ORDER

G.N. Prasad, J.

1. The petitioners, who are the principal defendants in Title Suit No. 12 of 1962. have preferred this civil revision application against the order of the learned Additional Munsif, Second Court, Patna, dated the 11th November, 1965. By that order, the court below dealt with two petitions filed by the plaintiff in the suit, one of the petitions was filed on the 3rd August. 1965 and that was for adding three persons, namely, Jhalak Prasad Singh, Kapildeo Singh and Dwarika Gope, as defendants in the suit. According to the plaintiff, these three persons were sought to be added as parties to the suit to avoid future litigations and complications and for an ef fective and final decision in the suit. The second petition of the plaintiff, which was filed on the 9th August. 1965 was for amendment of the plaint and addition of certain alternative reliefs.

2. Both the petitions were opposed on behalf of defendants 1 and 2 on a variety of grounds; but after hearing the parties and considering the objections of the petitioners, the court below by the impugned order has allowed both the applications.

3. Mr. A.K. Roy, in support of this application, put forward the contention that the order of the court below is illegal and without jurisdiction, and that both the petitions of the plaintiff ought, in the circumstances of this case, to have been rejected.

4. It is the settled practice of this Court that where two distinct matters are dealt with by one order of the court below, then the party aggrieved thereby must file separate revision Applications challenging in each the two distinct matters respectively in regard to which it seeks the interference of this Court. Therefore, if the petitioners were aggrieved by the orders of the court below in respect of both the matters, namely, the addition of party and the amendment of the plaint by addition of a new relief, then they ought to have preferred separate revision applications in respect of each of those two matters. Since that has not been done, the petitioners would ordinarily be called upon to confine the revision application to one of the two matters dealt with in the impugned order. However, in the present case, I do not propose to dispose of this application on that footing; in other words, I will deal with the application with regard to both the matters about which the petitioners feel aggrieved.

5. I first take up the question of addition of party. As already stated, three persons are sought to be added as party defendants to the action on the footing that that would enable the Court to give an effective decision in the suit, and future complications and litigations would be avoided. Whether these grounds can be said to be well founded or not, it is manifest that there is no substance in the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioners that the mere addition of parties would change the nature of the suit One of the reliefs which the plaintiff has sought in the original plaint is for a declaration that five heads of bullocks described in schedule 1 of the plaint belonged to the plaintiff and not to defendants 1 and 2. It is manifest that the plaintiff would like this declaration to be made not only in the presence of defendants 1 and 2 but also in the presence of the three persons sought to be added as defendants in the suit. Nevertheless, the nature of the suit remains the same and it is not in any way affected by adding three more defendants therein.

Furthermore, it will appear from the body of the plaint, and, in particular, from paragraphs 10 and 11 thereof that the three proposed defendants are not entirely new persons sought to be added. The truth is that a specific reference to them has been made in the averments contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the original plaint. Be that as it may, it is manifest that it is for the court below to feel satisfied as to whether or not it should exercise its powers under Order 1. Rule 10 of the Code, and in a case like the present, where the trial court is satisfied that certain persons should be added as parties to the suit, it would ordinarily not be possible for this Court to interfere with the exercise of such discretion. By no means, it can be maintained that the order relating to the addition of parties is a matter touching upon the jurisdiction of the Court so as to justify an interference under the provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am, therefore, unable to interfere with this part of the impugned order.

6. I now turn to the propriety of the the order relating to the amendment, of the plaint. A perusal of the plaint, as originally filed, leaves no room for doubt that to principal reliefs sought by the plaintiff therein are of the nature contemplated by section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The five head of bullocks, referred to in the plaint and said to belong to the plaintiff, are alleged to have been in the custody of a receiver who has been joined in the suit as defendant No. 3, and the plaintiff has sought a declaration of his title to those bullocks. The further relevant relief which the plaintiff has sought m the action is for a direction to the receiver (defendant No. 3) to hand over the said bullocks to the plaintiff. The substance of the amendment which the plaintiff has proposed in the original plaint is to add a relief in the nature of an alteranative relief for a decree for the money value of the bullocks in dispute in the event of the court feeling difficulty in granting a decree for delivery of the bullocks to the plaintiff upon the plaintiff's establishing his title or right to the said bullocks.

A reference to section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, makes it clear that an action in detinue contemplated by that section can be successful on very limited grounds, one of which is that the article of movable property in question is of such a nature that money compensation in respect of the same would not afford adequate relief to the plaintiff Such an action can also succeed in a case where it would be extremely difficult to assess the actual damage caused to the plaintiff by the loss of the movable property in question. It is not difficult to visualise the nature of articles contemplated by section 8. They may be a rare piece of art or a rare painting of a celebrated artist in respect of which it would not only be extremely difficult to assess the actual damage caused to the plaintiff by loss of the article, but it would also be impossible to afford adequate money compensation to the plaintiff for the loss of such a rare article.

So far as bullocks are concerned, it is manifest that they are not articles of the nature contemplated by section 8 of the Act. Furthermore, it appears that from the record that, according to the case put forward by the plaintiff, one of the bullocks in suit has since died. In respect of that bullock at any rate it is manifest that an action in detinue can no longer succeed even though the plaintiff succeeds in establishing his title thereto. If in these circumstances, the plaintiff seeks to add an alteranative relief in the shape of money value of the bullocks in suit and for compensation for loss of use of the bullocks on the part of the plaintiff, then it is not correct, in my opinion, to hold that the proposed amendment would fundamentally change the nature of the suit. The substantial case sought to be made by the plaintiff will in no case be changed merely on the ground that -the plaintiff wants to seek and alternative relief in the event of the ingredients of section 8 of the Specific Relief Act not being established.

7. Mr. Roy, however, contends that the alternative relief, now sought to be claimed by the plaintiff, ought not to have been allowed to be added since that stood time-barred on the 9th August, 1965 when the petition lor amendment of the plaint was filed. Learned Counsel contended that the cause of action pleaded in the plaint is of a time which is more than three years before the filing of the amendment petition. Mr. Rov has referred to Article 69 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in this context. At this stage, I do not wish to express my concluded opinion on the question as to whether the proposed amended claim is or is not barred by limitation; bat I will assume for the purposes of this civil revision application that the amended relief sought to be added in the plaint was time-barred on the 9th August, 1966. According to Mr. Roy it would be all the more barred against the three new defendants joined in the suit. Even so, I find it difficult to say that the order of the court below allowing the amendment of the plaint is without jurisdiction.

It has been repeatedly laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the power of amendment of the plaint contained In Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be exercised in the interests of justice, even though a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of the application for amendment. The fact that a fresh salt on the amended claim is barred by limitation is only a factor to be taken into consideration in exercise of the discretion whether amendment should be ordered or not. But that does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if in the opinion of the Court that is required in the Interests of justice This principle was upheld by their Lordships of the Supreme Court to L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co. AIR 1957 SC 367. In Nichhalbhai Vallabhai v Jaswantlal Zinabhai. Civil Appeal No. 403 of 1964. disposed of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on 23-8-1965: (reported in AIR 1966 SC 997) Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Court, referred to L. J. Leach and Co Ltd's case. AIR 1967 SC 357 and observed that the mere fact that a fresh such on the amended claim is barred by limitation, it would not affect fee powers of the court to allow the amendment of the plaint if that is considered to be necessary in the interests of justice.

8. In the instant case, as I have already pointed out, the structure of the original case put forward by fee plaintiff remains unchanged and the amendment is substantially confined to the nature of the relief which the plaintiff may be entitled to in the event of succeeding in establishing his title to the bullocks in question. I do not think that the addition of the alternative relief in such circumstances should reasonably have been refused upon the footing that such an alternative relief was barred by limitation on the date of the application for amendment

9. Far the aforesaid reasons I uphold the order of the court below in regard fee both the matters and dismiss this application with costs; hearing fee Rs. 32/-.