ORDER

Since common questions of facts and law are involved in these similar matters, with the consent of parties the matters were analogously heard and decided by this common judgment.

2. The facts are taken from Misc. Cri. Case No. 213/2012.

On 14.3.2011 a tractor trolley of the petitioner was seized by forest officials under the provisions of Indian Forest Act, 1927 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1927 Act’). As per the story of prosecution, the forest officials were petrolling in the Chambal Sanctuary to check illegal mining of surface soil, sand. During the said petrolling, petitioner's tractor trolley was found laden with sand, surface soil, a forest produce in the prohibited area. Accordingly, the vehicle was seized and a forest criminal case was registered against the petitioner under 1927 Act. The ‘forest produce’ is defined in Section 4 of the 1927 Act. It is not in dispute between the parties that forest officials sent an intimation of aforesaid seizure to the Magistrate as per section 52 of 1927 Act (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) and it is also not in dispute that such an information was duly received by the concerned Magistrate.

3. The petitioner filed an application under section 451 read with section 457 of Cr.P.C before the Magistrate for releasing his vehicle. The learned Magistrate by order dated 8.4.2011 rejected the said application on the ground that the information of seizure of said tractor trolley is already received by the Magistrate and, therefore, under the provisions of the Forest Act, the jurisdiction of Magistrate is ousted. At this stage, the petitioner filed a revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C before the Additional Sessions Judge, Morena, which was registered as Case No. 63/2011. The said Court by order dated 16.6.2011 rejected the revision on the ground that once information is given under Section 52 of the 1927 Act by the forest officials to the Magistrate, the jurisdiction of Magistrate is ousted. Thus, no fault was found in the order of the Magistrate and revision was rejected.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in these matters submitted that in view of the recent judgment of this Court in Misc. Cri. Case No. 7937/2008 (Dilip v. State of Madhya Pradesh), the vehicle should have been released and the courts below had jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 451 read with section 457 of Cr.P.C

5. Shri V.D Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed heavy reliance on (2003) 2 SCC (Cri) 1943 (Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat), which was recently followed in (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 226 (General Insurance Council v. State of Andhra Pradesh) to submit that if vehicle is unnecessarily kept in the police station or with the forest department, no useful purpose would be served. The vehicle would be damaged because it is exposed to sun and rain and in that eventuality in view of Sunderbhai's case (supra), the vehicle can very well be released. He also placed reliance on 2007 (3) SCC (Cri) 353 (State of U.P v. Lalloo Singh) and 2003 (2) SCC (Cri) 1085 (State Of Karnataka v. K.A Kunchindammed. placing reliance on 2002 (1) SCC (Cri) 889 (Moti Lal v. Central Bureau of Investigation), Shri Sharma submits that both the courts below have committed an error of law in not releasing the vehicle.

6. Shri V.D Sharma placed heavy reliance on Section 55(1) of the 1927 Act (Madhya Pradesh Amendment). On the basis of this provision, it is submitted that confiscation is possible only upon conviction. As on date, there is no conviction and, therefore, in absence of any conviction neither seizure nor confiscation is permissible. He further submits that as per the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1972 Act’), very stringent provisions are made with regard to forest offences and, therefore, the authorities should not have applied the provisions of the 1927 Act.

7. Shri Satyendra Dixit, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in Misc. Cri. Case No. 779/2012, almost borrowed the same argument. Shri Prashant Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Misc. Cri. Case No. 6856/2010 has also placed heavy reliance on Section 55 of the 1927 Act (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) and submits that unless the petitioners are found to be guilty by an authority/court of competent jurisdiction, their vehicles cannot be even seized. He submits that it violates their fundamental rights and such a provision cannot be read in the fashion whereby a person is deprived from his tractor trolley/vehicle etc. He submits that the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners include right to get engaged in a business of their choice and if their vehicle which is main source of business is seized and if it is not released, their fundamental rights are infringed.

8.Per Contra, Smt. Sangita Pachauri, learned Public Prosecutor, supported the action and placed reliance on various provisions of 1927 Act to submit that there exists a special provision dealing with seizure, confiscation and release of the vehicle etc. By taking the court to various provisions of 1972 Act, she submits that both the provisions of 1927 Act and 1972 Act are totally different and deal with different situations.

9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

10. Section 52 of the 1927 Act (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) reads as under:-

“52. Seizure of property liable to confiscation and procedure therefor.— (1) When there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any forest produce, such produce, together with all tools, boats, vehicles, ropes, chains or any other article used in committing any such offence may be seized by any Forest-officer or Police Officer.

(2) Every officer seizing any property under this section shall place on such property a mark indicating that the same has been so seized and shall, as soon as may be, either produce the property seized before an officer not below the rank of an Extra Assistant Conservator of Forest authorised by the State Government in this behalf by notification (hereinafter referred to as the authorised officer) or where it is, having regard to quantity of bulk or other genuine difficulty, not practicable to produce the property seized before the authorised officer, make a report about the seizure to the authorised officer or where it is intended to launch criminal proceedings against the offender immediately, make a report of such seizure to the magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure has been made:

Provided that when the forest produce with respect to which offence is believed to have been committed is the property of Government and the offender is unknown, it shall be sufficient if the officer makes, as soon as may be, a report of the circumstances to his official superior.

(3) Subject to sub-section (5), where the authorised officer upon production before him of property seized of upon receipt of report about seizure, as the case may be, is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed in respect thereof, he may by order in writing and for reasons to be recorded confiscate forest produce so seized together with all tools, vehicles, boats, ropes, chains or any other article used in committing such offence. A copy of order on confiscation shall be forwarded without any undue delay to the Conservator of Forests of the forest circle in which the timber produce, as the case may be, has been seized.

(4) No order confiscating any property shall be made under sub-section (3) unless the authorised officer-

(a) sends an intimation in form prescribed about initiation of proceedings for confiscation of property to the magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure has been made;

(b) issues a notice in writing to the person from whom the property is seizure, and to any other person who may appear to the authorised officer to have some interest in such property;

(c) affords an opportunity to the persons referred to in clause (b) of making a representation within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the proposed confiscation, and (d) gives to the officer effecting the seizure and the person or persons to whom notice has been issued under clause (b), a hearing on date to be fixed for such purpose.

(5) No order of confiscation under sub-section (3) of any tools, vehicles, boats, ropes, chains or any other article (other than the timber or forest produce seized shall be made if any person referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (4) proves to the satisfaction of authorised officer that any such tools, vehicles, boats, ropes, chains or other articles were used without his knowledge or connivance or as the case may be, without the knowledge or connivance of his servant or agent and that all reasonable and necessary precautions had been taken against use of the objects aforesaid for commission.”

Section 52A (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) reads as under:-

“52A. Appeal against the order of confiscation.— (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of confiscation may, within thirty days of the order, or if the fact of such order has not been communicated to him, within thirty days of date of knowledge of such order, prefer an appeal in writing, accompanied by such fee and payable in such form as may be prescribed, along with certified copy of order of confiscation to the conservator of forests (hereinafter referred to as Appellate Authority) of the forest circle in which the forest produce has been seized.

Explanation- (1) The time requisite for obtaining certified copy of order of confiscation shall be excluded while computing period of thirty days referred to in this sub-section.

(2) The Appellate Authority referred to in sub-section (1), may, where no appeal has been preferred before him, “suo motu” within thirty days of date of receipt of copy of order of confiscation by him, and shall on presentation of memorandum of appeal issue a notice for hearing of appeal or, as the case may be, of “suo motu” action to the officer effecting seizure and to any other person (including appellant, if any) who in the opinion of the Appellate Authority, is likely to be adversely affected by the order of confiscation, and may send for the record of the case:

Provided that no formed notice of appeal need be issued to such amongst the appellant, officer effecting seizure and any other person likely to be adversely affected as aforesaid, as may waive the notice or as may be informed in any other manner of date of hearing of appeal by the Appellate Authority.

(3) The Appellate Authority shall send intimation in writing of lodging of appeal or about “suo motu” action, to the authorised officer.

(4) The Appellate Authority may pass such order of “Interim” nature for custody preservation or disposal (if necessary) of the subject matter of confiscation, as may appear to be just or proper in the circumstances of the case.

(5) The Appellate Authority having regard to the nature of the case or the complexities, involved, may permit parties to the appeal to be represented by their respective legal practitioner.

(6) On the date fixed for hearing of the appeal or “suo motu” action, or on such date to which the hearing may be adjourned, the Appellate Authority shall peruse the record and hear the parties to the appeal if present in person, or through any agent duly authorised in writing or through a legal practitioner, and shall thereafter proceed to pass an order of confirmation, reversal or modification order of confiscation:

Provided that before passing any final order the Appellate Authority may if it is considered necessary for proper decision of appeal or for proper disposal of “suo motu” action make further inquiry itself or cause it to be made by the authorised officer, and may also allow parties to file affidavits for asserting or refuting any fact that may raise for consideration and may allow proof of facts by affidavits.

(7) The Appellate Authority may also pass such orders of consequential nature, as it may deem necessary.

(8) Copy of final order on an order of consequential nature, shall be sent to the authorised officer for compliance or for passing any appropriate order in conformit with the order of Appellate Authority.

Section 52B (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) reads as under:-

“52B. Revision before Court of Sessions against order of Appellate Authority.— (1) Any party to the appeal, aggrieved by final order or by order of consequential nature passed by the Appellate Authority, may within thirty days of the order sought to be impugned, submit a petition for revision to the Court of Sessions division whereof the headquarters of the Appellate Authority are situate.

Explanation.- In computing the period of thirty days under this sub-section the time requisite for obtaining certified copy of order of Appellate Authority shall be excluded.

(2) The Court of Sessions may confirm, reverse or modify any final order or an order of consequential nature passed by the Appellate Authority.

(3) Copies of the order passed in revision shall be sent to the Appellate Authority and to the Authorised Officer for compliance or for passing such further order or for taking such further action as may be directed by such Court.

(4) For entertaining, hearing and deciding a revision under this section, the Court of session shall as far as may be, exercise the same powers and follows the same procedure as it exercises and follows while entertaining, hearing and deciding a revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974).

(5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) the order of the Court of Sessions passed under this section shall be final and shall not be called in question before any Court.

There is yet another State Amendment, i.e, Section 52C.

11. A bare perusal of Section 52 shows that it deals with seizure of property liable to confiscation and prescribes a procedure therefor. Section 52(4) makes it obligatory for the authority to send an intimation in the prescribed form about initiation of confiscation proceedings for confiscation of property to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure has been made. Section 52A provides an appeal against the order of confiscation. Section 52B provides a remedy of revision before the Court of Session against the order of Appellate Authority. Section 52C puts a bar to the jurisdiction of courts in certain circumstances.

12. The basic question before this Court is whether after getting an information under section 52(4) of the 1927 Act the Magistrate will have jurisdiction to release the vehicle? In fact, on more than one occasion various Benches of this Court have held that once such an intimation is given to the Magistrate, as per the bar created under Section 52C of 1927 Act, the Magistrate's jurisdiction for providing the vehicle on interim custody stands ousted. This view is taken in 1987 Cri.L.J 368 (Kanhaiyalal v. State of M.P). Para 17 of the said judgment reads as under:-

“17. In the ultimate analysis I find that the applicability of S. 52-C of the Central Act is attracted in the instant case and the Magistrate's jurisdiction to make orders with regard to interim custody of the truck in question stands ousted.”

13. In 1992 Cri.L.J 1764 (Rishi Nath Singh v. State of M.P) this Court again took the same view in para 9, which reads as under:-

“9. ………. Therefore, in my opinion, after the directions of this Court in writ petition the legal proceedings to acquire the vehicle on Supurdgi are not saved after the notice and intimation of confiscation of the seized truck under the provisions of Forest Act. Therefore, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal and decide the application of the applicant for the same.”

14. Thereafter in 2002 (3) MPLJ 245 (Vishambhar Yadav v. State of MP), this Court again took the same view. Last para of the judgment reads as under:-

“In case the confiscation proceedings are initiated under clause 3 of section 52 of the Forest Act, the J.M.F.C exercising jurisdiction over the relevant area, ceases to have any jurisdiction to pass an order, on application seeking Supurdagi under section 457 of the Criminal Procedure Code in cases he is informed by Forest Officer under section 52(4) of the Forest Act. Therefore, the learned J.M.F.C is found to have committed no illegality or impropriety in rejecting the petitioner's application moved under section 457 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus this revision petition does not merit which is accordingly disallowed and rejected at this stage of motion hearing.”

15. Thus, this Court consistently held that in view of bar created in section 52C of the 1927 Act, the vehicle cannot be released by the Magistrate after getting the intimation of seizure under section 52 of the 1927 Act.

16. Similar issue travelled to Supreme Court in (2004) 4 SCC 159 (State of West Bengal v. Sujeet Kumar Rana). In the said case the effect of West Bengal amendment in 1927 Act was under consideration before the Supreme Court. For the purpose of analysis, it is profitable to quote both the provisions, which are reproduced as under:-

Sec. 59-G of West Bengal Amendment

Sec. 52C of Madhya Pradesh Amendment

Bar of jurisdiction in certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law for the time being in force, the officer authorized under Section 59-C or the District Judge to whom an appeal may be preferred under Section 59-D shall have and any other officer or Forest Officer or court, tribunal or authority shall not have jurisdiction to make orders with regard to the custody, possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of any property or tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles or cattle seized under Section 52.

(Emphasis Supplied)

Bar to jurisdiction of courts etc. under certain circumstances:-

(1) On receipt of intimation under Sub-section 4 of Section 52 about initiation of the proceeding for confiscation of the property by the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which the seizure of the property which is subject matter of confiscation, has been made, no court, tribunal or authority (other than the authorized officers, appellate authority and the court of Sessions referred to in Section 52, 52-A, and 52-B), shall have jurisdiction to make order with regard to possession, delivery, disposal of distribution of the property in regard to which proceedings for confiscation are initiated under Section 52, notwithstanding any thing to the contrary contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force.

Explanation: where under any law for the time being in force two or more courts have jurisdiction to try forest offence, then receipt of intimation under Sub-section 4 of Section 52 by one of the courts of Magistrate having such jurisdiction shall be construed to be in receipt of intimation under that provision by all the courts and the bar to exercise jurisdiction shall operate on all such courts.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

A perusal of both the aforesaid provisions would show that the same are almost pari materia and are introduced with same aim and object. The apex Court while dealing with the same provision has held as under:-

“31. The said authority before passing a final order in terms of Section 59-A(3) of the Act is required to issue notice and give opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. Unless such a notice is issued, the confiscation proceeding cannot be said to have started. Once, however, a confiscation proceeding is initiated; in terms of Section 59-G of the Act, the jurisdiction of the criminal court in this behalf stands excluded. The criminal court although indisputably has the jurisdiction to deal with the property which is the subject-matter of offence in terms of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure but once a confiscation proceeding is initiated, the said power cannot be exercised by the Magistrate.

32.The High Court cannot, thus, in such a situation exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said provision reads thus:

“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.— Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

33. From a bare perusal of the aforementioned provision, it would be evident that the inherent power of the High Court is saved only in a case where an order has been passed by the criminal court which is required to be set aside to secure the ends of justice or where the proceeding pending before a court amounts to abuse of the process of court. It is, therefore, evident that power under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised by the High Court in relation to a matter pending before a court; which in the context of the Code of Criminal Procedure would mean “a criminal court” or whence a power is exercised by the court under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Once it is held that the criminal court had no power to deal with the property seized under the Act, the question of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not arise.

34.The amendments carried out by the State of West Bengal by reason of Sections 59-A to 59-G in the Indian Forest Act provide for a complete Code. The validity or otherwise of the said provisions is not in question before us. An order of confiscation in respect of a property must be distinguished from an order of forfeiture thereof. Although the effect of both confiscation and forfeiture of a property may be the same, namely, that the property would vest in the State but the nature of such order having regard to the statutory scheme must be held to be different. A proceeding for confiscation can be initiated irrespective of the fact as to whether prosecution for commission of a forest offence has been lodged or not. A confiscation proceeding, therefore, is independent of a criminal proceeding. We may also notice that the State has been made liable to refund the amount which has been deposited pursuant to an auction held in respect of the confiscated property only in the event the order of confiscation is set aside or annulled under Section 59-A(4)(b) thereof. No provision has been made in the statute unlike Section 6-C of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 to the effect that the confiscated property or the amount deposited in the treasury pursuant to the auction of the confiscated goods would be returned to the owner thereof in the event, the criminal trial ends in an acquittal.

35. This Court, in this case, is not concerned with the effect of acquittal vis-à-vis a confiscation proceeding. There may be a case where a judgment of acquittal has been rendered not on merit of the matter but by way of giving benefit of doubt or for certain reasons unrelated to the adjudication on merits as for example dropping of the proceeding as the prosecution witnesses did not turn up despite service of summons.

36. This Court in Sudhakar Rao (1985) 4 SCC 573, we may note, however, approved the decision of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mohd. Yaseen v. Forest Range Officer stating: (SCC pp. 584-85, para 14)

“14. We find that a later Division Bench consisting of Kondaiah, C.J and Punnayya, J. in Mohd. Yaseen v. Forest Range Officer approved of the view expressed by Jeewan Reddy, J. in P.K Mohd. case and held that the Act contemplates two procedures, one for confiscation of goods forming the subject-matter of the offence by the authorized officer under sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 of the Act, and the other for trial of the person accused of the offence so committed under Section 20 or 29 of the Act. The learned Judges held that the Act provides for a special machinery for confiscation of illicitly felled timber or forest produce by the authorized officer under sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 enacted in the general public interest to suppress the mischief of ruthless exploitation of government forests by illicit felling and removal of teak and other valuable forest produce. They further held that merely because there was an acquittal of the accused in the trial before the Magistrate due to paucity of evidence or otherwise did not necessarily entail in nullifying the order of confiscation of the seized timber or forest produce by the authorized officer under sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 of the Act based on his satisfaction that a forest offence had been committed in respect thereof. We affirm the view expressed by Jeewan Reddy, J. in State of A.P v. P.K Mohd. (1978) 1 APLJ 391 and by Kondaiah, C.J and Punnayya, J. in Mohd. Yaseen case (1980) 1 An LT 8.”

37. In State Of W.B v. Gopal Sarkar (2002) 1 SCC 495, this Court followed Sudhakar Rao and on construction of sub-section (3) of Section 59-A held: (SCC p. 498, para 10)

“10. On a fair reading of the provision it is clear that in a case where any timber or other forest produce which is the property of the State Government is produced under sub-section (1) and an authorised officer is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed in respect of such property he may pass order of confiscation of the said property (forest produce) together with all tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing the offence. The power of confiscation is independent of any proceeding of prosecution for the forest offence committed.” (emphasis supplied)

38. Yet again, in State of Karnataka v. K.A Kunchindammed (2002) 9 SCC 90, this Court observed that even the expression “sandalwood” as contained in the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 would include “sandalwood oil”. This Court in no uncertain terms held: (SCC p. 99, paras 23-24)

“23. The Karnataka Forest Act is a special statute enacted for the purpose of preserving the forests and the forest produce in the State. The scheme of the Act, as expressed in the sections, is to vest power in the authorised officers of the Forest Department for proper implementation/enforcement of the statutory provisions and for enabling them to take effective steps for preserving the forests and forest produce. For this purpose, certain powers including the power of seizure, confiscation and forfeiture of the forest produce illegally removed from the forests have been vested exclusively in them. The position is made clear by the non obstante clause in the relevant provisions giving overriding effect to the provisions in the Act over other statutes and laws. The necessary corollary of such provisions is that in a case where the authorised officer is empowered to confiscate the seized forest produce on being satisfied that an offence under the Act has been committed thereof the general power vested in the Magistrate for dealing with interim custody/release of the seized materials under CrPC has to give way. The Magistrate while dealing with a case of any seizure of forest produce under the Act should examine whether the power to confiscate the seized forest produce is vested in the authorised officer under the Act and if he finds that such power is vested in the authorised officer then he has no power to pass an order dealing with interim custody/release of the seized material. This, in our view, will help in proper implementation of provisions of the special Act and will help in advancing the purpose and object of the statute. If in such cases power to grant interim custody/release of the seized forest produce is vested in the Magistrate then it will be defeating the very scheme of the Act. Such a consequence is to be avoided.

24. From the statutory provisions and the analysis made in the foregoing paragraphs the position that emerges is that the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge were right in holding that on facts and in the circumstances of the case, it is the authorized officer who is vested with the power to pass order of interim custody of the vehicle and not the Magistrate. The High Court was in error in taking a view to the contrary and in setting aside the orders passed by the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge on that basis.”

39. ………..The courts cannot shut their eyes and ignore their obligations indicated in the Act enacted for the purposes of protecting and safeguarding both the forests and their produce. The forests are not only the natural wealth of the country but also protector of human life by providing a clean and unpolluted atmosphere. We are of the considered view that when any vehicle is seized on the allegation that it was used for committing a forest offence, the same shall not normally be returned to a party till the culmination of all the proceedings in respect of such offence, including confiscatory proceedings, if any. Nonetheless, if for any exceptional reasons a court is inclined to release the vehicle during such pendency, furnishing a bank guarantee should be the minimum condition. No party shall be under the impression that release of vehicle would be possible on easier terms, when such vehicle is alleged to have been involved in commission of a forest offence. Any such easy release would tempt the forest offenders to repeat commission of such offences. Its casualty will be the forests as the same cannot be replenished for years to come.

8. From the above dictum of this Court, we find that when a vehicle is involved in a forest offence the same is not to be released to the offender or the claimant as a matter of routine till the culmination of the proceedings which may include confiscation of such vehicle.”

41. In view of the aforementioned binding precedents, we are of the opinion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in releasing the vehicles in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

42. In view of our findings aforementioned, the contention of the learned counsel that this Court may not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India having regard to the purported findings of the criminal court, will have to be judged. As indicated hereinbefore, there exists a distinction between confiscation and conviction.

43. A confiscation envisages a civil liability whereas an order of forfeiture of the forest produce must be preceded by a judgment of conviction. Although indisputably having regard to the phraseology used in sub-section (2) of Section 59-A, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that commission of a forest offence is one of the requisite ingredients for passing an order of confiscation; but the question as to whether the order of acquittal has been passed on that ground and what weight should be attached thereto is a matter which, in our opinion, should not be gone into at this stage.”

17. The principles which can be culled out from the provisions of the 1927 Act and the judgment in Sujeet Kumar Rana's case (supra) are as under:-

(i) Forest Act is a Special Act;

(ii) M.P Amendments provide a complete Code in itself by giving sufficient safeguards both substantive and procedural against any arbitrary exercise of power. It also prescribe hierarchy of adjudicatory bodies;

(iii) Section 52-C creates a bar on the jurisdiction of courts as described in it. Because of non-obstante clause used in Section 52-C it will have an overriding effect on other laws including general provisions of Cr.P.C;

(iv) Once intimation of initiation of confiscation proceedings is given to Magistrate, the jurisdiction of Magistrate is ousted;

(v) Magistrate and revisions Courts can't grant interim custody of vehicle de hors the bar of Section 52-C.

(vi) Once confiscation proceeding is initiated, the jurisdiction of criminal courts in terms of Section 52-C of the 1927 Act is barred, the High Court also cannot exercise its jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C for interim release of such vehicle/property.

18. It is also clear that this Court in various judgments has taken a consistent view that as per bar created under Section 52-C, the Magistrate cannot release the vehicle on interim custody. The Apex Court has finally drawn the curtains on this issue in Sujeet Kumar Rana's case (supra).

19. The petitioners although have placed reliance on 2000 (I) MPLJ 289 (Madhukar Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh), decided by Full Bench, but in the opinion of this Court, the said judgment has no application in the facts and circumstances of this case. In the said case, the Full Bench was dealing with a different question regarding provisions of 1972 Act.

20. Learned Public Prosecutor has relied on 2000 (3) MPLJ 27 (Union of India v. Raju Construction Company). Para 16 of the said judgment reads as under:-

“16. ……………Therefore this court has an unenviable task of choosing between the two views. With great respect, the view taken in the case of Nandayal Cooperative Spinning Mills Ltd. (supra) was decided on 11.5.1993 without taking note of the earlier judgment in case of H.S Tulli and Sons Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) which was decided on 11.2.1992 It appears that this case was reported also prior to delivery of the subsequent Judgment. It appears to this Court that this subsequent decision is per incuriam in the sense that the earlier judgment was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. It is per incuriam for another reason that it does not discuss the essential terms of section 8(1)(a) of the Act that there should be consent of both the parties which was not there after delegation of power to the named authority. After analysing section 8(1)(a) of the Act in paragraph (8) of judgment and mentioning the condition No. 4, regarding consent, their Lordships of the Supreme Court omitted to consider if condition No. 4 was applicable to the facts of the case. The judgment rendered is sub silentio.”

(Emphasis supplied).

On the basis of this judgment, it is argued that in Dilip's case (Misc. Cri. Case No. 7937/2008) neither the provisions of 1927 Act were considered nor the judgments delivered by the Coordinate Benches by dealing with the specific bar created under Section 52-C of the 1927 Act. Thus, it is submitted that Dilip's case (supra) cannot be pressed into service and courts below have not committed any error in rejecting the applications.

21. In the opinion of this Court, the provisions of 1927 Act (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) in no uncertain terms make it crystal clear that the procedure is laid down for the purpose of seizure, confiscation etc. The statutory forums are created. Statutory bar is introduced for the courts in certain circumstances. This is age old principle of law that if something is provided in law, it has to be followed in the same manner or not at all. This view is taken in (2011) 10 SCC 714 (J&K Housing Board v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul) and 2011 (2) MPLJ 690 (Satyanjay Tripathi v. Banarsi Devi).

22. Shri V.D Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed heavy reliance on 2010 (1) SCC (Cri) 79 (Babubhai Jamnadas Patel v. State of Gujarat), to submit that this Court has tremendous power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, this Court can direct for release of the vehicle in its section 482 jurisdiction.

23. In my considered opinion, this argument deserves to be rejected in the light of categorical finding given by the Supreme Court in Sujeet Kumar Rana (supra). In so many words it has been held by the Apex Court that the 1927 Act provides a Code in itself and the entire adjudicating machinery has to act in accordance with law provided in the Act. It is stated that even jurisdiction of this Court for releasing vehicle under section 482 of Cr.P.C is ousted. In paras 41 and 46 of the said said judgment the Apex Court has taken this view.

24. Apart from this, the Legislature in its wisdom has prescribed methodology to deal with the forest offences, seizure, confiscation, release etc. Once such a procedure is prescribed, the courts have to examine the rights of the parties as per the procedure so prescribed. In the opinion of this Court, various Single Benches in the cases of Kanhaiyalal (1987 Cri.L.J 368), Rishinath Singh (1992 Cri.L.J 1764) and Vishambhar Yadav (2002 (3) MPLJ 245) (supra) have rightly taken a consistent view that the vehicle cannot be released after getting an intimation from the forest department by the Magistrate. The Supreme Court has dealt with almost similar procedure in Sujeet Kumar Rana (supra). Thus, I am unable to hold that the Magistrate and Revisional Court have committed any error in rejecting the applications preferred by the petitioner under section 451/457 of Cr.P.C In view of the special provision of 1927 Act, the general provision laid down in Sunderbhai's case (supra) cannot be pressed into service for release of vehicle from the Court of Magistrate.

25. Shri Amit Lahoti, learned counsel appearing in one matter (Misc. Cri. Case No. 18/2012), fairly submits that as per his understanding of law, Section 52-C of 1927 Act prescribes a complete bar on the jurisdiction of Magistrate once intimation of seizure is received by him. He fairly submits that as per his legal research, the Magistrate's order and Revisional Court's order cannot be found fault with. He further submits that as per Section 53 of 1927 Act, power to give interim custody of vehicle is vested with forest authority and not with Magistrate or Sessions Court. However, by placing reliance on 2001 (2) MPHT 21 (CG) (Smt. Indrani Shrivastava v. State of Chhattisgarh) he submits that such a power can be exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for releasing the vehicle.

26. In the opinion of this Court, this argument cannot be accepted because these petitions are not filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Apart from this, reliance placed on Section 55(1) of State Amendment is of no help to the petitioners. Admittedly, this matter is not regarding validity of confiscation proceedings. The lis is regarding jurisdiction of Magistrate and revisional Court to release the vehicle on interim custody. Section 55(1) does not deal with that eventuality and for that special provisions are made in Sections 52-A, 52-B and 52-C of the State Amendments in 1927 Act. Thus, heavy reliance placed on Section 55(1) is of no assistance to the petitioners.

27. In view of aforesaid legal position, the judgment in Dilip's case (supra) cannot be pressed into service for release of vehicle by the Court of Magistrate or by the Revisional Court. In the case of Dilip neither the provisions of Forest Act were dealt with nor the judgment of Supreme Court holding the field in Sujeet Kumar Rana (supra) was taken into account. Earlier judgments of this Court were also not brought to the notice of this Court in the case of Dilip. In this view of the matter, the judgment of Dilip is distinguishable.

28. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, I have no hesitation to hold that in the light of the provisions of 1927 Act and as per the judgments by various Benches of this Court in the cases of Kanhaiyalal, Rishinath Singh and Vishambhar Yadav (supra) and because of binding judgment of Supreme Court in Sujeet Kumar Rana (supra), the Magistrate and the Revisional Court have not committed any error in rejecting the applications.

30. Resultantly, petitions are dismissed. No costs.