H.P Mineral & Industrial Development Corporation Employees' Union v. State Of H.P And Others

Order

1. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated 16-3-1992 dismissing the writ petition (CWP No. 980 of 1985) filed by the appellant-Union and allowing the writ petition (CWP No. 650 of 1995) filed by the Himachal Pradesh Wool Processors Ltd., Respondent 3 (hereinafter referred to as “the respondent-Company”). The petitioners in both the said writ petitions were assailing the award dated 7-7-1985, made by the Industrial Tribunal, Himachal Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”).

2. The H.P Wool Processors Ltd. was incorporated as a public limited company under the Companies Act, 1956 in 1974 and it started production sometime in January 1976. It was a subsidiary of the H.P Mineral and Industrial Development Corporation and was wholly managed and controlled by the Government of Himachal Pradesh. It did not turn out to be a viable undertaking and it continued to suffer losses from year to year. The Board of Directors of the respondent-Company, therefore, in the meeting held on 6-8-1983, decided to close the undertaking. On the same date it was also decided that the State Government may be moved for waiving the notice of 60 days required to be given under Section 25-FFA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). By order dated 9-8-1983 the State Government granted exemption from complying with the provisions of Section 25-FFA of the Act. Thereafter, on 10-8-1983, the respondent-Company issued an order for the closure of the undertaking with effect from 13-8-1983 and terminated the services of all the employees barring those necessary to maintain a minimum of administrative functions. The workmen were paid one month's pay in lieu of notice, closure compensation, gratuity, amount in lieu of leave due and earned wages due to them. The appellant-Union, representing the workmen of the respondent-Company whose services were terminated, raised an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication to the Tribunal by the Government of Himachal Pradesh. The Tribunal by its Award dated 7-7-1985 held that Section 25-N of the Act was attracted which required three months' notice to be given before retrenchment and since only one month's wages in lieu of notice were paid, the Tribunal directed that the workmen be paid wages for two months.

3. Feeling aggrieved by the said Award writ petitions were filed in the High Court by the appellant-Union as well as by the respondent-Company. The High Court has observed that Section 25-O of the Act which provided for the procedure for closure of an undertaking had been struck down by this Court in its decision Excel Wear v. Union of India (1978) 4 SCC 224, (1979) 1 SCR 1009 and the amended provisions of Section 25-O, which were introduced by Act 46 of 1982, came into force on 28-8-1984 and were not in operation on the day of the closure of the industry and that the provisions of Section 25-N of the Act had been held to be unconstitutional by the High Courts of Madras and Rajasthan in K.V Rajendran v. Dy. Commr. of Labour (1980) 2 LLJ 275 (Mad) and J.K Synthetics v. Union of India (1984) 48 FLR 125 (Raj). The High Court has held that the workmen could not invoke the protection of either of these two provisions and that the only protection that was available to them was that contained in Sections 25-FFA and 25-FFF of the Act and that the said provisions had been complied with by the respondent-Company. On that view of the matter, the High Court felt that no relief could be granted to the workmen. The High Court, therefore, set aside the Award of the Tribunal insofar as it awarded two months' wages to the workmen and held that the workmen were not entitled to any relief.

4. Shri M.R Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Union, has urged that the High Court was in error in not applying Section 25-N of the Act and in support of his aforesaid submission he has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Workmen v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (1992) 3 SCC 336 wherein the validity of the provisions of Section 25-N of the Act, as originally enacted, has been upheld and the decisions of the Madras and Rajasthan High Courts aforementioned have been reversed. The submission of Shri Sharma is that since termination of services of the workmen constitutes retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the Act the provisions of Section 25-N were applicable to the present case and the workmen could be retrenched only by giving three months' notice which was not given in this case.

5. We are unable to accept this contention. It is no doubt true that in Section 2(oo) the expression ‘retrenchment’ is defined to mean the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action and categories referred to in clauses (a) to (c) have been expressly excluded from the ambit of the said definition. But as far back as in 1957 a Constitution Bench of this Court in Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A.D Divikar 1957 SCR 121, AIR 1957 SC 121, (1957) 1 LLJ 243 had laid down that ‘retrenchment’ under Section 2(oo) of the Act would not cover termination of services of all workmen as a result of the closure of the business. The said decision was considered by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1990) 3 SCC 682, (1990) 3 SCR 111, wherein it has been observed: (SCR pp. 140-42, 143 and 152-53 :, 710 and 718-19, paras 52, 53 and 76)

“Mr V.A Bobde submits, and we think rightly, that the sole reason for the decision in Hariprasad 1957 SCR 121, AIR 1957 SC 121, (1957) 1 LLJ 243 was that the Act postulated the existence and continuance of an industry and where the industry, i.e, the undertaking, itself was closed down or transferred, the very substratum disappeared and the Act could not regulate industrial employment in the absence of an industry. The true position in that case was that Sections 2(oo) and 25-F could not be invoked since the undertaking itself ceased to exist.

The judgments in Sundara Money (1976) 1 SCC 822 and the subsequent decisions in the line could not be held to be per incuriam inasmuch as in Hindustan Steel (1976) 4 SCC 222 and Santosh Gupta (1980) 3 SCC 340 cases, the Division Benches of this Court had referred to Hariprasad case 1957 SCR 121, AIR 1957 SC 121, (1957) 1 LLJ 243 and rightly held that its ratio did not extend beyond a case of termination on the ground of closure and as such it would not be correct to say that the subsequent decisions ignored a binding precedent.

For the purpose of harmonious construction, it can be seen that the definitions contained in Section 2 are subject to there being anything repugnant in the subject or context. In view of this, it is clear that the extended meaning given to the term ‘retrenchment’ under clause (oo) of Section 2 is also subject to the context and the subject-matter. Section 25-F prescribed the conditions precedent to a valid retrenchment of workers as discussed earlier. Very briefly, the conditions prescribed are the giving of one month's notice indicating the reasons for retrenchment and payment of wages for the period of notice. Section 25-FF provides for compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings. Very briefly, it provides that every workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in an undertaking immediately before such transfer shall be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-F as if the workman had been retrenched. (emphasis supplied) Section 25-FFA provides that sixty days' notice must be given of intention to close down any undertaking and Section 25-FFF provides for compensation to workmen in case of closing down of undertakings. Very briefly stated Section 25-FFF which has been already discussed lays down that ‘where an undertaking is closed down for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such closure shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-F, as if the workman had been retrenched’.”

(emphasis supplied)

6. From the aforementioned observations it is evident that the definition of ‘retrenchment’ as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Act has to be read in the context of Sections 25-FF and 25-FFF of the Act and if thus read ‘retrenchment’ under Section 2(oo) does not cover termination of service as a result of closure or transfer of an undertaking though such termination has been assimilated to retrenchment for certain purposes, namely, the compensation payable to the workmen whose services are terminated as a result of such closure. In that view of the matter Section 25-N which deals with retrenchment cannot apply to the present case where termination of the services of the workmen was brought about as a result of the closure of the undertaking.

7. There is one more reason why Section 25-N cannot be made applicable to the workmen in the present case. Sections 25-N and 25-O were inserted in the Act by Act No. 32 of 1976 whereby Chapter V-B was introduced in the Act. Section 25-N imposed restrictions in the matter of retrenchment of workmen employed in large undertakings while Section 25-O dealt with the procedure for closing down such undertakings. Section 25-O was held to be unconstitutional by this Court in Excel Wear case (1978) 4 SCC 224, (1979) 1 SCR 1009. The striking down of Section 25-O would not, ipso facto, result in enlargement of the ambit of Section 25-N so as to cover termination of services of workmen as a result of closure which was otherwise outside the ambit of Section 25-N. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of Shri Sharma that Section 25-N was applicable in the present case and it was obligatory for the Management of the respondent-Company to give three months' notice as required by Section 25-N. Since Section 25-O was not available on account of the said provision having been struck down by this Court the only protection that was available to the workmen whose services were terminated as a result of closure was that contained in Sections 25-FFA and 25-FFF of the Act. It is not disputed that both these provisions have been complied with in the present case.

8. Another contention that has been urged by Shri Sharma was that before the closure of the undertaking the workmen were asked to give their option either for absorption by the State Government in some government departments/public sector undertakings or for having retrenchment benefits by the respondent-Company by order dated 19-7-1983 and that in response to the said order the workmen had given their option for absorption in government service or in the service of any other corporation. The submission is that in view of the fact that the workmen were required to exercise their option in this regard and the workmen having exercised their option for absorption it was obligatory on the part of the State Government to have absorbed the workmen in government service or in the service of some other public sector corporation. In this connection, it may be mentioned that the appellant-Union had earlier filed a writ petition (CWP No. 518 of 1984) in the High Court wherein question of absorption was raised but the said writ petition was dismissed in view of the dispute having been referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. The said order of the High Court in the writ petition has become final insofar as the absorption of the workmen is concerned. Moreover, no direction can be given to the State Government to absorb the workmen in government service or in other public sector corporation because in the order dated 19-7-1983 no specific assurance was given regarding absorption to the workmen. In the said order it was stated: “The option will not be taken as granted and the final decision vests with the Management/State Government.” The order passed by this Court in G. Govinda Rajulu v. A.P State Construction Corpn. 1986 Supp SCC 651 on which reliance has been placed by Shri Sharma, cannot, therefore, assist the appellant-Union in the present case.

9. Shri Sharma has also invited our attention to the order passed by this Court on 26-7-1991 in (Himachal Worsted Mills Staff Assn. v. State of H.P CA No. 2957 of 1991) wherein it was directed that compensation at the rate of Rs 40,000 per person in full and final settlement of the claim for compensation should be paid to the workmen whose services were terminated on account of closure of the Himachal Worsted Mills Ltd. The said order made in the facts and circumstances of that case cannot be applied to the present case because here we find that the workmen have been paid compensation and the benefits in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

10. The appeal, therefore, fails and it is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.