Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Jai Narain Singh v. Collector Of Aligarh

Allahabad High Court
Jan 8, 1942
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Allsop, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (Ch. Jai Narain Singh and two others) sued to recover possession of certain immovable property alleged to have been alienated by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar and Mt. Chhattar Kunwar, widows of the deceased Ch. Tej Singh. Ch. Jai Narain Singh is admitted to be the nearest reversioner of Ch. Tej Singh's estate; the other two plaintiffs had purchased a share from him.

The property in dispute was described under four heads in the plaint; subsequently the plaintiffs withdrew their claim to one particular holding (holding No. 2 in head three, area 1 bigha 8 biswas). The defendant (the Collector of Aligarh acting as manager for the Court of Wards of the estate of Kunwar Shri Newas) was in possession under a chain of title traceable to (i) a sale deed executed by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar dated 30 January 1889 and subsequent transfers and execu­tions, and (ii) a mortgage deed executed by Mt. Chhattar Kunwar dated 7 July 1892 and subsequent transfers and execution.

The Civil Judge found for the defendant and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed. The central factual focus in the appeal was whether the transfers by the widows were executed out of legal necessity and therefore binding on the reversioner and his representatives.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale (dated 30 January 1889) executed by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar of her life interest and related transfers were justified by legal necessity and binding on the reversioner (i.e., whether the debts for which the property was alienated were debts of the estate).
  2. Whether the mortgage (dated 7 July 1892) and subsequent transfers by Mt. Chhattar Kunwar were justified by legal necessity and binding on the reversioner, given earlier usufructuary mortgages and the nature of the security accepted by mortgagees.
  3. Whether the reversioner (nearest reversioner) had ratified or acquiesced to the transfers relied upon by the defendant (specifically the 2 May 1898 deed and other facts relied upon in the lower Court).
  4. Whether one widow could alienate without the consent of the other and — relatedly — whether the widows had effectively consented to one another's alienations.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Position

  • Plaintiffs sought recovery on the basis that the properties had been alienated by the widows and that such alienations were not justified by legal necessity and therefore not binding on the reversioner.
  • Plaintiffs withdrew the claim to holding No. 2 (1 bigha 8 biswas) during proceedings.
  • Appellants contended (as part of appeal) that neither widow could alienate without the consent of the other; they also relied on absence of evidence of legal necessity for the loans which justified the alienations.

Respondent's (Defendant / Collector / Purchasers') Position

  • The defendant relied on chains of title deriving from the sale and mortgage deeds and on findings of the lower Court that the transfers were justified by legal necessity.
  • The defendant produced a witness (Ishri Singh) to support the assertion that a loan (to Gulab Singh) had been taken for payment of revenue; the lower Court accepted a presumption of necessity relying on lapse of time and a Madras authority (A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 7621).
  • The defendant also relied on a deed of 2 May 1898 (signed by the widows and Kunwar Jairam Singh) which the lower Court treated as indicative of consent or ratification; the defendant raised other technical points in the lower Court (limitation, right to sue), which were decided for the plaintiffs and were not further contested on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 7621 Authority cited by the lower Court for the proposition that, given the passage of time and the widows' poor financial condition, a presumption of necessity for an ancient loan may be permissible. The learned Civil Judge relied on this authority to presume legal necessity where evidence was lacking. The present Court rejected this application here: it held that presumption of necessity could not substitute for proof when the alleged transaction produced no advantage to the estate or the widow, and that the burden of proof remains on the party alleging necessity.
19 All. 3002 Held that creditors of a Hindu widow could not, after her death, have recourse to ancestral property held by reversioners where the widow had only a life estate and no instrument charged the property beyond her lifetime, even if the debt was incurred for legal necessity. Referred to as an authority illustrating that a widow's creditors cannot bind the reversioners beyond the widow's life interest where no instrument extends the charge; used to support the proposition that the character of the security (life interest only) is material.
30 All. 3943 Held that a decree based on a debt incurred by a widow and sale executed thereunder bound only the widow's estate where the advance was to the widow on her personal security. Referred to as showing that where money is lent to a widow personally, the liability may bind only her life estate; used to demonstrate that outcome depends on factual character of the transaction.
60 Bom. 3114 Held that an estate in the hands of a reversioner was bound by an unsecured debt contracted by a Hindu widow as representing the estate, if the debt was for legal necessity. Referred to as a contrasting authority. The Court treated these differing decisions as reconcilable on facts: if the creditor reasonably believed the widow was acting for the estate, the estate may be bound; if the advance was plainly to the widow personally, it will not bind the reversioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by tracing the title history of the properties and then evaluating, deed by deed, whether the transfers were justified by legal necessity and hence binding on the reversioner.

Deed of Mt. Lachhman Kunwar (30 January 1889)

  • The sale deed's consideration had three parts: (1) Rs. 2,800 left with the vendee to pay purchasers at an auction relating to mortgagee rights; (2) Rs. 500 (with interest) alleged to be due to Gulab Singh on account of a mortgage of 4 May 1884; and (3) Rs. 100 cash.
  • The Court accepted that the first item related to sums that discharged debts binding on the estate (debts recited in earlier instruments and decrees connected to litigation to recover the husband's estate), and that the widow might have been justified in alienating her husband's estate to discharge such debts if she had in fact alienated the estate.
  • However, the deed expressly mortgaged/sold only the widow's life interest. The Court questioned the rationale of selling to discharge a mortgage on the widow's life interest: such a sale produced no advantage to the estate or to the widow (it merely transferred the equity of redemption subject to the mortgage).
  • As to the Rs. 500 item (bond to Gulab Singh), there was no recital showing the purpose of that loan. A witness (Ishri Singh) tendered by the defendant to show the loan was for payment of revenue was disbelieved as unreliable. The lower Court had held there was no proof of necessity but drew a presumption of necessity based on lapse of time and referred to A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 7621. The present Court rejected that inference here: it held the burden of proof of necessity rests on the party alleging it, and that mere lapse of time and an assertion that the widows were poor were insufficient where the transaction conferred no benefit to the estate or to the widow.
  • Regarding the Rs. 100 cash, the deed stated the property was under "qurq tehsil" (direct management by the Collector under the Land Revenue Act for collection of rents to pay revenue). The Court held this did not mean an imminent sale or that the widow personally faced arrest or sale of her property; there was no evidence the Rs. 100 was required to pay revenue. Consequently, the Court concluded there was no justification for the sale by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar.

Deeds of Mt. Chhattar Kunwar (7 July 1892 and earlier mortgage 19 June 1879; deed of 5 Oct 1890)

  • Mt. Chhattar Kunwar's 7 July 1892 deed was a simple mortgage for Rs. 2,000, stated to be for redeeming an earlier usufructuary mortgage (dated 5 October 1890 and originally 19 June 1879) for about Rs. 2,800 plus small arrears.
  • The earlier, original mortgages were usufructuary and were expressly limited to the widows' life interests; the mortgagees had accepted the life estate as security and discharged prior debts on that basis.
  • The Court analysed whether a widow's personal borrowing to pay debts binding on the estate could, by itself, bind the estate. It reviewed authorities showing differing outcomes but concluded the question is essentially factual: if creditors reasonably believed money was advanced to the widow as the representative of the estate, the estate may be bound; if the advance was plainly to her personally, it will not.
  • Here, the deeds (usufructuary mortgages) made clear the widows hypothecated their personal life interest; mortgagees accepted life estate security. Therefore, those advancing money to redeem the usufructuary mortgages did so to recover the widow's life estate — a personal matter. They did not advance money in the interest of the reversioners. Consequently, the later simple mortgage (1892) was not binding on the estate; the monies borrowed were personal liabilities of the widows and did not justify alienation of the husband's estate.
  • The Court additionally considered and rejected the suggestion that the widows intended to advance their own money to the estate with a view to later recoupment from the estate; there was no evidence of such intention.

Other Contentions Addressed

  • Ratification by the reversioner: The lower Court had relied on a sale deed of 2 May 1898 (executed by the widows and Kunwar Jairam Singh) as indicative of acquiescence. The Court found that Kunwar Jairam Singh's execution of the deed related only to sale of the right of redemption in certain villages (not the properties in the present suit) and did not constitute general consent to the alienations under challenge.
  • Whether one widow could alienate without the other's consent: The Court agreed with the lower Court that facts (including the 1898 deed and the contemporaneous and similarly worded usufructuary mortgages executed by both widows) showed each widow had, in effect, consented to the other's alienations; therefore the appellants' point on this was rejected.

Holding and Implications

Holding: After evaluating the evidence and applicable principles, the Court held that the disputed alienations by both widows were not justified by legal necessity and therefore were not binding on the reversioners.

CORE RULING: The appeal is allowed in part; a decree is to be drawn up awarding the plaintiffs possession of the property described in the plaint except for holding No. 2 (area 1 bigha 8 biswas in heading No. 3), the suit in respect of which is dismissed (the claim to that item had been withdrawn).

Implications and consequential directions (direct effects):

  • The plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profits. The Court directed a trial court enquiry into mesne profits for (a) the three years next before the institution of the suit, and (b) pendente lite and future mesne profits, under the provisions cited (Order 20, Section 12(b) and (c), Schedule 1 to the Code of Civil Procedure). A final decree shall then be passed by the lower Court in accordance with Order 20, B. 12(2) of the Code (as referred to in the opinion).
  • The appellants (plaintiffs) were awarded costs in both Courts.
  • The Court recorded that the claim to holding No. 2 was withdrawn and that dismissal of the suit as to that holding should not affect the decree for costs.
  • The Court did not announce any novel legal principle; it treated conflicting authorities as reconcilable on their facts and applied established tests (whether the creditor reasonably believed the widow was acting as representative of the estate, and whether the security was limited to life interest) to determine whether the estate was bound.

Signed: G.N./B.K. — Order accordingly.

Show all summary ...

Allsop, J.:— The plaintiffs in the suit which has given rise to this appeal were Ch. Jai Narain Singh and two others. They instituted the suit with the object of recovering possession of certain immovable property alleged to have been alienated by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar and Mt. Chhattar Kunwar, the widows of Ch. Tej Singh. Ch. Jai Narain Singh is the grandson of Ch. Tej Singh's brother and is now admitted to be the nearest reversioner to Ch. Tej Singh's estate. The other two plaintiffs purchased a share in the property in suit from Ch. Jai Narain Singh on the assumption that he had acquired a title to it. The property was described in the plaint under four heads, namely, (1) a 4 and ⅔rds biswa share in Akrabad, (2) a half share in a specific area of 61 bighas 13 biswas in the town of Akrabad, (3) a 4 and ⅔rds biswa share in Akrabad, and (4) a 4 biswa share in Dhuri. It was explained that the fractions described under the first and third heads were at the time of the institution of the suit expressed in the register in somewhat different terms. This fact was doubtless due to partitions and re-measurements, but it gave rise to some controversy in the Court below about the property under the third head. According to the plaint the share described under that head included holdings Nos. 1 and 2 of the register of that time. The defendant contended that holding No. 2 comprising an area of 1 bigha 8 biswas had never belonged to Ch. Tej Singh and ultimately the plaintiffs withdrew their claim to it. We may explain that there was some confusion in the lower Court about this matter. Issue 11 framed was “whether the plaint property (No. 3) did not belong to Tej Singh” and the finding was that the plaintiffs had given up their claim to property No. 3 and the issue no longer arose. The fact is that the defendant in para. 9 of the written statement raised an issue only about holding No. 2 in item 3 and that B. Sohan Lal, pleader for the plaintiffs, stated:

“The plaintiff withdraws his claim in respect of the property aforesaid, i.e, the property which is entered in the khewat as holding No. 2, comprising an area of 1 bigha 8 biswas.”

2. It is to be understood, therefore, that the property now in suit is that mentioned under headings one, two, three and four of the plaint with the exception only of holding No. 2, mentioned under heading three. This property is in the possession of the respondent, that is, the Collector of Aligarh in his capacity as manager, on behalf of the Court of Wards, of the estate of Kunwar Shri Newas and it is necessary to set forth how that possession was acquired in order to explain the issues which arise in this appeal. Ch. Tej Singh died in the year 1873 leaving him surviving the two widows, Mt. Lachhman Kunwar and Mt. Chhattar Kunwar and a brother, Ch. Jawahir Singh, who had two sons, Ch. Jai Ram Singh and Ch. Sital Singh. A dispute arose about Ch. Tej Singh's property between the widows on one hand and Ch. Jawahir Singh on the other. The latter claimed it by right of survivorship on the allegation that he and his brother were members of a joint Hindu family. The widows maintained that there had been a partition and that they had a title to the property by right of succession. They took possession of some buildings but the Collector, pending the settlement of the dispute, placed under his direct management the villages on which revenue was payable to the Government. The widows therefore instituted a suit, No. 28 of 1873, against Jawahir Singh in which they asked for a declaration that they were entitled to the buildings and sought possession over the other property which consisted of ff shares in several villages and certain specific areas of land, part of which had been inherited and part granted by the Government. The part inherited included a share of one-third out of 10 biswas in Akrabad and the part granted by Government a share of 10 biswas in Dhuri, a share of 6 biswas out of 10 biswas in Akrabad and an area of 61 bighas 6 biswas presumably in the latter village. The widows were successful in their suit and were therefore each entitled during their lifetime to half the property, that is, among other shares, to 5 biswas in Dhuri, 1 and ⅔rds, plus 3 biswas, or in all 4 and ⅔rds biswas, in Akrabad and a half of the specific area.

3. On 30th January, 1889, Mt. Lachhman Kunwar executed a deed of sale in favour of Gulab Singh. She transferred her share of 4 and ⅔rds biswas in Akrabad and her share in the mahal abadi or residential part of the same village. It is not possible to identify the area given in the sale deed with the area given in the decree in favour of the widows in the suit of 1873 or with the area given in heading two of the properties mentioned in the plaint but this appeal has been argued before us upon the assumption that the properties mentioned in headings one and two of the plaint were transferred by this deed and there is no suggestion in the pleadings that the property in heading two came into the possession of the defendant by any other means. We suppose that some confusion or difficulty may have been caused by the creation of a new mahal abadi and by re-measurements and will assume that the properties mentioned in headings one and two in the plaint came into the possession of Gulab Singh by means of this deed. These properties were put to sale by Qadir Bakhsh in execution of a decree against Gulab Singh and were purchased by Sujan Singh on 20th a June 1892. Sujan Singh executed a deed on 31st October 1892, in which he admitted that he was only a benamidar and that Beche Lal was the real purchaser. Kunwar Shri Newas is the grandson and representative of Beche Lal. On 7th July, 1892, Mt. Chhattar Kunwar executed in favour of Th. Tikam Singh a deed of mortgage by which she hypothecated her 4 and ⅔rds biswa share in Akrabad and 4 biswas out of her 5 biswa share in Dhuri, the properties described in headings three and four of the plaint. Th. Tikam Singh sold his mortgagee rights to Beche Lal in 1897. Chiranji Lal, son of Beche Lal, brought a suit on the basis of the mortgage in 1910, obtained a decree and himself purchased the property in execution thereof on 20th January, 1914. Kunwar Shri Newas is the son and successor of Chiranji Lal. The defendant was thus in possession under a title which can be traced back to the deed of sale executed by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar on 30th January, 1889, and the deed of mortgage executed by Mt. Chhattar Kunwar on 7th July, 1892, and the main question in the suit was whether these transfers were executed for legal necessity and were binding upon the reversioner and his representatives in interest. The learned Civil Judge found in favour of the defendant and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs have appealed and we have to consider whether we can uphold the decision of the lower Court. In doing so, we shall first deal with the deed executed by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar. The consideration for the sale mentioned in this deed is (1) a sum of Rs. 2800 left with the vendee for payment to Sant Lal and Moti Lal, the purchasers at an auction sale of the mortgagee rights of Jai Ram Singh, (2) a sum of Rs. 500 with interest due to the vendee, Gulab Singh, on the basis of a deed of mortgage executed in his favour by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar on 4th May, 1884, and (3) a sum of Rs. 100 received in cash.

4. The first item refers to a deed of usufructuary mortgage executed by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar on 19th June, 1879, in favour of Jai Ram Singh and Sital Singh, the sons of Jawahir Singh. The property mortgaged was the 4 and ⅔rds biswa share in Akrabad and the consideration consisted of the payment of Rs. 260-11-9 in cash to the lady herself and the payment of her half share of four debts, namely, Rs. 2169-3-0 due to Bhikha Lal, Rs. 2000 due to Bhup Singh, Rs. 127-5-6 due to Phul Chand and Makkhan Lal and Rs. 782 due to Jai Ram and Sital Singh themselves, the half shares being rupees 1084-9-6, Rs. 1000, Rs. 63-11-9 and Rs. 391. The first debt was due on a bond executed by the two widows in favour of Bhikha Lal on 16th February, 1875, and the second on a bond executed by them in favour of Bhup Singh on 1st February 1874. In each bond there is a recital that the money is being borrowed for the purposes of the suit which was instituted by the widows to recover their husband's estate and as we know that the suit was pending and the widows probably had no means to prosecute it, we must after so long a period accept the recitals as true and hold that these debts were binding on the estate. The debt due to Phul Chand and Makkhan Lal was under a decree passed in a suit for the recovery of money alleged to have been advanced for the purpose of buying seed and we may presume that money was also borrowed on behalf of the estate. It does not appear why the remaining debt was incurred or why the cash was paid but the sums involved are comparatively small and we would have been willing to hold that Mt. Lachhman Kunwar was justified in alienating her husband's estate by means of the mortgage if she had in fact done so but what she did was to mortgage only her life interest. She said in the deed that ‘she had executed these few presents by way of a mortgage deed of her life interest in the property.’ We cannot see what necessity there could possibly have been for her to sell the property in order to redeem a usufructuary mortgage of her life interest in the property itself or what advantage could have accrued to the estate or for that matter to herself. The deed of sale was in effect a transfer of property subject to the mortgage for the purpose of discharging the widow's liability to Gulab Singh and obtaining a further sum of Rs. 100 in cash.

5. That being so, we have to consider whether the debt due to Gulab Singh was binding on the estate and whether it was necessary for the widow to get the sum of Rs. 100. The bond in favour of Gulab Singh contains no recital to show why the widow borrowed the money from him. The defendant produced a witness called Ishri Singh who pretended to remember that the money had been borrowed 50 years before for the payment of revenue. He said that he had been Mt. Lachhman Kunwar's servant for two or two and a half years about the time when the bond was executed, but he did not know the names of her brothers or nephews or other male relations. The learned Judge did not believe him and we agree that his evidence is worthless. The result is that there is no evidence at all that this debt was incurred for any legal necessity.

6. The learned Civil Judge held that the defendant had failed to prove legal necessity for the loan but he said that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that there was no legal necessity and he, therefore, presumed that there was legal necessity on the principle that presumptions are permissible to fill in details which have been obliterated by time. He quoted as his authority the case in A.I.R 1932 Mad. 7621 and mentioned that the widows were not well off. If we could hold, as the learned Judge has held, that the redemption of the mortgage justified the alienation, we would agree with him that a failure to prove the necessity for the loan of Rs. 500 would not be a matter of great importance, but we have found that no advantage accrued to the estate or the widow herself by the redemption of the mortgage and in these circumstances we cannot think that it is in consonance with the principles of Hindu law to say that the loan of Rs. 500 should be presumed in the absence of any evidence at all to have been justified by legal necessity merely because it was taken many years before the suit was instituted. The burden of proof must remain on the person who alleges necessity and to say that a suit by a reversioner to recover property alienated by a Hindu widow must fail in the absence of any evidence about the necessity of the loan would be in effect to abrogate the rule of limitation that he is entitled to institute a suit for the recovery of the property within twelve years of the date of the death of the limited owner. There is, in this case, nothing to lead to the conclusion that there was any necessity for the loan except the passage of time and possibly the allegation that the widows were not well off.

7. The learned Judge in discussing the financial position of the widows has been considerably influenced by the decision of this Court in a previous suit by the reversioners to set aside another alienation. This decision, as far as we can see, was not relevant to the suit which has given rise to the appeal, but we assume that the learned Judge intended to adopt the arguments which were used in that decision and we, therefore, propose shortly to deal with it. It was a case in which Jai Narain Singh sought to recover some property which had been transferred by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar by two mortgage deeds and had come into the possession of Munna Lal and others. There were recitals in the deeds to the effect that the property was being transferred in order to obtain money for the payment of revenue and for subsistence in the year 1897. The Subordinate Judge decided that the transfer was for necessity and this Court dismissed the appeal against his decision. Recitals are important in cases of this hind not so much because they prove the existence of a necessity but because they may be held to establish that the person who advanced the money was led to believe that such necessity existed and may have had good reasons for thinking that the representations made to him were true.

8. The learned Judge of this Court who decided the appeal mentioned incidentally that one of the reasons for believing that the transfer was binding upon the reversioners was that the widows were left only with a 10 biswa share in one village, that the revenue of that village was about Rs. 658 and consequently that the net income could not be more than a thousand rupees a year which would mean that each widow was in receipt of about Rs. 40 a month. This may have been an additional reason for thinking that the persons who advanced the money on the basis of the mortgages had reason for thinking that it was really required for the purpose of paying of revenue due upon the village and for the support of the widow. The learned Judges mentioned that there had been a serious famine in the year 1896 which is a notorious fact. We do not think that alone is a good reason for thinking that Mt. Lachhman Kunwar must necessarily have required Rs. 500 to support herself or to pay revenue in the year 1884 in the absence of any recital to that effect in the deed under which she borrowed the money. In order to create the impression that the case before us was analogous to the previous case decided by this Court we have been referred to the Gazetteer of the district in which it is stated that there was some scarcity in the years 1877 and 1879 on account of the failure of rain, but the Gazetteer does not indicate that the situation was a very serious one and we do not think that there is any real analogy between the two cases. Our own opinion is that an income of Rs. 40 a month was adequate for the support of a Hindu widow in view of the standard of living which is expected of widows and which they ordinarily adopt and in view of the prices of commodities which prevailed at the time when the transactions took place. There is, in our judgment, no reason for holding that it can be inferred from the financial condition of Mt. Lachhman Kunwar at that time that she must have been in need of money either to support herself or to pay the revenue due on the estate.

9. There remains the item of Rs. 100 which was paid in cash to Mt. Lachhman Kunwar on the date when the deed of sale was executed. There is no recital to show for what purpose this money was paid. It would be a negligible sum if there were reasons for thinking that the alienation was justified on other grounds, but as it is, we must go into the question whether this advance by itself was justified. It is certainly stated in the deed that the property was under attachment for the payment of revenue, but it must not be inferred that the attachment was one preparatory to the sale of the property. We have examined the original document. The term which has been translated by the word ‘attachment’ is ‘qurq tehsil’ which implies that the property had been taken under the direct management of the Collector under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act so that he could collect the rents and credit them to the payment of the revenue. There is no indication that the sum of Rs. 100 was to be used for the payment of the revenue. The property was in no danger of alienation. As soon as the rents had been collected and the revenue paid by the Collector, he would have returned the property to the person entitled to it. It has been suggested that the widow was personally liable, but we do not believe that there was any likelihood at all that the Collector, after having taken the property under his direct management so as to pay the revenue, would have taken any steps for the sale of the widow's personal property or for her arrest. Our conclusion is that there was no justification for the sale of this property and we think that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree.

10. We must now deal with the transfer by Mt. Chhattar Kunwar. She mortgaged the property in consideration for the payment of Rs. 2000 in cash which she admitted to have received. This money was borrowed according to the deed for the purpose of redeeming a mortgage executed by Mt. Chhattar Kunwar on 5th October, 1890, in favour of Sant Lal and Moti Lal to secure a debt of Rs. 2862-8-0. This money was advanced to her according to the deed in order to redeem a prior mortgage for Rs. 2800 and to pay a sum of Rs. 62-8-0 arrears due by tenants payable by her. According to the deed executed on 5th October, 1890, this prior mortgage had already been redeemed and the property delivered to her. We, therefore, assume that the sum of Rs. 62-8-0. Was on account of rent due to the prior mortgagees which Mt. Chhattar Kunwar had undertaken to pay, the prior mortgage being a usufructuary mortgage. This mortgage had been created by a deed executed by Mt. Chhattar Kunwar in favour of Kunwar Jai Ram Singh and Kunwar Sital Singh on 19th June, 1879. It was in the same terms as the deed executed by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar on the same date to which we have already referred. We have explained that we are satisfied that the widows would have been justified in alienating their husband's estate in order to pay the debts which were due to them but that they purported not to alienate their husband's estate but to alienate their life-interest in the property. By the deed of 5th October, 1890, Mt. Chhattar Kunwar created a simple mortgage in order to redeem the usufructuary mortgage of her life-interest and the question is whether she was entitled to do so. We have held that the original debts were binding upon the estate, but these were discharged by the usufructuary mortgage of the life interest. By the terms of this usufructuary mortgage, it is clear that the mortgagees had accepted as their security the interest of the widow and had discharged the original debts on that assumption. The question is whether a debt incurred by the widow on her personal responsibility in order to pay a debt binding on the estate is itself binding on the estate so as to justify a transfer of that estate. We have been referred to certain authorities. In 19 All. 3002 it was held that the creditors of a Hindu widow could not after her death have recourse to ancestral property in the hands of the reversioners, in respect of which property the widow had enjoyed only a widow's life estate, if in fact no instrument charging the property beyond the widow's lifetime had been executed by the widow, even though the debt sued upon was incurred for legal necessity and was one in respect of which such property might have been made liable beyond the widow's lifetime.

11. In 30 All. 3943 it was held that a decree on the basis of a debt incurred by a widow and the sale of the property of the widow's late husband in execution of such a decree bound only the widow's estate where the money had been lent to the widow on her personal security. On the other hand, in 60 Bom. 3114 it was held that an estate in the hands of a reversioner was bound by an unsecured debt contracted by a Hindu widow as representing the estate, if the debt was for legal necessity. It was suggested to us that it was not possible to reconcile these decisions and that we should follow the later one of the Bombay High Court. In our judgment it is not necessary to conclude that a different rule of law was laid down by the High Courts at Allahabad and Bombay. The question seems to us really to be one of fact. If in the circumstances of a particular case a person advancing money in order to discharge a liability against the estate is led to believe and quite reasonably concludes that the widow is acting on behalf of the estate, we suppose that the estate would be bound, while, on the other hand, if it appears that the advance was made personally to the widow and there was no suggestion that she was borrowing the money on behalf of the estate the widow alone would be bound and the creditor would have no remedy against the estate. In the Bombay case to which we have referred the finding was that the debt was incurred by the widow in order to obtain money for the cultivation of her husband's land and for payment to the servants working on it, and it might well have been understood both by the widow and by the person who advanced her money that the money was being advanced to the widow as the representative of the estate and not to her in her personal capacity.

12. In the two Allahabad cases the facts are not clear from the judgments but there may have been reason to think that the transaction was one between the creditor and the widow in her purely personal capacity. In the case which has given rise to this appeal the deed of usufructuary mortgage makes the matter perfectly clear. The widows said in so many words that they were hypothecating their personal life estate and the mortgagees could not have been under any misapprehension that they were advancing the money to the widows as the representatives of the estate. It seems to us that they having accepted the security of the life estate, could not possibly afterwards turn round and allege that they had any right to hold the property against the reversioners till such time as the mortgage was redeemed. We do not think that the persons who advanced the money to redeem the mortgage could be in any better position than the mortgagees themselves. Those who advanced money to Mt. Chhattar Kunwar did so in order to enable her to recover her life estate. That was purely a personal matter. They did not advance the money in the interest of the reversioners who would have been entitled in any event to take the property on the death of the widow free from the mortgage. In our judgment, therefore, the debt of the simple mortgagees of the year 1890 was not binding on the estate and the money borrowed to pay that debt was a personal liability of the widows and did not justify the alienation of the husband's estate.

13. We may mention that another point was raised in the course of arguments. This was that a widow might pledge her own credit, or use her own money, for the payment of debts binding upon the estate and then at some later time might recoup herself as it were from the estate. We can understand that there may be circumstances in which a widow might act in this way but we think it would have to be made clear that she intended to advance her own money to the estate with the intention ultimately of recovering the money from the estate. There is nothing in the case with which we are dealing to suggest that either of the widows had any intention of this kind. Mt. Lachhman Kunwar, as we have already said, acquired no advantage by transferring the equity of redemption by the deed of sale. Mt. Chhattar Kunwar did apparently recover her life interest in the property transferred by the deed of usufructuary mortgage and hold it for a certain time, but she acquired no ultimate advantage because she eventually lost not only the property in which she had mortgaged her life interest out also a large part of her share in the village of Dhuri. However that may be, she had discharged the liability due from the estate by the usufructuary mortgage of her life interest and it does not appear that at that time she was intending to make a temporary advance to the estate out of her own personal interest so that she might be justified in alienating the estate in order to recoup herself. Our conclusion is that the alienation of the estate by Mt. Chhattar Kunwar under the simple mortgage was not justified by any necessity and that the mortgagees on the slightest enquiry could have discovered the true position of affairs. We find that the suit in so far as it relates to the property alienated by Mt. Chhattar Kunwar should also be decreed.

14. We may mention that the learned Judge of the lower Court also considered that the plaintiffs could not recover the property because the reversioner for the time being had in the year 1898 ratified the transfers. He referred to a deed which was executed by Mt. Lachhman Kunwar, Mt. Chattar Kunwar and Kunwar Jairam Singh on 2nd May, 1898. It was a sale deed in favour of Thakur Chattar Singh and others by which the two widows alienated their right of redemption of a mortgage of certain villages with which we are not concerned. This mortgage was executed by the two widows on 16th April, 1877, in favour of Kunwar Jairam Singh and Kunwar Sital Singh to secure a debt of Rs. 14,000. The mortgage was usufructuary. Kunwar Jairam Singh executed the deed of sale. He said in the deed that he was executing it “for this reason that in future the vendee may not have any kind of dispute or apprehension for a claim and that all the property may be transferred with my consent.” The widows themselves in the body of the deed said that they had divided the property between them in equal shares as they were not on very good terms and that they had been appropriating the income and transferring the property as need arose. We do not think that the execution of this document by Kunwar Jairam Singh can be held to be an acquiescence on his part in the transfer of the properties with which we are dealing. He certainly consented to the transfer of the right of redemption in the villages which were sold by the deed of 1898 but he did no more than that. There is nothing else to suggest that the nearest reversioner at any time consented to the transfers which were in question in the suit which has given rise to this appeal.

15. The appellants have also raised the point that the transfers by the widows were not binding even if they were executed for necessity because neither widow could alienate without the consent of the other. The learned Judge of the lower Court repelled this argument holding that the deed of 1898 to which we have just referred suggested that each widow had consented to all alienations made by the other. We agree with the learned Judge upon this point. Apart from the recitals in the deed of 1898 there is the fact that both the widows on the same date executed the two deeds of usufructuary mortgage to secure a debt of Rs. 2800 each and that these deeds were in the same terms and were executed in order to discharge the respective liabilities of the two widows in the same debts due in the main from the estate. We may mention that certain other points were raised in the lower Court but have not been argued before us. Only one of these points is mentioned in the grounds of appeal and that was that the widows were induced by fraud to transfer the property. The learned Judge found that there was no definite allegation of fraud in the plaint and no argument has been addressed to us upon the point. The defendant raised some points about technical defects in the plaint about limitation and about the right of the plaintiffs to sue. These were decided in favour of the plaintiffs and it has not been suggested in the course of arguments that the decision of the learned Judge of the lower Court was wrong.

16. The result is that we find that the alienations were not justified by any legal necessity and we consequently direct that a decree should be drawn up awarding the plaintiffs possession of the property mentioned in the plaint with the exception of holding No. 2 comprising an area of 1 bigha 8 biswa described in heading No. 3 of the details of the zamindari property given in the plaint. The suit in respect of that item of property is dismissed, but as the claim to it was withdrawn our decision should not affect the decree for costs. There was also a claim for Rs. 1500 on account of mesne profits, but the learned Judge of the lower Court has not come to any decision about the amount which is due under this head.

17. We therefore direct that the plaintiffs shall be entitled to mesne profits and that an enquiry shall be held by the lower Court as to the amount due for the three years next before the institution of the suit and for pendente lite and future mesne profits under the provisions of O. 20, S. 12(b) and (c), Sch. 1 to the Code of Civil Procedure a final decree shall then be passed by the Court below in accordance with the provisions of O. 20, B. 12(2) of the Code. The appellants shall get their costs in both Courts.

G.N/B.K

18. Order accordingly.