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Sheo Narain v. East Indian Railway

Allahabad High Court
Jul 15, 1927
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant, Sheo Narain, sued the East Indian Railway Company (E.I. Ry. Co.) for damages for non-delivery in full of a consignment consisting of some bags of rice and 185 tins of ghee (each 20 seers). The consignment was despatched from Maihar for delivery at Allahabad. It is common ground that the wagon arrived at Allahabad with the seals intact on 22 April 1923. The wagon was in the goods-shed on 27 April 1923, and on that date the chaukidar reported that the seals were broken. The goods were checked on 2 May 1923 and delivered to the plaintiff that same day. The shortage was: 13 tins missing entirely and three tins containing only 8 seers instead of 20 seers. The plaintiff claimed Rs. 561-5-0.

At trial, the railway company relied on a risk-note (form B), which limited railway liability to loss caused by wilful neglect of the railway administration or theft by, or wilful neglect of, its servants. The trial Court held that the defendant (as bailee) bore the burden of proving that it took such care as a prudent man would take; it found the theft occurred after arrival at Allahabad and attributed it to railway servants, decreeing recovery for the loss of contents of the 13 tins but dismissing the claim for shortage in the three tins because the risk-note protected the railway in that respect.

On first appeal the Additional Subordinate Judge, Allahabad, set aside the trial Court's decree and dismissed the suit on the ground that the burden of proving wilful neglect or theft by railway servants lay on the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had failed to discharge it.

This opinion arises in the second appeal. The only argued ground before the higher Court was that the lower appellate Court wrongly placed the burden of proof of wilful neglect on the plaintiff. The higher Court considered and decided that question, set aside the lower appellate Court's dismissal, restored the trial Court's decree, and awarded costs to the plaintiff in both lower courts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lower appellate Court erred in placing the burden of proof of "wilful neglect" on the plaintiff (consignor) instead of on the railway company.
  2. Whether signing risk-note form B operates to shift the burden of proof to the consignor to prove wilful neglect or theft by the railway administration or its servants.
  3. (Raised but not separately argued) Whether, more broadly, the defendant was protected by the risk-note such that it bore no liability for the shortages at issue.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant relied on statutory and common-law principles governing bailees: under Section 160 of the Contract Act a bailee is bound to deliver goods in the condition consigned, subject to exceptions such as the care standard in Section 151, and Section 76 of the Indian Railways Act relieves the consignor from the necessity of proving how the loss occurred. On these bases the appellant argued the railway company bore the burden of proving it had taken proper precautions.
  • The appellant also took the broader ground (ground five in the memorandum) that the defendant was not protected by the risk-note; this was flagged in the memorandum though not argued as the principal point on appeal.

Respondent's (Railway Company's) Arguments

  • The respondent argued that the risk-note (form B) signed by the consignor shifted the burden of proof onto the consignor, so that the plaintiff had to prove wilful neglect or theft by the railway or its servants.
  • Respondent's counsel suggested facts (as volunteered in argument) that the goods train was kept in a siding outside the goods-shed until there was room to unload; he also pointed to the presence of a chaukidar and contended that the appointment of a chaukidar indicated absence of wilful neglect.
  • At one point respondent's counsel was said to have argued that "wilful neglect" required an intention to bring about theft; the Court described that as a weak argument.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
H.C. Smith Ltd. v. G.I.P. Ry. Co. [1922] 1 A.C. 178 (House of Lords) Held that a risk-note which relieves the railway from all liability except upon proof that loss arose from the wilful misconduct of its servants amounts to a contractual allocation of the burden of proof onto the consignor. The Court distinguished this authority on the ground that the risk-note before the House of Lords contained explicit words requiring the consignor to prove wilful misconduct; by contrast risk-note form B (in the present case) does not contain such words, and therefore H.C. Smith was not directly applicable.
E.I. Ry. Co. v. Nathmal Behari Lal [1917] 39 All. 418 Found (in that case) that under risk-note B it lay upon the consignor to show that loss was occasioned by theft or wilful neglect of the company's servants. The Court examined this decision and concluded it was fact-specific: in Nathmal the usual precautions were shown to have been taken, supporting the outcome. The present Court declined to accept Nathmal as establishing the general rule that risk-note B shifts the burden of proof when no evidence of precautions is adduced.
E.I. Ry. Co. v. Sri Ram Mahadeo, A.I.R. 1924 All. 177 Applied Nathmal and the House of Lords' approach to attribute the burden of proof to the consignor under similar risk-note terms. The Court noted that Sri Ram Mahadeo was a single-Judge decision based on Nathmal and H.C. Smith; having distinguished H.C. Smith and declined to follow Nathmal as a general precedent, the Court expressed that the Sri Ram Mahadeo decision should likewise not be followed as an authoritative rule on the burden question here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis grounded on statutory provisions and evidentiary principles as stated in the record:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court invoked Section 160 of the Contract Act to state the bailee's duty to deliver goods in the condition consigned, subject to the care standard of Section 151 (the bailee must take as much care as a prudent man would of his own goods) and the protection of Section 152 where that care is shown. The Court also relied on Section 76 of the Indian Railways Act to emphasize that the plaintiff need not prove how the loss or destruction occurred.
  2. Evidentiary burden: Because the exception (i.e., that due care was taken) is especially within the railway company's knowledge, the Court held the ordinary law of evidence places the burden on the railway company to prove it took sufficient care. The Court concluded these statutory and evidentiary rules mean it is not necessary for the consignor to explain how the loss occurred.
  3. Effect of risk-note B: The respondent argued the risk-note altered the burden of proof. The Court examined the text of form B and concluded it merely limits the scope of the railway's liability (i.e., it defines when the railway will remain liable) but does not contain any provision addressing who must prove facts or how the burden of proof is to be allocated. Thus, the Court found that risk-note B did not operate to shift the evidentiary burden onto the consignor.
  4. Distinguishing authorities: The Court considered the House of Lords decision in H.C. Smith Ltd. v. G.I.P. Ry. Co. and distinguished it because the risk-note in that case expressly required proof of wilful misconduct — wording absent from form B. The Court noted the later issuance of a new risk-note form H that included explicit proof language and disclosure obligations, apparently introduced to effect the change contemplated by H.C. Smith.
  5. Review of local precedents: The Court reviewed earlier decisions (Nathmal Behari Lal and Sri Ram Mahadeo). It observed that Nathmal was fact-specific (the railway had proved usual precautions) and declined to accept it as establishing a general rule that absent any evidence the burden should lie on the consignor. It also declined to follow Sri Ram Mahadeo, which had relied on Nathmal and H.C. Smith.
  6. Allocation of burdens as fact-process: The Court explained the proper sequence: the plaintiff must prove non-delivery (initial burden). Once non-delivery is shown, the burden shifts to the railway company to show that it took reasonable precautions. Very little evidence may suffice to shift the burden back; but in the present case the railway adduced only the fact of a chaukidar's presence and some suggestion the train had been held in a siding. The Court held that such minimal showing did not establish that reasonable precautions had been taken, and thus did not discharge the railway's burden.
  7. Conclusion from evidence: Because the evidence as set out in the courts below did not adequately disclose the precautions taken by the railway or demonstrate the absence of wilful neglect, the Court found the lower appellate Court was wrong to place the burden on the consignor. The Court accepted the trial Court's finding that theft occurred after arrival at Allahabad and that the railway (or its servants) was responsible for the loss of the contents of the 13 tins, while the trial Court had dismissed the claim for the three partly empty tins based on the risk-note — the higher Court restored that outcome.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The lower appellate Court's decree dismissing the suit was set aside, and the trial Court's decree was restored.

Consequences and implications:

  • The Court held that risk-note form B does not, by its terms, shift the evidentiary burden of proving wilful neglect to the consignor; rather, after proof of non-delivery, the railway company must disclose and prove the precautions it took to rebut an inference of wilful neglect.
  • The Court clarified the evidentiary sequence: initial proof of non-delivery is for the consignor; thereafter the burden shifts to the railway to show reasonable precautions; a small amount of evidence may once more shift burden, but in this case the railway's showing (essentially the presence of a chaukidar) was insufficient.
  • The direct effect on the parties is that the plaintiff's decree for the loss of the contents of the 13 tins is restored, and the plaintiff was awarded costs in this Court and in the lower appellate Court.
  • The Court distinguished and limited the precedential application of H.C. Smith Ltd. v. G.I.P. Ry. Co. and declined to follow Nathmal Behari Lal and Sri Ram Mahadeo as establishing a general rule contrary to the position adopted here. The decision clarifies the effect of risk-note B as not altering the burden of proof, though it recognizes that a differently worded risk-note (e.g., form H) can and was intended to have that effect.
Show all summary ...

1. This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-appellant, Sheo Narain, against the E.I. Ry. Co. for damages on account of the failure of the defendant to deliver a consignment of ghee in its entirety, The consignment consisted of some bags of rice and 185 tins of ghee, each containing 20 seers, despatched at Maihar for delivery to the plaintiff at Allahabad. It is common ground that the consignment was in a wagon that arrived safely at Allahabad with the seals intact on 22nd April 1923. The evidence shows that the wagon was in the goods-shed on 27th April 1923. It is not clear whether it was kept outside up to that date. On that date the chaukidar reported that its seals were broken. The goods were checked on the 2nd May 1923, and found short. They were delivered to the plaintiff on 2nd May 1923. The shortage was as follows: 13 tins were missing and in three other tins the amount of ghee was only eight seers instead of 20 seers. The value claimed was Rs. 561-5-0. The defence was that the consignment was despatched under a risk-note form B which protected the railway company from any loss occasioned otherwise than by wilful neglect and that there had been no wilful neglect on the part of the railway company or on the part of its servants. The trial Court held that in the circumstances of the case it was for the defendant to prove that the railway company had taken such care of the goods in dispute as a man of ordinary prudence would have taken. It found that the theft of the ghee occurred after arrival at Allahabad station and came to the conclusion that it was due to theft by the railway servants. It gave a decree for the loss of the contents of the 13 tins of ghee, but dismissed the claim as to the shortage in the three tins, holding that the railway company was protected by the risk-note from responsibility for this shortage.

2. In appeal, the Additional Subordinate Judge of Allahabad set aside the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit on the ground that the burden of proving wilful neglect or theft by the railway administration or its servants was on the plaintiff and he had failed to sustain this burden.

3. In this second appeal the six grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal have not been argued. The only ground taken is that the lower appellate Court came to a wrong conclusion by incorrectly placing the burden of proof of wilful neglect on the plaintiff. There is, however, one ground, namely, the fifth, in the memorandum of appeal which takes up the broad plea that the defendant was not protected by the risk-note. The counsel for the defendant-respondent raised no objection to the appeal being argued on the lines stated. Accordingly we think it permissible to decide this appeal on the question whether the lower appellate Court's dismissal of the suit was vitiated by incorrect placing of the burden of proof. At the same time we would point out the extreme risk run by an appellant in formulating the grounds of appeal absolutely at random and then asking the Court to interfere with the decree of the lower appellate Court on a different ground.

4. Under Section 160, Contract Act, the railway company as bailee was bound to deliver the goods consigned in the condition in which they were consigned, but this duty was subject to certain exceptions. One was that the railway company was only bound to take as much care of the goods as a man of ordinary prudence would under similar circumstances take of his own goods of the same bulk, quality and value as the goods consigned (see Section 151, Contract Act). It was not responsible for any loss, destruction or deterioration if this amount of care was taken. (See Section 152). Now, this being an exception the burden of proving the exception was on the railway company. Moreover, the circumstances in which the loss and damage occurred was especially within the knowledge of the railway company. So, under the ordinary laws of evidence, the burden of proving that sufficient care was taken was on the railway company. To make this clear beyond all doubt, Section 76 Indian Railways Act (9 of 1890) enacts that in any suit for loss, destruction etc., of goods, it shall not be necessary for the plaintiff to prove how the loss or destruction was caused. It has been argued however, by respondent's counsel that the burden of proof placed on the railway company by these provisions of the law was shifted by the fact that the plaintiff signed what is known as risk-note B.

5. This risk-note amounted to a contract that the consignor would not hold the railway responsible for any loss except the loss of a complete consignment or of one or more complete packages forming part of a consignment due either to the wilful neglect of the railway administration or to theft by or to the wilful neglect of its servants, etc.

6. It also provided that the term "wilful neglect" should not be held to include fire, robbery from a running train or any other unforeseen event or accident. We fail to see how this risk-note could shift the burden of proof. Its only effect was to limit the extent of the railway responsibility. We hold, therefore, that the lower appellate Court was wrong in placing on the plaintiff the burden of proving wilful neglect. It was for the railway company to disclose the facts and show that they were inconsistent with wilful neglect. The counsel for the respondent admitted, indeed he volunteered, that there was little information disclosed by the evidence of the facts. He said that the goods train was kept in a siding outside the goods-shed for some time until there was room in the goods-shed for unloading the train. It is sufficient to say that the evidence failed entirely to show what were the risks of theft from the wagon and what precautions were taken to meet those risks.

7. We would here state that we were not referred in the argument of this appeal to any evidence. We accordingly had to accept what was stated in the judgments of the Courts below as mainly correct.

8. We find then that the evidence did not suffice to justify a finding that there had been no wilful neglect by the railway company. At one time in his argument in this appeal counsel for the respondent seemed to suggest that the fact that there was a chaukidar was sufficient to show that there was no wilful neglect. The more appointment of a chaukidar would not appear to us to exclude the possibility of wilful neglect. Again, respondent's counsel argued that wilful neglect meant neglect intended to bring about a theft. This appears to us a desperate argument. The definition of "wilful neglect" in the risk-note appears to us to mean the failure to take such precautions as a prudent man would in respect of his own goods take to provide against such loss or theft as a prudent man would contemplate as not merely possible but as likely, fire and robbery from a running train being given as instances of events so exceptional or impossible to guard against as to justify absence of precautions. It is clear that theft from a wagon within the railway station when the wagon is merely sealed was a very probable contingency in the absence of definite precautions. We know vaguely the risks but we do not know the precautions, from the evidence; and the railway company must suffer for their failure to prove these precautions. It may be that the railway company could prove such precautions or even that they have proved such precautions, but the evidence has not been printed and their counsel has not indicated or attempted to indicate any beyond saying that there was a chaukidar there.

9. It is urged, however, by counsel for the railway company that there is strong authority for the view that under the terms of the risk-note the burden of proving wilful neglect was on the plaintiff. The risk-note runs as follows:

I, the undersigned, do in consideration of such lower charge agree and undertake to hold the said railway administration... harmless and free from all responsibility, for any loss, destruction, or deterioration of, or damage to the said consignment from any cause whatever except for the loss of a complete consignment or of one or more complete packages forming part of a consignment due either to the wilful neglect of the railway administration, or to theft by or to the wilful neglect of its servants,... employed by them before, during and after transit over the said railway... provided the term "wilful neglect" be not held to include fire, robbery from a running train or any other unforseen event or accident.

10. There is nothing in these terms which purport to govern the question of burden of proof. The burden of proof will, therefore, be the same as if the risk-note had not been signed, and as shown above we are of the opinion that the burden of proving proper precautions rests, apart from the risk-note, on the railway company. We have, however, been referred to the decision of the House of Lords, H.C. Smith Ltd. v. G.I.P. Ry. Co. [1922] 1 A.C. 178. We would distinguish this decision on the ground that it dealt with a risk-note containing different terms from risk-note form B. In the risk-note considered by their Lordships the consignor relieved the railway company from all liability for loss, damage, etc., except by the proof that such loss, damage, etc, arose from the wilful misconduct of your servants. Their Lordships held that these words amounted to a contract; by the consignor that he would not be entitled to compensation unless he proved the wilful misconduct of the railway company. Lord Buckmaster made the following remarks:

It is perfectly true that this results in holding that the apparent protection afforded to the trader is really illusory; it practically gives him no protection at all, for it is often impossible for a trader to know what it is that has caused the loss of his goods... The explanation of the loss is often within the exclusive knowledge of the railway company, and for the trader to be compelled to prove that it was due to wilful misconduct on the part of the railway company's servants, is to call upon him to establish something which it may be almost impossible for him to prove. Nonetheless, that is the burden that he has undertaken.

11. It will be seen that the risk-note before their Lordships was one which required positive proof of wilful conduct. Their Lordships, therefore, in effect, held, that the, plaintiff could not rely upon mere negative proof of want of sufficient precautions. The risk-note before us, form B, says nothing about proof, and on this ground we would distinguish it. We may mention that recently a now form of risk-note, form H, has been issued by the railway company to take the place of risk-note form B. That risk-note provides for the consignor holding the railway administration free from all responsibility....

except upon proof that such loss, destruction, etc., arose from the misconduct of the railway administration servants.

12. Apparently this form was issued with the specific purpose of making the judgment of the House of Lords applicable. This conjecture is strengthened by the fact that in the new form H, an endeavour has been made to meet the objection of their Lordships that the risk-note was unfair to the tradesmen inasmuch as the risk-note also contains an obligation on the railway company that the railway administration shall be bound to disclose their dealings with the packages in transit and to give evidence thereof. It appears then that it was recognized by the Government (which is required to approve of the form of risk-notes) when approving the new rule that the House of Lords decision could not be invoked in favour of the railway company under the old form B. Then we have a two-Judge decision of this Court in E.I. Ry. Co. v. Nathmal Behari Lal [1917] 39 All. 418, where it was hold that under risk-note B it lies upon the consignor claiming damages to show that the loss was occasioned by the theft or wilful neglect of the company's servants,

13. In this case there was a theft between the last station but one before Cawnpore and Cawnpore on a running train. The evidence; in this case justified a finding on the facts that there was no wilful neglect to take the necessary precautions by the railway company. All the usual precautions were proved to have been taken. The decision would, therefore, appear to have been justified on the facts without invoking the reason that the burden of proof lay on the plaintiff. So far as that ruling is authority for holding that the burden of proof, in the absence of any evidence as to precautions being taken should be placed on the consignor, we are not disposed to agree with it. Then we have a single Judge decision of this Court, E.I. Ry. Co. v. Sri Ram Mahadeo A.I.R. 1924 All. 177. This decision was based on the case of E.I. Ry. Co. v. Nathmal Behari Lal [1917] 39 All. 418, and on the House of Lords' decision referred to. As we are not disposed to follow the former and have distinguished the latter, this decision of a single Judge should not, in our opinion, be followed. There are many decisions which impose on the plaintiff, in such a case as this, the initial burden of proof, but differ as to the exact amount of proof which will shift the burden of proof. We agree that it is for the plaintiff to prove non-delivery, and so for the initial burden of proof is on the plaintiff. On such proof the burden would, in our opinion, shift to the railway company to show that they took reasonable precautions. A very little evidence in this direction may again shift the burden of proof. In the present case counsel for the railway company has only pointed to the fact that there was a chaukidar at the Allahabad railway station. This as stated above, we do not consider to be sufficient evidence to shift the burden of proof.

14. We hold, therefore, that the lower Court was wrong in putting the burden of proof on to the plaintiff. On this ground we set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the trial Court The plaintiff will get his costs in this and in the lower appellate Court.