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Hem Raj v. The State (Delhi Administration) .
Factual and Procedural Background
Hem Raj (the appellant) was tried alongside three co-accused for the fatal stabbing of Ravinder Kumar on 5 October 1972 at Arya Nagar, Delhi. Although charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder committed in furtherance of common intention, the trial court convicted only Hem Raj under Section 302 IPC simpliciter and sentenced him to life imprisonment, acquitting the remaining three accused (Madan Lal, Naresh and Daulat Ram). The Delhi High Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 157 of 1974, affirmed the conviction and sentence. Hem Raj then filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging both courts’ concurrent findings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC could be sustained when the same eyewitness testimony had been disbelieved as against the three co-accused.
- Whether, on the facts proved, the offence made out was murder punishable under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The eyewitnesses were unreliable because their testimony regarding participation of the three acquitted co-accused had been rejected; therefore the same testimony should not be relied upon solely to convict the appellant.
- Given the constructive charge under Section 302/34 IPC against all four accused, convicting the appellant alone under Section 302 IPC was legally unsustainable.
The opinion does not set out detailed prosecutorial arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616 | Single-blow incidents arising out of sudden quarrel may attract Section 304 Part II, not Section 302, where intention to cause death is not proved. | Cited to support downgrading the conviction from murder to culpable homicide. |
| Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 245 | Absence of premeditation and single fatal injury indicates knowledge, not intention, justifying conviction under Section 304 Part II. | Relied upon to assess mens rea of appellant. |
| Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 484 | Guidelines for distinguishing clauses (b) & (c) of Section 299/300 when only knowledge can be inferred. | Used to conclude that clause III of Section 300 IPC was inapplicable. |
| Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 185 | Sudden fight without premeditation usually falls under Section 304 Part II. | Supported finding that incident occurred in heat of passion. |
| Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 342 | Principle that knowledge of likelihood of death, absent intent to kill, attracts Section 304 Part II. | Followed to modify conviction and sentence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Credibility of Eyewitnesses: The Supreme Court carefully scrutinised the testimony of PWs 16, 17 and 21, concluding it was consistent, natural and unshaken. Their presence at the scene was independently corroborated (e.g., PW 16’s own injury). Hence the appellant’s challenge to their reliability was rejected.
2. Conviction of Single Accused: The Court held there was no legal bar to convicting the appellant alone under Section 302 IPC because the evidence established it was he—and he alone—who inflicted the fatal stab; the constructive liability under Section 34 IPC therefore became irrelevant.
3. Nature of the Offence: Analysing the surrounding circumstances—previous family dispute, sudden quarrel outside PW 16’s house, single stab delivered “within a minute”, absence of premeditation—the Court inferred that the incident occurred in the heat of passion. It therefore ruled out both clause I and clause III of Section 300 IPC, finding that the appellant lacked the specific intention required for murder but possessed knowledge that the act was likely to cause death.
4. Precedential Support: The Court relied on a line of its own earlier judgments (listed above) that convert murder convictions to culpable homicide in similar single-blow, sudden-quarrel situations.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Conviction under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment are set aside. The appellant is instead convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven (7) years. The appeal is otherwise dismissed, and the appellant is directed to surrender to serve the remaining sentence.
Implications: The decision affirms the principle that in single-injury, sudden-quarrel cases, absence of intent to kill may warrant conviction under Section 304 Part II rather than murder under Section 302. No new legal test was created, but the judgment reinforces existing jurisprudence and provides further guidance for trial courts on appropriate charging and sentencing in similar factual scenarios.
S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.— The above appeal is preferred by the second accused before the trial court, namely, Hem Raj challenging the correctness of the judgment made in Criminal Appeal No. 157 of 1974 on the file of the High Court of Delhi confirming the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to imprisonment for life and dismissing the appeal.
2. This appellant along with three others took his trial on the accusation that on October 5, 1972 at about 7.30 a.m at Gali Arya Nagar, near Arya Samaj Mandir in furtherance of common intention he committed the murder of Ravinder Kumar, the deceased herein by stabbing him with a knife. The trial court convicted only the appellant and acquitted the other accused persons 1, 3 and 4, namely, Madan Lal, Naresh and Daulat Ram.
3. The facts, material for the purpose of this appeal may, however, be briefly indicated thus:
The appellant, Hem Raj and Madan Lal are brothers. Similarly, Naresh and Daulat Ram are brothers. The deceased Ravinder Kumar was the son of PW 16, and was residing with his family near Arya Samaj Mandir, Arya Nagar, Delhi. Naresh and Daulat Ram resided in a house opposite to the house of PW 16. The appellant and his brother Madan Lal lived in a nearby street.
4. On July 14, 1971, the appellant and his brother Madan Lal along with one Bishan Chand had beaten Ravinder Kumar in respect of which a case under Section 325 IPC in Crime No. 673 of 1971 was registered on a report by Ravinder Kumar. However, on January 13, 1972 the parties compounded the offence.
5. On October 3, 1972, Daulat Ram had gone to the house of PW 16 and complained to PW 20, the wife of PW 16 that she was not permitting the wife of the appellant to come and live with her husband and abused her in filthy language. In the evening, PW 20 complained to her husband of what had happened. PW 16 tried to contact Daulat Ram, but could not meet him. So PW 16 complained to his neighbours about the incident.
6. On October 5, 1972 at about 7.30 a.m while PW 16 was standing in the verandah of his house, the appellant along with the acquitted accused persons came there and shouted. On hearing the hue and cry, Ravinder Kumar came outside. Accused Madan and Naresh (since acquitted) caught hold of Ravinder and Daulat (since acquitted) instigated the appellant to kill Ravinder. The appellant took out a knife from his pyjama and inflicted a stab on the chest of Ravinder. When PW 16 tried to intervene, he was hit with a stone on his nose by Daulat Ram. After causing injuries to Ravinder and PW 16, all the accused took to their heels by the side of Desh Bandhu Gupta Road. Ravinder ran after the accused for a short distance and fell down. PW 19, the neighbour of PW 16 with the help of another person removed the injured Ravinder to Irwin Hospital where the Medical Officer on examination pronounced Ravinder dead.
7. PW 18, another son of PW 16 informed the Police Control Room about the occurrence over telephone. The Police Control Room in turn informed the concerned police station. PW 23, the Sub-Inspector of Police on receipt of the information reached the hospital and recorded the statement (Ex. P. 34) from PW 16. On the basis of Ex. P. 34, a case was registered. PW 3 who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased found the following fatal injury which is described as injury No. 3 in the post-mortem certificate besides 3 abrasions. Injury No. 3 is described as follows:
“Incised punctured wound 2 × 1 cm. oblique 5 cm. away from mid line and 8 cm. below left nipple just inside and mid-clavicular line on the left side from the chest. The upper outer end of the injury was rounded while the lower inner end was with clean cut. Blood was coming out of it and it was chest cavity deep.”
8. On internal examination, injury No. 3 was found going medially upwards, first below the skin in subcutaneous tissue, then entering the chest cavity from the angle below costasternal junction near xiphoid process — cutting the rib near it, then going in the chest cavity below sternum, cutting the recess of the left lung and then the right border of the heart i.e the right ventricular in its full thickness measuring 1.6 cms. The opinion of the Medical Officer was that injury No. 3 could have been caused by a sharp edged weapon and it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
9. PW 22, another Medical Officer examined PW 16 at about 7.25 p.m on the same day and found on his person an abrasion on the left side nose measuring 1″ × 1/10″. On X-ray examination, fracture of nasal bone was found. In the opinion of the Medical Officer, the injury was grievous in nature. PW 25 investigated the case with the assistance of PW 23. The accused were arrested on various dates. After completing the investigation, he laid the charge-sheet. The prosecution has examined as many as 24 witnesses and filed the relevant documents. The appellant totally denied his complicity with the offence and stated that he had been falsely implicated in this case. The trial court found the appellant guilty under Section 302 IPC (simpliciter) and consequently convicted and sentenced him as aforementioned. On appeal, the High Court confirmed the judgment of the trial court. Hence this present appeal.
10. The fact that Ravinder had succumbed to the injury sustained by him on October 5, 1972 cannot be disputed. The actual occurrence is spoken to by PWs 16, 17 and 21 of whom PW 16 is the father of the deceased. The presence of PW 16 at the scene cannot be disputed for the reasons — firstly that the occurrence took place in front of the house of PW 16 and secondly PW 16 himself sustained fracture on his nose on being his with a stone. PW 17 is a neighbour of PW 16. PW 21 had gone to Arya Nagar to see his relation at the time of the occurrence. All these three witnesses consistently testify that the appellant stabbed the deceased with a knife. As the occurrence had taken place in broad daylight, the question of identity of the appellant does not arise. On carefully scanning the evidence of these three witnesses, we, without any reservation, agree with the concurrent findings of the courts below that it was the appellant and appellant alone who inflicted the injury on the deceased. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, besides attacking the testimony of these witnesses urged that when the major portion of the prosecution case relating to the participation of the other three accused has been disbelieved, there can be no justification to convict the appellant alone relying on the same evidence of the witnesses, especially when there was a constructive charge against all the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Both the contentions in our view do not merit consideration. The evidence of the eye-witnesses for the reasons aforementioned inspires confidence and commands acceptance at the hands of this Court. Nothing tangible to discredit the testimony of these witnesses is brought on record. Coming to the other contention, we may say that there is no illegality in convicting the appellant under Section 302 (simpliciter) though there was a constructive charge against all the accused inclusive of appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, since the evidence has disclosed that it was only the appellant who inflicted the injury which proved fatal.
11. The only question that remains to be considered on the established facts of the case is whether the offence committed by the appellant is the one punishable under Section 302 IPC. It transpires from the evidence that the wife of the appellant is the niece of PW 20 who is the wife of PW 16 and mother of the deceased. The complaint made against PW 20 was that she was not allowing the wife of the appellant to live with him. Taking the cause of the appellant, the acquitted accused Daulat Ram went to the house of PW 16 on October 3, 1972 at 12.30 p.m and questioned the conduct of PW 20 in interfering with the family affairs of the appellant, reprimanded her and also threatened her with dire consequences. PW 20 had reported this incident to her husband, PW 16 on that evening. Thereupon PW 16 tried to meet Daulat, but could not do so. So he complained the matter to the neighbours. This was the proximate cause according to the prosecution for the perpetration of this crime.
12. On the day of occurrence at 7.30 a.m when PW 16 was standing in the verandah of his house, the appellant and his three other associates came there and threw a challenge stating that they would prove the complaint of PW 16 as baseless. On hearing the sudden outcry, the deceased who was inside the house rushed outside and thereafter this unfortunate incident had occurred. The background of the situation reveals that PW 16 was aggrieved at the conduct of Daulat for having reprimanded his wife on October 3, 1972. Therefore, it is but natural when the appellant and three others threw a challenge, PW 16 would also have been infuriated. The deceased who was in the prime of his youth and who should have felt aggrieved at the conduct of the appellant and others for having reprimanded his mother and thereafter having picked up a quarrel with his father, had rushed outside the house evidently to take side with his father. It was under that circumstance the appellant inflicted a single stab resulting in his death.
13. In our considered view, a true and accurate version of the prosecution as to the origin and genesis of the occurrence is not brought out clearly. Nonetheless, it is inferable from the circumstances that the occurrence had happened in a spur of moment and in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. The above inference is fortified by the admission of PW 17 admitting that both the appellants and the deceased suddenly grappled with each other and the entire occurrence was over within a minute. Thus, it is clear that it was during the course of the sudden quarrel the appellant gave a single stab which unfortunately landed on the chest of the deceased causing an injury which in the opinion of the Medical Officer was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
14. The question is whether the appellant could be said to have caused that particular injury with the intention of causing death of the deceased. As the totality of the established facts and circumstances do show that the occurrence had happened most unexpectedly in a sudden quarrel and without premeditation during the course of which the appellant caused a solitary injury, he could not be imputed with the intention to cause death of the deceased or with the intention to cause that particular fatal injury; but he could be imputed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. Because in the absence of any positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the deceased with the intention of causing death or intentionally inflicted that particular injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, neither clause I nor clause III of Section 300 IPC will be attracted. We are supported in this view by a series of decisions of this Court, namely, (1) Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana (1981) 3 SCC 616, (2) Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab (1981) 4 SCC 245, (3) Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab (1981) 4 SCC 484, (4) Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab (1982) 3 SCC 185 and (5) Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 342. Following the ratio of the aforementioned decisions, we hold in the present case that the offence committed by the appellant is the one punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC but not under Section 302 IPC.
15. In the result, we set aside the conviction under Section 302 and the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed therefor, instead convict him under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7 years. In the result, the appeal is dismissed subject to the modifications as indicated above. We direct the appellant to surrender before the trial court to undergo the remaining unserved portion of the sentence.
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