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Hissar Improvement Trust v. President, Tribunal Improvement Trust, Hissar And Others
Judgment Summary — Letters Patent Appeals (Hissar Improvement Trust & claimants)
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment disposes of a batch of 10 Letters Patent Appeals challenging a Single Judge's common judgment dated August 25, 1989. Seven appeals were filed by the Hissar Improvement Trust and three by the claimants.
A notice dated July 9, 1974 under Section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 sought to acquire 8,686.8 square yards of land in Hissar for Scheme No. 5-A. The scheme was sanctioned on April 15, 1975 and a notification under Section 42 was issued on May 6, 1975. The opinion records that Section 36 of the Punjab Act corresponds to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 42 corresponds to Section 6 of the Act.
The Land Acquisition Collector issued an award on April 26, 1976 classifying the land into three zones with values fixed at Rs.100, Rs.60 and Rs.40 per square yard for Zone-A (1,209 sq. yd.), Zone-B (402 sq. yd.) and Zone-C (7,075 sq. yd.) respectively, and allowed 15% solatium. The claimants sought a reference under Section 18 and the matter was referred to the Tribunal, Improvement Trust, Hissar.
The Tribunal's award dated September 29, 1987 divided the land into two belts: belt-A (fronting National Highway No.10 — ~300 feet by 50 feet) at Rs.400 per sq. yd., and belt-B (the remainder) at Rs.350 per sq. yd., with 30% solatium and interest as per amended provisions. Both the Trust and the claimants challenged the Tribunal's award by filing writ petitions before the High Court.
The Single Judge (August 25, 1989) disapproved the Tribunal's belting, found the Tribunal's assessment arbitrary and erroneous, and held that claimant-landowners were entitled to Rs.900 per square yard; the claimants' writ petitions were allowed with costs and the Trust's petitions were dismissed. Both parties then filed Letters Patent Appeals: the Trust seeking to set aside the enhancement and the claimants seeking further enhancement.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, could interfere with and effectively enhance the compensation awarded by the Tribunal (i.e., scope of High Court interference in the decision-making process of the Tribunal).
- Whether the Tribunal's adoption of a belting system and its valuation (Rs.400/ and Rs.350/ per sq. yd.) were arbitrary, devoid of reasons and thus subject to correction by the High Court on the material on record.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Hissar Improvement Trust)
- The Single Judge committed an error of law and jurisdiction by interfering with and enhancing the Tribunal's award.
- In proceedings under Articles 226 and 227, it was not open to the High Court to enhance compensation awarded by the Tribunal; the High Court's writ jurisdiction does not permit it to convert itself into an appellate forum to re-assess compensation.
Claimants (landowners)
- The Tribunal's award was arbitrary and based on a misapplication of law; there was an error apparent on the face of the award.
- The belting system adopted by the Tribunal was legally unsustainable (even by the Tribunal's own findings) and the Tribunal overlooked or misread material evidence, resorting to a rule-of-thumb assessment.
- On these grounds the High Court had ample jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct the Tribunal's errors and to reassess compensation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in This Case |
|---|---|---|
| State of A.P. v. P.V. Hanumantha Rao and another, 2003 (10) SCC 121 | Defines the scope of High Court interference under Articles 226/227: writ remedy is against the decision-making process; High Court can correct errors where the subordinate forum ignored vital evidence, misconstrued law or misunderstood jurisdiction. | The Court relied on these observations to uphold the High Court's jurisdiction to examine the Tribunal's decision-making process and to interfere where errors were manifest and apparent. |
| Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, 2003 (6) SCC 675 | Parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 cannot be rigidly formulated; exercise is discretionary and governed by judicial conscience and experience. | Used to underscore that supervisory powers are discretionary and may be exercised where appropriate; supports the High Court's assumption of jurisdiction in this case. |
| Shail (Smt.) v. Manoj Kumar and others, 2004(4) SCC 785; 2005(1) RCR(Crl.) 384 (SC) | Under Article 227 the High Court has power to guide inferior courts/tribunals and, in appropriate circumstances, to pass the decision which the inferior forum should have made; jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly but exists. | Cited to show that the High Court can issue directions or pass decisions in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction where facts and circumstances warrant it. |
| Sawarn Singh (case name referenced in text) | Writ of certiorari can be issued against a finding of fact if the tribunal acted on inadmissible evidence, refused admissible evidence, or if the finding is unsupported by any evidence (error of law). | Invoked to reinforce that the High Court may interfere where the subordinate forum's findings lack evidentiary support or are legally unsustainable. |
| Ludhiana Improvement Trust v. Hari Shanker, 1986 (P&H) Recent Revenue Reports 540 | High Court may examine legality of a Tribunal's award where relevant evidence was ignored; Single Judge was correct to consider the award's legality. | Relied upon to support the proposition that the Single Judge properly inquired into the Tribunal's failure to consider relevant evidence. |
| Administrator General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, 1988(1) RRR 480 (SC) : AIR 1988 SC 943 | Principle defining 'market value' for Section 23: price at which property changes hands between a willing seller and a willing buyer; bona fide transactions at or about the time of preliminary notification are best evidence. | Applied to frame the correct approach to market-value assessment and to justify reliance on contemporaneous sale instances as evidence of market value. |
| Mehta Ravindrarai Ajitrai v. State of Gujarat, 1989 RRR 243 (SC) : AIR 1989 SC 2051 | Reiteration of principles regarding market-value evidence and reliance on comparable sales around the date of notification. | Reinforced the Court's acceptance of sale instances contemporaneous to notification as proper evidence to assess market value. |
| Bhagwathula Samanna and others v. Special Tehsildar and L.A. Officer, 1992(1) RRR 257 (SC) : 1992 LACC 314 | Price fetched by small plots may be taken into account for larger areas in appropriate circumstances; deduction is not absolute — if larger tract has similar advantages and is in a developed area, deduction may not be warranted. | Relied upon to reject the Trust's contention that the sale of a 27 sq. yd. plot could not be used as a basis; Court accepted that small-plot sales can inform market value with appropriate analysis. |
| Special Tehsildar (Adi Dravidar Welfare) v. Abdul Reguman, 1996 LACC 394 (Madras High Court) | Applied Bhagwathula principle: where land is in a developed area with amenities and advantageous position, deduction from small-plot sale price may be unwarranted. | Used to support the proposition that, given the acquired land's developed location, the Single Judge's acceptance (with limited deduction) of a small-plot sale instance was justified. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two connected strands: (A) jurisdictional competence of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 to interfere with the Tribunal's award; and (B) the substantive correctness of the Tribunal's belting and valuation.
(A) Jurisdiction
- The Court reviewed Supreme Court authority (State of A.P. v. P.V. Hanumantha Rao and others and related decisions) establishing that writ jurisdiction is directed at the decision-making process and that the High Court may interfere where there is a manifest and apparent error, disregard of law, misreading of evidence, or a gross failure of justice.
- The Court emphasized that interference is not to convert the High Court into an appellate forum for the re-appreciation of evidence, but where a tribunal ignores vital evidence or misapplies legal provisions, Articles 226/227 empower the High Court to correct such errors and, in appropriate cases, pass the decision which the tribunal should have made.
- The Court noted that the Improvement Trust had not raised the jurisdictional objection before the Single Judge and that the objection was raised for the first time in the present Letters Patent Appeals; the Court nonetheless examined jurisdiction and upheld the Single Judge's assumption of jurisdiction.
(B) Merits — Belting and Valuation
- The Tribunal had inspected the site (August 24, 1987) and recorded facts showing the acquired land lay in the heart of Hissar, adjacent to major municipal buildings, commercial bazaars and cinemas and abutting roads on three sides.
- Despite the claimants' challenge to the Collector's three-category classification, the Tribunal adopted a two-belt classification (belt-A and belt-B) without explaining why a belting system was appropriate for an approximately 8,000 sq. yd. tract centrally located and surrounded by roads.
- The Tribunal relied primarily on four sale instances and ruled out most other sale exemplars (including those produced by the Trust) for reasons such as temporal remoteness or distance; but the Tribunal gave no reasoned basis for fixing Rs.400 and Rs.350 per sq. yd. for the two belts — the Court characterized the Tribunal's approach as a rule-of-thumb, arbitrary assessment lacking reasoning.
- The Single Judge had accepted a sale instance dated March 6, 1974 (27 sq. yd. plot sold for Rs.32,500 — about Rs.1,200.14 per sq. yd.), applied a 25% cut to account for small-plot effects, and fixed the market value at Rs.900 per sq. yd. The Trust contested reliance on a small-plot sale as a basis for valuing the larger acquisition.
- The Court analyzed precedent (including Bhagwathula Samanna and Abdul Reguman) holding that prices of small plots may be used where the larger tract has similar advantages and requires little further development; thus the Trust's objection was rejected on principle and on the facts: the acquired land's location and surrounding development made the small-plot sale relevant.
- The Single Judge's use of other sale instances from 1972–1973 and the exclusion of the Trust's sale exemplars (on valid grounds of remoteness) further supported the Rs.900 per sq. yd. assessment.
- Because the Tribunal failed to give reasoned justification for its belting and valuation, the High Court's reassessment of available record material and affirmation of Rs.900 per sq. yd. was held to be justified under Articles 226/227.
Holding and Implications
Final Holding: The Letters Patent Appeals are DISMISSED.
Direct consequences and operative effects:
- The Court affirmed the Single Judge's decision that the claimant-landowners are entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.900 per square yard.
- The Court held that the belting system adopted by the Collector and the Tribunal was unjustified and that the Tribunal's values (Rs.400 and Rs.350 per sq. yd.) were arbitrary and unsupported by reasoned analysis.
- The claimants were held not entitled to benefit under Section 23(1A) of the Act by mutual agreement between the parties; accordingly no benefit under Section 23(1A) was allowed.
- There shall be no order as to costs.
Broader implications: The Court applied established Supreme Court and High Court authorities to reiterate that the High Court may, in proper cases, correct arbitrary or reasonless awards of tribunals under Articles 226/227. The opinion does not purport to announce a new precedent beyond the application of these settled principles to the facts before it.
Viney Mittal, J. - This judgment shall dispose of a bunch of 10 Letters Patent Appeals as all the appeals have been directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated August 25, 1989. Whereas seven appeals have been filed by the Hissar Improvement Trust, the remaining three appeals have been filed by the claimants. 2. Vide a notice dated July 9, 1974, issued under Section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the "Punjab Act"), land measuring 8686.8 square yards situated in the city of Hissar was sought to be acquired for the Scheme No. 5-A framed under the Punjab Act. Subsequently, the aforesaid scheme was accorded sanction vide a notification dated April 15, 1975 by the competent Government and a notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Act was issued on May 6, 1975, acquiring the said land. It is not in dispute that a notice under Section 36 of the Punjab Act corresponds to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), whereas a notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Act corresponds to Section 6 of the Act. 3. Vide award dated April 26, 1976, Land Acquisition Collector, Hissar assessed the market value of the acquired land. He classified the land in three zones. For the land in Zone-A, measuring 1209 square yards, market value was fixed at the rate of Rs. 100/- per square yard; with regard to the land falling in Zone-B measuring 402 square yards, the market value was assessed at the rate of Rs. 60/- per square yard; and with regard to the remaining land falling in Zone-C, measuring 7075 square yards, the market value was fixed at the rate of Rs. 40/- per square yard. Separate assessment was made with regard to building and super-structure standing on the acquired land. The claimants were also held entitled to solatium at the rate of 15% (as prevalent at the time). The claimants were not satisfied with the amount of compensation fixed by the Collector. They sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The matter was, accordingly, referred for assessment to the Tribunal, Improvement Trust, Hissar. 4. Vide an award dated September 29, 1987, the Tribunal assessed the market value of the aforesaid acquired land by classifying the acquired land in two belts. For the land falling in belt-A, (fronting the National Highway No. 10, Hissar-Delhi Road about 300 feet in length and 50 feet in depth), the market value was assessed at the rate of Rs. 400/- per square yard. The remaining land in belt-B was assessed at the rate of Rs. 350/- per square yard. The claimant-landlords were also held entitled to solatium at the rate of 30% and interest as per the amended provisions of the Act. The Improvement Trust, Hissar as well as the claimants challenged the aforesaid award before this Court by filing various writ petitions. All the aforesaid writ petitions were heard together by the learned Single Judge and were disposed of by a common judgment dated August 25, 1989. The learned Single Judge did not approve the belting system adopted by the Tribunal and also held that the assessment made by the Tribunal was arbitrary and erroneous. The claimant-landowners were held entitled to the market value at the rate of Rs. 900/- per square yard. Consequently, the writ petitions filed by the claimants were allowed with costs. However, the writ petitions filed by the Improvement Trust were dismissed. 5. The Improvement Trust has, accordingly, filed the Letters Patent Appeals challenging the enhancement of compensation by the Tribunal as well as by the learned Single Judge. The claimants, however, have filed the appeals claiming further enhancement. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length and have also gone through the record of the case. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant-Trust has argued that the learned Single Judge has committed an error of law and jurisdiction by interfering in the award of the Tribunal, thereby enhancing the compensation for the acquired land. To elaborate the aforesaid argument, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the Trust that in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, it was not open to the learned Single Judge to enhance the compensation awarded by the Tribunal and, therefore, the judgment of the learned Single Judge granting further enhancement of compensation was liable to be set aside on this short ground alone. This argument of the learned counsel for the Trust has been controverted by the claimant-landlowner Shri Shailender Jain, who has appeared in person. It has been argued on behalf of the claimants that the award of the Tribunal was not only arbitrary but was also based upon complete misapplication of law. Further there was an error apparent in the award of the Tribunal inasmuch as the Tribunal had assessed the market value on belting basis which was not legally sustainable even as per the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal himself. It has further been argued by the claimant-landowners that the Tribunal had completely overlooked the evidence available on the record and had assessed the compensation merely by a rule of thumb which was contrary to the material available on the record. In these circumstances, it has been argued that this Court has ample jurisdiction while exercising the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. To appreciate the aforesaid rival contentions, certain observations made by the Apex Court need to be noticed. In the case of State of A.P. v. P.V. Hanumantha Rao and another, 2003(10) Supreme Court Cases 121, the Apex Court while examining the correctness of an order passed under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, noticed the following facts : "28. On examination of the relevant provisions of the Act of 1982 and in the light of its objects and reasons, it is apparent that in cases of alleged land-grabbing, exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Special Court. Jurisdiction of a Civil Court on such subject-matter stand ousted. The Special Court has been conferred powers of a civil Court to examine all questions of title and possession with respect to the land alleged to have been grabbed. The findings of the Special Court are binding and conclusive on the parties and all others having interest in the land which is alleged to have been grabbed. Against the decision of the Special Court, no appeal is provided. The only remedy of the aggrieved party is to approach the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. It is on the basis of the aforesaid provisions that we have to determine the scope of interference of the High Court in writ jurisdiction in the judgment and decision of the Special Court....." (emphasis supplied) Thereafter it was observed as follows : "30. True it is that remedy of the writ petition available in the High Court is not against the "decision" of the subordinate Court, tribunal or authority but it is against the "decision-making process". In the "decision- making process", if the Court, tribunal or authority deciding the case, has ignored vital evidence and thereby arrived at erroneous conclusion or has misconstrued the provisions of the relevant Act or misunderstood the scope of its jurisdiction, the constitutional power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 can be invoked to set right such error and prevent gross injustice to the party complaining. 31. In the case of Surya Dev while examining the nature and ambit of power of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, the above-stated legal position has been recognised by observing thus : "39. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a strait-jacket formula or rigid rules. At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the judge." 32. This Court has recognised the right of the High Court to interfere with orders of subordinate Courts and tribunals where (1) there is an error manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings, such as, when it is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (2) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. 33. No doubt, it was held that neither in exercise of the power of writ under Article 226 nor in supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court will convert itself into a Court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence. The power of the High Court in writ jurisdiction to interfere where important evidence has been overlooked and the legal provisions involved are misinterpreted or misapplied has been recognised even in the case of Sawarn Singh on which strong reliance was placed on behalf of the State. The relevant observations are: "13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law." 9. In the case of Shail (Smt.) v. Manoj Kumar and others, 2005(1) RCR(Crl.) 384 (SC) : 2004(4) Supreme Court Cases 785, the Apex Court while relying upon the law laid down in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, 2004(1) RCR(Civil) 147 (SC) : 2003(6) SCC 675 held that in exercise of power of superintendence conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India on the High Court, the High Court does have power to make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be, by way of guiding the inferior Court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would proceed hence and the High Court has the jurisdiction also to pass itself such a decision or direction as the inferior Court or tribunal should have made. Although it was held that the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is to be exercised sparingly and with care and caution but is certainly one vesting in the High Court and meant to be exercised in appropriate cases. 10. A Division Bench of this Court while deciding L.P.A. in the case of Ludhiana Improvement Trust v. Hari Shanker, 1986 Recent Revenue Reports 540 (P&H) held as under : "The only contention raised before us by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the learned Single Judge should not have interfered with the determination of the compensation in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A similar contention was raised before the learned Single Judge and was repelled on the ground that the Tribunal had ignored the relevant evidence. In our view, the learned Single Judge was right in going into the legality of the award of the Tribunal as the relevant evidence was ignored while determining the amount of compensation." In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and also the Division Bench of this Court as noticed above, it is apparent that when there is an arbitrary exercise of power or an error apparent on the face of record or any other error of law committed by a Tribunal, then this Court has the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to correct the aforesaid errors. It is well settled by now that when there is misreading of evidence, misapplication of law or ruling out of any evidence available on the record or when the order does not disclose the reasons i.e. the decision making process is not disclosed to the Court, then this Court always interferes and comes to the rescue of the aggrieved party. The learned Single Judge while evaluating the award of the Tribunal has gone into the details of the documents and the reasoning process adopted by the Tribunal and thereafter observed that the award of the Tribunal was arbitrary and that the belting system was not justified. We have also examined the award of the Tribunal. We entirely agree with the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge. For the reasons we shall give in later part of this judgment, we entirely uphold the assumption of jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge. Before parting with this order, we notice that the objection whatsoever with regard to jurisdiction of this Court for entertaining the petitions filed by the claimant-landowners under Articles 226 and 227 was never raised by the Improvement Trust before the learned Single Judge. It is only for the first time during the pendency of the present Letters Patent Appeals that the aforesaid objection has been raised. 11. This brings us to the merits of the controversy. The Tribunal had himself inspected the site on August 24, 1987. After inspecting the site, the following observations were made by the Tribunal in his award passed finally : "Having had the advantage of inspecting the site on August 24, 1987, I found that it is situate cheek by jowl to the main Post and Telegraph Office which is housed in a new huge building. Opposite to the site in dispute is situate the municipal office across the National highway No. 10 (Hissar-Delhi road). The main commercial centres namely, bazars inside Nagori Gate and Rajguru Market are situate at a distance of less than a furlong from the acquired land. Jambeshwar market has come up in the acquired land which comprises of three blocks in which about 35-40 shops have been built. I had mentioned the names of 31 shops out of 35-40 shops in para 2 of the inspection note. Old Anaj Mandi road, Devi Bhawan road pass on either side of Parijat Cinema which is situate on the other side of the crossing opposite the acquired land at a distance of 30-40 yards from it. The acquired land is situate in the heart of the town. The distance of Urban Estate No. 1 from the acquired land is less than a furlong. In between the acquired land and the Urban Estate No. 1 are the buildings of the main Post & Telegraph Office and Telephone Exchange which are housed in newly constructed buildings. A new shopping market has come in the Urban Estate No. 1. Neelam Cinema is situate at a distance of less than 50 yards. Elite Cinema and railway station are situate at a distance of less than one km., Dayanand College and F.C. College at a distance of half a km., bus stand and civil hospital at a distance of half a km. from the acquired land. There are banks and offices of the industrial houses situate close to the acquired land on Old Anaj Mandi road, Highway No. 10 and Urban Estate No. 1." From the aforesaid observations made by the Tribunal himself, it is apparent that the acquired land which was only approximately 8000 sq. yards was situated within the heart of the city, adjacent to main Post and Telegraph Office, and opposite to acquired land the building of municipal committee was situated. The main commercial centres, bazars and main Jambeshwar market was adjacent to acquired land. Cinema houses were also situated at the distance of 30-40 yards from the same. It is also not in dispute that the aforesaid acquired land situated within the heart of Hissar city was surrounded by roads on three sides. 12. Although the Land Acquisition Collector had classified the land in three categories but the aforesaid action was challenged by the claimant- landowners in the reference proceedings before the Tribunal. The claimants had claimed that taking into consideration the advantageous position of the land and its location in the heart of the city and the developed commercial surroundings, the aforesaid classification into three separate categories for such a small piece of land was wholly unjustified. The learned Tribunal in his award has noticed the aforesaid contention of the claimants. However, no reasoning was given by the Tribunal to reject the aforesaid contention. While assessing finally the market value of the acquired land, the acquired land was divided into two belts, belt-A-fronting the National Highway No. 10 Hissar-Delhi Road about 300 feet in length and 50 feet in depth; the remaining land was classified as belt-B. Therefore, it is apparent that while a specific challenge was made by the claimant-landowners with regard to the belting system adopted by the Land Acquisition Collector, no reasons were given to adopt another belting system by the Tribunal. When the land was situated within the heart of the city and the entire acquired area was only measuring about 8000 square yards and the entire acquired land was abutting on three sides by roads, then there was absolutely no justification for the aforesaid belts. Learned Single Judge has done away with the aforesaid belting system and has rightly held that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the belting system adopted by the Tribunal was not called for. We affirm the aforesaid findings recorded by learned Single Judge and hold that the belting system which was adopted by the Land Acquisition Collector as well as by the Tribunal was wholly unjustified and ignoring the facts and circumstances of the case and the material available on the record. 13. This brings us to the market value of the acquired land. The claimant- landowners had produced 16 sale instances before the Tribunal during the reference proceedings. The Tribunal in his award primarily relied upon four sale instances i.e. dated October 23, 1972, two sale instances of January 31, 1973 and a sale instance of March 6, 1974. All the remaining sale instances were ruled out of consideration as the same were either executed much after the acquisition in question or were much before in point of time to the said acquisition. Some of the sale instances were ruled out of consideration due to distance of place from the acquired land. Similarly, the Tribunal also ruled out of consideration the sale instances relied upon by the Trust. It was observed by the Tribunal that the Trust had not given distances of the site underneath property of the sale instances relied upon by it. Although their location was depicted in the site plan Ex. RW3/1, still the said sale instances had been executed in the years 1968 and 1969 i.e. much earlier to the acquisition in question. Some of the sale instances relied upon by the Trust were with regard to the sale of such lands which were far away from the acquired land. After ruling out of consideration the sale instances relied upon by the Trust and the majority of sale instance relied upon by the claimants, the learned Tribunal made the assessment of the acquired land by making the following observations : "11. To reverst back to the chart of the sale exmplars proved by the claimants, it is of real note that the first four sale transactions of plot Nos. 4, 87, 88 and 45 situate in Urban Estate No. 1 were of the area of 27.08 sq. yards each. These were small plots on which a single shop of a small size could have only been raised. The layout and the development charges, roads, lanes, sanitation, street etc. were included in it." 12. Thus, in view of the factual and legal position discussed above, I fix the value of the acquired land at Rs. 400/- for belt-A fronting the National Highway No. 10 Hissar-Delhi Road about 300 feet in length and 50 feet in depth and Rs. 350/- per square yard for the rest of the acquired land together with 30% solatium and interest as envisaged under Sections 23(2) and 28 of the L.A. Act, 1894, as amended by the act 68 of 1984." From the aforesaid observations made by the Tribunal, it is apparent that no reasoning whatsoever was given by the Tribunal for fixing the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 400/- for belt-A and Rs. 350/- for belt- B, neither any reasoning was given for classifying the land in two categories. It is, thus, apparent that an arbitrary rule of thumb was adopted by the Tribunal while making the assessment in question, therefore, learned Single Judge, in our view, was fully justified in reassessing the material available on record and giving his assessment of the market value on the basis of the aforesaid material. 14. A perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge shows that primarily the sale instance of March 6, 1974 whereby 27 square yards of plot in Urban Estate No. 1 was sold for Rs. 32,500/- i.e. at the rate of Rs. 1200.14 per square yard was taken into consideration. The aforesaid sale instance was also relied upon because of the fact that the said sale transaction was executed on March 6, 1974 i.e. a few months prior to the date of present notification i.e. July 9, 1974. However, taking into consideration the fact that the said sale transaction was of a small plot of land, a cut of 25% on the value of the aforesaid plot was applied. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge assessed the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 900/- per sq. yard. During the course of arguments, it has not been disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the Trust that the aforesaid plot reflecting the sale instance dated March 6, 1974 was only situated at a distance of 379 yards away from the acquired land, as has been noticed by the learned Single Judge also. 15. Learning Counsel appearing for the Trust has, however, argued that the aforesaid sale instance could not have formed the basis for assessing the market value of the acquired land since the aforesaid plot was only measuring 27 square yards and, therefore, the sale price of the aforesaid plot could not reflect the market value of the present acquired land. 16. Before commenting upon the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the Trust, we may notice certain observations made by various Courts regarding the principles, which have to be kept into consideration while assessing the market value of the acquired. 17. It has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Administrator General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, 1988(1) RRR 480 (SC) : AIR 1988 Supreme Court 943 that the market value of a piece of property for the purpose of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act is stated to be the price at which the property changes hands from a willing seller to a willing, but not too anxious a buyer, dealing at arms length. Prices fetched for similar lands with similar advantages and potentialities under bona fide transactions of sale at or about the time of the preliminary notification are the usual, and indeed the best, evidences of market value. 18. The aforesaid principle was again reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Mehta Ravindrarai Ajitrai (deceased by LRs) and another v. State of Gujarat, 1989 RRR 243 (SC) : AIR 1989 Supreme Court 2051. 19. The generally accepted principle while assessing the market value is that while assessing the market value for the acquired land, the prices for small plots can be taken into consideration and a reasonable cut can be applied while reaching the fair price of the acquired land. 20. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Bhagwathula Samanna and others v. Special Tehsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, 1992(1) RRR 257 (SC) : 1992 LACC 314 observed as follows : "The proposition that large area of land cannot possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are sold is not absolute proposition and in given circumstances it would be permissible to take into account the price fetched by the small plots of land. If the larger tract of land because of advantageous position is capable of being used for the purpose for which the smaller plots are used and is also situated in a developed area with little or no requirement of further development, the principle of deduction of the value for purpose of comparison is not warranted. With regard to the nature of the plots involved in these two cases, it has been satisfactorily shown on the evidence on record that the land has facilities of road and other amenities and is adjacent to a developed colony and in such circumstances it is possible to utilise the entire area in question as house sites. In respect of the land acquired for the road, the same advantages are available and it did not require any further development. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court has erred in applying the principle of deduction and reducing the fair market value of land from Rs. 10/- per square yard to Rs. 6.50 per sq. yard. In our opinion, no such deduction is justified in the facts and circumstances of these cases." 21. A Division Bench of Madras High Court in Special Tehsildar (Adi Dravidar Welfare) v. Abdul Reguman, 1996 LACC 394 observed as follows : "In our view the observation made by the Supreme Court is squarely applicable to the case in hand. Admittedly, the land, in question is already in a developed area and situated in an advantageous position and quite suitable for building purpose. It is also proved in evidence that the land in question has all the amenities such as roads, drainage, electricity, communications etc. Therefore, we are of the view that the learned Subordinate Judge is not justified in deducting 20% from the market value. We, therefore, set aside that part of the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, fixing the market value at Rs. 1,325/- per cent - less 20%. The cross-objection is, therefore, allowed and the order of the Subordinate Judge is modified to this extent. Thus it is apparent that in a given case and in facts and circumstances permitting, even the price fetched by a small plot of land can be accepted as the market value for the lands which had been acquired adjacent to a developed colony. The location of the acquired land and proximity to the sale instance is the main consideration. 22. In view of the observations made by the Apex Court in Bhagwathula Samanna's case (supra) and the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Abdul Reguman's case (supra), we cannot accept the argument of the learned counsel for the Trust that the price reflected by the sale instance dated March 6, 1974 could not have been treated as the basis for determining the market value of the acquired land in the present case. 23. Even otherwise, learned Single Judge has taken note of the other sale instances which took place in the years 1972 and 1973 in Urban Estate No. 1. It has been observed by the learned Single Judge that providing normal appreciation of the value to the aforesaid sale prices, the market value of the acquired land would still come to Rs. 900/- per sq. yard. 24. Still further, the various sale instances relied upon by the Trust had been rejected by the learned Tribunal and even the learned Single Judge has found that there was absolutely no justification to rely upon the said sale instances, since the land covered under the aforesaid sale instance was far away from the present acquired land. 25. Since we have already noticed above, that the Tribunal had not given any reasoning for fixing the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 400/- per sq. yard for belt-A and at the rate of Rs. 350/- per sq. yard for belt-B and, therefore, the learned Single Judge was wholly justified in exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to correct the aforesaid error and fix the market value of the acquired land on the basis of the material which was already available on the record. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we uphold the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and affirm the assessment of the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 900/- per sq. yard. 26. It has been agreed between the learned counsel for the Trust and the claimant-landowner that the provisions of Section 23(1A) of the Act shall not be applicable to the claim of the claimant-landowners and, as such, the claimant-landowners shall not be entitled to any benefit on that account. In view of the aforesaid agreement we hold that the claimant-landowner shall not be held entitled to he benefit of the provisions of Section 23(1A) of the Act. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeals, either filed by the Trust or by the claimants, therefore, dismiss the same accordingly. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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