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Ganesh Kumar Sharma v. State Of M.P And Others

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Feb 8, 2013
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was a Constable in the 26th Battalion, Special Armed Force (SAF). By communication dated 17-10-2001 (Annexure P/1) he was granted conditional permission to appear in an examination for recruitment to the post of Sub Inspector in the Government of Uttar Pradesh; the communication expressly stated that the permission could be cancelled in exigency of service. The permission was alleged to have been cancelled on 4-1-2002 and, although a copy of the cancellation letter was returned as unserved (Annexure R-4 Roznamcha), the disciplinary authority found that the cancellation had been specifically communicated to the appellant (including orally) and that the appellant, despite knowledge of cancellation, proceeded to appear in the selection and disobeyed lawful orders.

A charge-sheet was issued (Annexure P/7). After a disciplinary enquiry, by order dated 17-5-2002 (Annexure P/8) the Commandant (disciplinary authority) found the charges proved and imposed the punishment of removal from service. The appellant's departmental appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, SAF was dismissed on 6-9-2002 (Annexure P/10). The appellant filed a writ petition challenging both orders and seeking reinstatement with backwages; the learned Writ Court dismissed the writ petition by order dated 21-6-2012. The appellant then filed this writ appeal under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the cancellation of the appellant's permission to appear in the examination (dated 4-1-2002) was communicated to him and, if not communicated, whether the disciplinary proceedings and the finding of disobedience were vitiated.
  2. Whether the charges framed against the appellant were essentially for absence from duty or for a different misconduct, and the legal consequence of that characterization.
  3. Whether, assuming the charges were proved, the quantum of punishment (removal from service) was excessive vis-à-vis the appellant's rank (Constable) and the guiding provisions of Regulation 226 of the M.P. Police Regulations (particularly clauses (iii) and (v)).
  4. Whether decisions cited by the State (Supreme Court authorities) justified non-interference on merits and quantum of punishment in this case governed by M.P. Police Regulations.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The cancellation of the permission granted on 17-10-2001 was never communicated to him; Annexure R-4 (Roznamcha) shows the cancellation letter was unserved because the appellant was unavailable.
  • Because there was no communication of cancellation, the appellant was unaware of the withdrawal and did not disobey any lawful order; therefore the disciplinary and appellate orders (Annexures P/8 and P/10) should be set aside and the writ court order dated 21-6-2012 should be quashed.
  • Alternatively, even if the appellant knew of the cancellation, he was absent only for 18 days and, as a Constable (the lowest post), the extreme penalty of removal (dry bread without butter metaphor) was harsh; Regulation 226 of the M.P. Police Regulations—particularly clauses (iii) and (v)—normally prescribes lesser penalties for constables and dismissal should be reserved for exceptional cases.
  • The appellant relied on a Single Bench decision of this Court (S.P. Tiwari v. Union of India, 2006(2) MPLJ 218 : 2007(1) JLJ 333) in support of the contention regarding non-communication/unserved notice.

Respondent's Arguments (State / Dy. Advocate General)

  • The charges framed against the appellant were altogether different and were not framed in relation to mere absence from duty; the disciplinary authority proved the charges on available material including that the cancellation had been orally communicated.
  • Once charges are proved and the punishment is not shockingly disproportionate, there is no scope for judicial interference in either the merits or the quantum of punishment.
  • Reliance was placed on multiple Supreme Court decisions (listed in the opinion) to support the proposition that the court should not interfere with the disciplinary findings or punishment where charges are properly proved and punishment not outrageously disproportionate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.P. Tiwari v. Union of India, 2006(2) MPLJ 218 : 2007(1) JLJ 333 (Single Bench of this Court) Relied upon by appellant to support the contention that an unserved cancellation (as per Roznamcha) could invalidate disciplinary action. The court held this decision inapplicable on the facts: the charges in the present case were different (not mere absence) and the delinquent in S.P. Tiwari was not governed by M.P. Police Regulations; therefore S.P. Tiwari does not assist the appellant.
Director General, RPF v. Ch. Sai Babu, (2003) 4 SCC 331 Invoked by respondent as authority to resist interference in disciplinary findings/quantum where charges are proved. The court found such Supreme Court decisions distinguishable because they do not pertain to provisions of the M.P. Police Regulations; consequently they were not treated as controlling in this case.
Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate, (2005) 2 SCC 489 Invoked by respondent to argue against interference in disciplinary punishment. The court observed the decision is distinguishable from the present case as it does not concern M.P. Police Regulations.
State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, (2005) 12 SCC 182 Invoked by respondent in support of non-interference where charges proved and punishment not shockingly disproportionate. The court treated this precedent as inapplicable on facts because it does not involve M.P. Police Regulations.
Union of India v. Datta Linga Toshatwad, (2005) 13 SCC 709 Invoked by respondent to support the position on non-interference with disciplinary findings/penalty. The court held it distinguishable for the same reason: not governed by M.P. Police Regulations.
Union of India v. R.K. Sharma, (2001) 9 SCC 592 Relied upon by respondent for the proposition that courts should not lightly interfere with disciplinary penalties. The court found this precedent distinguishable since it does not concern M.P. Police Regulations.
Union of India v. Debashish Ghosh, (2009) 16 SCC 621 Invoked by respondent to resist interference with disciplinary orders. The court observed this case is distinguishable from one governed by M.P. Police Regulations and therefore not directly applicable.
Shri Bhagwanlal Arya v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi, (2004) 4 SCC 560 Relied upon by respondent in support of non-interference in disciplinary punishment. The court held it distinguishable as it does not pertain to M.P. Police Regulations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a stepwise analysis grounded in the record and the applicable M.P. Police Regulations:

  1. Characterization of Charges: The court examined the charges and concluded they were not framed for mere absence from duty but were "altogether different." Because of this characterization, the applicability of provisions that deal specifically with absence (Regulation 190, as referred by the court) was rejected.
  2. Communication of Cancellation: Although Annexure R/4 (Roznamcha) indicated that a written cancellation letter remained unserved, the Disciplinary Authority's finding (Annexure P/8) records that the cancellation was also specifically and orally communicated by the Commandant to the appellant. The Disciplinary Authority's finding was based on material before it; given the limited scope of judicial review on such findings, the Writ Court correctly held that the appellant was aware of the withdrawal. The appellate bench saw no reason to disturb that conclusion.
  3. Scope of Judicial Review and Precedent: The court accepted the State's submission that where charges are proved and the punishment is not shockingly disproportionate, interference is generally unwarranted. However, the court also assessed whether decisions cited by the State were comparable and found them distinguishable: none of the cited Supreme Court authorities pertained to the M.P. Police Regulations framework applicable here.
  4. Re-examination of Quantum under M.P. Police Regulations: The court noted that the appellant was a Constable and that Regulation 226 of the M.P. Police Regulations prescribes appropriate penalties and guidance for constables. Particularly, clauses (iii) (withholding increment/grade reduction) and (v) (fine for repeated carelessness/disobedience; fining of constables prohibited) are relevant when determining punishment for a constable. Considering these provisions and the appellant's service record (including warnings, appreciation, and awards noted by the State), the court concluded that the disciplinary and appellate authorities ought to have considered Regulation 226 (clauses (iii) and (v)) before imposing the extreme punishment of removal.
  5. Remedy Decreed: Because the court found fault only with the quantum of punishment (not with the finding of guilt), it set aside the order of removal only insofar as quantum is concerned and remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority (Commandant, 26th Battalion, SAF, Guna — respondent No. 3) to re-examine and pass fresh orders in accordance with Regulation 226, paying heed to clauses (iii) and (v), and after affording the appellant a personal hearing. The court imposed a two-month timeline from receipt of certified copy to pass the fresh order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed in part. The appellate court affirmed the Writ Court's conclusion on the disciplinary finding (i.e., the charges were proved and the appellant was aware of cancellation), but it set aside the portion of the disciplinary and appellate orders that imposed removal from service insofar as the quantum of punishment is concerned, and remanded the matter for reconsideration of punishment.

Direct Consequences and Directions:

  • The orders of the Disciplinary Authority dated 17-5-2002 (Annexure P/8) and the Appellate Authority dated 6-9-2002 (Annexure P/10) are set aside only in relation to the quantum of punishment (removal).
  • The matter is remanded to the Disciplinary Authority, Commandant, 26th Battalion, SAF, Guna (respondent No. 3) to re-examine the case vis-à-vis Regulation 226 of the M.P. Police Regulations, with specific attention to clauses (iii) and (v), and to pass an appropriate order in accordance with law within two months from receipt of certified copy of this order.
  • Before passing any fresh order, the Disciplinary Authority must afford a personal hearing to the appellant.
  • There is no order as to costs.

Broader Implications:
The court limited its interference to the question of quantum of punishment and directed reconsideration under the specific statutory/regulatory framework (M.P. Police Regulations). The opinion expressly distinguishes and therefore does not apply the several Supreme Court authorities cited by the State because those authorities do not involve the M.P. Police Regulations; accordingly, the decision effects a factual and regulatory reassessment of penalty in this particular case rather than laying down broader, novel legal precedent.

Show all summary ...

A.K Shrivastava, J.:— Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 21-6- 2012 passed by learned Writ Court in Writ Petition (s) No. 994/2004 dismissing the writ petition, the writ petitioner has filed this writ appeal under section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005.

2. The facts leading to this appeal are that the appellant who was a Constable in 26th Battalion, Special Armed Force (SAF) was given a conditional permission by communication dated 17-10-2001 (Annexure P/1) to appear in the examination for the recruitment on the post of Sub Inspector to be conducted by the Government of U.P In the said permission/order itself, a condition was embodied that it can be cancelled in exigency of service.

3. The appellant was served with a charge-sheet (Annexure P/7) wherein it was alleged that the aforesaid permission dated 17-10-2001 was cancelled on 4-1-2002 and the said cancellation was specifically communicated to him and he was directed to undergo the training which was to be commenced from 2-1-2002 to 18-3-2002, but, the appellant despite having knowledge to the factum of cancellation of the permission proceeded for the aforesaid selection and did not obey the lawful order of his superior officers which amounts to gross misconduct.

4. A disciplinary enquiry was initiated against him and vide order dated 17-5-2002 (Annexure P/8), the Disciplinary authority i.e the Commandant found the charges to be proved and hence passed the punishment order of removal from services. The departmental appeal which was filed by the appellant to Dy. Inspector General of Police, SAF was also dismissed vide order dated 6-9-2002 (Annexure P/10) and thus a writ petition was filed by the appellant challenging the orders of Disciplinary as well as the Appellate Authority and prayed for its quashment with a further prayer that he be reinstated with full backwages.

5. The learned writ Court dismissed the writ petition by the impugned order dated 21-6-2012. In this manner, this writ appeal has been filed by the writ petitioner.

6. The contention of Shri D.K Katare, learned counsel for the appellant is that withdrawal of the permission granted to the writ petitioner was never communicated to him and, therefore, he was not aware about passing of the cancellation of the permission and if that is the position, the impugned orders of the Disciplinary authority dated 17-5-2002 (Annexure P/8) and Appellate authority dated 6-9-2002 (Annexure P/10) deserve to be set aside and for same reason the order of learned Writ Court dated 21-6-2012 be also set aside. In this context, learned counsel has invited our attention to Annexure R-4 dated 4-1- 2002 which is the relevant entry of the Roznamcha wherein the letter of cancellation which was sent to him was unserved on account of non-availability of the appellant. In this regard, our attention has been drawn to Single Bench decision of this Court which has been decided by one of us (A. K. Shrivastava, J.) S.P Tiwari v. Union of India, 2006(2) MPLJ 218 : 2007(1) JLJ 333.

7. An alternative submission has also been propounded by him that in case this Court comes to the conclusion that the aforesaid cancellation order was in the knowledge of the writ petitioner/appellant, since the absence was only for 18 days, therefore, taking a harsh step the dry bread which is without butter of the appellant should not have been snatched by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. Further it has been argued by him that the services of the appellant are governed by M.P Police Regulations which are having statutory force and by inviting our attention to Regulation 226 it has been submitted that normally the punishment of dismissal from services should not have been passed and this order should be exercised in exceptional cases.

8. On the other hand Shri Vivek Khedkar, learned Dy. Advocate General argued in support of the impugned order passed by learned writ Court and has also placed reliance upon the punishment orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority. Learned counsel submits that the charges which have been framed against the delinquent appellant are altogether different and they are not in regard to the absence from duty and, therefore, since the charges have already been proved, there is no scope of any interference either on merit or in the quantum of punishment since it is not shockingly disproportionate. Learned counsel has placed heavy reliance upon certain decisions of Supreme Court, they are Director General, RPF v. Ch. Sai Babu, (2003) 4 SCC 331, Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate., (2005) 2 SCC 489, State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, (2005) 12 SCC 182, Union of India v. Datta Linga Toshatwad, (2005) 13 SCC 709, Union of India v. R.K Sharma, (2001) 9 SCC 592, Union of India v. Debashish Ghosh, (2009) 16 SCC 621 and also Shri Bhagwanlal Arya v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi, (2004) 4 SCC 560 and thus it has been prayed that there is no scope of any interference in this intra-Court appeal and, therefore, the same be dismissed.

9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered view that this appeal deserves to be allowed in part.

10. We find sufficient force in the contention of Shri Khedkar, learned Dy, Advocate General that the charges which have been framed against the appellant are altogether different and the charges have not been framed against him in regard to absence from his duty. We think it appropriate to quote the charges which reads thus :—

Thus, we have no scintilla of doubt in our mind in holding that since the charges were not framed against the appellant pertaining to his absence but they are altogether different, therefore, the Single Bench decision of this Court S.P Tiwari (supra) place reliance by learned counsel for the appellant is not applicable in the present case. Apart from this, in this decision, the delinquent employee was not the employee to whom M.P Police Regulations are applicable.

11. According to us, the service conditions of the appellant are governed by M.P Police Regulations which are having statutory force. Thus, this Court is bound to see the provisions contained in the aforesaid Regulations. But, before we deal with the provisions of Regulations, first of all we would like to meet out and decide the argument of learned counsel for the appellant on merit. We are not impressed by the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that because the order of cancellation of the permission to appear in the examination of selection of Sub Inspector in the State of U.P was never communicated to the appellant therefore, he did not flout any order of his superiors and, therefore, the charges are not proved. The argument so placed by learned counsel for the appellant at the first blush appears to be quite attractive, but on deeper scrutiny it is found to be devoid of any substance. True, in Annexure R/4 which is the copy of the Roznamcha filed along with the return it is mentioned that the letter to communicate the cancellation order could not be served upon the appellant because he was not available but, looking to the finding and the order of the Disciplinary Authority (Annexure P/8) dated 17-5-2002, it is gathered that apart from sending the written letter withdrawing the permission to appear in the examination of Sub Inspector to be held in the State of U. P., it was specifically and orally directed by the Commandant to the appellant that the permission has been withdrawn. The said finding of Disciplinary Authority is based upon the material placed before the Disciplinary Authority and looking to the limited scope of judicial review, learned writ Court has rightly held that the appellant was fully aware about the withdrawal of the permission earlier granted to him. Thus, we are not having any scintilla of doubt in our mind in holding that appellant was fully aware that the permission which was granted to him earlier was later on withdrawn. Hence, the argument placed before us by learned counsel for the appellant is not accepted.

12. We have already held hereinabove that the present case is not of absence from the duty since the charges were altogether different and at the cost of repetition, we may again reiterate that learned writ Court has already held that since the charges were quite different, therefore, the applicability of Regulation 190 of M.P Police Regulations is not applicable. The finding of learned Writ Court in that regard is hereby affirmed.

13. However, we find some substance in the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that since the appellant was serving on the lowest post of Constable, therefore before passing the order of extreme punishment of dismissal from service, provisions of Regulation 226 or the Police Regulations and particularly clauses (iii) and (v) should have been taken into consideration. For ready reference, Regulation 226 is quoted hereunder, which reads thus :—

226. Punishments-Offences for which given — the following rules should be observed in determining what penalty should be awarded for any particular offence :—

(i) XXXXXX

(ii) XXXXXX

(iii) Withholding of increment either temporary or permanent (or grade reduction in the case of head constables), is a suitable punishment for all cases of serious dereliction of duty. It may also be inflicted for culpable ignorance of police procedure, laziness or apathy in conducting the work of the police station, and the like. Fair warning should be given in every instance and opportunity for amendment afforded before the punishment is awarded.

In the case of a constable, the period of deprivation shall not exceed a year, nor is it advisable that a constable should be deprived of more than one increment at a time. If, after a departmental enquiry for a subsequent offence, it is found advisable to inflict this punishment on a constable already under reduction, the proper order to pass is one extending the reduction by a period not exceeding one year.

Note. — When an officer in a graded posts is reduced permanently, his place in the grade to which he is reduced must be determined at the time of passing the order of reduction with due regard to the amount of punishment deserved.

(iv) XX XX XX

(v) Fine is an appropriate punishment for repeated carelessness and disobedience of orders, unpunctuality and the like. Fines should be moderate in amount; the loss of half a month's pay is the utmost that should ever be inflicted, save in very exceptional circumstances. The fining of constables is prohibited.

If the aforesaid provision is kept in juxtaposition to Clause 64 (iv) of M.P Police Regulations for which appellant was charged, it would reveal that despite there is provision in Regulation Clause 64(iv) which pertains to maintain discipline; to observe subordination and to obey lawful orders promptly, even then Clauses (iii) and (v) have been framed in Regulation 226 which are applicable to Constables and which pertains to the penalty to be awarded to a Constable. Indeed, by keeping in mind Clause 64(iv) of the said Regulations, the charges were framed in regard to disobeying lawful orders of the superiors and, therefore, before passing the extreme order of punishment of removal from service, according to us, clauses (iii) and (v) of Regulation 226 ought to have been seen by the Disciplinary as well as by the Appellate Authority. Learned Dy. Additional General has submitted that earlier the appellant was warned by the authorities but fairly states from the record that his work was appreciated and several times he was also awarded by suitable awards. According to us, since clauses (iii) and (v) of Regulation 226 was not taken into account by the Disciplinary and the Appellate Authority therefore, we hereby direct the Disciplinary Authority, Commandant, 26th Battalion, SAF, Guna (respondent No. 3) to examine the case of the appellant vis-a-vis to Regulation 226 of M.P Police Regulations and by paying heed to clauses (iii) and (v) of Regulation 226, fresh order in accordance to the law may be passed.

14. All the decisions placed reliance upon by learned Dy. Advocate General are distinguishable because none of these cases pertains to M.P Police Regulations since they are either under the service jurisprudence or industrial jurisprudence or of the provisions of Armed Forces which are not governed by M.P Police Regulations but are governed by different statutes.

15. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned order passed by learned Writ Court, except upholding the punishment order of the writ petitioner, rest part of the order is hereby affirmed. However, that part of the impugned order of learned Writ Court by which the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authority (Annexure P/8) dated 17-5-2002 and affirmed by the Appellate Authority (Annexure P/10) dated 6-9-2002 by which the order of removal from service has been passed is hereby set aside partly and only on the quantum of punishment the matter is remanded to the Disciplinary Authority with a direction that the necessary orders in accordance with law may be passed within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Needless to say, before passing any order, a personal hearing to the appellant may be provided.

16. For the reasons stated hereinabove this appeal is allowed in part with no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.