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Mahabir Prasad Goel And Others v. Guru Saran Singh And Another
Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kanpur dated 31-03-1976, which dismissed a claim petition filed under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
On 25 August 1969, at about 3:40 P.M., Smt. Laxmi Goel boarded a rickshaw with her husband in front of the State Bank of India, Phool Bagh, Kanpur. While travelling on Birhana Road, a truck (registration No. USF 3275) driven by Gyan Singh allegedly came from behind and struck the rickshaw. Smt. Laxmi Goel sustained serious head injuries and was declared dead at the hospital. The truck and its driver were detained on the spot and an FIR was lodged by Mahabir Prasad (the husband).
Mahabir Prasad and the two daughters of the deceased filed a claim petition under Section 110-A claiming Rs. 50,000 against Guru Saran Singh (owner), the driver, and United India Fire & General Insurance Company (insurer). The owner and insurer filed written statements denying rash or negligent driving and disputing liability; the driver did not file a written statement. The claimants produced seven witnesses and documentary evidence; the respondents produced one witness. The Tribunal found that the claimants failed to prove rash and negligent driving and dismissed the petition. The claimants appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the truck was driven in a rash and negligent manner causing the accident and death of Smt. Laxmi Goel.
- Whether the owner and the insurer are liable to pay compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act for the death resulting from the accident.
- If liability is established, what is the appropriate quantum of compensation and its apportionment between the insurer and the owner, and the applicable rate of interest.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Claimants') Arguments
- The Tribunal erred in dismissing the claim; eyewitness testimony consistently stated that the truck hit the rickshaw from behind on Birhana Road and that the truck driver did not hoot before the collision.
- Eye-witnesses called included P.W.4 Mahendra Kumar Srivastava, P.W.5 Mahabir Prasad, P.W.6 Raja Ram and P.W.7 Hira Lal (rickshaw puller), whose accounts supported the claimants' version; one eyewitness (Mahendra Kumar) was not cross-examined by respondents.
- Physical evidence (recovery memo Ext. 9) corroborated the eyewitnesses by recording the damage to the rickshaw's right and front wheels; this damage could only be explained by the truck dashing into the rickshaw.
- The driver, who would have been best able to explain the accident, was not available to testify because he was reported to be dead; respondents produced no other evidence to rebut the eyewitness accounts.
- The Tribunal wrongly relied on a presumption that a busy road precluded driving at high speed and therefore improperly discarded eyewitness testimony.
- On quantum, the deceased earned stated amounts (salary and other earnings) and contribution to maintenance, leading to a calculated loss and a suggested compensation figure after deduction for lump-sum payment.
Respondents' Arguments
- The owner contended that the driver was not guilty of rash and negligent driving and that instead the rickshaw puller was at fault, having carelessly collided with the rear portion of the truck.
- The insurance company denied that the truck had been driven rashly or negligently.
- The driver did not file a statement in the claim proceeding (and was later reported dead).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| N.K.V. Brothers (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal ((1980) 3 SCC 457; AIR 1980 SC 1354) | The court quoted V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.'s dicta endorsing the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in road-accident cases, the welfare-object of the compensation provisions, and the caution that Tribunals should not let technicalities or "mystic maybes" deny relief to victims. | The appellate court relied on the dictum to stress that the Tribunal should not have rejected direct eyewitness testimony on technical grounds and that culpability may fairly be inferred from the surrounding circumstances when a fast vehicle hits a slower vehicle from behind. The precedent supported the appellate court's reversal of the Tribunal's finding and its approach to infer negligence from the facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a step-by-step review of the evidence and the Tribunal's appraisal:
- Evaluation of Eyewitness Evidence: The appellate court considered the statements of four named eyewitnesses (P.W.4 to P.W.7) who consistently testified that the truck struck the rickshaw from behind, that the truck was driven at a high speed on crowded Birhana Road, and that the truck driver did not hoot his horn prior to impact. One eyewitness (P.W.4) was not cross-examined by the respondents.
- Corroboration by Documentary Evidence: The court noted that Ext. 9 (a police recovery memo prepared on the spot) recorded substantial damage to the right and front wheels of the rickshaw, which the court found consistent with the eyewitness accounts and inconsistent with the respondents' contention that the rickshaw collided with the truck of its own accord.
- Absence of Driver's Testimony: The driver, who would have been the best witness to explain the accident, was not examined because he was reported dead. The court observed that the respondents did not produce any other witnesses, despite there being evidence that a large crowd gathered after the accident.
- Censure of Tribunal's Approach: The court characterized the Tribunal's rejection of eyewitness testimony as perverse and based on "imaginary grounds" — particularly the Tribunal's conclusion that, because Birhana Road was crowded, it was not possible for the truck to be driven at high speed. The appellate court held this to be an unwarranted presumption unsupported by evidence.
- Legal Principle on Inferences of Negligence: The court explained the applicable principle that when a fast vehicle hits a slower vehicle from behind causing injury, a presumption of rash and negligent driving arises; the onus then shifts to the driver to provide a plausible explanation. In the absence of such explanation or rebuttal evidence, the presumption stands.
- Application of Precedent and Statutory Purpose: Relying on the N.K.V. Brothers dictum and the welfare purpose of Sections 110-A to 110-D (summary and expeditious relief to dependents of road accident victims), the court held that tribunals must not allow technicalities to defeat compensation claims and must infer culpability where it is reasonably justified by the circumstances.
- Conclusion on Liability: Given the consistent eyewitness testimony, corroborating police memo, absence of rebuttal evidence, and the legal presumption applicable, the court concluded that the driver was guilty of rash and negligent driving and that the owner (vicariously) and the insurer were liable under the Motor Vehicles Act provisions.
- Assessment of Quantum: The court adopted the claimants' evidence on earnings and contribution, but the opinion itself records an inconsistency in the monthly total (the opinion states "Thus in all Smt. Laxmi Devi was earning a sum of Rs. 283/- or Rs. 510/- per mensem."), and then proceeds on a conservative assumed contribution of Rs.100 per month towards her daughters' maintenance, calculating annual loss of Rs.1,200, for 24 years = Rs.28,800. The court deducted 25% for lump-sum payment, arriving at Rs.21,600 as damages.
- Apportionment between Insurer and Owner: The court noted that in April 1969 the insurer's liability under Section 95 was limited to Rs.20,000; accordingly the insurer was ordered to pay Rs.20,000 and the owner to pay the balance of Rs.1,600.
- Interest and Costs: The court awarded interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition (15-10-1969) and granted costs to the claimants.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeal was allowed and the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal was set aside. The appellate court held that the driver was guilty of rash and negligent driving and the claimants were entitled to damages.
Direct consequences for the parties (as ordered by the court):
- The claimants are awarded total damages of Rs. 21,600.
- The insurer (United India Fire & General Insurance Company) is liable to pay Rs. 20,000 (reflecting the insurer's statutory limit as of April 1969).
- The owner (Guru Saran Singh) is liable to pay the remaining Rs. 1,600.
- Respondents are ordered to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 15-10-1969 (date of filing the claim petition) until payment.
- The claimants are entitled to their costs throughout.
Broader implications: The court applied established principles (including the N.K.V. Brothers dictum endorsing inference of culpability in appropriate road-accident cases and the welfare purpose of the statutory scheme) and reversed a Tribunal's dismissal for what it characterized as undue reliance on technicalities. The opinion applies existing precedent and statutory purpose to the facts; it does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying those authorities to the case.
Note: All facts, findings and figures in this summary are taken verbatim or paraphrased strictly from the provided opinion. No external facts or inferences not present in the opinion have been added.
K.N Singh, J.:— This appeal under S. 110-D Motor Vehicles Act is directed against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kanpur, dated 31-3-76, dismissing the claim petition filed under S. 110-A. Motor Vehicles Act.
2. Smt. Laxmi Goel a teacher in Junior High School boarded a Rickshaw along with her husband on 25th August 1969 at about 3.40 P.M in front of the State Bank of India, Phool Bagh, Kanpur. Both husband and wife proceeded on Birhana Road, a truck bearing registration No. USF 3275 was driven by Gyan Singh came from behind and dashed against the rickshaw as a result of which Smt. Laxmi Goel and her husband Mahabir Prasad fell down. Smt. Laxmi Goel received serious head injuries. She was rushed to the Hospital where she was declared dead. The truck and its driver both were detained on the spot by the police. Mahabir Prasad lodged the first information report at the police station. Mahabir Prasad and two daughters of Smt. Laxmi Goel joined together to file a claim petition under S. 110-A, Motor Vehicles Act, claiming Rs. 50,000/- as compensation from Guru Saran Singh, the owner of the truck, driver of the truck and also from the United India Fire & General Insurance Company, the insurer. The owner filed a written statement and pleaded that the driver was not guilty of rash and negligent driving of the truck instead the rickshaw puller was at fault who carelessly and negligently collided with the rear portion of the truck. He denied his liability to pay any damages to the claimants. The insurance company also filed a written statement denying any rash and negligent driving of the truck. The driver did not file any written statement to contest the claim petition. The claimants produced 7 witnesses in support of their claim in addition to the documentary evidence. On behalf of the respondents only one witness was produced. On appraisal of evidence, the Tribunal held that the claimants had failed to prove that the truck was being driven in a rash and negligent manner causing the accident and as such the claimants were not entitled to any compensation. On this finding the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition in its entirety, hence, this appeal by the claimants.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the Tribunal committed serious error in holding that the truck was not being driven in a rash and negligent manner or that it was not responsible for the accident. He took us through the statements of eye-witnesses which included P.W 4 Mahendra Kumar Srivastava, P.W 5 Mahabir Prasad, P.W 6 Raja Ram, P.W 7 Hira Lal the rickshaw puller. In their testimony they have supported the case set up by the claimants that the rickshaw was hit by the truck from behind on Birhana Road which is a very crowded road. As a result of dashing of the truck with the rickshaw the right and front wheels of the rickshaw were badly damaged. The rickshaw had tilted as a result of which both the occupants Smt. Laxmi Goel and her husband Mahabir Prasad had fallen down. The rickshaw puller P.W 7 and Raja Ram PW 6 eye-witnesses both categorically stated that the truck driver had not hooted his horn before the accident occurred. Mahendra Kumar Srivastava is a salesman of Uphar Brothers a shop at Birhana Road had seen the accident. He supported the statement of Mahabir Prasad. He was not cross-examined by the respondents. On a close scrutiny of the statement of eye-witnesses we find that all of them have given a cogent and reliable account of the accident. According to them, the truck was coming with high speed on crowded Birhana Road and it hit the rickshaw from behind and before that the driver of the truck had not hooted its horn. These facts are amply proved which leave no room for any doubt that the truck was being driven in a rash and negligent manner which caused accident. The driver of the truck who had special knowledge of the manner in which the accident took place was not examined as he was reported to be dead. D.W 1 R.N Misra was produced to prove that the driver was dead. No other witness was examined on behalf of the respondents although it has come in the testimony of the witnesses examined on behalf of the claimants that a large crowd had collected on Birhana Road immediately after the accident. Ext. 9 is a recovery memo prepared by the police on the spot soon after the accident. This document also states that the right and front wheels of the rickshaw were badly damaged. In our opinion this could not be possible unless the truck dashed against the rickshaw. The evidence of the eye-witnesses produced by the claimants coupled with the recovery memo Ext. 9 positively demonstrate that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle.
4. The learned Judge has discarded the testimony of the eye-witnesses on imaginary grounds. His appreciation of evidence is perverse. We are constrained to say that the learned judge took pains to paint an imaginary picture to discard the testimony of eye-witnesses. The learned Judge observed that the truck could not be driven in a rash and negligent manner as Birhana Road is a crowded locality. This presumption is wholly misconceived. All the eye-witnesses said that the truck was being driven in a rash and negligent manner and that it had not hooted its horn yet the learned Judge held that the truck was not being driven in a rash and negligent manner without there being any good ground for the same. When a fast vehicle specially a truck hits a rickshaw or other vehicle from behind as a result of which injuries are caused to the occupants of the rickshaw, a presumption would arise that the truck was being driven in a rash and negligent manner, although it is open to the driver of the truck to rebut the presumption by giving plausible explanation for the accident. As already noted, the driver was not produced as he was dead. The best evidence which could be produced to explain the manner of accident was of the driver but the same was not available. The respondents did not produce any other witnesses to support their contention. In the absence of any evidence produced on behalf of the respondents it was not open to the Tribunal to rely on the pleas raised in the written statement of the owner or in holding that the rickshaw must have dashed against the truck from its rear portion.
5. The Tribunal held that since Birhana Road was a busy road, it was not possible for the driver of the truck to drive the vehicle at high speed. On this finding he discarded the testimony of eye-witnesses and recorded a finding that the driver of the truck was not guilty of rash and negligent driving. The Tribunal, in our opinion, adopted an incorrect approach. The question whether the driver was guilty of rash and negligent driving depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A vehicle being driven at the speed of 50 to 60 kilometres on a highway where there is no traffic cannot be said to be driven in rash and negligent manner whereas a vehicle being driven at the speed of 10 to 15 kilometres in a crowded locality may amount to rash and negligent driving. In the instant case there is positive evidence of eyewitnesses that Birhana Road is crowded road full of pedestrians and vehicular traffic. The driver of the truck while driving at high speed without hooting its horn dashed against the rickshaw, The statements of eye-witnesses as discussed earlier leave no room for any doubt that the driver was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. Moreover, in the absence of testimony of the driver who was the best person to depose about the reason for the accident, the Tribunal was not justified in recording a finding on presumptions which are unwarranted by the evidence on record. We, therefore, hold that the driver was guilty of rash and negligent driving.
6. The provisions contained in Section 110-A to S. 110-D, Motor Vehicles Act, have been enacted by Parliament providing for compensation to the dependents of the victims of the road traffic through summary trial before a Tribunal with a view to expedite proceedings and to grant immediate relief to the suffering dependents as the road accidents are one of the top killers in our country. These provisions are in the nature of the welfare legislation. The Tribunal while dealing with the cases arising under the said provisions should keep in mind the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in N.K.V Brothers (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal ((1980) 3 SCC 457 : AIR 1980 SC 1354). In that case V.R Krishna Iyer, J. spoke thus (Para 3):—
“Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunal must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes.”
7. We are constrained to observe that the Tribunal succumbed to niceties and technicalities and mystic maybes as a result of which the claimants were denied compensation even in the case where accident did occur causing death of Laxmi Devi. The Tribunal ignored the direct testimony of witnesses on technicalities and for unjustified reasons and it proceeded to accept the unproved plea raised in the written statement of the respondents. On appraisal of evidence on record we find that the driver was guilty of rash and negligent driving of the truck.
8. The question then arises as to what amount of compensation the claimants are entitled. Mahabir Prasad PW 5 husband of the deceased lady stated that Smt. Laxmi Devi was employed as a teacher in Junior High School in Sultanpur where she was getting a salary of Rs. 350/- per mensem. In addition to her salary she was earning a sum of Rs. 160/- by giving private tuitions to the students and from embroidery. Thus in all Smt. Laxmi Devi was earning a sum of Rs. 283/- or Rs. 510/- per mensem. She was living at Sultanpur with her two daughters. Mahabir Prasad her husband was employed in the railways and he was living separately at his place of posting. He retired from service in 1974. Mahabir Prasad deposed that Laxmi Devi used to maintain her two daughters and on account of her death he has been put to pecuniary loss of Rs. 50,000/- Smt. Laxmi Devi was aged 36 years on the date of accident. She would have continued in service up to the age of 60 years. Even on a conservative view she must have been contributing at least Rs. 100/- towards the maintenance of her daughters and she may have been spending the remaining amount of Rs. 180/- on her own person. The claimants were thus put to pecuniary loss of Rs. 1,200/- per year. The claimants were deprived of this amount for 24 years. Thus in all the pecuniary loss comes to Rs. 28,800/-. In our opinion, there should be deduction from this amount at the rate of 25% on account of lump sum payment being made to the claimants. After such deduction the claimants are entitled to recover Rs. 21,600/- as damages from the respondents.
9. There is no dispute that the driver Gyan Singh was driving the vehicle in the course of his employment and as such the owner of the vehicle is responsible for the tortious act of his servant, the owner is thus responsible for the damages. The insurance company is, however, liable to indemnify the owner to the extent of Rs. 20,000/- as in April, 1969 the liability of the insurer under S. 95 was to the extent of Rs. 20,000/- only. The remaining amount is payable by the owner to the claimants.
10. In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the award of the Tribunal. We hold that the claimants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 21,600/- as damages, out of which the insurance company is liable to pay Rs. 20,000/- and the remaining amount of Rs. 1,600/- is liable to be recovered from Gur Saran Singh. The respondents will further be liable to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of making the claim petition (15-10-1969).
11. The claimants are entitled to their costs throughout.
12. Order accordingly.
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