Ranjit Singh, J. - A short but a substantial question of law that arises for determination in the present Regular Appeal is whether Adoption Deed can be treated as testamentary disposition in favour of a person where adoption is held illegal ? This question may not be arising for the first time but it needs to be determined in the present case. 2. This Regular Second Appeal is of the year 1979 and has journeyed from the trial Court to High Court and then back to the trial Court again to reach High Court. In view of earlier order dated 10.5.1999 vide which the case was referred back from deciding the additional issue, this order may be read in continuation of the said order dated 10.5.1999. The facts, in brief, can be listed out as follows : 3. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4, 6 and respondent No. 5 (since dead) had filed a suit against appellant Sher Singh seeking declaration and possession in regard to agricultural land measuring 46 Kanals 8 Marlas situate at Village Kakaheri. As disclosed in the plaint, one Biru died on or about 12.11.1973 leaving behind the above referred respondents as his legal heirs. It was stated that Biru deceased was brother of respondent No. 1 Parsanni Devi and maternal uncle of respondent Nos. 2 to 6, and that the appellant-defendant Sher Singh had taken forcible possession of the suit land on the basis of a sham and bogus adoption deed alleged to have been executed in his favour on 9.11.1968 by Biru. Appellant-Sher Singh, as per the respondent/plaintiff, had no right, title or interest in the property of said deceased Biru. The adoption deed was stated to be null, void, ineffective, illegal, sham and bogus, as such, had no binding effect on the respondents. It was further pleaded in this regard that the said adoption deed was never executed and in case it had been so executed, then the same is shrouded by suspicious circumstances and that it was never intended to take effect. Plea was also made that Biru deceased was not competent to adopt the appellant under any provision of law and further that adoptee was not capable of being taken into adoption as he was stranger to the adoptor and was aged 16 years at the time of alleged adoption. Other averments were also made. 4. Notice in the suit was issued to the defendant-appellant. In the written statement filed, the appellant raised preliminary objection that the respondent-plaintiffs had no locus to file the suit and the said suit was not maintainable in the form it was presented. It was also stated that the suit was not within time and that the same had also not been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee. Otherwise it was admitted that Biru son of Sada was the owner of the suit land but it was denied of respondent No. 1 was his sister or that respondent Nos. 2 to 6 were his relatives, as alleged in the plaint. The appellant also took a stand that he was legally adopted son of Biru who had executed adoption deed in his favour which was duly registered before the Sub-Registrar. Further, the appellant pointed out that all the ceremonies of giving away and taking of adoption were performed according to the custom prevailing among the caste of Gujjars to which he and Biru belonged. It was also urged that Biru deceased was competent to adopt the appellant. 5. After the filing of replication, the trial Court framed the following issues on 8.4.1975 :- 1. Whether the Biru deceased was brother of plaintiff No. 1 and maternal uncle of plaintiff No. 2 to 6 and being so whether plaintiff's are the only legal heirs of the said deceased Biru ? If so, to what effect ? OPP 2. Whether the defendant is a duly adopted son of the deceased Biru ? If so, to what effect ? OPD 3. If issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative, whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the suit ? OPD 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form ? OPD 5. Relief. 6. Parties led evidence in support of their respective stands and after discussing the evidence in detail in regard to issue No. 1, trial Court held that Parsanni Devi-respondent was proved to be sister of Biru deceased but there was no sufficient evidence to show that the other respondent Nos. 2 to 6 were sons of second sister of Biru. In regard to issue relating to adoption of the appellant, the trial Court, after discussing the evidence in detail, held that the adoption deed was not valid and that it had not been acted upon. The main ground which weighed with the trial Court was that appellant Sher Singh at the time of adoption was married and this was against the provisions of Section 10 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, which provided that a married person could not be adopted. It was also found that at the time of alleged adoption in 1968, the appellant was about 20 years of age which was against the provisions of Section 10(4) of the Hindu Adoption Act. Negating the contention that a married person could also be adopted as per the customs, the trial Court also found that there was no evidence on the file which could show that there was a custom in Gujjars permitting adoption of a married person or a person above the age of 16 years. In view of the above finding, trial Court decreed the suit in favour of respondent-Parsanni Devi but dismissed the suit qua remaining respondents-plaintiffs. This judgment was taken in appeal before the District Judge, Karnal, who after appreciating the evidence and the facts, upheld the finding of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 7. It is in this background that the present Regular Second Appeal was filed impugning the judgments of the trial Court as well as of the lower Appellate Court. Cross-objections were also filed which were ordered to be heard along with the appeal. The Regular Second Appeal ultimately came up for hearing before this Court in the year 1999. 8. During the hearing of the Regular Second Appeal, an application was moved seeking permission to file an amended written statement. The amendment sought in the written statement was to the effect that adoption deed operated as testamentary disposition also even if it was not to be held valid. This application seeking permission to file amended written statement was heard and decided by this Court on December 10, 1998. Noticing the proposed written statement and after hearing the counsels for the parties, this Court vide its order dated December 10, 1998, allowed the application seeking filing of amended written statement by holding :- "20. In view of the principles laid down above, I find that the amendment can be allowed as it does not seek to make out a case on a manufactured subsequently got up evidence. Moreover, the appellant relied on the same document in his defence but seeking plea of other right which he contends being available to him from the very document. The plea which he proposes to advance is not inconsistent with the plea which he has already made. No right has been accrued to the respondents by lapse of any period of limitation. 21. In view of the above reasons, I find that the amendment deserves to be allowed. However, I find that while allowing the amendment, heavy costs be awarded in view of the fact that the amendment has been sought in the second appeal. When this is the position, I do not at present give findings on the other contested points. 22. As a result, C.M. for amending the written statement is allowed subject to payment of Rs. 5,000/- as costs in one set. The appellant is given one month's time to deposit the costs in the Court and carry out the amendment. I will like to make it clear that the above discussion in this order for consideration whether the amendment should be allowed or not, is restricted to the amendment application only and I am not interpreting the document, which will have to be done at a subsequent stage after the amendment is carried out". As can be seen from the above, this Court did not interpret the document in question and held that this will be done at a subsequent stage after the amendment is carried out. Amended written statement was accordingly filed by the appellant to which the respondents filed application. In this background and on the aforementioned basis, this Court vide its order dated 10.5.1999 framed additional Issue No. 4-A to the following effect :- "Issue No. 4-A : Whether the adoption deed, Ex. D-1 also operates as a Will ? OPD" 9. Having done so, the matter was referred by this Court to the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Guhla through the Additional District Judge, Kaithal, for deciding the issue 4-A framed by this Court. The parties were directed to appear before the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) on 14.6.1999. The Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Guhla gave opportunity to the parties to lead fresh evidence as directed by this Court. The appellant-Sher Singh got himself re-examined as DW-5. DW-3 Ram Niwas was recalled as DW-3 and Sher Singh son of Bishna was examined as DW-6. The appellant, after re-examining these witnesses, closed the evidence on the additional issue so framed by this Court. The respondents-plaintiffs, however, did not lead any evidence and made a statement before the Civil Judge to this effect that they did not want to lead any evidence on the additional issue. After discussing the fresh evidence adduced on the additional issue and noticing the contention of the parties appearing before him, the Civil Judge held that document Ex.D-1 also operates as a Will Deed. The findings recorded by the Civil Judge in this regard, as contained in para 9 onwards, are reproduced below :- "9. After hearing the arguments advanced by ld. counsel for the parties and a careful perusal of evidence as well as document Ex.D1, I am of the considered view that document Ex.D1 also operates as a Will-deed from the wording it contains. Copy of Hindu translation of Ex.D1 has been placed on the file. A careful perusal of Ex.D1 reveals that deceased Biru had two things in his mind at the time of execution of Ex.D1. First was that he was a man of property and generally after the death of a man of property there arise disputes of various types leading to wastage of property and therefore, with execution of Ex.D1 he wanted to avoid such dispute regarding his property after his death. Secondly, his mind was haunted with sermon of Hindu Shastra that a male issue is very much necessary otherwise one does not attain salvation (Gati). Keeping in view the above two factors, he adopted defendant Sher Singh son of Shri Mukhtiara as his son. Literally speaking, document Ex.D1 was an adoption deed but, if golden rule of interpretation of document is applied to collect the intention of executant Biru then it becomes crystal clear that he was not having the only intention to adopt defendant as his real son but also to avoid further litigation and dispute after his death regarding his property. It is pertinent to mention that adoption part of the document Ex.D1 comes in the text of Ex.D1 only after the testamentary disposition of Biru regarding his property. The authority in case 1923 India Law Reports (Lahore Series) 356 (supra) relied upon by ld. counsel for the plaintiffs is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand because in that case in the adoption deed nothing was mentioned so as to treat the same as a deed of gift, but in the case in hand as already mentioned that language of Ex.D1 itself speaks in volumes about the testamentary nature of it. By executing Ex.D1, Biru had not only adopted defendant Sher Singh as his son but also excluded all other legal heirs from inheriting his property after his death. Thus, by virtue of document Ex.D1 Biru wanted to avoid such litigation regarding his property like in the case in hand. Thus, in the light of authorities in case AIR 1931 Privy Council 109 (supra) and 1967 Current Law Journal (P&H) 628 (supra) relied upon by ld. counsel for the defendant, is not only the nomenclature of document but also language and intention of executant which is to be interpreted by the Courts to bring in the real import of document. The contention of ld. counsel for the plaintiff that witnesses examined in the case in hand admitted, if Biru wanted to bequeath his property then he would have executed a `Will' instead of `adoption deed' is devoid of legal force because witnesses of defendant have only opined about the execution of Will in case of testamentary disposition. Moreover, in the case in hand deceased Biru did not feel need to execute separate Will-deed as he was quite sure and intended about the inheritance of his entire property by defendant, Sher Singh after his death by virtue of document Ex.D1, keeping in view the language it finds mention therein. Thus, Ex.D1 can also be treated as a `Will-deed'. 10. In the light of discussion foregoing, issue No.4-A is decided in favour of defendant and against the plaintiffs". Having recorded the above findings, the case was referred back to this Court for decision of the Regular Second Appeal and that is how the case is now placed before me. 10. I have heard Shri C.B. Goel, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Sukant Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 11. Mr. Goel has submitted that factual finding returned by the Civil Judge has not been challenged in any manner by the respondents. They have also not filed any objection petition challenging the finding returned by the Civil Judge. He has further submitted that the finding of the Civil Judge is well reasoned and based on various judgments cited before him. As per the counsel, the adoption deed even if otherwise held invalid can operate as a Will in this case having regard to the wording contained therein. 12. Both the counsel have placed reliance on various judgments which would be noticed hereinafter. 13. Mr. Goel has first referred to Privy Council decision reported as Krishna Rao v. Sundara Siva Rao and others (AIR 1931 PC 109), in support of his contention that the deed in present case would operate as Will Deed. This case taken in appeal before the Privy Council against the judgment of Madras High Court. The main contention of the appellant was that the document (adoption deed) was of a testamentary nature and entitled the appellant to succession irrespective of the question of the adoption. The recital in the alleged adoption deed read as under :- "As I have no issue, I have brought you up while you were young and have adopted you and celebrated your Upanayanam, etc. and have chosen you as a son, so I have communicated this fact to the revenue authorities and got your name registered for the office of the karnam held by me. Further, you shall be my son and you shall be entitled to my entire property as a son". In this case, it was held by the Privy Council that the document would have testamentary effect in favour of the person alluded to in the document. It would be worthwhile to reproduce the observations of the Privy Council which are as follows :- "In their Lordships opinion the document does not support to convey any thing de presenti, and further, it cannot be read either as being itself intended as an act of adoption or as being an authority to adopt. The writer, a Brahmin and a karnam, must have been well aware that the document could not itself constitute the adoption - a formal ceremony being essential for the purpose of its terms referred to adoption in the past tense and cannot be read as an authority to adopt in the future. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the writer must have been fully aware of the fact, now admitted, that no actual adoption had taken place, and also to assume that his anxiety was to do all he could to secure the succession of defendant whom he had brought up and treated as a son, to his office as karnam, which would open on his death. The writer was ill at the time and died about four months later. Their Lordships are of opinion that the last sentence of the document clearly refers to succession to the writer's entire property on his death, and has testamentary effect in favour of defendant 2, who is now dead, and is represented by the appellant". It is, thus, clear that where a deed of adoption is held invalid or cannot be read as deed of adoption, still it can act as testamentary disposition. It can be noticed that this, however, would depend upon the wording of the document. To similar effect is the view of our Court in Ranjit Singh v. Garja Singh, 1967 CLJ (Punjab and Haryana) 628. This was a case where the adoption of the appellants therein had not been established and this finding had been affirmed by the District Judge in appeal. The Courts below had also concurred that the adoption deed on its language and terms could not be read operating as a gift deed or a testamentary disposition. When the case came up in Second Appeal before this Court a learned Single Judge found some inconsistency in two decisions, namely, Ishar Singh v. Surat Singh [(1923(4) Lahore 356] and Shib Singh v. Suba Singh (AIR 1935 Lahore 658) and referred the matter to a larger Bench. The matter that required consideration was "Where the property is non- ancestral and the adoption is found as a fact not to have been proved, can a document as a deed of adoption, Ex.D-2 in this case, operate either as a gift or a testamentary disposition by its executant ?" The Full Bench in this case held as follows :- (a) Where the adoption is proved, though its validity is open to question, the immovable property of the adoptive father passes to the adopted son, and (b) if the adoption is not proved as a fact, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case whether the language of the adoption deed and the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that it operates as a gift or a testamentary disposition, and (i) if such a conclusion is available, the alleged adopted son takes the property, but (ii) if such a conclusion is not available, he does not do so and the property passes to the natural heirs of the executant of the deed in intestacy". Above referred Full Bench noticed the finding in Ishar Singh's case (supra), wherein it was held as follows :- "Now it has been repeatedly held, vide inter-alia, Fanindra Deb v. Rajeshwar Das (1) and Lali v. Murlidhar (2) when, where a deed contains a testamentary disposition in favour of a person believed to be the adopted son, it is a question for consideration whether on the failure of adoption, the gift also fails. "The Court has to decide in each case, after considering the language of the document and the surrounding circumstances, whether the adoption was the reason or motive for making the gift or bequest, or whether the mention of the donee or legatee as an adopted son was merely descriptive of the person to take under the gift or bequest and he was to take the property even though his adoption may not be valid". The Full Bench had also called for and perused the adoption deed in issue in the case of Ishar Singh (supra), and approved the law laid down in the said case by observing :- "To my mind the learned Chief Justice has very accurately stated the law, if I may say so with respect, and it becomes clear from the statement of law that a deed of adoption, as in this case, Ex.D-2, may on its own language and having regard to the surrounding circumstances, operate as gift or a testamentary disposition, provided such a conclusion is justified from the language used and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the document and the making of the alleged adoption. But if no such inference is available and it is a mere declaration of adoption and no more without the adoption having been actually proved as a fact, it does not operate either as a gift or testamentary disposition. Whole things depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case". As can be seen from the above mentioned Full Bench judgment, it depends upon the recital and the language used in the deed and the circumstances surrounding the execution thereof to find if it would operate as a gift or testamentary disposition. 14. Relying upon Privy Council decision noticed above, our Court in Surja Ram v. Sukh Ram, (RSA No. 301 of 1961) held that the words in deed in the said case did convey a testamentary disposition. This was a case where it was urged before the District Judge that the adoption deed was a testamentary disposition in favour of the appellant in the said case but the same plea was not permitted to be raised. This Court ultimately allowed the amendment denied by the District Judge and then by framing additional issue, like in the present case, sent the case back to the trial Court for the parties to lead such evidence that they deem fit and submitting the report to this Court after doing the needful. In this case, it was held :- "xx xxx xxx who stated therein that Surja Ram had been adopted as a son from his childhood by her late husband Sobha Ram; that no formal deed of adoption had been written and that consequently the deed was being written and it was agreed that first Surja Ram will be our son and will inherit like a natural son and secondly, after my demise Surja Ram will be the owner of all property movable or immovable and the Brit, it has been found that adoption is not validly proved. xx xxx The sole question was whether this document does contain a testamentary disposition of property. As already said in my earlier order, this matter was desired to be raised in the trial Court by Surja Ram in an application for permission to amend the written statement and this was refused and I had held such an amendment should have been allowed because parties are to plead facts and the legal effect is for the Courts to determine. As has been reported by the Courts below, the document does contain testamentary disposition. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has urged that Exhibit D.1 is primarily an adoption deed and was meant to be such and the words which are being interpreted as amounting to testamentary disposition, are merely incidental to the adoption. There can be no manner no doubt that the main object of Mst. Aso in drawing up this deed was to create evidence of the adoption of Surja Ram. At the same time, it is clear that she left no doubt of her intention that not only Surja Ram would be an heir like her son but he would be the owner of the entire property after her demise. In case the adoption is held valid, the document can certainly be looked into in order to see whether there is any testamentary disposition or gift". It was also found that the facts in this case were identical with the facts in the case decided by Privy Council referred to above. Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Joginder Singh and others v. Savitri, 2002(4) RCR(Civil) 672 : 2002(3) P.L.R. 680, where the adoption was held to be void and the plaintiff being the only daughter, was allowed to inherit the property. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in the said judgment. In this case, the issue in regard to adoption deed being treated as a Will or testamentary disposition was not in controversy and hence this judgment would not apply in the present case. 15. Counsel has then drawn my attention to the judgment in Pralhad Ambadas Upasane and another v. Shantabai and others, AIR (34) 1947 Nagpur 231. This is a case where a person executed on the day before he died a deed of adoption for the purpose of ratifying the alleged adoption. The deed began with a recital that the executant was childless and that he had adopted the boy for the continuation of his line and family observances. He then stated that from that time the boy became the heir of his whole property. On the same day, another person, who would be the heir in the absence of a valid adoption, was given a small portion of the property by a Will. The adoption was not established. In his background, it was held that the deed itself was unexceptionable as a deed of adoption assuming that the ceremony had taken place. But the deed contained no intention to devise or bequeath and as such, its use as a Will was impossible. It is thus clear that the case was decided on the wording of the adoption deed and it was found that it contained no intention to bequeath. It is also worth noticing that in this case a Will had also been made of the part of the property in the name of person other the adoptee. This case, in my view, cannot apply to the case at hand. 16. From the facts and the judgments, as noticed and brought about above, it is clear that the issue of treating the adoption deed to be testamentary disposition or gift etc. would depend upon the recital, the language used and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed itself. Thus, for determining the same, one has to see the recital in the deed and the circumstances surrounding the execution thereof. The language of the deed has been established on record and is not in dispute. The surrounding circumstances regarding the execution can be seen from the evidence on record including the one noticed in the additional issue framed. The adoption deed which requires interpretation may be reproduced here :- "I, Biru, aged 50 yeas son of Saddu caste Gujar, am a resident of village Kakheri at present village Papsar Teh. Kaithal. That I have grown old. Life being ephemeral cannot be trusted. I do not have any male or female issue. I was not even married, hence there arises no question of issues. I am a man of property. After the death of a propertied man usually there arise disputes of various sorts leading to the wastage of the property in question. Moreover, according to Hindu Shastra being of a male issue is very much necessary, otherwise one does not attain salvation. Keeping in view these facts, I have adopted Shri Sher Singh son of Mukhtiara caste Gujjar resident of village Papsar, Tehsil Kaithal as my son, who is related to me as nephew, has been brought up by me and also resides with me. Sweets have been distributed and all the ceremonies required for adoption have been performed. With the execution of this deed he has become my adopted son and aforesaid Sher Singh now has become entitled to all the rights whatsoever a real son has got in the property of his father. Now Sher Singh has become my son. I certify that the copy is true to the original. Therefore, this adoption deed has been got written as an evidence of this fact". A perusal of this deed would reveal that Biru had clearly stated that he has no issue as was stated in the adoption deed before Privy Council already reproduced above. Likewise, in the present case, it has been mentioned that Biru had brought up Sher Singh-appellant. In the deed at hand, it has been mentioned by Biru that he was a man of property and was expecting, as usual, there would be disputes leading to wastage of property in question. In this background, he stated that he was adopting the appellant who was related to him as his nephew and that necessary ceremonies had been performed (like in the case before the Privy Council). In this adoption deed, Biru has clearly mentioned that "with the execution of this deed, he has become my adopted son and aforesaid Sher Singh now has become entitled to all the rights whatsoever a real son has got in the property of a father". This is also in line with the recital in the deed before Privy Council which was to the effect "you shall be my son and you shall be entitled to my entire property as son". Thus, it is clear that this deed was not only a deed of adoption but contained a clear intention of Biru deceased to bequeath all his property to his adopted son. From the wording of the adoption deed, an inference can clearly be drawn that Biru had, in fact, intended to will his entire property to the appellant as he was concerned that disputes might arise leading to the wastage of property. Thus the surrounding circumstances clearly show that Biru indeed had intended to will his property to the appellant. The surrounding circumstances showing that the adoption deed was intended to will the property to the appellant can be inferred from the additional evidence now produced. According to Ram Niwas (DW-3), attesting witness, Biru had executed the deed (Ex.D-1) in favour of the appellant so that he could become owner of the property after his (Biru's) death. Another witness, Sher Singh son of Bishna Ram (DW-6) stated that in Gujars adopted son will become legal heir. Having regard to this evidence and the attending circumstances, it is clearly inferable that Biru had also wished to pass on his property to the appellant. Accordingly, I have no hesitation in my mind and would hold that the adoption deed in this case would operate as a Will and a testamentary disposition. The Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) has rightly decided this issue in favour of the appellant. As a result, the present Regular Second Appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree under appeal passed by the trial Court dated 30.9.1977 and the lower Appellate Court dated 26.3.1979 are set aside. The cross-objections are, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.