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Visalakshi Ammal v. Sivaramien

Madras High Court
Mar 29, 1904
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Counsel of record named in the opinion: P.R. Sundara Ayyar and T.V. Vaidyanaiha Ayyar for appellant; S. Subrahmania Ayyar and S. Venkataramana Ayyar for the first respondent.

The matter was referred to the Court by an Order of Reference for determination of a specific question. The factual outline given in the opinion is that the plaintiff's natural father agreed to give his son in adoption and that the first defendant effected the adoption on the condition that the disposition of the property contained in Exhibit I would be binding on the plaintiff. The Court was asked to decide whether the provision in Exhibit I in favour of the first defendant, in respect of the property described in Schedule II to that exhibit, will bind the plaintiff.

The opinion was delivered by Benson, J., with Davies, J. and Russell, J. concurring.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provision in Exhibit I in favour of the first defendant in regard to the property described in Schedule II thereto will bind the plaintiff.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff relied on authority of the Privy Council and on this Court's earlier decision in Jagannadha v. Papamma, contending that those authorities decide the matter in the plaintiff's favour. The plaintiff emphasized an observation (from the Privy Council in Bhaiya Rabidat Singh v. Maharani Indar Kunwar) that it was difficult to understand how an agreement by the natural father could prejudice or affect the rights of his son, which could only arise when paternal control and authority ended.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any arguments advanced by the first defendant or other parties beyond the plaintiff's reliance on the cited authorities.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jagannadha v. Papamma Relied upon for the proposition that the Privy Council's observations limit the father's ability to bind the son; in that case the adoption was held not invalid and no condition was attached to the adoption instrument. The Court distinguished that case, observing it did not decide that a condition entered in the instrument evidencing the adoption is void; thus it could not be treated as directly controlling the present question.
Bhaiya Rabidat Singh v. Maharani Indar Kunwar (Privy Council) The observation that it was difficult to understand how an agreement by the natural father could prejudice or affect the rights of his son which arise when paternal control ends. The Court noted the observation but held it was not decisive for the present case because that Privy Council decision involved a deed of adoption with no reservation or condition attached.
Ramasamayyen v. Venkataramaiyen Holds that an agreement by the natural father is not void and may be "at the least, capable of ratification when his son became of age"; notes difficulty in defining the extent to which the father can renounce his son's rights by agreement before adoption. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the father's agreement is not inherently void, and to frame the question as whether the particular agreement should be upheld as fair and reasonable and for the minor's benefit.
Chitko Raghunath Rajadiksh v. Janaki Decides that an agreement by the father that his son's interest be postponed to the life interest of the widow is valid and binding. Used as an example supporting the capacity of the natural father to make binding arrangements affecting the son's interest where the arrangement is valid and reasonable.
Ravji Vinayakrav Jaggannath Shankar Sett v. Lakshmi Bai Principle that a guardian's act will bind an infant when bona fide and for the infant's interest, i.e., when reasonable and such as the infant might prudently have done if of full age; unreasonable stipulations should be rejected. The Court adopted this principle as a guide: agreements incidental to adoption should be upheld if fair, reasonable and for the minor's benefit, and rejected if they are unreasonable or ultra vires of the father.
Lakshmi v. Subramanya Holds that where the person adopting could dispose of property immediately prior to adoption, an agreement as to that property forms part of the contract of adoption and is valid; quoted reasoning explaining why the son's rights do not arise in the disposed property if the adoption and disposition are one transaction. The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that dispositions made as part of the adoption transaction may be treated as binding on the adopted son when the adopter had the capacity to alienate the property before adoption.
Lakshmana Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal Referenced for the proposition that an agreement made for a necessary purpose (e.g., to induce adoption) can bind the infant. Quoted and relied on within the discussion of why certain agreements connected to adoption may be considered part of the transaction and binding on the adopted son.
Narayanasami v. Ramasam and Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal Followed the reasoning in Lakshmi v. Subramanya; decisions are in accordance with other cited authorities. The Court treated these decisions as consistent precedent reinforcing the approach that fair dispositions linked to adoption are often upheld.
Vinak Narayan Jog v. Govindrav Chintaman Jog Referenced as a decision consistent with the line of authorities permitting reasonable arrangements affecting the adopted son's interest. Counted among the authorities lending weight to the view that such agreements are recognized in practice and not prohibited by any text of Hindu law cited in the opinion.
Basava v. Lingan Gauda Referenced among authorities in the same line of decisions. Included in the list of precedents supporting the Court's approach that reasonable dispositions adjunct to adoption have judicial support.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Benson, J. framed the single question referred by the Order of Reference and observed that the question was difficult. After further argument and consideration he concluded that the provision in Exhibit I should bind the plaintiff.

The Court's analysis proceeded by distinguishing authorities relied on by the plaintiff. The Jagannadha case and the Privy Council decision in Bhaiya Rabidat Singh were noted to concern the validity of adoption where no condition was attached to the adoption instrument; therefore those decisions did not determine the present question whether a condition entered in the instrument evidencing adoption is void.

The Court relied on Ramasamayyen v. Venkataramaiyen to establish that an agreement by the natural father is not inherently void and may be capable of ratification by the son on attaining majority. The opinion extracted from that authority the proposition that the natural father may be legally capable of acting as guardian and making agreements on behalf of his son with regard to property acquired by adoption.

From that premise the Court adopted a test, drawn from Ravji Vinayakrav Jaggannath Shankar Sett v. Lakshmi Bai and other authorities: whether the agreement made by the natural father is fair and reasonable and whether, taken as part of the contract for adoption, it is for the minor's benefit. The Court explained that where the disposition of property is part of the adoption transaction and the adopter had the capacity to dispose of the property prior to adoption (as described in Lakshmi v. Subramanya), the son's interest in the disposed property may never arise.

The Court acknowledged limits to this approach: if an agreement were inconsistent with the fundamental idea underlying adoption— for example, if it deprived the adopted son of all rights and left him unable to perform required religious offices—then the Court might refuse to uphold it as repugnant to Hindu law. But the Court found that a fair and reasonable disposition of property is not essentially repugnant to Hindu law and is commonly made and supported by caste authority and popular practice.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the condition as to the property in Exhibit I was reasonable and such as the Courts should uphold, and thus answered the referred question in the affirmative.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred question in the affirmative; the provision in Exhibit I in favour of the first defendant in regard to the property described in Schedule II binds the plaintiff.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the contested condition in Exhibit I is upheld and is binding on the plaintiff in the present case.
  • The adoption itself remains valid and the Court treated the disposition of property as capable of forming part of the adoption transaction when reasonable and when the adopter had capacity to dispose of the property prior to adoption.
  • The opinion grounds its conclusion in existing authorities and practice; it applies established principles (bona fide guardian acts that are for the infant’s benefit and reasonable arrangements attendant to adoption) rather than purporting to establish a novel rule. The opinion does not state any broader legal change beyond the direct effect on the parties in this case.

Judges: Benson, J. (delivering the opinion); Davies, J. (concurring); Russell, J. (concurring).

Show all summary ...

P.R Sundara Ayyar and T.V Vaidyanaiha Ayyar for appellant.

S. Subrahmania Ayyar and S. Venkataramana Ayyar for first respondent.

Their Lordships expressed the following opinion:—

Benson, J.:— The facts of the case referred for our decision are stated in the Order of Reference in the following terms [This has been set out above]:—

I understand that the plaintiff's natural father agreed to give his son in adoption and the first defendant made the adoption on the condition that the disposition of the property in exhibit I should be binding on the plaintiff.

The question for determination is “whether the provision in exhibit I in favour of the first defendant in regard to the property described in schedule II thereto will bind the plaintiff.”

This question is one of no small difficulty. Notwithstanding the view expressed in the Order of Reference to which I was a party, further argument and consideration has now led me to the conclusion that the answer must be in the affirmative.

It is argued for the plaintiff that the matter is decided by the authority of the Privy Council and that was the view taken by this Court in the Court of Jagannadha v. Papamma, where the facts were on all fours with those in the present case. In that case the learned Judges relied on the observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bhaiya Rabidat Singh v. Maharani Indar Kunwar that it was difficult to understand how an agreement by the natural father “could prejudice or affect the rights of his son which could only rise when his paternal control and authority determined.” In that case, however, the question was whether the adoption itself was invalid, and the decision was that it was not. Their Lordships expressly point out that no trace of any reservation or condition is to be found is the deed of adoption and that no condition were attached to the adoption.

The case, therefore, can hardly be regarded as deciding that a condition made at the time of adoption and entered in the instrument evidencing the adoption, as in this case, is void. On the contrary, it is clear from the decision of the Privy Council, in the case of Ramasamayyen v. Venkataramaiyen that such an agreement by the natural father is, at all events, not void.

Their Lordships there say (at p. 101):—“How far the natural father can by agreement before the adoption renounce all or part of his son's rights so as to bind that son when he becomes of age, is also a question not altogether unattended with difficulty; although the case of Chitko Raghunath Rajadiksh v. Janaki, certainly decides that an agreement on the part of the father that his son's interest shall be postponed to the life interest of the widow is valid and binding. In this case their Lordships think it enough to decide that the agreement of the natural father which has been set out was not void, but was, at the least, capable of ratification when his son became of age.”

The concluding words seem to indicate that in their Lordships' opinion the natural father was not legally incapable of acting as guardian of his son, and of making an agreement on his behalf with regard to the property to be acquired by the adoption. If that is the true position, then the question in each case would he whether the agreement so made by the natural father should or should not be upheld, and this, I take it, would depend on whether the agreement in regard to the property was in itself a fair and reasonable one, and one which, taken as part of the contract for the adoption, was for the minor's benefit, as being a condition on which alone the adoption would be made. This is the principle that was adopted in the case of Ravji Vinayakrav Jaggannath Shankar Sett v. Lakshmi Bai and I think that it accords with the general practice of the people in this Presidency and their consciousness of what their law allows.

No doubt in the case of Lakshmi v. Subramanya, this Court went further and held that when the disposition of property was one which the person adopting could make immediately prior to the adoption the agreement as to the property must be taken to he part of the contract for the adoption and be valid apparently in all cases, Shephard, J., put the case in these words:—

“In the present case the adoption was made not by a widow, as in the case of Lakshmana Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal(4) but by the plaintiff's husband who, before the adoption took place, was unquestionably at liberty to alienate his property as he pleased, subject only to the plaintiff's right of maintenance. If being thus full owner he might before the adoption have disposed of his property in part or in whole in favour of the plaintiff, I fail to see why he should not, when making the adoption, stipulate with the other party to the adoption that a certain part of his property should be set apart for the maintenance of his wife and to that extent taken out of the category of property in which his intended son should have the full right of a co-parcener. It seems to me a mistake to say that the infant adopted son on whose behalf the natural father consents to such a stipulation can only be bound by that consent on the principle on which he might be bound by other agreements made on his behalf, viz., on the principle that the agreement is made for a necessary purpose (Lakshmam Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal for the supposition is that, but for the consent of the natural father, the adoption would never have taken place. To object to the agreement is therefore tantamount to objecting to the adoption. The adoption and the disposition of his property by the father being part of one transaction, the son never acquired any interest in the property disposed of and therefore no question can arise as to his guardian's competency to deal with it.”

We may add that a reservation made by a widow in regard to her life interest, which she had the right to alienate before the adoption, would stand on the same footing.

The above case was followed in Narayanasami v. Ramasam and Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal and the decision is in accordance with the decision in Vinak Narayan Jog v. Govindrav Chintaman Jog, Chitko Raghunath Rajadiksh v. Janaki(5) and Basava v. Lingan Gauda(6). Among the Judges who decided these cases were such distinguished Hindu lawyers as Sir T. Muthusami Ayyar, Nanabhai Haridas and Ranade, JJ. I think that great weight must be attached to the decisions of such men on a question like the present which I regard as one of Hindu Law modified by Hindu customs and usage developed in accordance with the conceptions of the present time. It is to be observed that there is no text of Hindu law which either recognizes or prohibits such an agreement as the present being entered into, and it is certain, as remarked by West and Bühler, ‘Hindu Law,’ 3rd edition, page 1106, that in actual practice “fair arrangements for the protection of the widow's interest during her life, are commonly made, and are always supported by the authority of the caste.”

This is the principle on which Farran, J., proposed to decide cases like the present. He says “By Hindu law to infant will be bound by the act of his guardian when bonâ fide and for his interest, and when it is such as the infant might reasonably and prudently have done for himself if he had been of full age, but not where the act appears not to have been for his benefit unless he has ratified it on reaching majority. I cannot but think that this principle ought to guide the Courts in considering whether agreements like the one under consideration can be upheld or not. If the stipulations are unreasonable such as giving to the widow an absolute power of disposition over the property, they should be rejected as ultra vires of the father; if reasonable, such as only to define and limit the son's enjoyment of the property, they should be upheld” (Ravji Vinayakrav Jagganath Shankar Sett v. Lakshmi Bai). The validity of the adoption, if legally made, is quite independent of the validity of any agreement as to the property. If the agreement is such as to be inconsistent with the fundamental idea underlying adoption and the purpose for which it is sanctioned by Hindu law, as, for instance, if it deprived the adopted son of all right to the property of the adoptive father and so left him without any means of performing the necessary religious offices towards the manes of his adoptive father and his ancestors, it may well be that the Courts would regard the condition as essentially repugnant to Hindu law and would refuse to uphold it. But it would seem that a fair and reasonable disposition of the property is but essentially repugnant to Hindu law, or the purposes for which adoption is allowed, and is nowhere forbidden by that law. Such dispositions are commonly made, and are upheld by the authority of the caste and the consciousness of the people. In these circumstances, I think that the Courts ought no to refuse to recognize them as binding on the minor, for whose benefit the adoption, coupled with the agreement as to the disposition of the property, was really made. It maybe assumed that the natural father would not have agreed to the adoption, coupled with the disposition of the property, unless it was for the benefit of his son to do so: nor would the adoptive father have taken the son in adoption except on the condition agreed to. The adoption, of course, cannot he set aside, and to set aside the condition which was coupled with the adoption, while maintaining the adoption, would require the justification of strong grounds of legal necessity or public policy.

In the present case the condition as to the property is a reasonable one, and such as the Courts should uphold. I would therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative.

Davies, J.:— I concur.

Russell, J.:— I concur.