Mishri Debi Agarwal v. Asstt. Collector Of Central Excise & Ors. Opposite Party.

1. This is an application for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents Nos. 1 & 2 to forbear from allowing the respondent No. 3 to obtain a clearance of consignment of tea in the manner mentiond in paragraph 17 of the petition and for an injunction restraining the said respondents from allowing the respondent No. 3 to obtain clearance of consignment of tea from Bagdogra Tea Estate and Rungneet Tea Estate.

2. The petitioner along with 3 other persons, namely, Maidhandas Agarwal (the respondent No. 3 herein), Ramanand Agarwal and Sm. Ganga Debi Agarwal carried on business in copartnership under the name and style of Bagdogra Tea Estate the partners having certain shares specified in paragraph 3 of the petition.

3. The petitioner's case is that since the inception of the partnership the AL-4 Forms and B-2 Bond required under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the purpose of obtaining clearance of tea from the garden, were signed on behalf of the said partnership by all the said partners. It is alleged that out of the funds of the said partnership, another tea garden known as Rungneet Tea Estate, was purchased by the said firm on April 25, 1963. It is also alleged that on May 14, 1965, the said Sm. Ganga Debi Agarwal addressed a letter, through her solicitor, to the petitioner and the other partners expressing her intention to dissolve the said partnership, with effect from May 20, 1965. A copy of this letter was forwarded to the respondent No. 1, who by his letter dated May 29, 1965, to all the partners of the said firm, after informing the said partners that he had received the solicitor's notice about the dissolution of the firm, called upon the partners to execute all documents for clearance of tea from the said two tea estates. This letter was followed by another letter dated June 1, 1965, whereby the respondent No. 1, informed the said four partners, that he had received a notice of dissolution from the solicitor of Sm. Ganga Debi Agarwal, and called upon the said partners to apply afresh for amendment of AL-4 Licences for the tea estates under the joint signatures of the partners or their authorised representatives. The said partners were further informed that upon receipt of AL-4 applications signed by the partners jointly the respondent No. 1 would inform the said partners about the date and time for execution of the B-2 Bonds for the said tea estates jointly by all the partners or by their authorised representatives. In the last paragraph of the letter the respondent No. 1 requested the partners to inform him about the interest of the partners in the said two tea estates. This letter was not answered by any of the partners.

4. The petitioner's grievance is that although the respondent No. 1 by the said two letters dated May 29, 1965, and June 1, 1965, called upon the said partners to execute the documents and the bond jointly, he wrongfully and illegally failed and neglected to take steps for enforcement of the directions contained in the said two letters. The petitioner's further grievance is that the respondent No. 1 had allowed Maidhandas Agarwal, the respondent No. 3, to obtain clearance of tea from the said tea estates on the basis of documents executed by him alone, purporting to act as the sole proprietor of the said tea estates. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. A.K Sen contended that licence for clearance of tea had been granted to the respondent No. 3, by the respondent No. 1, in violation of the rules of natural justice. He argued that the licence was previously granted on the basis of documents executed by all the four partners, and that although the respondent No. 1 was given, notice of dissolution of the partnership firm, and although the respondent No. 1 by the two letters hereinbefore mentioned called upon the four partners to execute the documents for clearance of tea, yet the respondent No. 1 granted licence to the respondent No. 3 without giving an opportunity being heard to the petitioner.

5. It was next argued that licence granted by the respondent No. 1 for clearance of tea was a species of property, and the respondent No. 1 could not deprive the petitioner of this property without giving her an opportunity of being heard. The respondent No. 1, Mr. Sen argued, was aware of the fact that the partnership had been dissolved, and had on the basis of the notice of dissolution on behalf of Sm. Ganga Debi Agarwal, called upon all the partners to execute the documents. But this direction was not implemented, and on the contrary the licence for the period from September 25, 1965, up to December 31, 1965, and again for the period from February 2, 1966, up to December 31, 1966, were issued by the respondent No. 1 in favour of the respondent No. 3, behind the back of the petitioner and the other partners, and without giving them an opportunity of being heard to which, they were undoubtedly entitled. This was the only point canvassed before me in this application by Mr. Sen. He argued that his client's right to property had been invaded by the issue of the licence for clearance of tea in favour of the respondent No. 3. The petitioner admittedly was a partner of the said partneship firm and therefore, Mr. Sen argued, the clearance of tea from the said gardens could be made only on the basis of licence to be issued on the basis of application by all the partners of the firm, although this partnership was taken to have been dissolved by the said notice of dissolution. An opportunity of being heard, Mr. Sen argued, could not be denied to the petitioner merely because the partnership was dissolved.

6. In support of his contentions Mr. Sen relied upon Rules 174, 178 (1), 178 (2), 178 (3), 178 (5) and 181 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.

7. Appearing for the respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 Mr. Amiya Mukherjee argued that there was no question of an opportunity of being heard being given to the petitioner. He relied upon the two letters addressed by the respondent No. 1 to the partners of the firm, namely, the letters dated May 29, 1965, and June 1, 1965, and sumbitted that his client had called upon the partners of the firm including the petitioners to disclose their interest in the said two tea estates. The petitioner did not comply with the request of the respondent No. 1 and did not even care to answer either of the said two letters. If the petitioner's grievance was that the licence ought not to have been granted to the respondent No. 3, she should have asked the respondent No. 1 not to issue the licence to the respondent No. 3 and should have applied for a licence herself, or at any rate called upon the respondent No. 1 not to issue the licence to any one of the partners. This the petitioner failed to do and yet, Mr. Mukherjee argued, she now complained about the violation of the rules of natural justice in granting a licence to the respondent No. 3. An opportunity of making representations and of being heard, Mr. Mukherjee argued, was clearly granted to the petitioners by the two letters mentioned above.

8. Mr. Mukherjee next submitted that the licence with regard to which the petitioner now asked for writs under article 226 of the Constitution expired on December 31, 1966, He argued that there was no valid licence in favour of the respondent No. 3 under which the latter could make any clearance of tea at present from the said tea estates. In the case of both the said tea estates the licence expired on December 31, 1966. A provisional licence was issued in favour of the respondent No. 3 under Order of Court dated January 5, 1967, up to January 31, 1967. The licence issued by the respondent No. 1 in favour of the respondent No. 3 had, Mr. Mukherjee argued, expired long ago and therefore the petitioner was not in any event entitled to any relief in this petition. The petitioner, Mr. Mukherjee argued, had not made out a case for relief with regard to licence to be issued in future. In support of this contention, Mr. Mukherjee relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (1) K.N Guruswamy v. 1. State Of Mysore., AIR 1954 SC 592. In that case the question of a licence for sale of liquor was involved. An auction was held for grant of a liquor licence and the appellant who was the highest bidder obtained the contract. One of the respondents, however, did not make any bid, but went to the Excise Commissioner behind the appellant's back and made a higher offer, and thereupon this higher officer was accepted and the auction of the licence was cancelled. The appellant thereupon applied for a writ of mandamus and other reliefs. It was held that the appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus as he had obtained no right to a licence by the mere fact that he was the highest bidder at the auction sale. It was further held that the action of the authorities in giving the contract to the unsuccessful respondent was wrong as it ran counter to the policy of the legislature, which was, that matters of such consequence could not be dealt with arbitrarily and in the secrecy of the office. But it was also held that although ordinarily the appellant would have obtained the writ he applied for, as there was only a fortnight left for the contract to run out, the writ would be ineffective and it was not the practice to issue meaningless writs, end the appeal was accordingly dismissed.

9. Mr. Mukherjee next relied upon a Bench decision of this Court re-ported in (2) Sk. Md. Soleman v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1965 Cal. 312. In that case the question of a licence for an eating house was raised. The period for which the application was made, namely, 1962-63, had expired at the time when the application was heard and although a fresh application for 1963-64 had been made, this latter application was not the subject-matter of the writ petition. It was held that it was not possible to issue writs for the licence for the expired period 1962-63 as that would really be meaningless and worthless. Relying upon these two decisions Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the petitioner's grievance was that she was not heard with regard to the licence issued in favour of the respondent, but as this licence had already expired, no writ should be issued to give her any relief in this application. In my opinion, there is good deal of force in this contention of Mr. Mukherjee. I shall, however, revert to this question later in this judgment.

10. Mr. R. Chaudhuri, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3, also contended that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief with regard to the licence which expired on December 31, 1966. He, however, further argued that no relief was in fact asked for with regard to the licence issued. He referred to the prayers in the petition and submitted that prayer (a) was confined to the execution of the B-2 Bond and the applications in Form AL-4, prayer (b) was for a writ of mandamus recalling, cancelling or withdrawing the B-2 Bond and the AL-4 application and the L-4 licence issued to the respondent No. 3; prayer (c) was confined to clearance of consignment of tea and prayer (e) was for an injunction restraining the respondents to obtain clearance of any consignment of tea. Referring to these prayers Mr. Chaudhuri submitted that the main grievance of the petitioner appeared to be with regard to the clearance of tea and the B-2 Bonds and the AL-4 applications. There was nothing, Mr. Chaudhuri argued, in the prayers in the petition to show that any challenge was made to the issue of the licence to the respondent No. 3. Mr. Chaudhuri, therefore, argued that in any event the petitioner was not entitled to agitate the question of violation of rules of natural justice in issuing the licence to the respondent No. 3 without giving her an opportunity of being heard. It seems to me, however, that Mr. Chaudhuri was not right in contending that there was no challenge to the licence issued in favour of the respondent No. 3, as in prayer (b) there is a reference to the L-4 licence issued to the respondent No. 3, although the main relief asked for was regarding the clearance of tea from the tea gardens. It cannot be said that the petitioner had not asked for relief with regard to the licence issued.

11. In my opinion the licence issued by the respondent No. 3 in favour of the petitioner undoubtedly has expired and any relief granted to the petitioner on the ground that rules of natural justice had been violated as she was not heard in issuing the licence to the respondent No. 3, would indeed be worthless, ineffective and infructuous.

12. The question of violation of the rules of natural justice with regard to licence to be issued in future has not been raised by the petitioner, and indeed such a question cannot be raised as the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had not yet dealt with any application for a licence from the respondent No. 3 for any period subsequent to December 31, 1966.

13. Mr. Chaudhuri next contended that this application was moved and the rule nisi obtained by the petitioner by suppression of material facts. He argued that the petitioner had deliberately omitted to mention in the petition that before obtaining the rule nisi in this application the petitioner who was the plaintiff in Suit No. 1662 of 1966 (Misri Debi Agarwal v. Maidhandas Agarwal) of this Court had made an ex parte application in the said suit, for appointment of a receiver of the said two tea estates, and also for an injunction restraining the respondent No. 3, from doing anything with regard to the said two tea estates. On this ex parte application of the petitioner no order was made. The said ex parte application was moved on August 19, 1966, and having failed to obtain ex parte interim orders for appointment of a receiver and also for an order for injunction, the petitioner moved this application, Mr. Chaudhuri argued, on September 19, 1966, and obtained a rule nisi and also an interim order restraining the respondents Nos. 1 & 2 from allowing the respondent No. 3 to obtain clearance of tea from the said two tea estates. Directions were issued for service of notices of motion (in the application made in the said suit) which was made returnable on August 22, 1966, on which date a prayer for the said interim order was again made and A.N Sen, J., again refused to make any interim order. All these material facts, Mr. Chaudhuri argued, were withheld from the Court by the petitioner for the purpose of obtaining the interim order.

14. Mr. Chaudhuri next argued that the petitioner had also suppressed from this court the fact that the dispute between the said partners were referred to arbitration, that the arbitrators had made an award allowing various properties to the partners, that the award was acted upon by the partners, that on the basis of allotment of properties under the award deeds of sub-partition were executed by the parties, that the petitioner was a party to one of the deeds of sub-partition dated June 25, 1964, that the award dated April 7, 1964, was accepted by all the partners of the firm including the petitioner, who had put her signature to the award as a token of her acceptance of the same, that the award was explained to all the partenrs in Hindi by one B.L Agarwal, and that the petitioner had accepted the allotment of the properties under the award and was in possession and enjoyment of the same. Mr. Chaudhuri argued that the suppression of these material facts by the petitioner disentitled her to any relief in this petition. It was argued that relief in the writ jurisdiction of this Court, was a discretionary relief and the petitioner who was clearly guilty of suppression of vital and material facts, should not be granted any relief in this application. In support of the contention that the suppression of the material facts disentitles the petitioner to any relief, Mr. Chaudhuri relied upon a decision of this Court reported in (3) Raton Chandra Nayak v. Adhar Biswas, 56 CWN 302, in which it was held that the petitioner who made an ex parte application under article 226 was under an obligation to the Court to make the fullest possible disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge, and as that was not done, he could not obtain the advantage which he might have already obtained by means of the order which was wrongly obtained by him. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Chaudhuri on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in (4) Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhruram, AIR 1951 All 746, in which it was held that a petitioner moving an application under article 226 must not suppress any relevant facts from the Court and must refrain from making misleading statements and from giving incorrect information to the Court.

15. In my opinion, there is good deal of force in this contention of Mr. Chaudhuri. It is true that the petitioner has mentioned in paragraph 16 of the petition that the said Suit No. 1662 of 1956 had been filed by her, but there is a significant omission on her part to make any reference to the ex parte application made in that suit for interim order for appointment of a receiver and also for an injunction and that this Court had declined to make any interim orders. It was the duty of the petitioner to disclose that her application for ex parte interim orders made in that suit had not been acceded to and that a similar prayer made on the date when the notice of motion was made returnable met with the same fate. This conduct on the part of the petitioner in withholding from this Court material facts relating to her efforts to obtain interim orders with regard to reliefs which are the subject-matter of this application must be condemned in no uncertain terms. This Court must insist on full disclosure, of facts and events which have already taken place, by a petitioner who comes and asks for a rule nisi and ex parte interim orders for relief.

16. The next contention of Mr. Chaudhuri was that the dispute between the parties regarding the business was the subject-matter of arbitration proceedings. There was a written submission dated January 24, 1964, to arbitration, which was signed by several parties, and the petitioner was one of such signatories to the submission. The award was made by the arbitrators on April 7, 1964, and was accepted by all the parties to the submission, including the petitioner. This award, Mr. Chaudhuri submitted, was acted upon, and given effect to by way of family arrangement, by all the parties including the petitioner. The award was explained to the parties by one B.L Agarwal, and it was after the award was explained that the parties including the petitioner, put their signature to the same as a token of acceptance. Under the award, various properties mentioned in part (I) of the schedule were allotted to respondent number 3 and one Ram Pratap Agarwal. Various properties mentioned in part (III) of the schedule to the said award were allotted to the petitioner's husband and one Ramananda Agarwal. The allotment of the properties by the award, Mr. Chaudhuri further argued, was accepted and implemented by the respective parties. Mr. Chaudhuri next contended that one of the assets allotted to the petitioner's husband under the award was a business known as “Vartiya Steel Industries”, and after this award was made and accepted by the parties, the petitioner became a partner of this business by a deed of partnership dated June 26, 1964. It was next contended by Mr. Chaudhuri that the petitioner through her husband Sitaram Agarwal wrote a letter dated May 24, 1964, in which she disclaimed all interest in the said two tea gardens and she also admitted that she was a benamdar by her husband.

17. There was no reference in the petition, Mr. Chaudhuri argued to the arbitration proceedings or to the award, although several documents have been executed by the parties for the purpose of implementing the same, and although the petitioner herself was not only a party to the submission to the reference to arbitration but accepted the award by putting her signature thereto. The petitioner now contends that her husband fraudulently induced her to put her signature on documents, and therefore no reliance should be placed on the same, and no notice should be taken of these documents, including the award and the written submission to arbitration.

18. In my opinion there is a good deal of force in this contention. Undoubtedly there has been a reference to arbitration which was followed by an award, by which properties were allotted to the parties. This award is the subject-matter of other proceedings in in this court, and it is not necessary for me for the purpose of this application to say anything more about this award, beyond saying that arbitration proceedings did in fact take place and an award was made by the arbitrators in such proceedings. This award has been challenged by various parties and there is serious dispute between the parties with regard to validity of the same. So far as this Court is concerned notice must be taken of the proceedings that had already taken place and of the conduct of the petitioner in submitting to arbitration, in, accepting the award, in implementing the same by the various documents executed and then coming up to this Court to challenge the same on the ground that her husband induced her to put her signature to various documents and procured such signatures by false representations.

19. The next contention of Mr Chaudhuri was that there was a serious dispute regarding title to property. This dispute was the subject-matter of a suit in this court being the said suit No. 1662 of 1966. The question of title to property was also involved in the said award, which again was the subject-matter of applications challenging the validity and existence of the arbitration agreement itself and also the award. That being so, Mr. Chaudhuri argued, no relief could be granted to the petitioner in a writ petition. In support of this contention of Mr. Chaudhuri relied upon, the decision of the Supreme Court in (5) Sohanlal v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 529. In this case it was held that in a writ petition the court will not enter into the merits of disputed claims to title to property as that was a field of investigation, more appropriate for a Civil Court in a properly constituted suit rather than for a court exercising the prerogative of issuing Writs. Mr. Chaudhuri also relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in (6) Bokaro and Ramgur Limited v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 516. In that case it was held that before a party could complain of infringement of his fundamental right to hold property, he must first establish that he was entitled to that property, and if his title itself was in dispute and was the subject of adjudication in proper proceedings, he could not put forward any claim based on such title. In my opinion this contention of Mr. Chaudhuri must be upheld. Without a doubt there is a serious dispute with regard to the title to the said two tea gardens, and the petitioner's right to be heard before the licence with regard to tea gardens was issued to the respondent No. 3 depends entirely on her title to the said two tea gardens. This question of title to the properties is the subject-matter of a suit in this court and also of applications regarding the validity and existence of the arbitration agreement and also the award itself. That being so no writ can be issued to uphold the petitioner's contention that rules of natural justice had been violated as she heard before a licence was issued to the respondent No. 3.

20. The next contention of Mr. Chaudhuri was that the petitioner had an alternative remedy by a suit, and she had adopted that remedy by filing a suit in this court. In support of this contention reliance was placed by Mr. Chaudhuri on a Full Bench decision of this court reported in (7) Abanindra Kumar Maity v. A.K Majumdar, AIR 1956 Cal. 273. In that case it was held that though an alternative remedy was not an absolute bar to an application under article 226 of the Constitution, if a party had availed himself of the alternative remedy, he could not after this remedy was exhausted or after having gone a certain way in its pursuit turn round to article 226 of the Constitution and start a fresh line of proceedings under that provision. The next case relied upon by Mr. Chaudhuri in support of the same contention was also a decision of this court reported in (7a) 67 CWN 405 (Mahaluxmi Rice Mills v. Additional Commissioner of Taxes). The next case relied upon by Mr. Chaudhuri was a decision of Supreme Court in (8) The British India Steam Navigation v. Jarjit Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1451. In that case also it was held that although the existence of an alternative remedy did not bar the jurisdiction of the court to issue the prerogative writs, this rule should govern the exercise of discretion of the court in issuing the writs. Reliance was also placed on another decision of Supreme Court, in (9) Thansingh Nathmall v. The Superintendent of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419. In that case it was again held that the resort to the writ jurisdiction could not be had if there was an alternative remedy for relief which might be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Relying upon the decisions discussed above, Mr. Chaudhuri submitted that in this case the petitioner not only had an alternative remedy, but she had pursued the same, had applied for relief in the suit which she had filed and having failed to get that relief, the petitioner had taken recourse to the writ jurisdiction of this court, for the same relief which was refused in the suit. In my opinion this contention of Mr. Chaudhuri is well founded. The petitioner has filed a suit and has taken recourse to other proceedings challenging the existence of the arbitration agreement and also the award. The question of title to property, is involved and there are serious disputes with regard to title to such property. The writ jurisdiction of this court is not a proper forum for adjudication of such disputed questions of title.

21. The next contention of Mr. Chaudhuri was that there was no substance in the petitioner's contention that there was a violation of rule of natural justice, as she was not heard before the licence was issued to the respondent No. 3. Mr. Chaudhuri argued that the petitioner was given ample opportunity by the respondent No. 1 by the letters dated May 29, 1965 and June 1, 1965, to make representations, if she wanted to make any, in the matter of issue of the licence. Mr. Chaudhuri argued that in the letter dated June 1, 1965, the petitioner was requested to disclose her interest in the two tea gardens. But having got the opportunity of making representations, the petitioner did not choose to avail herself of the opportunity so given, and therefore it was not open to her to contend that rules of natural justice had been violated as she was not heard. In support of this contention Mr. Chaudhuri relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (10) P. Joseph John v. State of Travancore-Cochin, AIR 1955 SC 160. In that case it was held that if a party did not avail himself of the opportunity of being heard given to him, it was not open to him to contend that the requirements of clause (2) of article 311 had not been satisfied. In my opinion there is a good deal of force in this contention of Mr. Chaudhuri. The petitioner undoubtedly was aware that the respondent No. 1 had been informed of the dissolution of the partnership firm. She was informed that all the partners should apply afresh in proper form for amendment of licence issued under the joint signature of partners or under the signature of their authorised representatives. The petitioner was further invited to submit AL-4 application forms signed jointly by hereself and other partners. But strangely enough she remained completely silent after receiving all such information. Yet she now complains that opportunity of making representations was not given to her before the licence was issued to the respondent No. 3.

22. The next contention of Mr. Chaudhuri was that although the award was unregistered and no decree was passed on the same yet as the award was acted upon and given effect to, it was binding on the parties. It is not necessary for the purpose of this application to go into the question whether the award is binding on the parties, or as to the existence or the validity of arbitration agreement. These questions are involved in other proceedings in this court and such questions should properly be agitated in those proceedings. Quite clearly there are serious disputes as to the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and the award made by the arbitrators. These disputes cannot be adjudicated upon in this application, nor can this court go into such disputed questions in this application.

23. Before I conclude I should refer to one other matter. Mr. Chaudhuri contended that the petitioner herself had not verified the petition, but had caused the same to be verified by one Punamchand Sanchenti, who had described himself as an agent of the petitioner. All the paragraphs in the petition beginning from paragraph 1 and ending with paragraph 23 except the last sentence in paragraph 22, have been verified as true to the knowledge of the deponent. It was argued that the facts alleged in several paragraphs in the petition were within the knowledge of the petitioner, but could not be within the knowledge of the deponent, who must have obtained the information about those facts from the petitioner. The deponent however, had not stated in the affidavit verifying the petition that he had obtained information about such facts from the petitioner but had recklessly stated that such facts were within his knowledge. Mr. Chaudhuri referred to paragraphs 9 and 17 of the petition. In paragraph 9 it has been alleged that a letter from the solicitor of Sm. Ganga Devi Agarwal was received by the petitioner and this information, Mr. Chaudhuri argued must have been obtained by the deponent from the petitioner as the letter was not addressed to the deponent himself. In paragraph 17 of the petition it has been alleged that the petitioner came to know about illegal clearance of tea by the respondent No. 3 on or about July 28, 1966. This allegation Mr. Chaudhuri argued was plainly within the knowledge of the petitioner, and could not be within the knowledge of the deponent. Yet the deponent has verified the allegation in paragraphs 9 and 17 of the petition Mr. Chaudhuri argued as true to his knowledge. Mr. Chaudhuri referred to Rule 14 of the rules of this court relating to applications under article 226 of the Constitution, and submitted that where statements were based on information, the source of information should be disclosed. Mr. Chaudhuri submitted that the petition had not been verified according to the rules of the court and therefore this application should be rejected. In support of this contention Mr. Chaudhuri relied upon a decision of this court reported in AIR 1952 Cal. 16.

24. In my view although the petition has not been verified strictly accordingly to the Rule 14 and the deponent has assumed knowledge of facts which must necessarily be based on information received by him from the petitioner herself, and although the deponent has no stated that he received the information relating to such allegations from the petitioner as required by Rule 14 of the said rules, this irregularity arising from non-compliance with the said rule, does not merit a dismissal of the application on that ground.

25. But the petition, however, must fail on the other grounds discussed earlier in this judgment.

26. In my view the application is misconceived and not maintainable for the reasons mentioned above and is accordingly dismissed. The rule is discharged.

27. Each party to pay its own costs.

28. The respondent No. 3 will furnish a statement of tea, if any, sold by him, to the petitioner for one month.

29. Let the certified copy of the judgment be supplied to the petitioner within one week from the date of application for such copy.

C.R.D