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Kanak Kanti Roy v. Kripa Nath Gain
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit (instituted in 1922) for enhancement of rent under Section 46 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and for ejectment for refusal to pay the enhanced rent. On a prior hearing (order of remand in 1927) this Court remitted the matter to the lower appellate Court to determine service of notice and other questions. On remand the Subordinate Judge entered a decree in the plaintiff's favour. The defendant appealed to this Court; S.K. Ghose, J. reversed that decree. The present appeal under the Letters Patent challenges that reversal. The sole question for this Court is whether S. 20, sub-S. (1-A) introduced by Bengal Act 1 of 1925, entitled the defendant to the status of an occupancy (settled) ryot and thereby defeated the plaintiff's claim.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether S. 20, sub-S. (1-A) (Bengal Act 1 of 1925) operated to confer on the defendant the status of a settled/occupancy ryot despite the village being declared after the defendant's period of continuous occupation, and if so whether that status could be relied on in the pending suit.
- Whether the defendant was precluded from raising the point based on sub-S. (1-A) after the case had been remitted, given it was not raised earlier before this Court when the remand was ordered.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The question under S. 20, sub-S. (1-A) was not raised before this Court when the case was remitted although Bengal Act 1 of 1925 had come into force; accordingly the respondent (defendant) is precluded from raising it on remand.
Respondent's Arguments
- The defendant relied on sub-S. (1-A), S. 20 (then the law) in support of his defence that he had acquired status as an occupancy/settled ryot.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Janab Ali Molla v. Port Canning and Land Improvement Co. Ltd. A.I.R 1925 Cal. 336 | The law that would have applied at the date the suit was instituted (principle on acquiring occupancy rights by continuous holding). | The Court held that the rights of the parties must be decided according to the law as it stood when the action began, as explained by this decision, because the new sub-section did not plainly indicate it was intended to vary prior rights. |
| Jonah Molla v. Port Canning and Land Improvement Co. Ltd. | Referenced as the controlling exposition of law at the date the suit commenced. | The Court treated the rule in this case as governing the parties' rights at the commencement of the action and held the legislature had not clearly intended sub-S. (1-A) to vary those pre-existing rights. |
| Lauri v. Benad. [1892] 3 Ch. 402 | General rule on retrospective effect: statutes should not be construed to have retrospective operation unless language plainly requires it. | The Court applied this principle to conclude that sub-S. (1-A), being an ex post facto provision, should not be given retrospective effect beyond what its language plainly necessitates; no such plain intention appeared. |
| Maxwell, Edn. 7, p. 192 | When the law is altered during the pendency of an action, rights are decided according to the law as it existed when the action began unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. | The Court relied on this statement to hold that, absent clear legislative intention, the law at the action's commencement governs and the 1925 amendment should not vary parties' pre-existing rights. |
| Maniruddin Mondal v. Sm. Charusila Debi. [1928] 114 I.C 150. | Cited as prior decision bearing on related questions under the Act. | The Court observed the decision was ex parte (no appearance for respondent) and that that case did not address whether the new law should govern a pending suit; therefore it was not treated as authoritative on the present point. |
| S.A No. 347 of 1925 (unreported) decided on 11th July 1927 | Cited as an authority mentioned in the judgment under appeal. | The Court noted that no question was raised or expressly decided in that unreported case regarding whether the new law should govern a pending suit, so it did not press as authority. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined whether sub-S. (1-A) of Section 20 (Bengal Act 1 of 1925) should be construed to operate retrospectively to affect rights in a suit pending from 1922. The Court noted the remand left the Subordinate Judge able to consider all questions arising and accordingly the defendant could raise a defense based on the then-existing law (sub-S. (1-A)). The sub-section's text deems a person to have continually held land in a village notwithstanding that the village was declared after the relevant 12-year period. The Court recognized that the provision is ex post facto in the sense that it creates settled-ryot status for persons who were not so under prior law and removes certain landlord rights. Applying the established principle (Lauri v. Benad) that statutes are not to be given retrospective operation unless language plainly requires it, and the maxim (Maxwell) that when law changes during pendency rights are decided by the law at commencement unless the statute clearly intends otherwise, the Court found no words in the amending sub-section showing an intention to control or vary rights existing before its enactment. While agreeing with S.K. Ghose, J. that the amendment's object was to prevent a result that would render it meaningless, the Court concluded that, despite the defendant having continuous occupation since 1896/97 (and thus acquiring settled-ryot status by fact), he could not raise that plea in 1922 because the law at the time of institution did not recognize it; the legislature had not clearly declared the sub-section to be declaratory of prior law or to vary existing rights in pending suits. The Court also found the cited domestic decisions did not compel a contrary conclusion because they did not decide the pending-suit question.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED.
Holding: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision under appeal, and restored the decree of the Subordinate Judge, awarding costs in this Court and in the Court below.
Implications: The direct effect is the restoration of the Subordinate Judge's decree in favour of the plaintiff with costs. The Court concluded that the law as it stood when the action was instituted (1922) governs the parties' rights because the amending sub-section did not plainly express an intention to vary pre-existing rights in pending suits. The opinion does not articulate broader precedential changes beyond this disposition.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit for enhancement of rent based on an agreement served under Section 46 of the Ben. Ten. Act and for ejectment on the ground of refusal to pay the enhanced rent. The suit was instituted in 1922. On a previous occasion, when the suit came up on second appeal before this Court, it was remitted to the lower appellate Court to determine the question of service of notice and other questions that might arise. The order of the remand was made in 1927. The Subordinate Judge, on remand, made a decree in plaintiff's favour. The defendant then appealed to this Court, and the said appeal being heard by our learned brother S.K Ghose, J., that decree has been reversed. From his decision the present appeal has been preferred under the Letters Patent. One of the questions mooted before the Subordinate Judge who heard the appeal on remand was whether in view of S. 20, sub-S. (1-A) introduced by Bengal Act 1 of 1925, the defendant had not acquired the status of an occupancy ryot so as to defeat the plaintiff's claim. This question was answered by the Subordinate Judge in the negative, but our learned brother S.K Ghose, J. has taken a contrary view. This is the only question for our consideration in this appeal.
2. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that as the question was not raised before this Court on the previous occasion, when this Court remanded the case though Bengal Act 1 of 1925 had then come into force, the respondent was precluded from raising it afterwards. We are not prepared to accede to this contention: the order of remand left it open to the Subordinate Judge to deal with all questions that might arise in the suit, and if in support of his defence that he was an occupancy ryot the defendant put forward an additional and new reason based on sub-S. (1-A), S. 20, which was then the law, the Subordinate Judge was right in considering it.
3. The tenancy in this case originated in 1896 or 1897. The area in which the land is situate was not declared to be a village until February 1912. The suit was instituted in 1922. The position therefore is that the defendant held the land continuously for nearly 16 years before 1912 and for about ten years after 1912. At the date, when the suit was instituted, the sub-section had not been introduced, and the law that would have applied to the case was what was enunciated in the case of Janab Ali Molla v. Port Canning and Land Improvement Co. Ltd. . A.I.R 1925 Cal. 336. Now sub-S. (1-A), Section 20, was introduced by Bengal Act 1 of 1925 in order to counteract the effect of the decision in the aforesaid case and the question is to what extent did it do so.
4. The sub-section declared that in construing S. 20:
“a person shall be deemed…. to have continually held land in a village, notwithstanding that such village was defined, surveyed and recorded as, or declared to constitute a village at a date subsequent to the commencement of the said period of 12 years.”
5. The general rule, as to the retrospective effect of a statute, has been concisely istated by Lindley, L.J, in Lauri v. Benad . [1892] 3 Ch. 402, at p. 421, thus:
“It is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed so as to have a retrospective operation, unless its language is such as plainly to require such construction and the same rule involves another and subordinate rule to the effect that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary.”
6. Now, it is plain, upon a reading of the sub-section that it is an ex post facto law and like all ex post facto legislation is retrospective in the sense that it created for a person who was not a settled ryot under the law as it stood before the status of a settled ryot and on the other hand took away such vested rights of the landlord as he may have had on the ground of that person not having been a settled ryot. In that way, no doubt, the sub-section was retrospective in its effect. But the other question at once arises and that is to what extent is its retrospective operation rendered necessary by its language. In other words, is it necessary to interprete the sub-section as indicating that the sub-section was intended to control the section as it stood even before the sub-section was introduced? There are, in our opinion, no words in the Act, by which the sub-section was enacted, which may be construed as indicating such an intention. It is well settled that
“in general, when the law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new istatute shows a clear intention to vary such rights: Maxwell, Edn. 7, p. 192.”
7. In the present case no such intention; appears.
8. The result is that we agree with our learned brother S.K Ghose, J., in so far as he has held:
“If it is held that the amendment of 1925 did not affect the position in favour of the defendant then the whole object of the amendment would be lost. It would be meaningless to say that in the case of the present defendant his-occupancy right is to accrue from after the date of the amendment that is in 1925.”
9. We agree that the defendant acquired the status of a settled ryot on twelve years' continuous occupation since 1896 or 1897, that is to say, since the inception of the tenancy, though the area was declared a village much later, i.e, in 1912. But we hold that it was not possible for the defendant to take up this plea in 1922 when the action was commenced, and that the law as it stood at that date and as explained in the case of Jonah Molla v. Port Canning and Land Improvement Co. Ltd. must decide the rights of the parties to the suit, the legislature not having expressed any clear intention that the sub-section was-declaratory of the law prior to the date, when the sub-section came into force, or to vary their relative rights notwithstanding that an action had been commenced on the basis of such rights.
10. Two decisions of this Court have been, referred to in the judgment under appeal. One is the case of Maniruddin Mondal v. Sm. Charusila Debi . [1928] 114 I.C 150., and the other, an unreported case S.A No. 347 of 1925-decided on lith July 1927. In the former case there was no appearance on, behalf of the respondent and the decision was an ex parte one and in neither of the two cases was any question raised or argued or expressly decided as to whether the new law should govern a pending, suit. We accordingly do not feel pressed by the authority of these decisions. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decision under appeal being set aside that of the Subordinate Judge is restored with costs in this Court and the Court, below.
K.N/R.K
11. Appeal allowed.
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