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Umrao Singh v. The Commissioner Khudkasht, Rajasthan Jaipur
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Tyagi, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioners: Umrao Singh and five other residents of village Bichpuri, Tehsil Behror, District Alwar.
Respondents Nos. 3 and 4: Vinayak Dutt and Laxmi Kant, who were erstwhile Muafidars of lands in village Chittor, Tehsil Rajgarh, District Alwar. Their muafi was resumed under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (the Act). After resumption, they applied (21 April 1962) to the Deputy Collector (Jagirs), Alwar, for allotment of khudkasht lands including Khasra 600 in village Bichpuri (46 Bighas).
The villagers of Bichpuri objected that (a) no notice had been given before allotment, and (b) the land was pasture land (charagah) and thus not allocable as khudkasht. The Deputy Collector (Jagirs) initially issued notice to respondents and directed status quo. The Deputy Collector framed two issues on 29 January 1963: whether the allotted land was charagah and what relief would follow. Respondents raised a jurisdictional objection that the Deputy Collector could not re-open the matter; the Deputy Collector then held he had no jurisdiction and dropped proceedings.
The Khudkasht Commissioner (on 4 April 1964) disagreed, holding the Deputy Collector could review the matter and remanded the case for disposal after hearing the parties. On remand, the Tehsildar submitted a report (3 December 1966) recording the land as charagah in settlement records and noting it had been entered in the Government papers in the allottees' names without possession being handed over.
The successor Collector (Jagirs) refused the petitioners' request to adduce further evidence on 27 November 1967, stating he was to dispose of the review under the Khudkasht Commissioner's directions after hearing the parties. The Collector ultimately dismissed the petitioners' review application on merits by order dated 23 May 1968. The petitioners appealed to the Khudkasht Commissioner, who rejected the appeal under Order XLVII, rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) on the ground that an appeal against an order rejecting a review application could not be entertained. The petitioners then filed the present writ petition challenging that rejection.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, an appellate court (here the Khudkasht Commissioner) can entertain an appeal against an order passed by a reviewing court which has dismissed a review application after having gone into the merits of the case (i.e., after the third stage of review has been reached)?
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The view taken by the Khudkasht Commissioner that he could not entertain an appeal under Order XLVII, rule 7 CPC was erroneous; the Commissioner was empowered to hear the appeal on merits.
- Pertinent factual objections by villagers: (a) no notice had been given before the allotment to the Muafidars, and (b) the land allotted (46 Bighas in village Bichpuri) was pasture land (charagah) and could not be allotted as khudkasht.
Respondents' Arguments
- Respondents contended that the Khudkasht Commissioner's interpretation of Order XLVII, rule 7 CPC was correct and that the Court should not interfere with that view. They relied on the proposition that issuance of a rule for review suspends the original judgment and, if the review is later rejected, the original decree is revived (as argued from Achyut Vishnu Patankar v. Tapibai).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Maji Mohan Kanwar v. State of Rajasthan | Held that when a review reaches the stage of rehearing on merits (the third stage), the subsequent judgment of the reviewing court constitutes a fresh decree or order. | The court relied on this decision as a direct ruling supporting the proposition that if the reviewing court hears the matter on merits, its order is a fresh decree from which an appeal lies. |
| Sha Vadilal Hakamchand v. Shah Fulchand Umedram | Explains the three-stage process of review proceedings and the legal distinction between a rule being discharged (resulting in the parties being relegated to the old decree) and a rehearing on merits (resulting in a fresh decree). | The court quoted and relied on the exposition of S. Jenkins C.J. to illustrate that a rehearing constitutes reopening the matter and leads to a fresh decree. |
| Gour Krishna Sarkar v. Nilmadhab Saha | Identified as an authority considered on the question of the effect of rehearing review applications (supporting the view that rehearing produces a fresh decree). | Referenced (via Maji Mohan Kanwar) as supporting the consistent view about the scope of Order XLVII that rehearing on merits yields a fresh decree. |
| Fakkiri Muhammad Howther v. L. Swaminatha Mudaliar | Identified as an authority considered on the same question of review and rehearing. | Referenced (via Maji Mohan Kanwar) as further support for treating a rehearing as producing a fresh decree. |
| Achyut Vishnu Patankar v. Tapibai | Holds that grant of a rule for review has the effect of holding the judgment in suspense until the review is heard; argued to mean that if review is later rejected the original decree is revived (and no fresh decree results). | The court considered this decision relied on by respondents but distinguished it as being in a different context and not controlling in the present circumstances where rehearing on merits had occurred. |
| Nibaran Sikdar v. Abdul Hakim | Identified as fortifying the view that rehearing on merits results in a fresh decree (supports Maji Mohan Kanwar). | Used as additional authority to support the consistent view regarding the scope of Order XLVII; bolstered the conclusion that an appeal lies from a reviewing court's order made after rehearing on merits. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a textual and purposive analysis of Order XLVII, CPC, identifying a three-stage scheme for review proceedings:
- Stage 1: When a review application is placed before a judge (Order XLVII, r.4(1)), the judge may summarily reject if there are no sufficient grounds or may issue a rule calling on the other side to show cause; admission at this stage is typically ex parte.
- Stage 2: After issuing notice and hearing both parties on the rule to show cause, the court decides whether the review application merits further consideration; if the court finds no merit within the scope of sub-rule (1), it may dismiss the application without entering into the merits.
- Stage 3: If the court is of the opinion that the original order ought to be re-examined, it proceeds to rehear the matter on merits (Order XLVII, r.8). At this stage the court may confirm, reverse, or modify the earlier order — and, according to the authorities relied upon, the result of such rehearing is a fresh decree or order.
The court reviewed precedent (Maji Mohan Kanwar and other High Court decisions) and quoted the exposition in Sha Vadilal Hakamchand to show the legal distinction between mere suspension/discharge of the rule and a full rehearing that reopens the matter and produces a fresh decree. It noted an alternative view from Achyut Vishnu Patankar (that a rule for review suspends the judgment and, if review is rejected, the original decree is revived) but distinguished that authority as being in a different context and not decisive in the present circumstances.
Applying the three-stage framework to the facts, the court found that the Collector (Jagirs) had passed beyond the second stage: after remand by the Khudkasht Commissioner the Collector called for reports (for example, from the Patwari/Tehsildar), framed issues on the merits earlier in the proceedings, and otherwise proceeded as if reviewing the merits. Therefore, even though the Collector ultimately dismissed the review application and refused to accept further evidence, that dismissal occurred after the reviewing court had crossed into the third stage (a rehearing on merits). Under the legal authorities, such an order is to be treated as a fresh decree or order.
Consequently, the Khudkasht Commissioner's rejection of the petitioners' appeal on the ground that he lacked power under Order XLVII, r.7 CPC to entertain an appeal against an order dismissing a review application was legally incorrect in the present facts. The Commissioner's view was set aside and the matter remanded to the Commissioner to dispose of the appeal on merits.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The order of the Khudkasht Commissioner rejecting the petitioners' appeal under Order XLVII, rule 7 CPC is set aside.
Direct Effect on the Parties:
- The case is remitted to the Khudkasht Commissioner with a direction to dispose of the appeal filed by the petitioners against the Collector's order dismissing their review application on merits.
- The petitioners are awarded their costs from respondents Nos. 3 and 4.
Broader Implications: The opinion affirms the principle, as applied by this Court, that when a reviewing court proceeds to a rehearing on merits (the third stage), its subsequent order constitutes a fresh decree or order from which an appeal lies. The opinion did not purport to lay down any additional novel precedent beyond the application of this established principle to the facts of the case.
Tyagi, J.:— Petitioner Umrao Singh along with five other residents of village Bichpuri, Tehsil Behror, District Alwar have filed this writ application praying that the order passed by the Khudkasht Commissioner dated 30th November, 1968, dismissing the petitioners' appeal be quashed and the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 be restrained from cultivating the land allotted to them as khudkasht lands.
2. The facts giving rise to this writ petition are, in a nutshell, as follows—
Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 Vinayak Dutt and Laxmi Kant were the Muafidars of certain lands in village Chittor, Tehsil Rajgarh, District Alwar. Their ‘muafi’ was resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (hereinafter called the Act). After the resumption of the said ‘muafi’ lands, the aforesaid Muafidars applied for the allotment of khudkasht lands under the provisions of the Act and they submitted an application before the Deputy Collector (Jagirs), Alwar, on 21st of April, 1962, praying that land bearing Khasra 600 in village Bichpuri measuring 46 Bighas, land bearing Khasra No. 712 in village Jogarwas measuring 20 Bighas be allotted to them as khudkasht land. It is alleged that Vinayak was an influential person and, therefore, he got the allotment of the aforesaid lands made in their favour by the authorities without complying with the requirements of the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder. The villagers of village Bichpuri. however, objected to the allotment of 46 Bighas of land in their village to the Muafidars on the ground that no notice was given to them before the allotment was made and that the land was a pasture land and as such it could not be allotted to the Muafidars as khudkasht land. On receiving the objections from the residents of the village, the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) issued notice to the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and meanwhile ordered to maintain the status quo as regards the land in dispute in village Bichpuri. After hearing the respondents Nos. 3 and 4. the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) held that the order of allotment was passed without hearing the persons interested and without making any enquiry by the Tehsildar according to the rules regarding the availability of the land, and, therefore, he proceeded to decide the merits of the application filed by the villagers. The Deputy Collector (Jagirs) framed two issues on 29th of January, 1963. (1) Whether the allotted land was Charagah of the whole village and could not be allotted? and (2) What would be the relief? At this stage the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 raised an objection of jurisdiction and submitted to the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) that he had no jurisdiction to re-open the matter which had once been finalised by the authorities. On hearing the parties, the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) came to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction to re-open the matter and therefore he dropped the proceedings. An appeal was taken against this order of the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) to the Khudkasht Commissioner. The Commissioner was, however, of the opinion that the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) could review the matter and he passed an order to that effect on 4th April, 1964 which is Ex. 8 on the record, and the case was remanded to the file of the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) with a direction that the application for review filed by the villagers may be disposed of after hearing the parties.
3. It appears that after the receipt of the record from the office of the Commissioner, the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) called for a report from the Tehsildar, Behror and the Tehsildar submitted his report dated 3rd of December, 1966, stating that according to the settlement record the land in dispute, which was allotted to Laxmi Kant & Vinayak Dutt as Khudkasht land, has been recorded as ‘charagah’. It was also mentioned therein that in spite of the order of the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) this land measuring 46 Bighas has been recorded in the name of the allottees in the Government papers and the possession thereof was never handed over to the ex-Muafidars. When the matter came up for final hearing before the Collector (Jagirs), Alwar (the post of the Deputy Collector Jagirs having been abolished), the petitioners sought to adduce evidence in support of their contention before him, but the learned Collector held that the review application pending before him was ordered to be disposod of by him under the directions issued by the Khudkasht Commissioner only after hearing the parties and, therefore, he refused to accept any evidence in support of the contention of the petitioners that the land allotted was a ‘charagah’ land. This order refusing the prayer of the petitioners to adduce evidence was dated 27th of November, 1967. Thereafter the arguments of the parties were heard by the learned Collector and he ultimately came to the conclusion that the land in dispute could be allotted for Khudkasht and therefore he rejected the review application of the petitioners by his order dated 23rd of May 1968. This order has been placed on record as Ex 12. The petitioners thereupon filed an appeal before the Khudkasht Commissioner, Rajasthan against the said order of the Collector. The Commissioner rejected this appeal observing: “Since this is not an appeal preferred against the original order under which allotment of land was made but against the order rejecting the review application, the appeal against such order cannot be entertained as provided under O XLVII, r. 7 of the C.P.C the same deserves to be rejected, and accordingly it is rejected.” It is against this order of the learned Khudkasht Commissioner that the present writ petition has been filed by the villagers of Bichpuri challenging that the view taken by the Khudkasht Commissioner of O 47, r. 7 C.P.C is erroneous and he was empowered under the law to hear the appeal of the petitioners on merits. It is in these circumstances that a prayer referred to above has been made by the petitioners.
4. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 have opposed this writ petition on the ground that the view taken by the Khudkasht Commissioner of the provisions of r. 7 of O. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is correct and, therefore, this Court should not interfere in this writ petition.
5. The rival contentions made by the parties raise an important question of law ragarding the scope of O. 47 C.P.C whether in such circumstances the appellate court could hear the appeal against the order of the reviewing court when the review application has been dismissed by the reviewing court after having gone into the merits of the case. This requires the examination of O. 47 C.P.C as a whole and to determine its true scope.
6. While examining the scheme of O. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure we find that a review petition is dealt with by the reviewing court at three stages after a review application is filed before it. The first stage is when the application for the grant of review is placed before the Judge or Judges under r. 4, sub-rule (1), At that stage if it appears to the court that there is not sufficient ground for a review it rejects the application. If there is a prima facie case for a Judge to entertain the review application as provided in R. 1 of O. 47, then a notice is issued to the opposite party to appear before the Court. Thus, it is clear that the first order is always passed admitting the review application ex parte. The next stage is reached when after hearing both the parties the Judge has to decide whether the review application should further be heard on merits or not. At this stage if the Court is of opinion that there are no merits in the review application and it does not fall within the four corners of sub-rule (1) of O. 47, then after hearing both the parties it dismisses the application and does not enter into the merits of the case. But the third stage arises only when the Court is of opinion that the former order passed by it need be looked into on merits and it is then that the Court further hears the entire case on merits Then the third stage is arrived under Rule 8 of O. 47 after the original case is registered and the Court re-hears it on merits. After re-hearing the case, the court can arrive at three conclusions (1) it may confirm its former order, (2) it may reverse the former order, or (3) it may modify it.
7. The question posed for determination, therefore, is that if the review application is disposed of after the third stage has been arrived at what is the effect of it. This Court in Maji Mohan Kanwar v. State of Rajasthan (1), after considering the decisions of Bombay High Court in Sha Vadilal Hakamchand v. Shah Fulchand Umedram (2) Calcutta High Conrt in Gour Krishna Sarkar v. Nilmadhab Saha (3) and Madras High Court in Fakkiri Muhammad Howther v. L. Swaminatha Mudaliar (4), held that in either case whether the former decree is confirmed, reversed or modified, the whole matter is re-heard by the Court and, therefore, whatever order is passed thereafter that judgment of the court results in either a fresh decree or order. It would be useful to reproduce the wordings of S. Jenkins, Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court while deciding this question of law in Sha Vadilal Hukamchand v. Sha Fulchand Umedram (2)—
“An application for review commences ordinarily with an ex parte application under sec. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court then may either reject the application at once, or may grant a rule calling on the other side to show cause why the review should not be granted. In the second stage the rule may either be admitted on rejected and it is obvious that the hearing of this rule may involve, to some extent, an investigation into the merits. If the rule is discharged then the case ends. If on the other hand, the rule is made absolute, then the third stage is reached; the case is reheard on the merits and may result in a repetition of the former decree or in some variation of it. Though in one aspect the result, whether the rule be discharged or on the rehearing the original decree, be repeated, in law there is a material difference, for, in the latter case, the whole matter having been reopened, there is a fresh decree. In the former case the parties are relagated to, and still rest on the old decree.”
8. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, relied on another Bombay case in Achyut Vishnu Patankar v. Tapibai (5) and urged that where a rule for a review of judgment is granted it has not the effect of reversing the judgment but it holds the judgment in suspense until the review application is heard, and disposed of. On the basis of these observations, learned counsel for the respondents argued that if ultimately the review application is rejected, then the effect of it is that the original decree passed by the revenue court is revived and it cannot be a fresh decree and hence no appeal can lie from the order passed by the revenue court confirming the original decree or order. It is true that their Lordships of the Bombay High Court held that when a rule for a review is issued by the court then it has the effect of keeping in suspense the judgment or order against which a review application has been preferred, but these observations of their Lordships are in different context which have nothing to do with the present circumstances of the case There is a direct ruling of the Division Bench of this Court in Maji Mohan Kanwar v. State of Rajasthani (1) and the view expressed by their Lordships in that case finds support from the Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts referred to above. There is another case of the Calcutta High Court in Nibaran Sikdar v. Abdul Hakim (6) which fortifies the view expressed by the Bench of this Court in Maji Mohan Kanwar v. State of Rajasthan (1). In my opinion, the consistent view taken by the courts about the scope of O. 47 as discussed above is correct and if the matter is heard by the reviewing court on merits, then the order passed by the reviewing court under all circumstances, whether the original order or decree is confirmed, reversed or modified, the judgment of the reviewing court shall constitute a fresh decree or order and in all circumstances an appeal can lie from the order passed by the reviewing court at the third stage. In the present case, the Collector (Jagirs) who was a successor court of the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) dismissed the review application after having reached the third stage before the Deputy Collector (Jagirs) while framing issues referred to above and come to this conclusion that the merits of the case must be reviewed and it was from that point of view that the issues on merits were framed by him. It may also be noted here that after the case was remanded by the Khudkasht Commissioner, a report from the Patwari was called by the Collector which is on the record. This procedure adopted by the Collector shows that he had crossed the second stage of the proceedings and he was, while calling for the report from the Patwari. acting after crossing the seeond stage. In this view of the matter, even though the Collector had dismissed the review application without recording any further evidence which the petitioners wanted to adduce in support of their contention, it shall be taken that the review application was dismissed by the Collector (jagir) after crossing the second stage of the proceedings and as such the order passed by the Collector (Jagirs) shall be treated as a fresh decree or order from which an appeal can lie to the Khudkasht Commissioner.
9. In view of these discussions, the order of the Khudkasht Commissioner rejecting the appeal on the ground that he was not empowered to bear the appeal under R. 7 of O 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is erroneous and it is, therefore, set aside. The case is sent back to the Khudkasht Commissioner with a direction that the learned Khudkasht Commissioner will dispose of the appeal filed by the petitioners against the order of the Collector dismissing the review application of the petitioners. The writ petitioners shall get their costs from respondents Nos. 3 & 4.
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