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State Of U.P And Others v. Surendra Kumar .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent, Surendra Kumar, is a partner in a firm functioning as a City Booking Agent for the Northern Railway at Kanpur. The Sales Tax Officer seized certain goods from the City Booking Office, leading to proceedings before the Court of the Ist Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM), Kanpur. Although a criminal case was registered under several provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the respondent was not named as an accused.
On 20-4-2002, the ACJM ordered release of the seized goods to the respondent upon his furnishing a personal bond of Rs 1,00,000. Seeking relief from this condition, the respondent filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) before the Allahabad High Court. On 21-5-2002, the High Court modified the ACJM’s order and dispensed with the requirement of the personal bond, thereby disposing of the Section 482 application.
Subsequently, on 1-7-2002, the respondent filed another application before the High Court, styled as one for “modification,” requesting directions restraining State authorities from searching or seizing goods in the custody of the City Booking Agency and from interfering with its functioning. On 20-9-2002, the High Court granted these additional directions.
The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s order dated 20-9-2002.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court, after having finally disposed of the original Section 482 CrPC application, possessed jurisdiction to entertain a subsequent “modification” application that effectively sought a review of its earlier order.
- Whether, in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court could issue directions restraining State authorities from searching or seizing goods and from interfering with the functioning of the City Booking Agency—reliefs unrelated to the original bond condition.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State of Uttar Pradesh)
- The second application was, in substance, a review petition; the High Court lacks power to review its own orders passed under Section 482 CrPC.
- The reliefs sought in the “modification” application were unrelated to, and beyond the scope of, the High Court’s earlier order that merely waived the personal bond requirement.
Respondent (Surendra Kumar)
- Supported the High Court’s directions, asserting they were consistent with a Division Bench judgment holding that goods in the custody of a City Booking Agency cannot be seized.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court characterized the High Court’s impugned order as “wholly unwarranted.” Once the High Court allowed the respondent’s initial Section 482 application and dispensed with the personal bond requirement, nothing further remained. The subsequent application, although labeled one for “modification,” amounted to a request for review—an action beyond the High Court’s authority under Section 482 CrPC.
The Court emphasized that the impugned directions did not stem from any judicial order under challenge, nor did they relate to an abuse of process or manifest injustice—traditional grounds for invoking Section 482. Such directions could arise, if at all, from the High Court’s writ jurisdiction, not its inherent criminal jurisdiction. Accordingly, entertaining and granting the second application constituted an excess of jurisdiction.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court order dated 20-9-2002 set aside.
Immediate Effect: The restraining directions against the State authorities are vacated, restoring the legal position to what it was after the High Court’s earlier order of 21-5-2002. Broader Impact: The decision underscores that the High Court cannot review or enlarge its final orders passed under Section 482 CrPC through subsequent “modification” applications; any wider relief must be pursued in appropriate writ proceedings.
B.P Singh, J.— The application for intervention is refused.
2. The State of U.P, the appellant herein has impugned the order passed by a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court dated 20-9-2002 in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 4909 of 2002. The learned Judge, by his aforesaid order, modified his earlier order passed on 21-5-2002 which was an order passed on an application filed by the respondent under Section 482 CrPC.
3. The facts of the case are that the respondent Surendra Kumar is a partner of a firm which has been appointed as the City Booking Agent of the Northern Railway having its office in Kanpur. It appears that the Sales Tax Officer seized certain goods from the aforesaid City Booking Office of the respondent and in connection therewith a proceeding was initiated which was pending before the Court of the Ist ACJM, Kanpur. A criminal case was registered under Sections 420, 468, 471, 481, 482 and 120-B IPC but it is not in dispute that the respondent is not an accused in that case which is against unknown persons. A prayer was made before the learned ACJM for release of the goods seized by the Sales Tax Authorities. After considering the matter, by an order dated 20-4-2002 the ACJM directed that the goods be released in favour of the respondent Surendra Kumar subject to his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs 1,00,000.
4. This order of the ACJM was impugned before the High Court by the respondent in an application filed under Section 482 CrPC. The prayer in the said application was as follows:
“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the part of the order dated 20-4-2002 (Annexure 7 to the affidavit) passed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ist, Kanpur Nagar, in Case No. 21 of 2001 (State v. Unknown) to the extent only by which the court below has directed the applicant to file personal bond of Rs one lakh in the Court.
It is further prayed that this Hon'ble Court may further be pleased to pass an order directing the court below not to compel the applicant to file personal bond of Rs one lakh in the court, and direct Opposite Party 2 that they may check and seize the goods only after the delivery of the goods to the consignee by the applicant.
And/or pass such other and further order which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.”
5. The High Court by its order dated 21-5-2002 allowed the application and modified the order of the ACJM to the extent that the respondent shall not be required to file personal bond of Rs 1,00,000. The application under Section 482 CrPC was accordingly, disposed of. It appears that thereafter on 1-7-2002 the respondent moved another application for modification of the order dated 21-5-2002 in which the following prayer was made:
“… modify the order dated 21-5-2002 … restraining the opposite parties from search and seizure of the goods etc. which are lying at the railway station or in the custody of City Booking Agency prior to delivery of goods to its consignee … restrain the opposite parties from interfering in the functioning of the City Booking Agency by illegal mode of seizure under Section 102 CrPC….”
6. The High Court by its impugned order allowed the application. The operative part of the order reads as follows:
“I agree with the argument and accordingly, direct that Opposite Parties 2 and 3 shall not search and seize the goods lying at the railway station or in the custody of the City Booking Agency of the applicant prior to their delivery to the consignees and they shall also not interfere in the functioning of the City Booking Agency. The order dated 21-5-2002 is modified accordingly.”
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of U.P submitted that the High Court having disposed of the application filed under Section 482 CrPC, the respondent could not have asked for modification of that order which really amounted to a review of the order. He further submitted that the application for modification of the order is not really an application for modification because the prayer made in the application has no relationship whatsoever with the order passed earlier, namely, absolving the respondent of his liability to furnish personal bond in the sum of Rs 1,00,000. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent sought to support the order submitting that what the High Court has done is only in accordance with the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court wherein it was held that the goods, as long as they are in the custody of the City Booking Agency, cannot be seized.
8. We are of the view that the impugned order passed by the High Court was wholly unwarranted. The respondent had moved the High Court only for setting aside that part of the order of the ACJM whereby he had required the respondent to furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs 1,00,000. That prayer was allowed. Nothing further remained to be done. In the garb of an application for modification of that order, the respondent could not file an application which was in effect a review application praying for other reliefs. Yet the High Court passed an order directing the appellants not to search and seize the goods lying at the railway station or in the custody of the City Booking Agency of the applicant prior to the delivery to the consignees. It has further directed that the appellants shall not interfere in the functioning of the City Booking Agency. These are matters which were entirely beyond the scope of the application under Section 482 CrPC and if, we may say so, beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. It does not arise out of any order passed by a court, nor was there any allegation of abuse of the process of the court, nor was it a case of manifest injustice caused to a party. A direction like the one which the High Court has given in its impugned order could be given by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in an appropriate case and not under Section 482 CrPC. In any event, since the application under Section 482 stood disposed of, the review of that order by the High Court in the garb of modifying that order is wholly unwarranted. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 20-9-2002.
9. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
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