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Kumar Stores v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax And Another
Structured Summary of Opinion (Jyoti Saran, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner carried on two businesses: (a) wholesale dealership of kerosene oil supplied by Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), and (b) plying a tanker lorry under contract with IOC. The tanker business income was assessed under section 44AE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which provides a presumptive/arithmetic computation of income per carriage.
For assessment year 2001-02 the petitioner filed returns for both activities and disclosed agricultural receipts. Although section 44AE provided a deemed income of Rs. 2,000 per month (Rs. 24,000 per annum) per tanker, the petitioner returned Rs. 35,500 (higher than the deemed amount) for the tanker business and produced proofs of advance tax paid and TDS.
The original assessment was completed after scrutiny under sections 142(1) and 143(2); total income was computed at Rs. 1,83,630. Certain expenses unsupported by vouchers were partly disallowed (5% disallowance) and added back. The original assessment order dated June 24, 2004 was passed by B.D. Gupta (annexure 3).
A successor Assessing Officer issued a notice under section 148 dated June 11, 2007 recording three reasons for reopening: (1) receipt of Rs. 6,85,149 from IOC not credited in P&L though driver expenses shown; (2) tanker income declared under section 44AE but number of lorries not mentioned; (3) income from tanker added to proprietor's capital account while value of tanker not included in capital account.
The petitioner responded in writing and appeared. The assessing authority proceeded to pass an assessment order under sections 143(3)/147 dated December 18, 2007 (annexure 11), enhancing the returned income by:
- an estimated value of the tanker lorry of Rs. 1,50,000; and
- disallowance of truck driver's expenses claimed of Rs. 33,500.
The petitioner challenged the reassessment by filing a revision under section 264, which was dismissed by the Commissioner by order dated June 12, 2009 (annexure 15). As no appeal lay against the section 264 order under section 260A, the petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the impugned assessment order passed by the Income-tax Officer under section 147 (based on reasons recorded under section 148) and the revisional order under section 264 satisfy the legal parameters permitting exercise of reassessment powers under the Act.
- Whether the specific additions — (a) estimating and adding a value of Rs. 1,50,000 for the tanker lorry, and (b) complete disallowance of driver's expenses of Rs. 33,500 — were sustainable or amounted to an impermissible change of opinion or were otherwise unsupported by definite information or material.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The reassessment constitutes a mere change of opinion by the successor-in-office and cannot be sustained; powers under section 148 cannot be exercised on mere presumption or because the AO formed a different opinion on the same facts that existed at the time of original assessment.
- The tanker business is governed by section 44AE (a special presumptive regime) and income from it need not be reflected in the firm's profit & loss or balance-sheet in the manner assumed by the AO; estimating the value of the tanker and adding it runs counter to section 44AE and is based on assumptions.
- The driver's expenses disallowance is impermissible because the original assessing officer had examined and adjusted those expenses (5% disallowance) at the time of the original assessment; the successor's complete rejection is a change of opinion on the same materials.
- Relied upon Supreme Court authority (including Kelvinator, TTO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur, Gemini Leather Stores) to underscore that reassessment must be based on definite, specific, reliable information and not on second thoughts.
Respondent / Department's Arguments
- The legal principles governing exercise of powers under section 148 are well-settled but must be applied case-by-case; there is no rigid formula.
- The section 148 notice was issued after obtaining Commissioner approval (dated March 20, 2007), and non-inclusion of the tanker value in the balance-sheet and the treatment of driver's expenses were sufficient grounds to reopen the assessment.
- Once material comes to the knowledge of the assessing authority, he is within jurisdiction to exercise powers under section 148; sufficiency of material is a question of fact for the authority.
- Relied upon precedents (Phool Chand Bajrang Lal; Raymond Woollen Mills) supporting the Department's approach and also cited a Madras High Court decision (Kadri Mills) to contend that the petitioner's revision challenge was not maintainable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi v. Kelvinator Of India Limited, [2010] 320 ITR 561 (SC) | Cited for the principle that reopening of assessment requires "tangible material" and that reasons must have a live link with formation of the belief of escapement of income. | The court relied on Kelvinator to affirm the standard that reassessment must rest on definite material; it applied this standard to hold that the reasons recorded by the assessing authority did not satisfy the requirement of tangible material and a live link to formation of belief, and thus were insufficient to justify reopening. |
| TTO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur, [1974] 97 ITR 239 (SC); (1975) 4 SCC 370 : AIR 1975 SC 703 | Invoked by the petitioner to support the proposition that mere change of opinion or second thoughts on the same set of facts do not justify reopening under reassessment provisions. | The court treated this authority as part of the body of precedent emphasizing that reassessment cannot be based on a mere change of opinion; it applied that principle to conclude that the successor AO's complete disallowance of driver's expenses amounted to an impermissible change of opinion. |
| Gemini Leather Stores v. ITO, [1975] 100 ITR 1 (SC); (1975) 4 SCC 375 : AIR 1975 SC 1268 | Cited by the petitioner to stress that reassessment proceedings require information of a definite, specific and reliable nature, and not mere suspicion or conjecture. | The court referenced Gemini Leather in support of the requirement that reassessment must be founded on definite material; it applied that test and found the reassessment lacking in definite information, particularly regarding the estimate of the tanker value. |
| Phool Chand Bajrang Lal v. ITO, [1993] 203 ITR 456 (SC) | Relied upon by the Department to support the Department's approach to exercise of reassessment powers and the fact-specific nature of such exercises. | The court acknowledged the Department's reliance on this authority as establishing settled principles but nevertheless examined whether, on the facts and materials before the AO, the statutory parameters were satisfied; ultimately the court found the materials insufficient in this case. |
| Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO, [1999] 236 ITR 34 (SC) | Relied upon by the Department as supporting the view that reassessment is governed by settled principles but must be examined in the factual context of each case. | The court noted this reliance but, applying the requirements highlighted in other precedents (e.g., Kelvinator), concluded the AO's formation of belief lacked definite material in the present case and therefore could not sustain the reassessment additions. |
| Kadri Mills (Coimbatore) Ltd. v. CIT, [2000] 243 ITR 861 (Mad) | Relied upon by the Department to contend that the petitioner's attempt to challenge findings under revision was not maintainable. | The Department relied on this High Court decision, but the court proceeded to hear the writ petition and decided the matter on its merits; it set aside both the assessment and the revisional order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by (i) identifying the statutory framework, notably section 44AE (a presumptive regime for income from plying/hiring of goods carriages) and the purpose of sections 147/148 (reopening to net escaped income), and (ii) examining whether the reasons recorded and materials relied upon met the legal threshold for reassessment.
Key analytical steps and findings:
- Understanding of s44AE: The court explained that section 44AE contains a non-obstante clause creating a uniform/arithmetic method of computing deemed income per carriage; certain deductions and adjustments are treated as having been given effect to by that special provision.
- Nature and purpose of s148: The court reiterated that section 148 is not designed to correct errors or to facilitate mere re-evaluation — its object is to recover escaped income based on information or material which must be definite and not speculative.
- Examination of reasons recorded: The AO's notice recorded three reasons. After the petitioner replied and provided explanations (accepted in part by the AO), the AO nonetheless enhanced income by estimating tanker value at Rs. 1,50,000 and completely disallowing driver's expenses of Rs. 33,500.
- Application of precedent-standard (Kelvinator): The court relied on the Kelvinator requirement of "tangible material" and a live link between reasons and belief. On analysis, the court found no documentary material or definite information in the AO's possession to justify estimating the tanker's value; the enhancement was based on inference and assumption.
- On driver's expenses: The court observed that the original assessing officer had specifically considered the driver's expenses and had made a 5% disallowance as part of the original assessment. The successor AO's complete rejection, ignoring the predecessor's considered finding on the same set of facts, amounted to an impermissible change of opinion.
- Conclusion on sufficiency of material: The court held the AO's formation of belief (to reopen and to enhance income) did not meet the statutory and judicially developed tests — it lacked definite material, and one addition (driver's expenses) was simply a change of opinion.
The court thus reversed the reassessment additions on the twin bases that (a) the estimated tanker value was unsupported by tangible material and (b) the disallowance of driver's expenses was a mere change of opinion.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The writ petition is allowed; the impugned assessment order dated December 18, 2007 (annexure 11) and the revisional order dated June 12, 2009 (annexure 15) are set aside.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The additions made by the assessing authority — the estimated tanker value of Rs. 1,50,000 and the disallowance of driver's expenses of Rs. 33,500 — are quashed; the petitioner succeeds in the writ petition and the contested orders are set aside. The writ was allowed without costs.
- Legal significance: The court applied and reiterated the established principle that reassessment under sections 147/148 requires definite, tangible material and cannot be sustained on mere inference or a successor officer's different view of the same facts (a change of opinion). The opinion applied existing authorities (including Kelvinator and earlier Supreme Court decisions) to the facts at hand; the court did not purport to lay down a novel legal rule beyond these precedents.
Administrative note: The bench composition reflected concurrence — R.M. Doshit, C.J., agreed with the judgment.
Jyoti Saran, J.:— Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
2. With the consent of the parties, this matter has been taken up for, disposal at the stage of admission itself. The sole question which arises for consideration before this court is as. to whether the impugned order of assessment passed by the respondent-Income-tax Officer in purported exercise of power vested under section. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), on the reasons recorded under section 148 of the Act and the revisional, order passed under section 264 of the Act satisfies the parameters enabling such exercise.
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts leading to the present application filed under article 226 of the Constitution of India is that the petitioner is engaged in a twin business of, (a) wholesale dealership of kerosene oil of the Indian Oil Corporation, and (b) plying tanker lorry under contract with the said oil company. The petitioner is being assessed to income-tax every year in respect of his business of wholesale dealership of kerosene oil and he is also being assessed under the provisions of section 44AE of the Act in respect of his business of plying tanker lorry.
4. The petitioner filed his return of income for the assessment year 2001-02 in respect of his income from oil business and also in respect of his business of plying tanker lorry under section 44AE of the Act together with the agricultural income receipts, copy whereof has been placed at annexure 1 of the writ petition.
5. It is stated that although in terms of the law as it existed, the deemed income arising from plying tanker lorry business would be at the rate of Rs. 2,000 per month, i.e, Rs. 24,000 per annum per tanker, the petitioner possessing one tanker, returned a higher income of Rs. 35,500. The petitioner also filed proof of payment of advance tax of Rs. 10,000 and certificate showing tax deducted at source of Rs. 15,080 on the gross payment of Rs. 6,85,149, received in respect of the tanker lorry from the oil company.
6. An assessment order was passed after going through the process of scrutiny under section 142(1) and 143(2) of the Income-tax Act. Upon examination of the papers, books of account, etc, produced on behalf of the petitioner-company, the total income was computed at Rs. 1,83,630. The petitioner had claimed expenses of Rs. 2,94,886 in respect of several heads mentioned in the assessment order and which was accepted. The petitioner also had claimed expenses of Rs. 1,81,226 which were not supported by proper vouchers. The assessing authority, after disallowing 5 per cent, of such expenses, not having the support of vouchers, added them to the assessee's income. The assessment order was passed by Sri B.D Gupta, Income-tax Officer, Ward Siwan, dated June 24, 2004, which is placed at annexure 3 to the writ petition.
7. As the matter rested, there was a change in the Assessing Officer, Ward Siwan and Shri B.D Gupta was succeeded by Sri Kumar Achyutam as the Income-tax Officer, Siwan Ward. The change of the Assessing Officer saw issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act, dated June 11, 2007 (annexure 7), recording the following reasons for reopening the assessment of the petitioner.
“1. Payment of Rs. 6,85,149 received from I.O.C Ltd. has not been credited in the profit and loss account filed along with the audited report, however, driver expenses amounting to Rs. 33,550 is being debited,
2. Income of tanker lorry is taken under section 44AE, however, the numbers of lorries are not mentioned,
3. Income from tanker is being added in the proprietor's capital account annually, however, the value of the tanker is not included in his capital account.”
8. The petitioner responded to the notice, vide letter dated July 6, 2007 (annexure 8).
9. The notice under section 148 of the Act as contained in annexure 7 was followed by another direction as contained in letter dated August 31, 2007 (annexure 9) requiring the petitioner to appear before the assessing authority to respond to the reasons set out in the notice. The petitioner appeared through his representative, who also filed a written submission to the notice dated August 31, 2007, and which is placed as annexure 10 to the writ petition.
10. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that as the tanker lorry business is a separate business under section 44AE of the Act, the same was not required to be shown in the balance-sheet and for the same reasons, the income received from the oil company from the said business was not shown in the profit and loss account. It was also contended that the driver's expenses is not in relation to the lorry in question, rather it was in respect of other tankers carrying goods. As the petitioner had returned the income from the tanker lorry in excess of the amount prescribed under section 44AE of the Act which was accepted upon scrutiny, the same could not be a subject-matter of reinvestigation. The assessing authority passed the assessment order under section 143(3)/147 of the Act on December 18, 2007, placed at annexure 11 to the writ petition enhancing income returned by the petitioner by making the following additions:
“(a) estimated value of the tanker lorry Rs. 1,50,000.
(b) truck driver's expenses claimed by the petitioner Rs. 33,500”
11. The reasons assigned for making the aforesaid additions can be found in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the impugned order of reassessment, relevant, portion whereof is being quoted hereinbelow for ready reference:
“8… Value of tanker is found missing in the balance-sheet and as such inference may be drawn that the same might also been not reflected in the books of account maintained by the firm’ under the name and style of M/s. Kumar Stores, Basantpur. Under the circumstances, I take the value of tanker lorry at Rs. 1,50,000 on estimate basis as the assessee did not appear and produce papers in support of the value of the tanker for assessment purpose and add back the same in the earlier assessed income
(emphasis by me).
9. Since the assessee has taken the income from lorry under section 44AE, he should not have debited the profit and loss account of M/s. Kumar Stores by Rs. 33,500 under a head relating to the tanker plying. Shri Singh stated in his letter that the driver's expense was not in respect of the lorry covered by section 44AE and this was incurred i. r. o. other tankers carrying goods to the dealer's shop from Patna for paying as khoraki to driver/drivers as per the trade practice prevalent in Bihar. I find that it is the duty of the concerned oil company to supply product to the retail outlet F.O.R (form of rail/road) and a dealer who is not also transporter in this trade is not bound to incur any expenses in respect of either the vehicle or its drivers/cleaners, etc. In view of the explanation offered, I do not take this sum of Rs. 33,500 shown as ‘driver expense’ as a genuine business expense and as such disallow this sum and add back in the income.”
12. As according to the petitioner, the exercise of powers by the assessing authority was clearly beyond the scope and the intent of the provisions underlying section 148 of the Act, hence, he chose to challenge the said order on the question of jurisdiction by filing a revision under section 264 of the Act. The revision of the petitioner was dismissed by the Commissioner, Income-tax, vide order dated June 12, 2009, placed at annexure 15 to the writ petition. As no appeal lies against an order passed under section 264 of the Act either before the statutory authority under the Act or before this court under section 260A of the Act, hence, the present writ petition.
13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, relying upon a number of judgments passed by the Supreme Court, submitted that a bare perusal of the order of reassessment, manifests that this is a case of mere change of opinion by the successor-in-office of the assessing authority. He submits that the power vested under section 148 of the Act cannot be exercised on mere presumption and/or upon having a different opinion on a given set of facts ‘which existed even at the stage of passing of the original assessment order.’
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that although the notice initially was issued by recording three reasons as is manifest from annexure 7 but the assessing authority upon consideration of the matter did not choose to proceed with the reasons recorded by him in so far as it related to’ the’ income shown in the TDS certificate, as also the reasons as regarding the number of lorries not being reflected in the returns. He submits that the enhancement of income by addition of the value of lorry on a presumptive basis, not only runs counter to the provisions of section 44AE of the Act but is also based on assumptions and presumptions. In so far as the rejection of the driver's expenses is concerned, learned counsel submitted that the same is a mere change of opinion by the successor-in-office, inasmuch as, the assessing authority at the stage of the original assessment had taken note of the expenses claimed by the petitioner and had reduced the same by 5 per cent, on estimate basis, adding the same to the income returned by the petitioner. He, thus, submitted that on either counts, the order passed by the assessing authority as contained in annexure 11 is contrary to the express provisions of section 148 of the Act and the legislative intent flowing therefrom.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his submission, as regarding the scope and intent for exercise of powers vested under section 148 of the Act relied upon an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax, Delhi v. Kelvinator Of India Limited, [2010] 320 ITR 561 (SC) dated January 18, 2010.
16. Learned counsel, in support of his submission that having second thoughts on the same set of facts and on the same material, would not warrant a proceeding under section 147 of the Act, has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in TTO v. Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur, [1974] 97 ITR 239 (SC); (1975) 4 SCC 370 : AIR 1975 SC 703.
17. The writ petition was contested by Mr. Rishi Raj Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Department. Mr. Sinha, in respect of the assessment order, submitted that undoubtedly, the principles for exercise of powers under section 148 of the Act stands well settled by a series of judgments passed by this court and the Supreme Court, but. the exercise of such powers has to be examined in the back drop of each case and there is no strait jacket formula. He submits that the explanation to section 147 of the Act also takes notice of the nature of cases like, the one in hand. He submits that in the present case, the notice under section, 148 of the Act was issued after obtaining approval of the Commissioner of Income-tax which was granted on March 20, 2007. Learned counsel sub-! mitted that non-inclusion of the value of the tanker in the balance-sheet and debiting the amount against the driver's expenses were sufficient reasons for the exercise of powers under section, 148 of the Act. He submits that this court would not enter into the issue of sufficiency of materials leading to exercise of powers under section 148 of the Act and the moment any material comes within the knowledge of the assessing authority, he is well within his jurisdiction to exercise powers vested, in him. under section 148 of the Act.
18. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Department, in support of his submission, relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court reported in Phool Chand Bajrang Lal v. ITO, [1993] 203 ITR 456 (SC) and Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. ITO, [1999] 236 ITR 34 (SC).
19. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner's petition to challenge the findings of the assessing authority under revision was not maintainable and in support of which, he relied upon a judgment of the Madras High Court reported in Kadri Mills (Coimbatore) Ltd. v. CIT, [2000] 243 ITR 861 (Mad).
20. Learned counsel for the petitioner in response to the submissions of the counsel for the Department, submitted that there is no dispute as regarding the powers of reassessment vested in the assessing authority but while doing so, the assessing authority has to satisfy that the same is based on the information of a definite, specific and reliable nature and not being a mere change of opinion. He referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court on the issue reported in Gemini Leather Stores v. ITO, [1975] 100 ITR 1 (SC); (1975) 4 SCC 375 : AIR 1975 SC 1268.
21. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties at length and have also considered the materials available on the records of the proceedings.
22. The fact that the petitioner was engaged in the business of wholesale dealership of kerosene oil of the Indian Oil Corporation and was being assessed to tax from year to year, is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner was also having income from the business of plying tanker lorry under contract with the said oil company and which was being assessed under section 44AE of the Act since past years. The provisions of section 44AE of the Act begins with a non obstante clause and overrides the provisions contained in sections 28 to 43C of the Act subject to the stipulations provided This special provision is relatable to computation of profits and gains of business from plying, hiring or loading of goods carriages. The provisions proceed on the principles of deemed income arising from the activities mentioned therein. A uniform income has been designed under the said provision to be computed arithmetically as per the carriages owned by the assessee returning his income under this provision. Sub-section (2) thereof provides the rate at which the profits and gains would be calculated from each goods carriage. It has been stated and not controverted that the rate of calculation of profits and gains from each goods carriage during the relevant assessment year was Rs. 2,000 each month or part of the month. Sub-section (3) further provides that any deduction allowable under the provision of sections 30 to 38 of the Act would be deemed to have been given effect to and no further deductions would be allowed except that where the assessee is a firm, the salary and interest paid to its partners shall be deducted subject to the conditions and limits provided under section 40(b) of the Act. Sub-section (4) further provides that the written down value of any asset used for the purpose of business shall be deemed to have been calculated as if it was claimed and allowed. Another provision which would be relevant for the present purpose would be found under section 69C which relates to unexplained expenditure during any financial year.
23. It is manifest from the notice issued under section 148 of the Act as contained in annexure 7 that the reasons recorded by the successor-in-office of the assessing authority raises three issues.
24. The assessing authority, passing the impugned order of assessment under section 147 while has accepted the explanation offered on behalf of the assessee as regarding non-mention of the income as reflected in the TDS, received from the oil company in relation to the tanker lorry in his books of account as also the answer that the assessee possessed only one tanker lorry, but he yet has proceeded to enhance the returned income of the petitioner by addition of the estimated value of the oil tanker at Rs. 1,50,000 and by disallowing the driver's expenses of Rs. 33,500.
25. Section 148 of the Act is not designed for correction of errors. It has a definite purpose and has to be undertaken with a specific object of netting the escaped income. The foundation of such exercise has to be in the shape of information or materials which are definite in nature and not presumptuous or imaginary. The exercise of powers of special nature cannot be on mere suspicion or doubt in the minds of an assessing authority that certain income might have escaped notice at the stage of original assessment proceedings by the act of the assessee.
26. The Supreme Court in the case of Kelvinator of India Ltd., [2010] 320 ITR 561 (SC), has held that there has to be “tangible material” for an assessing authority to reopen a case and to come to a conclusion that there is a escapement of income from assessment and that the reasons so assigned must have a live link with the formation of the belief.
27. I find that the reasons assigned by the assessing authority in justification of reopening of the assessment and for enhancement of the income returned by the assessee, does not satisfy the parameters set out for exercise of such powers and oft repeated in the judicial pronouncement. The assessing authority on the two issues, has simply mentioned that the value of the tanker is not included in the capital account and that the expenses of Rs. 33,500 was wrongly debited. Not being satisfied by the explanation given by the petitioner, the assessing authority proceeded to make an estimated value of the tanker lorry and added the same to the income returned by the petitioner.
28. In my opinion, the assessing authority would not have done so without first giving a conclusive finding as to the information for formation of such belief. A perusal of the reasons in the context with the valuation of the tanker lorry as set out in paragraph 8 of the impugned order of the assessment manifests that the enhancement is sans any material, any document or any information in the possession of the assessing authority of a definite nature. On the contrary, the order itself shows that the same has been estimated on an inference being drawn presumptuously. Whether or not the assessee was noticed to explain the expenditure under section 69C of the Act at any stage, is nowhere discussed especially when the petitioner has been returning his income from the plying of oil tanker since past years. In the absence of these important prerequisites to an exercise of power under section 148/147 of the Act, the formation of belief by the assessing authority on an inference drawn by him does not satisfy the test of there being any definite material or information coming within his possession for drawing such a conclusion and cannot be upheld.
29. The second issue of enhancement is upon rejection of the claim of the petitioner towards the driver's expenses. I find from a perusal of the order of assessment passed under section 143 of the Act and placed at annexure 3 of the writ petition that the then assessing authority did take note of the expenses claimed by the petitioner upon verification of the papers, books of account, etc., and after disallowing 5 per cent, of the such expenses, added the amount towards his income. Thus, the claim towards the driver's expenses Was within the knowledge of the assessing authority and also the subject-matter of consideration at the stage of the original assessment order. The finding of the successor-in-office ignoring the findings of the predecessor on the issue and disallowing the same in its entirety, is undoubtedly a case of change of opinion on the same set of facts and ‘cannot be permitted.
30. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of assessment dated December 18, 2007, as contained in annexure 11 and the order passed on the revision dated June 12, 2009, as contained in annexure 15, are set aside. The writ petition is allowed, but without any order as to costs.
R.M Doshit, C.J:— I agree.
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