlord consent cannot prevent the deemed vacancy once events triggering Section 12 occur.
- Finally, the court observed there is no provision in the Act prohibiting a landlord from filing both a Section 21(1) application before the Prescribed Authority and a Section 16(1)(b) application before the District Magistrate. The earlier-cited precedent (Syed Majhar Mustafa Jafri) supports the proposition that such concurrent steps are legally permissible.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The court dismissed the writ petition summarily as lacking merit. The direct consequence is that the petitioner's request to quash the Section 21(1)(a) proceedings was refused and those proceedings may continue; the decision affirms that a landlord may initiate or continue simultaneous proceedings under Section 21 and under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act where the statutory conditions for each are asserted.
The opinion applies the statutory scheme and an earlier precedent to reach its conclusion; it does not purport to set aside or overrule existing law beyond that analysis. No specific broader precedent beyond the cited authority was declared by the court in this opinion.
G.P Mathur, J.:— The tenant-petitioner has filed this petition for quashing of the proceedings of P.A Case No. 25 of 1983, Hari Bhagwan v. Mmni Lal pending before the Prescribed Authority, Agra.
2. The petitioner is in occupation of a portion of a residential house No. 9/201, Moti Katra, Agra of which Hari Bhagwan Ban sal is the owner-landlord. A release application under section 21(1)(a) of U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was filed by the landlord on July 6, 1983, for release of the premises in occupation of the petitioner on the ground that the same were bona fide required for his personal use. This application was registered as P.A Case No. 25 of 1983 and is pending before the Prescribed Authority, Agra. Subsequently on September 9, 1991, the landlord filed a release application under Section 16(1)(b) read with Section 12 of the Act against the petitioner Munni Lal before the Rent Control & Eviction Officer for release of the premises in his favour on the ground that the petitioner had closed his business and had removed all his goods from the premises and the same were lying vacant. It was also asserted that the petitioner had acquired another residential building No. 9/885, Gali Koliha in vacant State. The contention of the petitioner is that in view of the allegations made by the landlord in the release application filed by him under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act have ceased to be maintainable and both the proceedings cannot simultaneously go on. The petitioner has thus sought quashing of the proceedings of the case under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, before the Prescribed Authority.
3. Leases of immovable property are governed by Chapter V of Transfer of Property Act and Section 106 of the said Act (As amended in U.P) provides that in absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by six months notice and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by one month's notice. After determination of lease, a lessor is entitled to recover possession of the property from the lessee. However, with regard to those buildings to which the Act is applicable, a restriction is imposed upon the right of the landlord to recover possession of the building from the tenant who is in occupation thereof. If a person is in occupation of a building which is covered by the provisions of the Act the landlord cannot evict him even after determination of his tenancy at his sweet will. The Act has been enacted in the interest of the general public as there is extreme shortage of accommodations in the cities which will be evident from its preamble which reads as follows:
“The Act to provide in the interest of the general public for the regulation of letting and rent of, and the eviction of tenants, certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas, and for matters connected therewith.”
4. There are three provisions in the Act under which a landlord can recover possession of his building which is in occupation of a tenant. Sub-section (2) of Section 20 provides that a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to (g). This suit has to be instituted in the Court of judge, Small Causes. Section 21 of the Act provides that the Prescribed Authority may on an application of the landlord order eviction of a tenant from a building under his tenancy on the grounds enumerated in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) thereof. Clause (a) provides that the building will be released on the bona fide requirement of the landlord and clause (b) provides that the building will be released if it is in dilapidated condition and is required for purpose of demolition and new construction. An application under Section 21 of Act has to be moved before the Prescribed Authority. Section 16(1)(b) provides that the District Magistrate may release the whole or any part of a building in favour of the landlord. However, this power can be exercised by the District Magistrate only with regard to those buildings which are either vacant or are deemed to be vacant under Section 12(4) of the Act. The Scheme of the Act, therefore, contemplates three different kind of proceedings which may be taken by the landlord for recovery of possession of the building which is covered by the provisions of the Act and the proceedings have to be taken before three different authorities. There is no inter se conflict between the nature of the proceedings which may be initiated under the aforesaid provisions of the Act.
5. Section 20 of the Act imposes a bar upon the right of a landlord to institute a suit for eviction of a tenant from a building except on one or more of the grounds enumerated in sub-Section (2) thereof. Unless the tenant commits one or more of the offending acts enumerated in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (2) the suit cannot be instituted. Therefore the landlord will get a right to institute a suit only if a tenant does one of the offending acts. However, if the landlord bona fide requires the building for occupation of himself or any member of his family or for any person for whose benefit it is held by him or if the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purpose of demolition and new construction the Act gives a right to him to file an application for release of the premises under Section 21 of the Act. In these circumstances the landlord has to satisfy the authority that his need is bona fide and while ordering eviction of the tenant from the building the authority has also to take into consideration, except in the cases covered by the Explanation, the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. While considering an application covered by clause (b) the landlord has to satisfy the authority that the building is in dilapidated condition and is required for demolition and new construction. As noticed earlier an application under Section 16(1)(b) is maintainable only if the building is actually vacant which means that there is no tenant in occupation thereof or is deemed to be vacant under Section 12(4) of the Act. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 12 create a legal fiction and a building is deemed to be vacant if the conditions enumerated therein are satisfied. If a tenant removes his effects or allows it to be occupied by a person who is not a member of his family or in case of a residential building he as well as members of his family take up residence else-where the building is deemed to be vacant. Again if in the case of a residential building a tenant or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state a residential building in the same city the building under his tenancy is deemed to be vacant except when it is covered by the proviso to sub-section (3) of the Act. A non-residential building is deemed to be vacant when a tenant, carrying on business therein, admits a person, who is not a member of his family, as a partner. These provisions show that the building would be deemed to be vacant only if he does one of the offending acts enumerated in sub-section (1) to (3) thereof.
6. A close scrutiny of the provisions of the Act would show that the causes of action for initiating proceedings under Section 16(1)(b) or under Section 21(1) or for instituting a suit for eviction of a tenant are entirely different. In proceedings under Section 21(1) the tenant asserts that he is in occupation of the building and the landlord also admits the said fact. In proceedings under Section 16(1)(b) though the tenant says that he is continuing in occupation of the building and is in lawful occupation thereof the landlord asserts that on account of one of the acts enumerated in sub-sections (1), (2) or (3) of Section 12 of the Act, done by the tenant he shall be deemed to have vacated the building within the meaning of sub-section (4) thereof. Thus in such a proceeding the landlord seeks to rely upon the legal fiction created by sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, there can be no conflict in the facts which have to be alleged and proved by a landlord for getting an order in his favour while initiating proceedings under Section 16(1)(b) for under Section 21(1) of the Act.
7. It may also be mentioned here that while proceedings for release under Section 21(1) of the Act can be initiated only by the landlord the proceedings under Section 16 can be initiated by any person who is an aspirant of the building being allotted to him or the District Magistrate himself. If a tenant does anyone of the offending acts enumerated in sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 12 of the Act the building shall be deemed in law to be vacant. In such a situation any person can apply for the building being allotted to him or the District Magistrate himself gets jurisdiction to allot the same to any person. The deemed vacancy of a building occurs automatically on the happening of certain events without any action being initiated by the landlord. Even if a landlord gives consent to such a tenant to continue in occupation of his building it will make no difference and the deemed vacancy would occur. This situation arises by operation of law on account of certain act done by the tenant or a member of his family and not on account of any steps taken by the landlord. Even if the landlord wants to save such a tenant he cannot do so and the law would take its own course, namely, that the building would be deemed to be vacant. The District Magistrate will then get the jurisdiction to either release the building to the landlord or to allot the same to any other person.
8. In the Act also there is no prohibition to the effect that if a landlord has filed an application under Section 21(1) of Act for the release of the building before the Prescribed Authority he cannot file an application under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act before the District Magistrate. In Syed Majhar Mustafa Jafri v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer,1 I have held that if a landlord has filed a suit for eviction of a tenant on anyone of the grounds enumerated in Section 50 of the Act the landlord can also participate in an inquiry held for the purpose of determing whether the building should be deemed to be vacant under Section 12 of the Act. In view of the discussion made above I am of opinion that there is no legal impediment in the way of a landlord in initiating or continuing simultaneous proceedings under Section 21 or under Section 16(1)(b) of the Act againtst a tenant who is in occupation of his building.
9. The writ petition lacks merits and is dismissed summarily.
10. Petition dismissed.
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