U.C Maheshwari, J.:— The petitioner-applicant has directed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the tenability and sustainability of order dated 22-11-2008 passed by the M.P State Co-operative Tribunal, Bhopal (in short “the Tribunal”) dismissing his Second Appeal No. 207/08 treating to be a revision under section 77 (14) of the M.P State Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (in short “the Societies Act”) affirming with some observations the order dated 18-11-2008 passed by the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Society, allowing the Revision of respondent No. 2, Bearing No. 80-A 98/07-08, whereby setting aside the orders dated 4-2-2008, 18-2-2008 and 25-3-08 passed by Dy. Registrar, Co-operative Society in Miscellaneous Case No. 15/07 remitted back the case again to Dy. Registrar with a direction to decide the application of the petitioner filed under section 67 of the Societies Act, read with Order XL, Rule 1 of the CPC afresh.

2. The facts giving rise to this petition in short are that respondent No. 1- Society by executing a sale-deed dated 22-2-1962 through its office bearer allotted the plot bearing No. 7-B, Panjabi Bagh, Bhopal with possession to Smt. Veerawali, (since deceased) the mother of the petitioner and such sale-deed was duly registered on 30-3-1962 with the Sub Registrar, Bhopal. Subsequent to such allotment the office bearer of the respondent No. 1, contrary to the right of said Veerawali and the petitioner, unilaterally executed and got registered an extinguished deed dated 9-8-2001. On the strength of such deed the respondent No. I through its office bearer executed and registered the sale-deed with consideration dated 21-4-2004 in favour of respondent No. 2 who on her turn by executing the registered sale-deed dated 11-7-2006 with consideration sold out such plot to respondent Nos. 4 and 5. According to the case of the petitioner the sale-deed executed in favour of her mother could not be deemed to be cancelled on the strength of above mentioned extinguished deed. As the same was got executed and registered by practicing fraud with the rights and title of Veerawali and after her death, of the petitioner. On coming to know about such fraud, the petitioner filed dispute in this regard before the Court of Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Society under section 64 of the Societies Act. In pendency of the same, such Court by issuing ad interim injunction dated 1-2-2006 restrained the respondent to make any construction over the disputed property. The same was approved by the Appellate Court, vide order dated 29-8-2006. While approving such interim injunction the Appellate Court also directed to the Dy. Registrar to conclude the trial and adjudicate the same upto the period ended on 29-11-2006. In spite that such dispute bearing Case No. 81/05 is still pending for adjudication.

3. In pendency of the aforesaid dispute the petitioner filed an application under section 67 of the Societies Act, read with Order XL, Rule I of the Civil Procedure Code with the prayer of appointment of the Receiver. Contending that respondent Nos. 2 to 5 never acquired any title or the possession of the disputed property, the same was remained on the strength of the said sale-deed 22-3-1962 with Smt. Veerawali and after her with the petitioner. But on dated 6-7-2004 by committing the offence of trespass, respondent Nos. 2, 4 and 5 put out the petitioner from the physical possession of the same. Such respondent did not have any right to remain or enjoy such property. With these averments, to protect the title and interest of the petitioner regarding disputed plot he filed the aforesaid application in the Court of Dy. Registrar on dated 4-2-2008.

4. After registering the petition as Miscellaneous Case No. M-15/07 an ex parte order for appointment of the receiver for the disputed property was passed on the same day whereby Shri J.S Gujral, Retired Sr. Co-operative Inspector was appointed as Receiver who withdrew his name from such appointment on dated 18-2-2008, on which Shri N.K Saxena, Advocate was replaced as Receiver and was directed to take physical possession of the disputed plot. But subsequently by passing a bi-parte order dated 25-3-2008 instead the physical possession, the Receiver was directed to take only symbolic possession of the property, on which the petitioner filed the Revision bearing No. 78/04/08-09 before the Joint Registrar with a prayer to set aside the aforesaid order dated 25-3-2008 by maintaining the orders dated 4-2-2008 and 18-2-2008 directing the Receiver to take physical possession of the property while respondent No. 2 Manjeet Kour filed two different revisions with a prayer to set aside the entire proceedings of appointment of the Receiver and also the aforesaid interim orders dated 4-2-2008 and 18-2-2008 passed by the Dy. Registrar in such proceedings.

5. On consideration such revisions were adjudicated by the impugned order dated 18-11-2008 whereby setting aside the aforesaid orders dated 4-2-2008, 18-2-2008 and 25-3-2008, the case was remitted back to Dy. Registrar with a direction to decide the aforesaid applications afresh in accordance with law. On challenging such order by the petitioner in Second Appeal before the State Co-operative Tribunal, on consideration by treating such appeal to be a Revision under section 77(14) of the Act, was dismissed by the impugned order and by affirming the order of the Joint Registrar the case has been remanded to the Dy. Registrar with some additional directions to decide the application afresh. Hence the petitioner has come to this Court with this petition.

6. We have heard at length to the petitioner in person and the Counsel of the respondents. Having heard, after perusing the record, we are of the considered view that this petition being filed against the order of the Tribunal and its Subordinate Courts constituted under the Societies Act could be entertained under the superintendence of power of this Court enumerated under Article 227 only and not under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

7. True, it is that initially on filing the aforesaid application for appointment of Receiver by passing an ex parte order some Retired Officer of the Co-operative Society was appointed as Receiver, vide order dated 4-2-2008 with the directions to take physical possession of the disputed property. Subsequently on considering the prayer of such Receiver permitting him to withdraw on 18-2-2008 one Shri N.K Saxena, Advocate was appointed to be a Receiver with a direction to take physical possession of the property. Both the orders were passed ex parte. After giving appearance on behalf of the respondents by passing bi parte order dated 25-3-2008 the Receiver was directed to take symbolic possession of the disputed property instead the physical possession of the same.

8. As per averments of the petition on the date of filing the application the petitioner was not in actual possession of the disputed property. According to his own case by committing the offence of criminal trespass, he was put out from the physical possession of the property by the respondents. Besides this at the instance of the petitioner dispute filed under section 64 of the Societies Act bearing No. 81/05, is still pending in the Competent Court of the Co-operative Sector. In such circumstance, we are of the considered view that while pendency of any litigation before any forum prescribed under the Co-operative Societies Act, the party has a right to approach such Court with the application for appointment of the Receiver. But such application could be considered and adjudicated by such Court keeping in view the scheme provided under section 67 of the Societies Act and under Order XL of the Civil Procedure Code and the settled propositions of law in that regard.

9. The Tribunal as well as the Joint Registrar after appreciation of the available circumstances of the case have categorically held that the aforesaid application of the petitioner was not considered by the Dy. Registrar in accordance with law and the prescribed procedure and the settled propositions of the law in this regard. After going through the aforesaid both the orders, we have not found any apparent error, illegality, irregularity or anything against the propriety of law in the same. On the contrary, same appears to be passed by the Subordinate Tribunal and the Joint Registrar under the vested jurisdiction in them.

10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this petition could not be allowed by invoking the writ jurisdiction vested in the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

11. Apart from above long before on arising the occasion the Single Bench of this Court in the matter of Bal Vyasi v. Mahila Ujjala, reported in 1973 MPLJ Page 941, has settled the principles for appointment of the Receiver, which are still covering such field. The same are as under:—

“14. Principles relating to appointment of receiver may now be recapitulated as under:—

(1) Generally stated, the object of appointment of receiver is preservation of the subject-matter of the litigation pending a judicial determination of the rights of the parties to it.

(2) The rule embodies in Order XL, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code empowers the Court to appoint a receiver whenever it appears to it to be just and convenient to do so. The language employed in the Rule leaves the matter to the discretion of the Court.

(3) The Court has fullest jurisdiction in the matter of appointment of receiver, but the discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily in an unregulated manner; it must be exercised judicially, cautiously and according to legal principles on a consideration of the whole of the circumstances of the case.

(4) Appointment of receiver is recognized as one of the harshest remedies which the law provides for the enforcement of rights so that the jurisdiction must be exercised only in extreme cases.

(5) The Court does not, while considering the question whether a receiver should be appointed, arrive at any final decision on the merits of the case. Its aim is merely to preserve the status quo ante during litigation.

(6) Receiver cannot be appointed just because it is expedient or convenient to one of the parties to do so; nor merely because it will do no harm to do so.

(7) When a person is in bona fide possession of the property in dispute, his possession should not be disturbed by appointment of receiver unless there is some substantial ground for such interference, such as a well founded fear that the property in suit will be dissipated or other irreparable mischief may be done unless the Court appoints a receiver. The plaintiff must not only show a case of adverse and conflicting claims to property, he must further show some emergency or danger or loss demanding immediate action and, further the plaintiffs own right must be reasonably clear and free from doubt.

(8) Although the jurisdiction of the trial Court in the matter of appointment of a receiver is discretionary, that discretion is liable to interfere, if it is not in accordance with the principles on which the judicial discretion must be exercised.”

12. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles also, on examining the orders of the Dy. Registrar appointing the Receiver and modifying such order, (at later stage), that same is not found to be passed in accordance with such principles. So in such circumstance, the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Society or the Tribunal had no option except to set aside the order passed by the Dy. Registrar and send back the matter again to trial Court to decide the application of the petitioner afresh in accordance with prescribed procedure. Thus, in such premises also the impugned order is not found faulted.

13. However, some of the observations made by the Tribunal in Para 7 of its order on merits regarding the sale-deed dated 21-4-2004, while giving the direction to the trial Court stating that “the Court of Dy. Registrar while considering the matter should also ensure that the second deed executed on 6-7-2004 should also have a bearing in the matter and as long as this deed is not declared void by a Competent Court, the question of appointing a Receiver will not arise” do not appear to be proper and reasonable, hence the same is hereby omitted.

14. Although in the course of arguments, various case laws reported in different journals were cited by the petitioner but in the aforesaid circumstances, the same being distinguishable on facts and circumstances of the case at hand, are not helping to the petitioner.

15. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed with aforesaid observation. There shall be no order as to the costs.

Petition dismissed.