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Akhlaq Ahmad v. Karam Ilahi

Allahabad High Court
Oct 4, 1934
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Judgment Summary — Collister, J. & Niamat-ullah, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued for a declaration that a sale deed executed by her on 17 October 1926 in favour of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was void and ineffectual as against her. The plaint bore a court-fee stamp of Rs. 10 only. The defendants appealed; their appeal was dismissed and they filed a second appeal to the present Court. On both appeals the defendants paid a court fee of Rs. 115 only. The Stamp Reporter reported that Rs. 115 was due from the plaintiff/respondent and Rs. 230 from the defendants/appellants. The learned Government Advocate supported the Stamp Reporter's view; counsel for the plaintiff contended that the suit was under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and, because no consequential relief was claimed, the plaint was properly stamped with Rs. 10.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint should be treated as one for a mere declaratory decree (attracting a fixed court fee of Rs. 10 under article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act) or as a suit falling under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act (avoiding an instrument), thereby attracting an ad valorem court fee under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act.
  2. Whether, for purposes of court-fee liability, the court must determine the fee strictly by reference to the relief actually claimed in the plaint, or whether an omission to claim consequential relief can be treated as implying that such relief is recoverable for fee-assessment purposes.
  3. Whether a suit that prays only for a declaration that an instrument is void may, by implication or construction, be treated as a suit for cancellation under section 39 when the plaint as a whole indicates that cancellation is sought.

Arguments of the Parties

Stamp Reporter / Government Advocate

  • The Stamp Reporter (supported by the Government Advocate) held the view that greater court fees were due: specifically, that Rs. 115 was due from the plaintiff and Rs. 230 from the defendants, implying that the suit should attract ad valorem fees rather than the minimum Rs. 10.

Plaintiff's Counsel

  • Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the suit was brought under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and that the plaintiff had prayed only for a declaratory relief (no consequential relief). Since no consequential relief was sought and the plaintiff was prepared to accept the consequences of not having claimed such relief, the plaint was properly stamped with the fixed court fee of Rs. 10.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Radha Krishna v. Ram Narain Where the plaint sought merely a declaratory decree (no consequential relief prayed), the suit was to be treated as for a declaratory decree and a nominal court fee (Rs. 10) sufficed; court-fee question is to be decided with reference to the plaint itself. Cited as authority that court-fee liability is ordinarily determined by the relief actually claimed in the plaint; contrasted with the present case because facts differ regarding the instrument and relief sought.
Mohammad Ismail v. Liyaqat Husain Courts have no right to treat a plaint as though the plaintiff had claimed consequential relief which he did not claim; court-fee question must be determined with reference to the plaint as it is. Used to support the proposition (in some authorities) that the court should look only to the plaint; considered in the Court's review of authorities.
Brij Gopal v. Suraj Karan For determining court fee, the actual relief asked for must be regarded; whether suit may fail for omission of consequential relief is irrelevant to court-fee determination. Approved prior decisions (e.g., Radha Krishna) emphasizing that the plaint's stated relief governs the court-fee analysis.
Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal (Full Bench) Where a suit is for cancellation of an instrument under section 39 Specific Relief Act, the relief is not merely declaratory and falls under the residuary article (Schedule I, Article 1) of the Court Fees Act, attracting an ad valorem fee. Treats that Full Bench's reasoning (though made in a case with an express prayer for cancellation) supports the proposition that suits under section 39 are substantial and attract ad valorem fees; used by Collister, J. as a basis to treat section 39 suits as implying cancellation.
Lakshmi Narain Rai v. Dip Narain Rai Where plaint sought declaration (owner in possession) and a decree be declared null, the court held Rs. 10 payable and distinguished Kalu Ram because Kalu Ram had an express prayer for cancellation. Relied upon in the survey of authorities showing conflict; used to illustrate that cases without an express cancellation prayer have been held to attract nominal fee.
Sri Krishna Chandra v. Mahabir Prasad (Full Bench) When the plaintiff merely asked for a declaration that a previous decree was void and ineffectual, the suit was for a declaratory decree only and a fee of Rs. 10 was payable; but the Full Bench recognized that suits under section 39 (cancellation of instruments) differ and are substantial. Cited to show the distinction courts draw between avoidance of a decree (declaratory) and avoidance/cancellation of an instrument (substantive). The Court used it to explain limits of Kalu Ram's ratio.
Abdul Samad Khan v. Anjuman Islamia Where the plaintiff claimed no more than a declaration, for purposes of the Court Fees Act the court must consider merely the relief actually claimed (omission of consequential relief may offend section 42 but does not change court-fee assessment). Invoked to show instances where the plaint's literal relief controls the fee assessment; part of the court's review of conflicting authorities.
Baburao v. Balajirao (Judicial Commissioner, Nagpur) Held that a suit that asks for declaration of title and that a sale deed does not affect title is in substance a suit for declaration and cancellation and thus attracts ad valorem fee under relevant provisions. Noted among authorities that take a broader view—used as an example of contrary decisions.
Malikka Meladathil v. Kunji Achammal (Madras High Court) In a suit by multiple plaintiffs (minors represented by next friend), the prayer so far as minors were concerned was held to be effectively for cancellation of the deed and an ad valorem fee was payable. Referenced as another authority holding that nominally declaratory prayers may be treated as cancellation for fee purposes in some factual contexts.
Umarannessa Bibi v. Jamirannessa Bibi (Calcutta High Court) Where the plaintiff alleged possession and sought a declaration that a deed executed by her was not her deed and inoperative, the proper court fee was Rs. 10 (nominal), not ad valorem. Displayed as part of the conflict of opinion among High Courts; noted by this Court in its review.
Suraj Ket Prasad v. Chandra (Referenced by the Court) Earlier view by a Bench of this Court that suits under section 39 may carry with them an implication of a prayer for cancellation. Cited by Collister, J. as an earlier view consistent with his present conclusion that section 39 suits imply cancellation even without an explicit prayer.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed review of decisions from this Court and other High Courts that present conflicting views on whether a plaint praying merely for a declaration that an instrument is void should be treated, for court-fee purposes, as a suit for cancellation under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act (thereby attracting an ad valorem fee) or as a mere declaratory suit attracting the nominal Rs. 10 fee under article 17(iii) of Schedule II.

Key analytical steps and considerations embraced by the Court:

  • Survey of authorities: The Court summarized and contrasted multiple authorities which hold opposite positions—some holding that the court-fee question must be decided strictly by the plaint's stated relief (e.g., Radha Krishna; Mohammad Ismail; Brij Gopal; Abdul Samad Khan), and others holding that suits to avoid or cancel instruments are substantive under section 39 and attract ad valorem court fees (e.g., Kalu Ram; Baburao; Malikka Meladathil).
  • Effect of Kalu Ram (Full Bench): Collister, J. treated the Full Bench observation in Kalu Ram (that relief to have a registered instrument adjudged void and delivered up/cancelled is more than a mere declaratory relief) as authoritative for the proposition that a suit under section 39 for avoiding an instrument carries with it, by implication, power for the court to order delivery up and cancellation even if no explicit prayer for cancellation is made.
  • Textual and contextual interpretation: Collister, J. relied on Chapter V of the Specific Relief Act, which is headed "Of the cancellation of instruments," and on the statutory language that the court "may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled," to infer that the statutory scheme contemplates cancellation as a natural and implied consequential relief of a section 39 claim.
  • Construction of the plaint (facts): Collister, J. identified specific factual allegations in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the plaint (that defendant No. 3 had been asked repeatedly to get the document cancelled, and that the plaintiff apprehended extinction of her proprietary rights due to the subsistence of the document) and took these as indicia that the plaintiff was seeking more than a mere declaration — that she wanted the instrument cancelled and removed.
  • Meaning of words: Niamat-ullah, J. observed that the original word used in the plaint ("istiqrar") can be translated as "adjudged," a term used in section 39, and concluded that, viewed in context with other allegations, the plaint contains a prayer that the instrument be adjudged void.
  • Limits and qualifications: Niamat-ullah, J. emphasized that the proper approach in a court-fee enquiry is to construe the plaint and determine what relief the plaintiff is actually claiming; he recognized that a plaintiff may validly sue only for a declaration and that such a suit might be dismissed on the merits under the proviso to section 42 if the plaintiff omitted to seek consequential relief he was able to obtain. Nevertheless, for court-fee purposes the court should not treat the plaint as though the plaintiff had done what he omitted to do.
  • Application to the present plaint: Both judges concluded, on construing the plaint as a whole and in light of the allegations and prayers, that the plaintiff had in substance sued for cancellation (i.e., the suit fell within section 39) and therefore the ad valorem fee regime (Schedule I, Article 1) applied rather than the nominal declaratory fee (Schedule II, Article 17(iii)).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the plaintiff's plaint must be construed as falling within section 39 of the Specific Relief Act (a suit to avoid/cancel an instrument) and that an ad valorem court fee is payable under Schedule I, Article 1 of the Court Fees Act; Schedule II, Article 17(iii) (the nominal Rs. 10 declaratory fee) is not applicable in this case.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's suit is to be treated as one for cancellation under section 39, and the plaintiff is liable to pay an ad valorem court fee (the opinion concludes that the nominal Rs. 10 stamp was insufficient). The Stamp Reporter's assessment (that larger fees were due) was supported in principle by the Court's construction, although the opinion's core ruling is on the proper classification and resulting ad valorem fee liability.
  • Legal clarification: The judgment clarifies the test to be applied when assessing court-fee liability in cases involving alleged avoidance of instruments — courts must construe the plaint as a whole and may treat a suit as one under section 39 (attracting ad valorem fee) where the pleadings indicate that cancellation is sought or is implied, even if the prayer is framed as a declaratory one.
  • Relation to prior authorities: The Court reconciled conflicting authorities by distinguishing suits concerning decrees (which may more readily be treated as merely declaratory) from suits concerning instruments (which the Court treated as substantively different when section 39 is engaged). The decision relies on earlier Full Bench statements in Kalu Ram and the Court's own prior opinions to support that approach.

This summary is limited to the content and reasoning expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Collister, J.:— This matter arises out of a report of the Stamp Reporter. The plaintiff sued for a declaration that a sale deed which had been executed by her on 17th October, 1926, in favour of defendants Nos. 1 and 2, was void and ineffectual as against her. The plaint was stamped with a court fee of Rs. 10 only. The defendants appealed, but their appeal was dismissed, and they have filed a second appeal in this Court; and on both appeals they have paid a court fee of Rs. 115 only. The Stamp Reporter is of opinion that Rs. 115 is now due from the plaintiff respondent and Rs. 230 from the defendants appellants.

The learned Government Advocate supports the view taken by the Stamp Reporter, while counsel for the plaintiff pleads that his suit was under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and that since he was asking for no consequential relief and was prepared to accept the consequences of not having claimed any such relief, the plaint was properly stamped.

In Radha Krishna v. Ram Narain (1) it was held by a Bench of this Court that where a plaint, as amended, was to the effect that it be declared that a compromise and decree were ineffectual as against the plaintiff, the suit as framed was to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief was prayed and therefore it was sufficiently stamped with a court fee of Rs. 10, and the learned Judges expressed the opinion that the question of court fee must be decided on the plaint itself. In the course of its judgment the Court reviewed the decisions of other High Courts, in which there was a conflict of opinion. The case of Mohammad Ismail…Applicant; v. Liyaqat Husain…Opposite Party. (2) was also a case relating to a decree and my learned brother there observed: “The court has no right to say that the plaintiff should have claimed consequential relief and that, not having done so, he should be deemed to have claimed the consequential relief and is, therefore, liable to pay the court fees. If, having regard to the nature of his claim, the plaintiff ought to have claimed consequential relief and has not done so, his suit might fail under the proviso to section 42, Specific Relief Act. The question of court fee must be determined with reference to the plaint as it is and not as it ought to have been.”

This case was referred to by a Bench of this Court in Brij Gopal v. Suraj Karan (3). In that case, the plaint as amended was for a declaration that an agreement and a will executed by certain deceased members of the family were null and void and did not bind the plaintiff and that certain property belonged jointly to the parties; and the learned Judges held that: “For the purpose of determination of the court fee the actual relief asked for should be looked into and it is entirely beside the consideration of the court whether the suit is likely or not to fail because the plaint did not ask for a consequential relief.” The Court approved the decision in Radha Krishna v. Ram Narain . It will be observed that in that case the documents had not been executed by the plaintiff himself, but by certain unspecified deceased members of the family.

The case of Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal was decided by a Full Bench of five Judges and this is the case which the Stamp Reporter has relied upon as authority for the view which he takes. In that case it was held that: “Where a suit is for the cancellation of an instrument under the provisions of section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, the relief is not a declaratory one. It falls neither under section 7(iv)(c) nor under schedule II, article 17(iii), but under the residuary article, namely schedule I, article 1 of the Court Fees Act.” That case differs from the present one in that there was a prayer not only that a certain mortgage be adjudged void and ineffectual as against the plaintiffs, but also that it be cancelled; but at page 821 the Court observed: “A relief to have a registered instrument adjudged void or voidable, with the possible result of its being delivered up and cancelled and a copy of the decree being sent to the registration office for a note to be made by the registering officer in his books, is much more than a mere declaratory relief. It is undoubtedly a substantial relief of a nature differing from a declaratory one.”

In Lakshmi Narain Rai v. Dip Narain Rai the plaint as amended was for a declaration that the plaintiff was the owner in possession of the property in suit and that a certain decree be declared null and void. The court below had held that the plaintiff was in fact asking for a cancellation of the decree and that this being a consequential relief, an ad valorem court fee ought to be paid in accordance with the view expressed in Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal . The case was heard by a Bench of which my learned brother was a member, and they held that a court fee of Rs. 10 only was payable. They followed the cases of Radha Krishna v. Ram Narain and Brij Gopal v. Suraj Karan and they distinguished the Full Bench case of Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal on the ground that in the latter case there was a distinct prayer for cancellation of the mortgage deed in suit.

A Full Bench of this Court in Sri Krishna Chandra v. Mahabir Prasad (4) held that: “Inasmuch as the plaintiff merely asked for a declaration that the previous decree was not in any way binding upon him and was altogether void and ineffectual, his suit was one for obtaining a declaratory decree only and fell under article 17(iii) of the second schedule of the Court Fees Act and the court fee payable was Rs. 10 only.” Thus it will be seen that case also was concerned with a decree and not with an instrument. At page 794 the Court observed: “Obviously, the Full Bench (i.e in the case of Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal) did not intend to lay down that where the plaintiff deliberately omits to claim a consequential relief and contents himself with claiming a mere declaratory decree, the court can call upon him to pay court fees on the consequential relief which he should have claimed although he has omitted to do so. What was held was that if the plaintiff does not ask for a mere declaratory decree, but also asks for a relief which he calls ‘consequential’ relief, the mere fact that he calls it so would not prevent the court from demanding full court fee, if in reality the additional relief claimed was a substantive relief and not a mere consequential relief. We do not think that the observation was intended to go further than this.” The learned Judges go on however to say: “On the other hand, there is no doubt that so far as suits relating to the cancellation of instruments are concerned, the Full Bench on page 821 clearly held that ‘A relief to have a registered instrument adjudged void or voidable, with the possible result of its being delivered up and cancelled and a copy of the decree being sent to the registration office for a note to be made by the registering officer in his books, is much more than a mere declaratory relief. It is undoubtedly a substantial relief of a nature differing from a declaratory one.’ It was clearly pointed out that it was not incumbent on a plaintiff to ask in express terms a relief for the instrument to be delivered up and cancelled and that he might merely ask for its being adjudged void or voidable. Nevertheless, a suit which falls under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act was held to be not a suit for obtaining a mere declaratory decree, but one for obtaining a substantive relief not otherwise provided for.” They distinguished the case of a decree on the ground that a suit to avoid a decree does not strictly fall under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act.

The case of Abdul Samad Khan v. Anjuman Islamia, Gorakhpur came before a Bench of which my learned brother was a member. The suit was for a declaration that a deed of gift executed by a third person in favour of the defendant was illegal and ineffectual as against the plaintiff and that the defendant had no right to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff. The Court, after referring to the cases of Lakshmi Narain Rai v. Dip Narain Rai and Sri Krishna Chandra v. Mahabir Prasad , observed: “In the case before us, the plaintiff claimed no more than a declaration, if he might and ought to have claimed any further or consequential relief and has omitted to do so, he may have offended against the provisions of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act; but for all purposes of the Court Fees Act we have to consider merely the relief actually claimed by the plaintiff and not the relief which he ought to have claimed.”

In Baburao v. Balajirao it was held by the court of the Judicial Commissioner of Nagpur that a suit which merely asks for a declaration of plaintiff's title to certain property and that a sale deed executed by him does not affect his title is really one for a declaration of title and cancellation of the sale deed and the court fee is on the value of relief under section 7(iv)(c) and (d) of the Court Fees Act.

In Malikka Meladathil v. Kunji Achammal there were 25 plaintiffs in the suit, of whom Nos. 2-25 were minors. Plaintiff No. 1 sued for himself and as the next friend of plaintiffs Nos. 2-25. The suit was for a declaration that a sale deed be declared invalid and the said deed had been executed by all the members of the tarwad except plaintiff No. 1, the remaining plaintiffs being represented at the execution by their mothers. A Bench of the Madras High Court expressed the view that the prayer, so far as plaintiffs Nos. 2-25 were concerned, must be held to be a prayer for the cancellation of the deed and therefore an ad valorem court fee was payable.

There are, however, other rulings of various High Courts in which a contrary view is taken. As pointed out by this Court in Radha Krishna v. Ram Narain , there is a conflict of opinion on the subject. For instance, in Umarannessa Bibi v. Jamirannessa Bibi the Calcutta High Court held that where the plaintiff alleged that she was in possession (as is the case here) and all she required was a declaration that the deed executed by her was not her deed and was inoperative, the proper court fee payable was Rs. 10. In other cases it has been held that an ad valorem court fee is payable.

It appears to me that the observations by the Full Bench in the case of Kalu Ram v. Babu Lal (5), though more or less obiter, since there was a prayer for cancellation, are authority for the proposition that a suit under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act for avoiding an instrument, even if there be no prayer for cancellation, carries with it by implication a prayer that the court may further use the discretion given to it by section 39 so as to order the said instrument to be delivered up and cancelled. This view was taken by a Bench of this Court of which I was a member in Suraj Ket Prasad v. Chandra .

Chapter V, Specific Relief Act, itself is headed “Of the cancellation of instruments”, and it seems to me that the words “and the court may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled” contemplate that if a court sees fit to use its discretion so as to adjudge the document void, it will at the same time order it to be cancelled. In the circumstances, the words “may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable” appear to me to imply a prayer for cancellation. The present suit clearly falls under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act and it is significant that in paragraph 12 of the plaint the plaintiff states that “Defendant No. 3 was asked many times to get the said document cancelled by the defendants, but he paid no heed to it” and in paragraph 13 it is stated that “Owing to the subsistence of the said document it is apprehended that the plaintiff's proprietary right to the property will be extinct.” The contents of these two paragraphs indicate that the plaintiff wanted something more than a declaration; she wanted the instrument to be cancelled and got rid of. In my opinion schedule II, article 17(iii) of the Court Fees Act is not applicable to this case; an ad valorem court fee is payable under schedule I, article 1, as though there had been a definite prayer for cancellation.

Niamat-ullah, J.:— I agree with my learned brother that, on a proper construction of the plaint in this case, the plaintiff must be taken to have sued for cancellation of the sale deed, dated 17th October, 1926, executed by herself. Taking the plaint as a whole, it is clear that the suit is one falling within the purview of section 39, Specific Relief Act. It is alleged that one of the defendants, taking advantage of the plaintiff's position as a helpless pardanashin woman, obtained from her the sale deed which she did not understand and which she did not intend to execute, that the defendant was repeatedly asked to have the “said document cancelled” and that the plaintiff apprehends that if the document is left outstanding “it will extinguish her proprietary rights”. These allegations are followed by a prayer that the instrument be “declared” to be void and ineffectual against her. The word used in the original plaint is “istiqrar”, which may also be translated in English as “adjudged”, a word which is used in section 39 of the Specific Relief Act. It is quite correct to construe the last paragraph of the plaint, taking it in conjunction with the other allegations above referred to, as containing a prayer that the sale deed may be adjudged void.

In each case the question is one of construction of the plaint and of ascertaining the relief which the plaintiff is claiming. Whether he is rightly claiming the relief of declaration need not be considered where the question is one of court fee only. To my mind it is open to a plaintiff to sue for a declaration that a document is void or voidable without making it a suit falling within the purview of section 39, Specific Relief Act. It may be that such a suit is, in certain circumstances, liable to be dismissed under the proviso to section 42 of that Act on the ground that the plaintiff, being able to seek a further relief (e.g, cancellation) than a mere declaration, omits to do so. There is a class of cases in which it is imperative that a plaintiff should have an instrument set aside or cancelled. Even where it is not so imperative, but the plaintiff is “able to seek further relief”, a mere declaration will not be granted. If a plaintiff deliberately prays for a mere declaration that an instrument is void and if the circumstances of the case are such that the document can be completely annulled, he is, at least, “able” to have the instrument adjudged void, which implies that a copy of the decree annulling it shall be sent to the registration office for a note to be made on the copy therein retained, so that anyone searching and inspecting the registration office may at once find out that the document, though subsisting at one time, was subsequently annulled. In such a case his suit may be dismissed, being barred by the proviso to section 42, Specific Relief Act. But, for all purposes of court fee, it is not open to a court to say that the plaintiff must be taken to have done what he should have done, though he persists in saying that he does not sue for cancellation.

Another class of cases in which a plaintiff can sue virtually for a declaration that an instrument is void or voidable against him without suing for cancellation is where the instrument has been executed by several persons or affects the interests of several persons against some of whom it is not void or voidable and the plaintiff sues for a declaration of his right to property and of the invalidity of the instrument so far as it affects his interest in such property. In such cases declaratory relief does not necessarily imply the relief that the instrument may be “adjudged” void or voidable with the consequence of a note of annulment being made in the registration office and of the court ordering that the same be “delivered up and cancelled”.

In the present case, however, the plaint is clearly one for cancellation, and I agree with my learned brother in holding that the suit is one under section 39, Specific Relief Act, and the plaintiff is liable to pay ad valorem court fee.