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Om Prakash Khadaria v. Navratan Mal & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner (plaintiff) filed a writ petition under Article 227 challenging an order dated 21.7.2012 passed by the Civil Judge (J.D.), Nohar in Civil Original Suit No. 75/2011. The impugned order had allowed an application by respondent No.1 under Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and stayed proceedings in Civil Suit No. 75/2011 until disposal of a second appeal pending before this Court.
Chronology (as stated in the opinion):
- 1996: Petitioner filed a suit for eviction under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 ("Act of 1950") on the ground of material alteration; the suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge (J.D.), Nohar.
- The petitioner appealed; the Additional District Judge, Nohar allowed the appeal and passed a decree for eviction on the ground of material alteration (judgment dated 23.2.1999).
- The respondent (defendant) preferred a second appeal before this Court (registered as S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 104/99), and a stay on execution of the appellate decree is operating in that second appeal.
- 1.4.2003: The Act of 1950 was repealed and the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 ("Act of 2001") came into force.
- 15.3.2011: After repeal, the petitioner served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and terminated the tenancy.
- Subsequently the petitioner filed Civil Original Suit No. 75/2011 for eviction under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
- Respondent filed an application under Section 10 CPC seeking a stay of the subsequent suit pending the second appeal; the trial court allowed that application on 21.7.2012 and stayed suit No. 75/2011 until disposal of the second appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court erred in allowing the respondent's application under Section 10 CPC and staying proceedings in Civil Original Suit No. 75/2011 when the earlier suit (under the Act of 1950) and the subsequent suit (after termination under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act) arose from different causes of action.
- Whether a subsequent eviction suit filed after repeal of the old rent law (Act of 1950) and after serving notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is maintainable when a second appeal in relation to the earlier suit is pending.
- Whether principles of res judicata or the procedural requirements of Section 32 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 / Order 6 Rule 17 CPC preclude the filing of the subsequent suit or justify staying it.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The cause of action in the earlier suit (under the Act of 1950) and the present suit (after termination under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act) are entirely different: the earlier suit was on the ground of material alteration under the Act of 1950, whereas the present suit arises from termination of tenancy after the Act's repeal.
- Following the Supreme Court decision in National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara ((2005) 2 SCC 256 : AIR 2005 SC 242), the subsequent suit is maintainable where the cause of action is different, and proceedings in such a subsequent suit cannot be stayed merely because an earlier appeal is pending.
- Relying on Chetna Dadhich & Anr. v. Mehrunnisa & Ors. (WLC 2007 (6) Page 633 : 2008 (1) RLW (Raj.) 127), a fresh petition based on a new cause of action under the Act of 2001 is not barred and the landlord need not obtain prior permission of the court to file such a petition; accordingly the impugned order should be quashed.
Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments
- The trial court correctly allowed the Section 10 CPC application because the earlier suit (under the old Act) and the subsequent suit are for the same cause of action and a second appeal in the earlier matter is pending in this Court; accordingly the subsequent suit should be stayed.
- If a new ground arises in favour of the landlord while an earlier suit is pending, the landlord should have applied under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC in the pending appeal to incorporate new grounds, rather than institute a fresh suit; instituting a subsequent suit is improper.
- The subsequent suit is barred by the principle of res judicata (Order 2 Rule 2 CPC) because eviction suits have been filed for the same cause of action and prior grounds (material alteration and bona fide necessity) were already taken.
- Under Section 32(iii)(a) & (c) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 the petitioner was required to withdraw the earlier suit and obtain permission to file a fresh suit under the Act of 2001; failure to comply with Section 32 prevents relief. To support these submissions, respondent relied on Durga Prasad v. Radhey Shyam (AIR 1990 Rajasthan 57 : 1989 (2) RLW 99) and Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. The Union of India (AIR 1971 Calcutta 221).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara ((2005) 2 SCC 256 : AIR 2005 SC 242) | The scope and object of Section 10 CPC: to prevent simultaneous trials of two parallel suits between the same parties on the same matter in issue; Section 10 applies only where the matter in issue is directly and substantially the same so that a decision in the previous suit would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit; Section 10 is referable to civil suits and prevents conflicting findings by concurrent courts. | The Court relied on and followed the principles in this judgment. Applying its test, the Court concluded that Section 10 would not apply where the causes of action and matters in issue in the two suits are different; accordingly, the subsequent suit is permissible and the trial court's Section 10 stay was incorrect. |
| Chetna Dadhich & Anr. v. Mehrunnisa & Ors. (WLC 2007 (6) 633 : 2008 (1) RLW (Raj.) 127) | Held that a fresh petition on a new cause of action under the Act of 2001 is not barred; the landlord is not required to obtain the permission of the court to file such a fresh petition; provisions of Section 32 permit continuation of proceedings under the repealed Act, but non-withdrawal of earlier suit does not debar instituting a fresh proceeding if based on a fresh cause of action. | The Court relied on this coordinate-bench judgment to support the conclusion that a fresh suit based on a new cause of action after the repeal and enactment of the new Act is maintainable and need not be barred or stayed. |
| Durga Prasad v. Radhey Shyam (AIR 1990 Rajasthan 57 : 1989 (2) RLW 99) | (Cited by respondent) — relied upon to argue that petitioner was not entitled to relief and that procedural/statutory requirements (as argued) precluded the subsequent suit. | The Court considered this authority as cited by the respondent but expressly held that the judgments cited by the respondent were not relevant for deciding the controversy in the writ petition and therefore were not applicable to the present case. |
| Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. The Union of India (AIR 1971 Calcutta 221) | (Cited by respondent) — relied upon to support the submission that the petitioner failed to comply with relevant statutory/procedural requirements and therefore is not entitled to relief. | The Court noted this authority but found it not relevant to the controversy before it and therefore did not apply it to sustain the impugned order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps as reflected in the opinion:
- Identification of the legal character of the two suits: The earlier suit (filed under the Act of 1950) was founded on the ground of material alteration as enumerated in Section 13 of the Act of 1950, a provision that required the Court to be satisfied of specified grounds before granting eviction. The subsequent suit (filed after repeal of the Act of 1950 and after the petitioner served notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act) is founded on termination of tenancy under Section 106, a different statutory basis requiring the trial court to examine the validity of termination rather than to record the satisfactions mandated by Section 13 of the old Act.
- Application of the test in Section 10 CPC as elaborated by the Supreme Court in National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara: the Court quoted and relied on the principle that Section 10 is attracted only where "the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue" and where the whole of the subject matter in both suits is identical such that a decision in the previous suit would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit.
- Assessment of identity of causes of action: On the facts before it, the Court determined that the earlier suit under the old Act (material alteration and the Section 13 framework) and the subsequent suit based on termination under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act are different causes of action and involve different matters in issue—thus Section 10 could not be invoked to stay the subsequent suit on the basis of the pending second appeal.
- Consideration of coordinate-bench authority (Chetna Dadhich): The Court reproduced and relied upon the para from that judgment which held that a fresh petition under the new rent law is not barred if based on a fresh cause of action, even if an older suit or appeal continues under the repealed law.
- Rejection of respondent's cited authorities as irrelevant: The Court reviewed the judgments relied upon by the respondent (including Durga Prasad and Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel) and concluded they were not relevant for deciding the present controversy.
- Conclusion and remedial direction: Applying the above legal tests and precedents, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in mechanically allowing the Section 10 CPC application without appreciating the distinct nature of the subsequent cause of action, and therefore quashed the impugned order and directed the trial court to proceed to decide the suit within one year.
Holding and Implications
Holding: This writ petition is allowed; the impugned order dated 21.7.2012 is quashed and set aside.
Direct consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):
- The stay of proceedings in Civil Original Suit No. 75/2011 granted by the trial court on 21.7.2012 is vacated.
- The trial court is directed to proceed with the suit and decide it within one year from the date of the opinion.
- The Court expressly held that a subsequent eviction suit is permissible under law when the cause of action and grounds in the subsequent suit are entirely different from those in the earlier suit; the opinion follows the Supreme Court and coordinate-bench authorities on this point.
The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle; it follows the existing authorities (including the Supreme Court decision in National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences and the coordinate-bench decision in Chetna Dadhich) in concluding that Section 10 CPC does not bar a subsequent suit founded on a distinct cause of action.
Gopal Krishan Vyas, J.:— In this writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner plaintiff is challenging the validity of impugned order dated 21.7.2012 (Annex. 6) passed by Civil Judge (J.D) Nohar in Civil Original Suit No. 75/2011 and prayed that while quashing the above order, the application filed by the respondent No. 1 under Section 10 of CPC may kindly be dismissed and trial Court may be directed to proceed with the suit expeditiously.
2. As per facts of the case, a suit for eviction was filed in the year 1996 by the petitioner plaintiff on the ground of material alteration in the court of Civil Judge (J.D), Nohar under the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1950’] and the suit was dismissed by Civil Judge (J.D) Nohar. Against that judgment and decree, an appeal was preferred by the petitioner. The Additional District Judge Nohar allowed the appeal filed by the petitioner plaintiff and decree for eviction was passed in favour of the petitioner on the ground of material alteration.
3. The respondent defendant preferred second appeal before this Court against the judgment dated 23.2.1999 passed by the Additional District Judge, Nohar in appeal filed by the petitioner. The said second appeal was registered being S.B Civil Second Appeal filed by the petitioner. The said second appeal was registered being S.B Civil Second Appeal No. 104/99 which is said to be pending before this Court.
4. In the second appeal filed by the respondent defendant, stay is operating upon execution of the decree passed by the appellate court.
5. The Act of 1950 was repealed on 1.4.2003 and new Act known as Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 came into force. Thereafter on 15.3.2011 a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act was served upon the respondent No. 1 by the petitioner plaintiff and his tenancy was terminated.
6. After termination of tenancy, the petitioner plaintiff filed a civil original suit No. 75/2011 for eviction in the court of Civil Judge (J.D) Nohar under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
7. The respondent defendant filed an application under Section 10 of CPC before the trial court in the suit with the prayer that earlier suit filed by the petitioner plaintiff for eviction and this suit is also filed for eviction in both the suit parties are the same, therefore, the proceedings of subsequent suit may be stayed till final decision of second appeal pending in this Court. The trial court passed an on 21.7.2012 whereby, the application filed under Section 10 of CPC by respondent No. 1 was allowed and Civil Judge (J.D) Nohar stay ed the proceedings of civil suit No. 75/2011 till disposal of the second appeal by this Court.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that cause of action in both thee suits are different. Earlier suit was filed under the provisions of Act of 1950 on the ground of material alteration whereas, after repealing of said Act, petitioner gave notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act and terminated the tenancy thereafter, filed civil suit for eviction against thee respondent defendant, as such cause of action in both the proceedings are entirely different, therefore, trial court ought to have considered the above aspect of the matter at the time of deciding application under Section 10 of CPC.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the present suit for eviction has been filed after service of notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act for terminating the tenancy and earlier suit was filed under the Act of 1950 on the ground of material alteration, therefore, in view of judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2005) 2 SCC 256 : AIR 2005 SC 242 ‘National Institution of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. C. parameshwara’, the subsequent suit is maintainable and proceedings of that suit cannot be stayed because cause of action and grounds in both the suits are entirely different.
10. Simultaneously, learned counsel for the petition invited attention of this towards judgment rendered by this in case of Chetna Dadhich & Anr. v. Mehrunnisa & Ors. reported in WLC 2007 (6) Page 633 : 2008 (1) RLW (Raj.) 127 in which it has been held that fresh petition on new cause of action under the Act of 2001 is not barred and land lord is not required to obtain permission of the court for filing such fresh petition, therefore, the order impugned may be quashed.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that no error has been committed by the trial court in passing the impugned order dated 21.7.2012 whereby, application filed under Section 10 of CPC by the petitioner was allowed on the ground that earlier suit was preferred under the old Act on the ground of material alteration and second appeal is pending before this Court and for the same cause of action, the plaintiff has preferred subsequent suit which is not permissible under the law. According to the learned counsel for the respondent defendant if any subsequent ground arises in favour of landlord plaintiff then obviously, he was to file an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC in appeal for incorporating his grounds for eviction but instead of taking the said recourse of law, the subsequent suit has been filed, which is totally illegal.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent defendant further argued that subsequent suit is barred by principle of res judicata as per Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC because for same cause of action, an eviction suit has been filed. It is also argued that earlier the suit was filed for material alteration as per ground available under Section 13 of the Act of 1950 and at that time the ground of material alteration and bonafide necessity was taken and in the present suit also, the plaintiff landlord took ground of bonafide necessity, therefore, the subsequent suit on the ground that plaintiff was terminated the tenancy while giving notice under Section 106 of CPC is not permissible under the law. The suit is barred by principle of res judicata, therefore, no error has been committed by the trial court.
13. Learned counsel for the respondent defendant further argued that as per Sec. 32(iii)(a) & (c) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001, the petitioner plaintiff was required to withdraw the suit and to take permission to file fresh suit under the Act of 2001 but he has failed to comply with Sec. 32, therefore, there is no error in the order impugned. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondent invited my attention towards judgments reported in AIR 1990 Rajasthan 57 : 1989 (2) RLW 99 ‘Durga Prasad v. Radhey Shyam’ Para 6; AIR 1971 Calcutta 221 ‘Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. The Union of India’ Para 5 & 8 and submits that petitioner is not entitled for any relief and the order passed by the trial court is perfectly in consonance with law, therefore, the writ petition may be dismissed.
14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the entire record of the case so also impugned order passed by the trial court dated 21.7.2012 Admittedly, the earlier suit was filed under the Act of 1950 on the ground of eviction enumerated under Section 13 of the Act of 1950 in which it is specifically provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any law or a contract, no court shall pass any decree or make any order in favour of the landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent thereof to the full extent allowable by the Act unless it is specified, meaning thereby in the old Act, there is duty cast upon the Court not to pass any decree unless the parties satisfy the Court the grounds enumerated in Section 13 of the Act whereas, after repealing the said Act, the petitioner plaintiff terminated the tenancy as per Section 106 of the Transfer Property Act, 1882 because this ground is available to him after repealing the old Act and the trial court in the suit filed after terminating the tenancy, is required to see validity of termination of tenancy not to record the satisfaction as provided in Section 13 of the Act of 1950, therefore/obviously both the suit have been filed for separate cause of action but trial court failed to consider this aspect of the matter and straightaway allowed the application filed under Section 10 of the CPC.
15. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences (Supra) has made following adjudication in para 8 of the judgment:—
“8. The object underlying Section 10 is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. The object underlying Section 10 is to avoid two parallel trials on the same issue by two Courts and to avoid recording of conflicting findings on issues which are directly and substantially in issue in previously instituted suit. The language of Section 10 suggests that it is referable to a suit instituted in the civil Court and it cannot apply to proceedings of other nature instituted under any other statute. The object of Section 10 is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits between the same parties in respect of the same matter in issue. The fundamental test to attract Section 10 is, whether on final decision being reached in the previous suit, such decision would operate as res-judicata in the subsequent suit. Section 10 applies only in cases where the whole of the subject matter in both the suits is identical. The key words in Section 10 are “the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue” in the previous instituted suit. The words “directly and substantially in issue” are used in contra-distinction to the words “incidentally or collaterally in issue.” Therefore, Section 10 would apply only if there is identity of the matter in issue in both the suits, meaning thereby, that the whole of subject matter in both the proceedings is identical.”
16. Likewise, in the judgment rendered by co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Chetna Dadhich (supra), this Court has held that fresh petition on new cause of action under the Act of 2001 is not barred and landlord not required to obtain permission of Court for filing fresh petition. The relevant Para 6 of the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:—
“6. Right has therefore been conferred on the plaintiff/appellant to continue the proceedings under the old Act for which Clause (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 32 provides that all prosecutions Instituted under the provisions of the repealed Act shall be effective and disposed of in accordance with such repealed law, including the right of appeal which has been provided in Clause (b) providing that “the provision for appeal under the repealed Act shall continue in force in respect of applications, suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder”. If however the plaintiff does not decide to withdraw the suit or the appeal in case the suit or appeal is pending at the time of commencement of Act of 2001, it would be continued and decided in accordance with old law. Such non withdrawal of suit or appeal however does not debar instituting a fresh proceeding by filing fresh petition under any of the provisions of the Act of 2001 provided it is based on a fresh cause of action, though nature of ground for ejectment may even be; same.”
17. I have perused the judgments cited by learned counsel for the respondent also on the ground of res judicata. In my opinion, those judgments are not relevant for the purpose of deciding the controversy raised in this writ petition, therefore, the judgments cited by learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff are not applicable for deciding the present case.
18. In view of above, while following the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences (Supra), this writ petition is allowed for the reason that subsequent suit is permissible under the law, if cause of action and grounds are entirely different than the earlier suit. Consequently, the impugned order dated 21.7.2012 is hereby quashed and set aside and trial court is directed to proceed in the suit and decide the same with one year.
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