Learned Single Judge having felt that the dictum laid down in the case of Chinnavenkatesh R.T. Vs. Senior RTO, Mysore and Another, 1975 (2) Kar. L.J. 385 requires reconsideration, referred these writ petitions to the Division Bench under Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act.

2. In the case of Chinnavenkatesh (Supra), learned Single Judge of this Court has ruled that Section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable to the appeals filed under Section 15 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as Taxation Act for short) read with Rule 31 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as Taxation Rules for short).

3. Thus, the question to be considered by the Division Bench is,

Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable for the purpose of condoning the delay in preferring the appeal filed under Section 15 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 read with Rule 31 of Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1957 ? .

And consequently,

Whether the ratio laid down in the case of Chinnavenkatesh R.T. Vs Senior RTO, Mysore and Another, reported in 1975 (2) Kar. L.J. 385 is to be interfered with ? .

4. The facts in these writ petitions are almost common. The petitioners herein have filed appeals before the prescribed Appellate Authorities under Section 15 of the Taxation Act, read with Rule 31 of the Taxation Rules, questioning the correctness of the notices/orders issued by the original authorities. Such appeals are filed with certain delay. Thus, the appellants before the respective Appellate Authorities i.e., the petitioners herein filed applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay in filing the appeals. The Appellate Authorities have dismissed the appeals on the ground that the appeals are filed beyond the prescribed period of 30 days and that is has no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal. Though the Appellate Authorities have not quoted the judgment of this Court reported in the case of Chinnavenkatesh R.T. Vs. Senior RTO, Mysore and Another, 1975 (2) Kar. L.J. 385, mentioned supra in their orders, seem to have followed the ratio laid down in the said judgment while passing the impugned order.

5. It is relevant to note the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 15 of the Taxation Act and Rule 31 of the Taxation Rules for the purpose of disposal of these writ petitions.

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act:- Where any special or local law prescribed for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

Section 15 of the Taxation Act is amended by Act No. 8 of 2007. Section 15, prior to amendment and subsequent to amendment reads thus:

Before amendment:

Section 15 of the Taxation Act: (Prior to amendment) Appeals: Any person, who is aggrieved by any order of a Taxation Authority made under this Act, may within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority.

After amendment:

Section 15: Appeals:- (1) Any person who is aggrieved by any order of a Taxation Authority made under this Act, may within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority.

(2) (a) No appeal shall be entertained by the Appellate Authority unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax not disputed in the appeal.

(b) Notwithstanding that an appeal has been preferred under sub-section (1), the tax or other amount shall be paid in accordance with the order against which the appeal has been preferred:

Provided that the Appellate Authority may, in its discretion, give directions as it thinks fit in regard to the payment of the tax or other amount payable under clause (b), if the applicant furnished sufficient security to its satisfaction in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed.

(3) Any appeal preferred after the prescribed period shall be dismissed.

Rule 31 of the Taxation Rules: Appeals: Any person aggrieved by an order made by any officer under the Act or these rules may, within thirty days of the date of receipt of the order by such person, appeal to.-

(i) the Deputy Commissioner of Transport, if the original order is that of an officer other than the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner for Transport, and

Provided that if the original order has been passed by the Deputy Commissioner for Transport himself in some other capacity appeal against such original order shall lie to the Commissioner.

(ii) the Karnataka Revenue Appellate Tribunal, if the original order is that of the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner-for Transport.

6. This Court in the case of Chinnavenkatesh (cited supra) has ruled that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to appeals filed under Section 15 of the Taxation Act on the ground that the taxing authorities are merely the instrumentalities of the State and do not form part of the judiciary. In other words, it is held therein that the taxing authorities cannot be treated as the Courts of Civil Judicature.

7. The test for determining whether the authorities are functioning as the Court or not has been laid down by a series of the decisions of the Apex Court. To avoid repetition, we may refer to one of them, i.e., in the case of Takur Jugal Kishore Sinha Vs. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Limited, AIR 1967 SC 1494. In this matter, the Apex Court was concerned with the question as to whether the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies functioning under Section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935, was a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of contempt of Courts Act, 1952. While answering the said question in the affirmative, the Apex Court relied upon the judgment in the case of Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66, wherein it is observed in Paragrph-18 thus:

It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial Tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.

It is relevant to note another decision of the Apex Court in the case Virindar Kumar Satyawadi Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153, wherein it is observed thus:

It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial Tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim arid to adduce evidence iii proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question the therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court.

8. If the aforementioned well-settled tests for deciding whether the authority is a Court or not are applied to the powers and functions of the Appellate Authority constituted under Section 15 of the Taxation Act, it becomes obvious that all the aforesaid essential trappings to constitute such an authority as a Court are found to be present.

9. The definition of Courts in the indian evidence act is not exhaustive (See The Empress Vs. Ashootosh Chuckerbutty and Others, ILR (4) Cal. (15) 493 (FB). Although the said definition is for the purpose of the Act alone, all authorities must be held to be Courts within the meaning of the said provision who are legally authorized to take evidence. The word Court under the said Act has come up for consideration at different times under different statutes.

The Commissioner who has been authorized to take evidence of the witnesses, has been held to be a Court (See Jyoti Narayan Vs. Brijnandan Sinha, AIR 1954 Patna 289). The Rent Controller has been held to be a Court (See G. Bulliswamy Vs. Smt. C. Annapuranamma, AIR 1976 Andhra Pradesh 270). The Election Tribunals have been held to be Courts (See Prem Chand Vs. Sri O.P. Trivedi and Others, AIR 1967 All. L.J. 5 at page 7). Corners before whom evidence can be adduced have been held to be Courts (See Tanajirao Martinrao Kadambande Vs. H.J. Chinoy, 71 Bombay Law Reporter 732). In Brijnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66, it has been held that any Tribunal or authority whose decision is final and binding between the parties is a Court. In the said decision, the Supreme Court, while deciding a case under Court of Enquiry Act held that a Court of enquiry is not a Court as its decision is neither final nor binding upon the parties. In Vindar Kumar Satya Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153, the Supreme Court has made a broad distinction of a Court and quasi judicial Tribunal.

As could be seen from Rule 31 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1957, the appeal lies to the Deputy Commissioner for Transport or to the Commissioner or to the Karnataka Revenue Appellate Tribunal as the case may be. Karnataka Revenue Appellate tribunal consists of two members, one of which is a Judicial Member of District Judge Cadre.

The Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957, was enacted with an intention to bring an uniform rate structure throughout the State and to consolidate and amend the law relating to levy of tax on motor vehicles in the State of Karnataka. The provisions of the Act clearly postulate that the State of Karnataka has created a separate forum for the purpose of determination of disputes arising inter alia relating to motor vehicle taxation. The Appellate Authority is not the one which can be said to be a Domestic Tribunal. The member/members of the Appellate Authority are not nominated by the parties. The disputants do not have any control over their appointment. The Appellate Authority may reject the appeal at the threshold. It has the power to summon records. It has discretion to give directions as it thinks fit in regard to payment of tax and other amount payable, if the applicant furnishes sufficient security to its satisfaction. Its decision is final.

The Presiding Officers of the Appellate Authority cannot be said to be persona designata, inasmuch as they are not the persons who are selected to act is private capacity. A persona designata is a person who is pointed or described as an individual, as a member of class or as filling a particular character.

Therefore, in our opinion, the Appellate Authority for all intent and purport is a Court for the applicability of Limitation Act. It was trapping of the Court. There are two parties before it. The Appellate Authority has to determine the lis. If the Appellate Authority is a Court then sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, would apply. As it is a Court. It is not necessary for the legislature to confer power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 specifically. In that view of the matter, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be maintainable.

10. The bare look at Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reveals that the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision for importing the machinery of the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act:

(a) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application.

(b) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act.

If the aforesaid requirements are satisfied, the consequences contemplated under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would automatically follow. These consequences are as under:

(i) In such a case, Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the schedule.

(ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

11. In the light of the aforesaid analysis of the relevant clauses of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, we will have to see whether Section 15 of the Taxation Act read with Rule 3 of the Taxation Rules providing for a statutory appeal to the Appellate Authority satisfies the aforesaid twin conditions for attracting the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. There cannot be any dispute that Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 is a special or a local law. Rule 31 of the Taxation Rules prescribes the period of limitation for the appeal under Section 15 of the Taxation Act, which is different from the period prescribed by the Schedule as the Schedule to the Limitation Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for filing appeal before the Appellate Authority under Section 15 of the Taxation Act or in other words, it prescribes nil period of limitation for such an appeal. It is by now well-settled that in a situation wherein the period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law for an appeal or application and for which there is no provision made in the Schedule to the Act, the second condition for attracting Section 29(2) would get satisfied. When the first Schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time limit for it, it can be said that, under the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, all appeals can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period. While the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to be filed within the prescribed period. It is, therefore, different from that prescribed in the former, and thus, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act as held in the case of Vidyacharan Shukla Vs. Khubchand Baghel, AIR 1964 SC 1099.

12. Once the aforementioned two conditions are satisfied, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act on its own force will get attracted to appeals filed before the Appellate Authority under Section 15 of the Taxation Act. In view of applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to appeals under Section 15 of the Taxation Act for computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeals under that Section, all the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one of them would therefore get attracted. There is no express exclusion anywhere in the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 or the Rules framed thereunder taking out the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed before the Appellate Authority under Section 15 of the Taxation Act. Consequently, all the legal requirements of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act can be said to have been satisfied.

13. The jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under the special laws is sometimes given to the ordinary Courts and sometimes given to separate Tribunals constituted under the special law. When the special law provides that the provision contained in Section 5 shall apply to the proceedings under it, it is really a conferment of the power of the Court under Section 5 to the Tribunals under the special law whether these Tribunals are Courts or not. If these Tribunals under the special law should be the Courts in the ordinary sense, an express extension of the provision contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act will become otiose in cases where the special law has created separate Tribunals to adjudicate the rights of parties arising under the special law. That is not the intention of the Legislature.

14. Section 29(2) clearly indicates that, once the requisite conditions for its applicability to given proceedings under special or local law are attracted, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, both inclusive, would get attracted, which obviously would bring in Section 5, which also shall apply to such proceedings, unless applicability of any of the aforesaid sections of the limitation act is expressly excluded by such special or local law. It is not necessary to expressly state in a special law that the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the determination of the periods under it. By the general provision contained in Section 29(2), this provision is made applicable to the periods prescribed under the special law. It becomes therefore apparent that on a conjoint reading of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act of 1963 and Section 15 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 read with Rule 31 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, the provisions of Section 5 would automatically get attracted to those proceedings as there is nothing in the Taxation Act expressly excluding the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals under Section 15 of the Taxation Act. An express mention in the special law is necessary only for any exclusion.

15. The express language of Section 29(2) clearly indicates that such special or local law must provide for period of limitation for filing of Suit, appeal or application entertainable under such laws and or computing period of limitation under such special or local law, the Legislature has made available the machinery of Sections 4 to 24 as found in the Limitation Act. Nowhere it is indicated that as per Section 29(2), the Courts functioning under such special or local law must be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure.

16. Learned Single Judge in Chinnavenkatesh s case by relying on the judgment of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Vs. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1039, has observed that the taxing authorities are merely instrumentalities of the State. Their functions and powers are governed by the statute under which they are created and that they cannot be converted into Courts of Civil Judicature. In other words, it is held therein that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act will apply only to the proceedings of the Courts constituted under special or local law which are Civil Courts, stricto sensu.

17. We are not concerned with the applicability of any of the Articles of the Schedule of the Limitation Act for governing the period of limitation as prescribed by Section 15 of the Taxation Act read with Rule 31 of the Taxation Rules. The period of limitation is prescribed not by Article 137 or any other Article under the Schedule, but by Section 15 of the Taxation Act read with Rule 31 of the Taxation Rules themselves which are part and parcel of the special or local laws. As far as that period of limitation is concerned, Section 29(2) is the only section which can apply. For interpreting Section 29(2), the applicability of any of the Articles to the Schedule to the Limitation Act would be totally irrelevant. The judgment in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Vs. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, AIR 1975 SC 1039, relied upon by learned Single Judge in Chinnavenkatesh s case may not be relevant for the purpose of the matter on hand. In that case, the Apex Court was concerned with the question as to whether the revisional authority functioning under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 could extend the period of limitation beyond six months even on sufficient cause being shown and whether the principle of Section 14(2) of the Limitation act could be imported into Section 10(3)(B) of that Act by analogy. Section 10(3)(B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act provides for filing revisions under the said Act. As per sub-section (3b) of section 10, such applications had to be made within one year from the date of service of order, but the revising authority may on proof of sufficient cause, entertain an application within a further period of six months. In view of this express provision in the special Act, it was held by the Apex Court that the general provisions of Section 14(2) of the Limitation act could not get attracted. It is trite to observe that as per Section 14(2) of the Limitation act, if the applicant was persuing any civil proceedings with due diligence in the first Court or any higher Court against the same party for the same relief, the period spent shall be excluded if such proceedings were found to have been filed in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, was unable to entertain it. It is easy to visualize that, if Section 14(2) applied to applications for revisions under Section 10(3)(B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, then even if such fruitless proceedings had lingered on for one or two years or even more, the entire period spent in such proceedings would get excluded for computing the period of limitation for filing such revisions under Section 10(3)(B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. Moreover, there was an express provision in sub-section (3)(B) of Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act putting a ceiling on the powers of the revisional authority even on proof of sufficient cause to entertain such applications and that was only up to a further period of six months beyond one year as prescribed. Consequently, this express provision to the contrary as found in Section 10(3)(B) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act made the general provisions of Section 14(2) inapplicable as it was an express provisions to the contrary to what is provided in Section 14(2). It is precisely for that reason that the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision held that the object, the scheme and language of Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act do not, permit the invocation of Section 14(2) of the Limitation act, either, in terms, or in principle, for excluding the time spent in prosecuting proceedings for setting aside the dismissal of appeals in default, for computation of the period of limitation prescribed for filing a revision under the Sales Tax Act. (See Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, AIR 1995 SC 2272).

In the matter of Mukri Gopalan (supra), the Apex Court while considering the similar question, referred to the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Vs. Parson Tools and Plants (cited supra), and observed thus

In any case, the scope of Section 29(2) was not considered by the aforesaid decision of the three learned Judges and consequently it cannot be held to be an authority for the proposition that in revisional proceedings before the Sales Tax authorities functioning under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, Section 29(2) cannot apply as Mr. Nariman would like to have it.

(Emphasis supplied)

In the said judgment of Mukri Gopalan, the Apex Court was considering the question as to whether the Appellant Authority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Rent Act, 1965, functions as a Court, and as to whether the period of limitation prescribed therein under Section 18 governing the appeals by aggrieved parties will be computed keeping in view the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. The Apex Court considering various judgments and by relying upon the judgments in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Vs. Madan Lal Dan and Sons Bareilly, AIR 1997 SC 523, and in the case of Sajkari Ganna Vikas Samiti Limited Vs. Mahabir Sugar Mills (Private) Limited, AIR 1982 SC 119, has ruled that the Appellate Authority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Rent Act, 1965, functions as a Court and the period of limitation prescribed therein under Section 18 governing appeals by aggrieved parties will be computed keeping in view the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and such proceedings will attract Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and consequently. Section 5 of the Limitation Act would also be applicable to such proceedings. It is further held therein that the Appellate Authority will have the jurisdiction to consider the question as to whether delay in filing such appeals could be condoned on sufficient cause being made out by the concerned applicant for the delay in filing such appeals. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mukri Gopalan (cited supra), is aptly applicable to the matter on hand.

In the matter of Union of India Vs. Popular Construction company, (2001) 8 SCC 470, the application of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was in question. The Arbitration Act clearly provided for a limitation in the matter of exercise of discretionary jurisdiction for condoning the delay only for a period of 30 days and not thereafter. It was in that situation, the Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act as such will have no application, as a special limitation has been provided for.

18. In the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Vs. Madan Lal Dan (cited supra), the Apex Court was concerned with the question as to whether Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to revision petitions filed under Section 10 of the same U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Apex Court held that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 12(2), inter alia, shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, and there is nothing in the U.P. Sales Tax Act expressly excluding the application of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the said provision was held applicable to the filing of revision applications under Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. It becomes therefore obvious that the aforesaid decision clearly applied Section 19(2) to the revision petitions filed before revision authorities under a special law like U.P. Sales Tax Act and via Section 29(2) applied Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act to such revisional proceedings. This decision is a direct decision on the point, viz., applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act for computing period of limitation prescribed by local or special law even though the authority before which such proceedings may be filed under the local or special law may not be full pledged Civil Court.

19. It is also relevant to note the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sahkari Ganna, AIR 1982 SC 119 (cited supra). In the said matter, the Apex Court was concerned with the question as to whether the Divisional Commissioner acting under the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 acted as a Revenue Court or whether he was a persona designata. It was held that the Divisional Commissioner had been constituted as an Appellate Authority under the Act. That showed that the Divisional Commissioner was made an Appellate Revenue Court but not as a persona designata. That being so, it was obvious that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to appeals before Divisional Commissioner and he could condone the delay in filing appeals.

From the above, it is clear that the Apex Court was dealing with Revenue Court constituted under U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, which was a special law. It was in terms held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable to revisional proceedings before such Revenue Courts. Of course, in the said decision, no other decision of the Apex Court was cited and Section 29(2) was not expressly referred to but the ratio of the decision is necessarily and implicitly based on the applicability of Section 29(2) but for which Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not have been made applicable to revision proceedings before Revenue Court functioning under the special law.

20. It is to be kept in mind that Section 29(2) gets attracted for computing the period of limitation of any suit, appeal or application to be filed before authorities under special or local law if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied, and once they get satisfied, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 shall apply to such proceedings, meaning thereby the procedural scheme contemplated by these sections of the limitation act would get telescoped into such provisions of special or local law.

21. In view of the above, we conclude that the period of limitation prescribed under Section 15 of the Taxation Act read with Rule 31 of the Taxation Rules is to be computed keeping in view the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Such proceedings will attract Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and consequently Section 5 of the Limitation Act would also be applicable to such proceedings. The Appellate Authority under Section 15 of Taxation Act will have the jurisdiction to consider the question as to whether the delay in filing such appeals would be condoned on sufficient, cause being made out by the concerned applicant for the delay in filing such appeals.

Thus, the law laid in the case of Chinnavenkatesh R.T. Vs. Senior RTO, Mysore and Another, 1975 (2) Kar. L.J. 385 is no more a good law on the point and consequently the judgment in Chinnavenkatesh in overruled.

In view of the above, the orders passed by the Appellate Authorities taking contrary view, are quashed and the proceedings are remitted to the Appellate Authorities, with a direction to consider the applications for condonation of delay on their own merit and then proceed further in accordance with law.

Writ Petitions are allowed accordingly.