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Bhagwan Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Appeals-I, Punjab Chandigarh & Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, respondent No. 4 and others applied for the post of Lambardar of village Pandori Mallian. The Circle Revenue Officer (Naib Tehsildar Gardhiwala) by report dated 18.9.1997 recommended the petitioner; the Tehsildar, Dasuya, endorsed that recommendation. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dasuya, recommended respondent No. 4. The District Collector, Hoshiarpur, by order dated 31.3.1999 appointed Bikram Singh (respondent No. 4) as Lambardar. The petitioner appealed; the Commissioner, Jalandhar Division, Jalandhar dismissed the appeal on 14.8.2001. The petitioner further sought revision, which was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner Appeals-I, Punjab, Chandigarh on 22.11.2001. The petitioner filed this writ petition (certiorari) seeking quashing of the three impugned orders.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the impugned orders (dated 31.3.1999, 14.8.2001 and 22.11.2001) appointing respondent No. 4 as Lambardar should be quashed.
- Whether hereditary claim (under Rule 15(a) of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1909) entitles the petitioner to preference for appointment as Lambardar.
- Whether the District Collector's selection can be set aside on grounds that the petitioner was allegedly rejected for being a government servant or that the Collector's choice was perverse, arbitrary, or violative of statutory provisions.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner asserted a hereditary claim to the office of Lambardar because his father was the Lambardar, and relied on Rule 15(a) of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1909 to contend that his hereditary claim should have been given preference.
- The petitioner contended he was better qualified than respondent No. 4 and, as a government servant, was conversant with government procedures and thereby suitable for appointment.
- It was argued that the District Collector rejected the petitioner’s candidature on the ground that he was a government employee and that this was an error which ought to have been corrected by the Commissioner or the Financial Commissioner Appeals-I.
- The petitioner sought quashing of the impugned orders as illegal and perverse.
Note: Counsel for the respondents was not present, and no respondent arguments are recorded in the opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Karnail Singh v. The State of Haryana, 1973 PLJ 676 | Invalidation of heredity-based provision (sub-rule (ii) of Land Revenue Rule 17) and implications for pari materia provisions (such as Rule 15(a)). | The Court relied on this Division Bench decision to conclude that Rule 15(a), being pari materia to Rule 17(ii), would violate Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution and that appointments cannot be made on the basis of hereditary claims. |
| Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 564 | Authority referenced concerning constitutional review of heredity-based selection (as cited in Karnail Singh). | Referred to in the quoted passage from Karnail Singh as one of the Supreme Court rulings relevant to assessing heredity-based distinctions; used as part of the antecedent reasoning that heredity-based rules may violate Articles 14, 15 and 16. |
| The State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta, AIR 1967 Suprente Court 884 | Authority referenced concerning constitutional objections to heredity-based distinctions (as cited in Karnail Singh). | Mentioned in the Karnail Singh excerpt quoted in the opinion as part of the Supreme Court authority considered when assessing the vires of heredity-based rules. |
| Rishikesavan Naidu v. S. Srinivasa Reddiar, AIR 1965 Madras 178 | Decision considered on the question of heredity; distinguished on its facts. | Noted in the Karnail Singh passage as a Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court whose facts were different (selected person had no rival); the opinion records that this decision was distinguished and therefore of limited application to the heredity-rule issue. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two principal strands.
- On the question of hereditary claims: the court quoted Rule 15(a) of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1909, which directs that hereditary claims be regarded among matters to be considered in first appointments of headmen. The court relied on the Division Bench decision in Karnail Singh v. The State of Haryana (1973 PLJ 676), which declared sub-rule (ii) of Land Revenue Rule 17 ultra vires and unconstitutional for attaching excessive importance to heredity and thereby appearing to violate Articles 14, 15 and 16. Because Rule 15(a) is pari materia to Rule 17(ii), the court held that Rule 15(a) similarly would violate Articles 14, 15 and 16 and that an appointment to the post of Lambardar cannot be made on the basis of hereditary claims.
- On the petitioner's other contentions (better qualification; alleged rejection because he was a government servant): the court stated the established principle that the Collector's choice in appointments of Lambardars is final unless the aggrieved party shows the Collector's order to be perverse, arbitrary, violative of a statutory provision, or otherwise warranting interference. Judicial review is therefore confined to determining whether the impugned order suffers from those disabilities. Applying that standard, the court found the District Collector's order neither perverse nor arbitrary and not in breach of any statutory provision; accordingly, the Collector's selection was properly upheld by the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner.
Holding and Implications
Writ petition dismissed with no order as to costs.
Implications:
- The appointment of respondent No. 4 as Lambardar, as made by the District Collector and upheld on appeal and revision, remains valid and is not quashed.
- The court confirmed the principle that hereditary claims under Rule 15(a) cannot be the basis for appointment, relying on prior authority that similar heredity-based provisions are unconstitutional under Articles 14, 15 and 16.
- The decision upholds the limiting principle of judicial review in appointment matters — that the Collector's selection will be interfered with only if it is perverse, arbitrary or violates statutory provisions; the court found no such defect here.
- No new legal precedent was created by this opinion; the court applied existing precedent and statutory interpretation to resolve the petition and confined the outcome to the parties before it.
Rajive Bhalla, J. (Oral):— The petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the orders, dated 31.3.1999, 14.8.2001 and 22.11.2001, passed by the District Collector, Hoshiarpur, Commissioner Jalandhar Division, Jalandhar and the Financial Commissioner Appeals-I, Punjab Chandigarh respectively.
2. The petitioner, respondent No. 4 and others applied forthe post of Lambardar of village Pandori Mallian. The antecedents of the candidates were inquired and verified. The Circle Revenue Officer, Naib Tehsildar Gardhiwala, vide report, dated 18.9.1997, recommended the name of the petitioner for the post of Lambardar. His recommendation was endorsed by the Tehsidar, Dasuya. The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dasuya, however, did not agree with the report and recommended the name of respondent No. 4. The District Collector, Hoshiarpur, vide order, dated 31.3.1999, held that Bikram Singh-respondent No. 4 was the most suitable candidate and directed his appointment as a Lambardar. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the Commissioner, Jalandhar Division, Jalandhar on 14.8.2001 Still dissatisfied, the petitioner preferred a revision, which was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner. Appeals-I, Punjab Chandigarh on 22.11.2001
3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that as the petitioner's father was the Lambardar, his hereditary claim to the office of Lambardar should have received preference, in view of Rule 15(a) of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1909 (for short herein after referred to as “the Rules”). It is submitted that the petitioner is better qualified than respondent No. 4. Even otherwise, being a government servant, he is conversant with the government procedures and should, therefore, have been selected as the Lambardar. It is further argued that the District Collector rejected the petitioner's candidature on the ground that he was a government employee. This error in the order, passed by the District Collector, should have been rectified by the Commissioner, Jalandhar Division or the Financial Commissioner Appeals-1. It is submitted that as the impugned orders are illegal and perverse, the writ petition be allowed and the impugned orders be set aside.
4. Counsel for the respondents is not present.
5. I have heard counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned orders.
6. As regards hereditary claims for appointment to the post of Lambardar, Rule 15(a) of the Rules reads as follows:
“15. Matter to be considered in first appointment - In all first appointments of headmen, regard shall be had among other matters to—
(a) his hereditary claims;
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7. While considering the vires of a similar provision, namely, Rule 17(ii) of the Rules, and as a consequence, the provisions of Rule 15(a), a Division Bench of this Court in Karnail Singh v. The State of Haryana, 1973 PLJ 676, held as follows:
“xxxxxxxx The main consideration that may appear to have prevailed is that the person selected was connected by ties of blood or heredity with the last incumbent. Shri Naubat Singh, the learned District Attorney for the State of Haryana, has argued that in actual practice other qualifications are also taken into consideration and the appointments are not made in all cases on the grounds only of heredity. Practice apart, Rule 17(ii) may seem to attach too much importance to the claim of heredity and the selection of the successor is sought to be confined to a male lineal descendant orthe nearest collateral. Rule 17(ii) may seem to make discrimination or distinction on the ground of heredity or family connections. This rule may, therefore, appear to be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Reference could in this connection be made to the Supreme Court rulings in Gazula Dasaratha Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 564, and The State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta, AIR 1967 Suprente Court 884. Shri Naubat Singh has cited before us a Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Rishikesavan Naidu v. S. Srinivasa Reddiar, AIR 1965 Madras 178, but the facts in that case were altogether different. The person who had been selected to the hereditary office in that case had no other rival in the field. He would have been selected unopposed independently of his family connections with the deceased. It was under these circumstances that it was held that heredity was no disqualification being selected to a particular past or appointment.
4. For reasons given above, we declare sub-rule (ii) of Land Revenue Rule 17 to be ultra vires and unconstitutional. The appointments under this sub-rule of respondent No. 4 in Civil Writ No. 1048 of 1967, respondent No. 3 in Civil Writ No. 696 of 1970 and respondent No. 4 in Civil Writ No. 666 of 1970 is quashed and the State Government is directed to make fresh appointments after considering the claims of all the contesting candidates. The three writ petitions are allowed but we make no order as to costs.”
8. It is, therefore, apparent that Rule 15(a), which is pari-materia to Rule 17(ii) of the Rules, and provides for consideration of the hereditary claim of a candidate, would violate Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution and, an appointment to the post of Lambardar cannot be made on the basis of hereditary claims.
9. As regards the petitioner's assertion that he was better qualified or that his claim was rejected on the ground that he was a government servant, suffice it to say that in matters of appointments of Lambardars, the choice of the Collector is final till such time as the aggrieved party establishes that the order, passed by the Collector, is perverse, violates any statutory provisions or is so arbitrary as to warrant interference. The District Collector, Hoshiarpur, in his wisdom, selected the best candidate available. In a process of selection, perceptions as to the comparative merits and suitability of a candidate, would vary from person to person and, therefore from court to court. It is an established principle that judicial review of such orders is confined to an appraisal of the impugned order so as to discern whether it is perverse, arbitrary or violates the provisions of any statutory enactment. Thus, till such time as the choice of the Collector does not suffer from any of the above disabilities, it shall be deemed to be final. The mere fact that there are minor errors in evaluating the respective merits, though in the instant case there are none, can not be a good ground to set aside the choice of the Collector. As the order, passed by the Collector, is neither perverse nor arbitrary and does not infringe any statutory provision, the choice of the Collector was rightly upheld by the learned Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner.
10. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.
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