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Abdul Haneef v. Mohd Sehjad
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this court under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure to challenge the judgment and decree dated 31-1-1992 of the IV Additional District Judge, Sagar, in C.S. No. 31-A/91. The trial court had decreed the plaintiffs' suit for specific performance to the extent of one half portion of the appellant/defendant No. 2's interest in the suit house and ordered refund of Rs. 2,750.
The respondents/plaintiffs had sued for specific performance alleging that in September 1983 the defendants (appellant and his brother Abdul Majid/defendant No. 1) agreed to sell their house for Rs. 31,500. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants demanded Rs. 18,500 as advance/earnest money; on 3-10-1983 defendant No. 2 received Rs. 18,500 as earnest money on behalf of himself and his brother and agreed to sell the house, with a four-month period (up to 3-2-1984) for execution of the sale deed. Plaintiffs alleged delivery of vacant possession of three rooms and that on discovering a discrepancy in area in January 1984 they wrote and served notices; the defendants purportedly refused to execute the sale deed. One plaintiff alleged he sold his own house hastily to raise funds and suffered a loss of Rs. 7,500.
The defendants filed separate written statements denying material allegations. Defendant No. 1 denied having entered into or executed any agreement or received consideration. Defendant No. 2 asserted he had earlier contracted with a third person (Kripal Singh), who later dropped the purchase; he alleged he had been compelled to sign a typed agreement in favour of the plaintiffs brought by plaintiff No. 1 and denied representing defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 2 also denied delivery of possession and contended the plaintiffs were not willing to perform their part, so the earnest money stood forfeited.
The trial court framed issues, found defendant No. 1 was not a party to the agreement, held defendant No. 2 alone entered into the agreement, and decreed specific performance for half the portion of defendant No. 2 with an order to refund Rs. 2,750. The plaintiffs/respondents filed a cross-objection contending the decree should have been for the sale of the whole house on the ground defendant No. 1 was also a party.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court's decree granting specific performance to the extent of one half portion of the appellant/defendant No. 2's interest in the suit house was valid and should be sustained on appeal.
- Whether defendant No. 1 (Abdul Majid / Abdul Hanif) was a party to the agreement and, relatedly, whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for sale of the whole house (as raised by the respondents' cross-objection).
- Whether the plaintiffs had established that they were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract (a prerequisite for specific performance).
- Whether specific performance of part of the contract could be directed under Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act when the part left unperformed constitutes a substantial (one half) portion of the whole.
- Whether the long delay (an elapsed period of about 23 years since the alleged agreement) and potential pre-emption rights in a joint Muslim family context precluded granting specific performance.
- What monetary relief (refund of earnest money, compensation, interest) and costs should follow if specific performance is refused.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondents / Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs maintained an agreement was made in September/October 1983 for sale of the house at Rs. 31,500 and Rs. 18,500 was received as earnest money on 3-10-1983 by defendant No. 2 on behalf of both brothers.
- The plaintiffs asserted delivery of vacant possession of three rooms and alleged defendants later refused to execute the sale deed; they sought specific performance of the contract or, alternatively, refund of earnest money with interest and damages (including Rs. 7,500 loss claimed by plaintiff No. 2).
- In the appellate court, learned counsel for the respondents did not press the cross-objection that the whole house should have been decreed.
Appellant / Defendant No. 2's Arguments
- Defendant No. 2 contended an earlier agreement existed with a third party (Kripal Singh) who abandoned purchase; he asserted he had been persuaded/compelled to execute a fresh typed agreement in favour of the plaintiffs and never represented that he was executing it on behalf of his brother (defendant No. 1).
- Defendant No. 2 denied delivering possession; he alleged the plaintiffs trespassed and took advantage of his absence to take possession.
- He argued the plaintiffs were not willing to perform their obligations and that, in any event, there was no satisfactory evidence that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract (the appellant advanced this contention during appeal).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Damroolaal Harchand and others v. Laxminarayan Ramanujdas Brijpuria and others, 1976 MPLJ 518 | Where the part left unperformed is not a small portion of the whole, specific performance of part cannot be allowed. | The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that specific performance of only one half of the house (a substantial portion) was inappropriate and therefore declined to confirm the trial court's decree for specific performance of that part. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The appellate court proceeded through the following analytical steps, relying on the record and applicable principles stated in the opinion:
- On the cross-objection: the respondents' counsel did not press the cross-objection that defendant No. 1 was a party and that the whole house should have been decreed. On the merits the court observed there was ample evidence that defendant No. 2 alone executed the agreement; accordingly, the cross-objection was dismissed (paras 10–11).
- On the core requirement for specific performance: the court accepted the appellant's contention that the plaintiffs had not produced satisfactory evidence that they were ever ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. The court noted the notice (Ex. P-2) indicated plaintiffs were not ready to take possession unless it was delivered according to the map. The appellate court also observed that no issue had been framed by the trial court specifically on the point of readiness and willingness, and that there was an absence of specific pleading and proof on this essential requirement (paras 11–13).
- On the propriety of decreeing specific performance of part of the contract: the court applied Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, stating the general rule that a court should not direct specific performance of a part of a contract where the contract is wholly or partly incapable of performance, and that specific performance of part can be directed only where the unperformed part is only a small portion in value. Because the unperformed part in this case comprised one half of the whole house, the court held it inappropriate to confirm specific performance for that half (para 14).
- On additional considerations: the court noted the property was joint Muslim family property where other family members may have a right of preemption, making it improper to grant specific performance. The court also emphasized that a long delay (agreement allegedly made on 3-10-1983 and 23 years having elapsed) would make specific performance inequitable and cause hardship to the appellant (para 15–16).
- Balancing relief: for the above reasons the court set aside the decree insofar as it related to specific performance. However, rather than leaving the plaintiffs without remedy, the appellate court directed monetary relief: refund of Rs. 8,500 (earnest money received by appellant as stated in the operative direction) and compensation of Rs. 20,000, with interest at 6% per annum on the aggregate Rs. 28,500 from the date of judgment until realization. Parties were ordered to bear their own costs (para 17).
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The decree of the trial court insofar as it granted specific performance of the contract was set aside.
The appellate court also:
- Dismissed the respondents' cross-objection that the decree should have been for sale of the whole house (the respondents' counsel did not press it and the court found defendant No. 2 alone had executed the agreement).
- Directed that the appellant refund Rs. 8,500 received by him by way of earnest money and pay Rs. 20,000 by way of compensation to the respondents.
- Ordered interest @ 6% per annum on the total amount of Rs. 28,500 from the date of this judgment until realisation.
- Ordered that the parties shall bear their own costs.
Implications:
The immediate consequence is that the plaintiffs will not obtain specific performance of any portion of the suit house; instead, they receive monetary relief (refund and compensation with interest). The decision turns on absence of proof of readiness and willingness, the statutory principle in Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act limiting specific performance of substantial parts, the joint/family pre-emption considerations, and the long delay alleged. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond applying these existing rules and the cited precedent; it resolves the parties' rights in this case by substituting monetary relief for specific performance and by directing each party to bear its own costs.
(1) Invoking appellate jurisdiction of this court under section 96 of the code of civil procedure, the appellant has filed this appeal calling in question the validity, legality, propriety and correctness of the judgment and decree dated 31 - 1 - 92, passed by iv th additional district judge, sagar, in c. S. No. 31 - a/91 decreeing the plaintiffs' suit for specific performance of the contract to the extent of half portion of appellant/defendant no. 2 and for refund of rs. 2,750/ -.
(2) The facts leading to the filing of this appeal, shortly narrated, are that the respondents/plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of the contract against the appellant and his brother abdul majid alleging that the defendants in the month of september, 1983 came to sagar and entered into an agreement with the plaintiff for sale of their house for a consideration of rs. 31,500/ -. They demanded a sum of rs. 18,500/ - as advance money but the plaintiffs were not having that much money, therefore, they offered the defendants to take some amount in the form of earnest money. The defendants insisted for the payment of rs. 18,500/ - and asked the plaintiffs that if they do not have the money, the same may be paid after fifteen days and on payment of rs. 18,500/ - the agreement would be executed. At that time defendant no. 1, abdul majid, the brother of the appellant also told the plaintiffs that after fifteen days if he fails to come to sagar, his brother, the defendant no. 2/ appellant would execute the agreement and that would be binding on him also and he would come at the time of registration of the sale deed.
(3) The plaintiffs also averred that on 3 - 10 - 83 defendant no. 2 received rs. 18,500/ - as earnest money on behalf of himself and his brother, abdul majid and agreed to sell the suit house for rs. 31,500/ -. It was agreed that remaining amount of consideration would be taken at the time of registration of the sale deed. A period of four months i. E. , up to 3 - 2 - 84 was settled for the execution of the sale deed. It was agreed by defendant no. 2 on behalf of both the brothers that vacant possession of the suit house shall be given to the plaintiffs after getting the same from the tenants. Thereafter, the defendants delivered vacant possession of three rooms to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also averred that in the month of january, 84 they went to the suit house and found that the area is less than what is shown in the map given by the defendants, therefore, on 25 - 1 - 84 they wrote a letter to the defendants in this regard and also served them with a notice dated 27 - 1 - 84. The defendants gave a false reply to the notice and by implication refused to execute the sale deed. The plaintiffs further averred that in order to collect money for purchasing the suit house plaintiff no. 2 sold his house having a value of rs. 17,500/ - for a small amount of rs. 10,000/ - and thus suffered a loss of rs. 7,500/ - to avoid any delay in payment of remaining amount of consideration.
(4) The plaintiff also pleaded that the neighbours of the suit house filed a suit against the defendants and the plaintiffs for permanent injunction. The suit was filed in collusion with the defendants in order to avoid the execution of the sale deed. As the sale deed was not executed, the plaintiffs filed the suit for specific performance of the contract and in the alternative, they claimed refund of earnest money together with interest and for damages of rs. 7,500/ - suffered by the plaintiff no. 2 in selling his house in hurry at a low price.
(5) The defendants by filing separate written statements controverted the allegations made in the plaint. The defendant no. 1 stated that he never entered into an agreement to sell the suit house. The agreement in question was not executed' by him. No amount was received by him in the form of consideration for sale. He denied that the possession of any portion of the house was handed over to the plaintiffs. The defendant no. 2 in his separate written statement has stated that earlier an agreement to sell the suit house was entered into between him and kripal singh who wanted to purchase the suit house in the name of prem singh. Subsequently, kripal singh dropped the idea of purchasing the suit house, therefore, in order to get the refund of earnest money kripal singh persuaded and compelled the defendant no. 2 to execute fresh agreement in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendant no. 2 had to sign a typed agreement which was brought by plaintiff no. 1. He never told the plaintiffs that he is executing the agreement on behalf of defendant no. 1 also.
(6) The defendant no. 2 also pleaded that no possession of any portion of the suit house was delivered to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, taking the advantage of their absence from sagar, took possession of some portion of the suit house. It is also the case of defendant no. 2 that the plaintiffs themselves were not willing to perform their part of the contract. As the plaintiffs did not perform their part of the contract, the earnest money stands forfeited.
(7) The trial court, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed issues and recorded a finding that the defendant no. 1 was not a party to the agreement. It was defendant no. 2/appellant alone who entered into the agreement. The plaintiffs are entitled to get the sale deed executed of half portion of defendant no. 2 over the suit house, on payment of consideration. As the amount received by defendant no. 2 is more than the half of the portion of the suit house, he is liable to refund of rs. 2,750/ - to the plaintiffs; and decreed the plaintiffs' suit as stated above.
(8) It is this judgment and decree which is the cause of grievance of the defendant no. 2/appellant.
(9) The plaintiffs/respondents also filed a cross objection on the ground that the trial court has erroneously held that the defendant no. 1, abdul hanif was not a party to the agreement. The decree ought to have been given for the sale of the whole house.
(10) I have heard shri r. S. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and ku. Janhvi jaamdar, counsel, appearing for the respondents; and perused the record.
(11) Learned counsel for the respondents, during the course of arguments, vehemently submitted that she does not press the cross objection. On merit also there is ample evidence on record to the effect that it was the defendant no. 2 alone who executed the agreement in question. Defendant no. 1 was not a party to the agreement. Therefore, the decree for specific performance of the contract could not have been passed against him. The agreement executed by defendant no. 2 alone in favour of the plaintiffs does not bind his brother, defendant no. 1. Therefore, the cross objection is dismissed.
(12) So far as the appeal filed by the appellant is concerned, learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently submitted that there is no satisfactory evidence that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of contract. In the notice, ex. P - 2, plaintiffs themselves stated that they are not ready to take the possession unless the same is delivered in accordance with the map.
(13) The contention is acceptable. The plaintiffs have not stated that they ever asked the defendants to get the remaining amount of the consideration and execute the sale deed. The plaintiffs have not stated that they had been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. No. Issue was framed by the trial court on this point. Therefore, in the absence of any specific pleading and proof that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract the trial court could not have decreed the plaintiffs' suit to the extent of l/2nd portion of the suit house.
(14) Even otherwise, according to the provisions under section 12 of specific relief act the general rule is that the court should not direct specific performance of a part of the contract when the contract becomes either wholly or partly incapable of performance. The specific performance of the part of a contract can be directed only where the part which is left unperformed bears only small portion to the whole in value. In the present case, the part which is to be left unperformed bears half portion of the whole house, therefore, under the circumstances of the case, i do not consider it appropriate to confirm the decree for the sale of the half portion of the suit house.
(15) The property in question is a joint property of muslim family in which the brother may have right of preemption, therefore, it will not be proper to grant relief of specific performance of the contract. In damroolaal harchand and others v. Laxminarayan ramanujdas brijpuria and others, 1976 mplj 518, it has been held that where the part unperformed is not a small portion of whole, specific performance cannot be allowed.
(16) In addition to the foregoing reasons the performance of the contract would involve hardship on the appellant. The agreement is alleged to have been executed on 3 - 10 - 83. Since then a long period of 23 years has elapsed. After such a long delay it will not be proper to grant relief by way of specific performance of the contract. Therefore, even if accepting that the plaintiffs had been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, in view of the fact that a long time has elapsed, the portion of which specific performance has been decreed by the trial court is not only a small portion of the whole, the right of preemption is available to other members of the family, i do not consider it appropriate to maintain the decree for specific performance of the part of the contact.
(17) Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the decree impugned, so far as it relates to specific performance of the contract, is set aside. It is directed that the appellant shall refund the amount of rs. 8,500/ - received by him by way of earnest money and shall also pay a sum of rs. 20,000/ - by way of compensation to the respondents. The appellants shall also pay interest @ rs. 6% per annum on this amount of rs. 28,500/ - from the date of this judgment till the date of realisation. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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