Manga Ram v. Gian Chand

Dua, J. - This is an application for revision under Section 15 (5) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act 3 of the 1949 and is directed against the order of the Appellate Authority, Karnal, dated 21st October, 1963, dismissing the tenant's appeal from the order of the Rent Controller Karnal dated 9th August, 1963 granting his ejectment from the premises in dispute. 2. The owner of the property, Shri Gian Chand (respondent in this Court) presented his application for ejectment of the tenant Manga Ram (petitioner in this Court) on 27th May, 1963. The owner had purchased the property under the Displaced persons (c&r) act 1954. The deed of conveyance, Exhibit P-1 was executed by the District Rent and Managing Officer on 30th November, 1961, but it was mentioned therein that the purchaser had become the owner of the property with effect from 1st October, 1955, from which date he had also become entitled to recover rent from the occupant. The tenant, it may be mentioned, had not paid any rent ever since 1st October, 1955. Notice of the application for ejectment was served on the tenant for 24th July, 1963 on which date he appeared, but declined to pay up the arrears of rent with costs, with the result that the following issue was settled by the Rent Controller for trial :- Whether the respondent is liable to ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent as claimed in this petition ? The Rent Controller relying on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Bishan Paul v. Mothu Ram, 1961 PLR 470, and on another Bench decision of this Court in Gobind Ram v. Takhat Mal Kanungo, 1962 PLR 969 granted the prayer for ejectment. 3. On appeal, the Appellate Authority affirmed this order observing that the Rent Controller had given cogent reasons and had noticed the law on the point and that no contrary ruling had been cited before him. The period of 2 years under section 29 of the displaced persons (c&r) act was thus held to have started running from the date of the auction. 4. On revision, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the legal position is not so certain and definite as has been assumed by the Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller and that there are Bench decisions of this Court which contain observations inconsistent with the view held by the two decisions relied upon by the Rent Controller. I may here point out that in Gobind Ram's case, it has been observed that the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act creates a special jurisdiction for dealing with landlords and tenants in respect of premises within the urban areas of Punjab and Ordinary Courts are not competent to take cognizance of any prayer for eviction of tenants because no decree passed by ordinary Courts can be effective and eviction of tenants can take place only by order of the Rent Controller. Section 29 of the Displaced Persons Act providing some special protection against eviction in respect of certain tenants does not take their cases out of the jurisdiction of the already existing Tribunals, that is the Rent Controllers under the Rent Restriction Act. It has also been pointed out in this decision that it would be reasonable to think that the Union Parliament when enacting the Displaced Persons Act was aware of the Rent Restriction legislation then in force in the various States and also aware of the various provisions of such legislation. The counsel has drawn my attention to another Bench decision (D. Falshaw, C.J. and Tek Chand, J.) in Roshan Lal Goswami v. Gobind Raj and others, AIR 1963 Punj. 532. In this case, the Bench disposed of by one order five regular second appeals and civil revision. Reference to a larger Bench had been made by Khosla, C.J. and the following passage from the referring order has been reproduced in the judgment of the Division Bench :- "I, therefore, direct that quite apart from the fact that the plaintiffs could fall back upon the ordinary law in the present case a Division Bench should consider the point whether an auction-purchaser of evacuee property, who has not yet obtained a sale certificate but to whom the occupier has attorned, can under the ordinary law maintain a suit for ejectment. In all these cases, as the judgment shows, the tenants, had resisted the suit for ejectment on the ground that case for eviction had not been made out under the Restriction Act. One of the controversial points falling for determination was the scope and effect of section 29 of the displaced persons (c&r) act. It was held, inter alia, that an auction-purchaser of evacuee property who has not yet obtained a sale certificate, but to whom the occupier has attorned, can under the ordinary law maintain a suit for ejectment. After referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries v. L.J. Johnson, AIR 1958 SC 289 and to rule 90 of the displaced persons (ca&r) rules, it was observed that till the sale certificate is issued to the highest bidder and till the balance of the purchase money has been paid, rights of ownership do not vest in the auction purchaser and the property rights do not stand transferred to him by the mere fact of his bid having been accepted. Transfer of ownership depends on the conditions of the auction and in that case the transfer had not taken place and, therefore, the provision of section 29 were not attracted. The reported case, it may be pointed out, was from Delhi and it was noticed that Section 3 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act excludes the operation of the said enactment from the premises belonging to the Government. The Bench took the view that this was an instance of casus omissus or a case of an omission in the Displaced Persons Act which could not be supplied by Construction. According to this decision, an auction-purchaser has in spite of Section 29 of the Displaced Persons Act till the certificate of sale is issued to him a right to go to the ordinary Courts and claim ejectment of the occupant who was attorned to him and the Delhi Rent Control legislation does not exclude the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Courts. Somewhat similar view had been taken earlier by Mahajan, J. in Kartar Singh v. Prem Singh, 1963 PLR 595, thought it was not described to be an instance of casus omisus by the Legislature. The next decision to which my attention has been drawn is an unreported decision by Falshaw, C.J. and Grover, J. in Dr. Hans Raj Sood v. Dr. Parkash Chand Gupta, Civil Revision No. 768 of 1962, decided on 24.9.1963. After noticing the Bench decision in Gobind Ram's case, the Court apparently took the view that it was only the transferee who could approach the Rent Controller under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act for eviction, the landlord as defined in the Rent Act being outside the purview of section 29 of the displaced persons (c&r) act. The observations in these two Bench decisions, it is emphasised by the petitioner's learned counsel, do not completely harmonise with the view taken by the Division Bench in Gobind Ram's case. The next decision referred to at the bar, and this decision has been relied upon by the respondent, is by Dulat and P.C. Pandit, JJ. in Mst. Ranjit Kaur v. Harbal Singh, 1963 PLR 1023. In this case the conveyance-deed was dated 14th June, 1960 and was registered on 26th July, 1960 specifying that the property was being transferred with effect from 1st October, 1955. It was held that the property must be deemed to have been transferred with effect from 1st October, 1955 and after the expiry of two years from that date, the tenants could not claim the special benefit of the protection contained in Section 29 of the Displaced Persons Act. This case did not deal with transfer by public auction but it was a case of transfer to an allottee and decision was given in the light of rule 34 of the displaced persons (c&r) rules. Another decision by this very Bench is reported as Jaimal Singh v. Smt. Gini Devi, 1964 PLR 99. This case had been referred to larger Bench by Falshaw, C.J. because of a conflict between a decision of D.K. Mahajan, J. in Ranjit Singh v. Anup Singh, Civil Revision No. 524 of 1959 and decision by the learned Chief Justice in Mohar Singh v. Mool Chand, 1963 PLR 253. According to this Bench decision, the date mentioned in the sale certificate granted to an auction-purchaser of an evacuee property as the date from which the transferee is to be considered as the purchaser of the property is the date generally taken to the date of confirmation of the sale and it is this date from which the auction-purchaser is said to become the owner of the property. Sale certificate may be issued later but the effect to the sale would have to be given from this date. The auction-purchaser can, therefore file an application for the aviction of a tenant after the date mentioned in the sale certificate from which the auction-purchaser and the protection to the tenant from eviction under section 29 of the displaced persons (c&r) act for a period of 2 years becomes operative from this very date. The auction-purchaser is thus entitled to file an application for ejectment after the date from which he is to be considered to have become the purchaser but the order of eviction will only be passed after the expiry of 2 years therefrom. Another decision by this very Bench is reported as Permanand v. Smt. Ram Lubhai, 1964 PLR 50 wherein it has been held that a purchaser of composite property in a public auction held by a competent officer is entitled to receive rent from the occupants of the property from the date specifically mentioned in the sale certificate or the notice of attornment and such a purchaser is a landlord within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and in an application for ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent, the tenant must tender arrears of rent from that date. 5. It has been strongly urged on behalf of the petitioner that the deeming provision in regard to tenancy contained in section 29 of the displaced persons (c&r) act becomes operative only after the transfer and not before and that it would be only reasonable to construe the proviso to sub-section (1) of this section to mean that the period of 2 years mentioned therein should commence from the date of the actual transfer. It is pointed out that in the case in hand, the sale-deed was executed on 30th November, 1961 conferring ownership on the respondent with effect from 1st October, 1955, thus making the provision of 2 years wholly illusory and in practice of no effect. The construction placed by the Courts below and by some decisions of this Court, it is complained, is not justified. A faint suggestion has also been thrown that if before the transfer certificate the matter of ejectment can lawfully be taken to the ordinary civil Courts, as has been suggested in some decisions of this Court, and not to the Rent Tribunal, as pointed out in the case of Roshan Lal Goswami's case, then it would be a point for consideration whether the Parliament in enacting Section 29, Displaced Persons Act, ever intended this kind of inconsistency in clothing different forums with jurisdiction in regard to the same property and same parties at different periods of time. In other words, prior to the sale certificate the auction-purchaser can only approach the civil Courts but as soon as the certificate is issued, civil Courts' jurisdiction is excluded and it is transferred to the Rent Controller. From these arguments, it is sought to infer that the Union Parliament perhaps did not intend to supplement or modify the different Rent Control laws made by the various States which may have divergent schemes and patterns. The draftsman of the Displaced Persons Act was perhaps only concerned with the Transfer of Property Act and not with the State laws, for even in regard to Delhi territory, a case of omission has been noticed by a Bench of this Court. The counsel has on the basis of this submission desired that the case be referred to a larger Bench for a more thorough re-examination of the point after considering all the various decisions of this Court. 6. I have gone through the various decisions mentioned above with care and have given due weight to the arguments addressed at the bar. It may be that prima facie some of the observations contained in the cited decisions may appear to be difficult to reconcile fully. I am also alive to the desirability of certainty in law and I am equally conscious of the fact that this Court owes to the Judiciary, to the Bar and to the litigant public, and indeed to the Rule of law itself, that all doubt or ambiguity descerned in the law as laid down by this Court is removed at the earliest possible opportunity, for uncertainties and ambiguities in law only contribute towards confusion and resultant dissatisfaction with our judicial process. 7. The Rent Controller has, however, in this case followed the Division Bench decision in Gobind Ram's case which is binding on me sitting in Single Bench. The two recent Bench decisions in Jaimal Singh's case and Parmanand's case also go against the petitioner. The ratio decidendi of these cases directly cover the case before us. Though there are observations in other decisions which seem to suggest different channels or tracks of judicial thanking by other Judges, which if logically applied to some possible on conceivable instances governed by Section 29 of the Displaced Persons Act may cut across each other, nevertheless, I am unable to persuade myself to refer this case to a larger Bench and further prolong its final disposal. This revision has been pending since 1963 and keeping in view the fact that the petitioner had wholly without jurisdiction - and apparently contumaciously - refused to pay rent right from October, 1955, and persisted in this refusal during the course of the ejectment proceedings, I should not like to postpone its final disposal without being fully convinced that the view in favour of the respondent is clearly less sound than the view in favour of the petitioner. I must confess that, as at present advised, I am not so convinced, though I must not be understood to be minimising the cogency of the view expressed in those decisions of this Court from which the petitioner has sought support. In a more appropriate and fit case in which the point more directly arises, it would, I hope, be more thoroughly examined by a larger Bench reviewing all the decided cases and their true ration so that the correct legal position is more clearly formulated for the benefit of the Courts, the bar and the suitors. Binding judicial decisions or stare decisis has, in my view, rightly been described to constitute a sort of a viaduct over which law travels in transporting the cargo of justice. Prudence and sense of duty accordingly dictate that whenever a doubt is raised, the piers of this viaduct must be tested to make certain that they are sound, strong, free from serious infirmity and capable of properly supporting the weight. Such course also tends to strengthen the citizens' faith in our judicial process. I for one consider this rule of practice to be of considerable value in a setup controlled by rule of law. 8. In the case in hand, however, the matter directly in issue being covered by more than one Bench decision and there being no contrary direct view that after the transfer deed the transfer does not operate retrospectively and date back to the date of confirmation of auction or attornment, and the case having come up before me on revision, interference on which is undoubtedly discretionary, intended primarily to promote the cause of substantial Justice, its wide scope notwithstanding, I have not been induced to refer this case to a larger Bench. If two views on a point, broadly speaking, are possible and one view has been adopted consistently, then considerations of stability and certainty, have to be given due weight in considering whether interests of justice demand variation of the view consistently adopted. 9. The result, therefore, is that this revision, fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. The petitioner should vacate the premises within six weeks. Revision dismissed.