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Irukulapati Venkates... v. Vemuri Ammayya And O...
Structured Summary of the Judgment (Varadachariar, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The second defendant appealed against a preliminary decree for sale passed by the lower Court founded on a mortgage-deed (Ex. A) executed on 10 March 1926 by the first defendant for himself and as guardian of his then-minor son (the second defendant). Ex. A recited a secured sum of Rs. 10,000, comprised of Rs. 2,429-3-3 then due to the plaintiff on promissory notes executed by the first defendant and Rs. 7,570-12-9 recited to have been received in cash by the first defendant for discharging debts contracted by him from others.
The first defendant contended that Ex. A was supported by consideration only to the extent of Rs. 2,429-3-3, and that the recital of cash payment for the balance was untrue; he asserted an alternative understanding that the document was to secure potential liabilities of the plaintiff as surety. The second defendant (by the date of suit he had attained majority) contended that even the Rs. 2,429-3-3 was not a genuine or binding debt and that the mortgage did not bind his share in the family property. An additional issue later raised was whether the mortgage-deed had been duly attested.
The learned Subordinate Judge held that the bond had been duly attested, that the Rs. 10,000 had been paid as recited, and that the cash payment of Rs. 7,570-12-9 had been used to discharge antecedent debts of the first defendant. A preliminary decree for sale of the mortgaged property was passed. On appeal, the lower Court's finding on attestation and the mortgage's binding character as to the Rs. 2,429-3-3 were not challenged.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the recital in Ex. A that Rs. 7,570-12-9 was advanced in cash is true and, if so, whether that sum was applied to discharge antecedent debts of the first defendant.
- Whether the mortgage-deed (Ex. A) is binding on the second defendant's (son's) share of the family property.
- Whether debts incurred by the first defendant in connection with a trade started by him are "avyavaharika" (not binding on the son), and therefore whether the son's share is immune from liability for such debts.
- Whether the mortgage-deed (Ex. A) had been duly attested (this was an additional issue; the lower Court's finding on attestation was not challenged on appeal).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Second Defendant)'s Arguments
- The appellant challenged the truth of the plaintiff's account that Rs. 7,570-12-9 was advanced in cash and applied to discharge antecedent debts.
- The appellant contended that even as regards Rs. 2,429-3-3 there was no genuine or binding debt.
- The appellant argued that debts incurred by the father in connection with a trade started by him were avyavaharika and consequently not binding on the son; this contention was acknowledged to conflict with the decision in Achutaramayya v. Ratnajee Bhootaji but was said to be supported by the Privy Council decision in Benares Bank, Ltd. v. Hari Narain.
First Defendant's Arguments
- The first defendant alleged that Ex. A was supported by consideration only to the extent of Rs. 2,429-3-3 and that the recital of cash payment for the balance was untrue.
- He suggested an alternative understanding that Ex. A should serve as security for amounts for which the plaintiff might stand surety for loans the parties intended to borrow for his benefit.
- He sought to cast doubt on documentary evidence by suggesting secret execution of Ex. A, and relied upon the circumstance of stamp papers purchased in three different names to imply fraud.
- He also suggested that recitals in Exs. D and E were inserted to enable the plaintiff to escape liability for income-tax.
Plaintiff's Arguments and Evidence
- The plaintiff bore the onus of proof to show that the mortgage bound the second defendant's share and that the cash advances recited in Ex. A were in fact made and applied as stated.
- The plaintiff examined himself and multiple witnesses. Some witnesses showed that part of the money required for Ex. A was borrowed by the plaintiff immediately prior to Ex. A; others (P.Ws 5 to 8) claimed to be creditors of the first defendant whose debts were paid out of moneys advanced under Ex. A.
- Documentary evidence: Exs. D and E were promissory notes executed by the plaintiff on 8 March 1926, said to represent money borrowed to be advanced to the first defendant; these notes were attested by the first defendant and were not impeached by him when confronted. Ex. F recorded sale of some of the plaintiff's lands and P.W.4 proved that the proceeds were paid to the promisees under Exs. D and E, discharging those notes.
- The plaintiff admitted that he had subsequently stood surety for some borrowings of the first defendant; the plaintiff argued that such later accommodations did not establish that Ex. A was not genuine.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Achutaramayya v. Ratnajee Bhootaji | Decision concerning the status of "commercial" debts and the son's liability; treated as authority that debts borrowed for trade may be binding (opposed to the contention that trade debts are avyavaharika). | The Court declined to depart from Achutaramayya on the question in issue. The learned Counsel for the appellant admitted his contention was opposed to this decision; the Court refused to hold that all debts borrowed for purposes of trade by a Hindu father are avyavaharika. |
| Benares Bank, Ltd. v. Hari Narain | Privy Council decision dealing with binding character of mortgage where moneys were borrowed contemporaneously with the mortgage for the purpose of carrying on a trade started by the father; the Privy Council did not decide the son's liability under the pious obligation doctrine because that question was not raised in the Indian Courts. | The Court found nothing in this decision to support the appellant's argument that trade debts are avyavaharika and thereby relieve the son of liability. The Court noted that the Privy Council declined to deal with the son's liability under the pious obligation doctrine and so the decision did not support the appellant's position. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded by assessing the oral and documentary evidence with attention to the onus on the plaintiff. Key elements of the reasoning were:
- Onus and credibility: The onus of proving the cash advances and application to antecedent debts was on the plaintiff. The Court reviewed the witnesses and found the first defendant to be an unreliable witness, while crediting the plaintiff and several of his witnesses (including P.Ws 5–8 and P.W.4).
- Documentary corroboration: Exs. D and E (promissory notes executed by the plaintiff on 8 March 1926) supported the plaintiff's case that he borrowed part of the funds to be advanced under Ex. A. The fact that the first defendant attested these notes and did not impeach them in the witness box supported their genuineness. No convincing reason was shown for false recitals in Ex. A, D or E.
- Stamp-paper argument and other inconsistent explanations: The Court rejected the first defendant's attempts to characterise the purchase of stamp papers in three names as evidence of fraud, explaining the vendor's limitations made such a purchase pattern understandable. Other explanations offered by the first defendant (secret execution, tax-evasion motive) were found unpersuasive.
- Evidence of discharge of promissory notes: The plaintiff's sale of lands under Ex. F and the unchallenged testimony of P.W.4 that proceeds were used to discharge Exs. D and E reinforced that money had been borrowed and used as avowed.
- Credibility of creditors' evidence: Although P.Ws 5–8 did not produce account books, their testimony that antecedent debts of the first defendant were discharged from Ex. A monies was accepted by the Subordinate Judge and upheld. The Court read their evidence in the context of the other circumstances and found no reason to differ from that view.
- Subsequent accommodation and prior omissions: The Court considered but did not treat the plaintiff's later acts of suretyship, or his earlier lack of detailed disclosure about antecedent debts, as dispositive against the plaintiff. The Court held that the plaintiff was not previously required in the ordinary course to set out details until the second defendant raised specific challenges in the suit.
- Conclusion on consideration: On the whole evidence the Court concurred with the lower Court that Ex. A was fully supported by consideration and that the sum of Rs. 7,570 borrowed in cash under it was utilised by the first defendant to discharge antecedent debts.
- Question of son's liability (avyavaharika contention): Although the appellant argued that the father's trade-related debts were avyavaharika and not binding on the son, the Court found this contention to conflict with Achutaramayya and not to be supported by the Privy Council decision relied upon. The Court refused to hold that all debts borrowed for trade by a Hindu father are avyavaharika debts.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal fails and is DISMISSED WITH COSTS. The Court affirmed the lower Court's finding that Ex. A is supported by consideration and that the sum of Rs. 7,570 was used to discharge antecedent debts, such that Ex. A would prima facie be binding on the second defendant's share.
Consequences and immediate effects:
- The appellant was ordered to pay the Court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal.
- C.M.Ps Nos. 4674 and 4675 of 1938 were dismissed.
- C.M.P No. 4676 of 1938 (application under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act for scaling down the debt) was not finally adjudicated; the Court directed that the petitioner file, within a fortnight, a more detailed affidavit stating the grounds for claiming agriculturist status and whether the father (first defendant) was claimed to be an agriculturist.
- No broader doctrinal change or new precedent was laid down by this judgment; the Court declined to extend or overturn the existing approach in Achutaramayya on the question discussed and held that Benares Bank, Ltd. v. Hari Narain did not support the appellant's argument.
N.R.RAppeal dismissed.
JUDGMENT
(Delivered by Varadachariar, J.)
The second defendant appeals against a preliminary decree for sale passed by the lower Court on foot of a mortgage-deed (Ex. A) executed on 10th March, 1926, by the first defendant for himself and as guardian of his then minor son the second defendant. The mortgage-deed had been executed to secure repayment of a sum of Rs. 10,000 made up of Rs. 2,429-3-3 then due to the plaintiff himself on promissory notes that had been executed by the first defendant and of a sum of Rs. 7,570-12-9 recited to have been received in cash by the first defendant for discharging debts that had been contracted by him from others. The first defendant contended that Ex. A was supported by consideration only to the extent of Rs. 2,429-3-3 and that as regards the balance, the statement of cash payment in Ex. A was not true and that the understanding between the parties was that the document should serve as security for any amounts for which the plaintiff might ultimately become liable in connection with loans which the parties intended to borrow for the benefit of the first defendant, with the plaintiff standing as surety therefore. The second defendant who had attained majority by the date of the suit contended that even as regards the sum of Rs. 2,429-3-3, there was no genuine or binding debt and that in any event the mortgage was not binding upon his share in the family property. At a later stage, a further question was raised by an additional issue, namely, whether the mortgage-deed has been duly attested.
The learned Subordinate Judge held that the bond had been duly attested and that the sum of Rs. 10,000 had been paid as recited in the document and that the cash payment of Rs. 7,570-12-9 paid by the plaintiff to the first defendant at the time of Ex. A had been utilised for discharge of antecedent debts due by the first defendant to other creditors. He accordingly passed a preliminary decree for the sale of the mortgaged property. Before us, the lower Court's finding on the question of attestation has not been challenged nor has any objection been taken to the binding character of the mortgage so far as it related to the sum of Rs. 2,429-3-3 found to be due from the first defendant to the plaintiff on the date of Ex. A.
The learned Counsel for the appellant has directed his arguments mainly to the question of the truth of the plaintiff's story as to the cash advance of Rs. 7,570-12-9 and as to the application of this sum in the discharge of antecedent debts by the first defendant. The decision of both these questions rests to a certain extent on the appreciation of oral: evidence. The onus of proof is, of course, on the plaintiff, so far at any rate as he seeks to hold the second defendant's share in the property liable under the mortgage. Besides examining himself, the plaintiff has examined a number of witnesses some of whom prove that a portion of the money required to be advanced under Ex. A was borrowed from them by the plaintiff just prior to Ex. A and the rest claim to be creditors of the first defendant whose debts were discharged out of the moneys borrowed by the first defendant under Ex. A. As against this body of evidence, there is, on the other side, only the testimony of the first defendant who has shown himself to be a very unreliable witness.
There are three documents in the case, besides Ex. A, which lend considerable support to the plaintiff's case. Exs. D and E are two promissory notes executed by the plaintiff on 8th March, 1926, in favour of certain relatives of his and it is the plaintiff's case that as he had not on hand at the time the whole amount required to be advanced under Ex. A, he borrowed part of the amount under these promissory notes. That these notes cannot be a later fabrication is shown by the fact that the first defendant has himself attested them and when confronted with them in the box, the first defendant did not impeach their genuineness. These notes recite in terms that the money was borrowed for the very purpose of being advanced to the first defendant. No reason has been suggested why false recitals should have been put in either in Ex. A or in Exs. D and E. The explanation attempted by the first defendant in respect of these recitals is difficult to understand. At one stage, he suggested that Ex. A was secretly executed, but it does not seem to be part of his case that he had any creditors to cheat at the time. The argument founded on the purchase of the stamp papers for Ex. A in three different names is absolutely disingenuous. The stamp papers were purchased on the same date from the same stamp vendor and as, under the rules, the vendor could not sell to the same person stamps in excess of the value of Rs. 50, the parties found it convenient to purchase three papers in three different names at the same time. It is regrettable that this circumstance should have been pressed into service for a baseless suggestion of fraud. If the understanding was that Ex. A was in part to be security to plaintiff in respect of transactions wherein he might stand surety for the defendant, there was no conceivable reason why it should not have been so recited in Ex. A. As regards the recitals in Exs. D and E, the first defendant suggested that they were put in with a view to enable the plaintiff to escape liability for income-tax. We can only say that it is not easy to understand the suggestion. It is only if money was really due under Ex. A and interest was paid by the debtor on that basis that any question of liability for income-tax or of escaping from it will arise. If no money was due under Ex. A to the extent of Rs. 7,500 there is no point in the parties taking steps to evade payment of income-tax. The evidence further shows that Exs. D and E were discharged by the plaintiff by the sale of some of his lands under Ex. F. P.W 4, the vendee under Ex. F, proves this sale and the payment of money in pursuance thereof to the promisees under Exs. D and E. This witness has not been cross-examined at all on behalf of the defendants. In the face of these documents which prove that the plaintiff did borrow money to advance under Ex. A and subsequently sold some of his lands to pay off the moneys thus borrowed, it is difficult to accept the story of the defendants that Ex. A is not what it purports to be and that no money was in fact advanced on the date of Ex. A as recited therein.
That the first defendant must have had other debts than what he had borrowed from the plaintiff or with his help is shown by his admission that even in connection with his purchases of lands, he has had to borrow moneys and by the admission in his Insolvency Petition Ex. K of the existence of other debts. He is also obliged to admit that he had been carrying on trade at least since 1922. Though as a mere Kamma agriculturist, it would be nothing strange if he did not keep account books, it is hardly likely that he would not have kept accounts in connection with his trade. If these accounts had been produced, they would have shown what debts he had borrowed and how they had been discharged. The learned Subordinate Judge who recorded the evidence of P.Ws 5 to 8 who claimed to be creditors of the first defendant and deposed to the amounts due to them having been paid out of the money borrowed under Ex. A, accepted their evidence as reliable. It is true that they have not produced any account books or other materials in corroboration of their story; and their inability to remember other transactions entered into by them has also been rightly commented on. But their evidence has got to be read as a whole and in the light of the other circumstances established in the case. We see no reason to differ from the learned Subordinate Judge's view that the plaintiff's version is substantially true.
Some point has been made of the fact that the plaintiff admittedly joined as surety for the first defendant in some of his borrowings after the date of Ex. A. One such transaction was put to him when he was in the witness-box and was admitted by him. Four other notes in which he had joined were sought to be filed in the lower Court but were rejected by that Court as not having been produced in time. An attempt has been made to ask us to receive them in evidence. We do not think it proper to admit them in evidence at this stage, as, in view of the allegations in the counter-affidavit, further examination of witnesses will be necessary to appreciate their bearing on the case. We are however willing to proceed on the footing that the plaintiff did accommodate the first defendant in some of his subsequent borrowings. This by itself does not necessarily establish the truth of the first defendant's story as to Ex. A. It is the common case of the parties that the plaintiff and the first defendant were good friends at this time; and seeing that the margin of security afforded by Ex. A was fairly large, it is nothing strange that the plaintiff was prepared to take the risk of accommodating the first defendant in some of his borrowings, without insisting on security. The cordial relations between the parties also seem to account for the plaintiff's failure to insist on delivery to him of the documents discharged by the first defendant from out of the money borrowed under Ex. A. It has been argued that the omission of the plaintiff to refer on earlier occasions in detail to the pre-existing debts of the first defendant now proved through P.Ws 5 to 8 militates against the truth of that story. But we are not satisfied that any occasion arose before the trial of the suit when the plaintiff need, in the ordinary course, have set forth these details. In the notice which the first defendant issued to the plaintiff in 1929, he denied that Ex. A was supported by cash payment as recited therein to the extent of Rs. 7,570 and the plaintiff merely repudiated this assertion. We do not see that he was at that time called upon to say how exactly this amount had been applied by the first defendant. It was only when the second defendant attempted to impeach the binding character of Ex. A in this suit, that the question of the discharge of antecedent debts assumed importance. We accordingly concur in the finding of the lower Court that Ex. A is fully supported by consideration and that the sum of Rs. 7,570 borrowed in cash under it is shown to have been utilised by the first defendant for the discharge of antecedent debts.
On the above finding, Ex. A would prima facie be binding on the second defendant's share as well. But it has been contended on his behalf that as the debts of the first defendant were incurred by him in connection with a trade started by himself, when trade was not the normal occupation of the family, the debts must be held to be avyavaharika debts and as such not binding on the son. The learned Counsel for the appellant admitted that this contention was opposed to the decision in Achutaramayya v. Ratnajee Bhootaji(1), but he argued that it is supported by the decision of the Privy Council in Benares Bank, Ltd. v. Hari Narain(2). We find nothing in Benares Bank, Ltd. v. Hari Narain that supports this argument. Their Lordships there decided only the question of the binding character of the mortgage as such on the footing that moneys had been borrowed contemporaneously with the mortgage for the purpose of carrying on a trade started by the father. They declined to deal with the question of the son's liability for the debt under the pious obligation doctrine, on the ground that the question had not been raised in the Courts in India. We have been asked to say that the decision in Achutaramayya v. Ratnajee Bhootaji as to “commercial” debts is opposed to the Hindu law texts. We are not prepared to accede to this contention. All that could be said against it is based upon an ambiguous text of Gauthama which has been differently read and variously interpreted by different commentators. It is too much at this time of the day to ask the Court to hold that all debts borrowed for purposes of trade by a Hindu father are avyavaharika debts. The fact that on another question, the decision in Achutaramayya v. Ratnaji Bhootaji must be deemed to have been overruled by the decision in Benares Bank Ltd. v. Hari Narain does not affect the present question.
The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The Court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal will be paid by the appellant.
C.M.Ps Nos. 4674 and 4675 of 1938 are dismissed.
C.M.P No. 4676 of 1938 is an application under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act for scaling down the debt. The counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent denies that the applicant is an agriculturist. The affidavit filed in support of this application is too meagre to be acted on. The petitioner will, within a fortnight, file a more detailed affidavit stating the grounds on which he claims to be an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act and also whether even his father, the first defendant, is claimed by him to be an agriculturist within the meaning of the Act.
N.R.RAppeal dismissed.
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