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Kurseong Hydro-Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi Narayan Sukhani
Factual and Procedural Background
The Kurseong Hydro-Electric Supply Co., Ltd. (the company) was incorporated in August 1930. A firm trading as Sundar and Rai (partners P.M. Sundar and N.B. Rai) became the company's managing agents and, it is said by the company, were appointed its engineers from October 1930 on specific remuneration terms (Rs. 700 per month with yearly increments of Rs. 25 for three years). The respondents contended that the appointment as engineers was to the two individuals in their personal capacities rather than to the firm.
Sundar and Rai continued to provide engineering services through to March 1936, but after February 1931 received no engineering remuneration from the company. On the company's calculation, engineering remuneration from March 1931 to March 1936 amounted to Rs. 47,400 (equating to Rs. 23,700 for each individual on the contention that the sums were payable to them individually).
Respondent judgment-creditors obtained decrees against N.B. Rai (and another co-debtor) in December 1934 and April 1935. Execution proceedings were instituted as Money Execution Cases (Nos. 6 and 19 of 1936). Attachment processes under Order XXI, rule 46 of the Civil Procedure Code were issued and prohibitory notices were served on the company on 31 January and 18 March 1936. Garnishee proceedings followed, in which the company asserted that an adjustment/agreement (purportedly converting the firm's claim into separate individual liabilities and providing partial cash and share payments) had been made with Sundar and Rai. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the adjustment was ineffective as against the attaching creditors because it had been made after the attachments, and ordered the company to deposit sums in court (calculations leading to an order for Rs. 22,953-15). The company appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the engineering remuneration (Rs. 47,400) was payable to the firm Sundar and Rai (i.e., partnership property) or to P.M. Sundar and N.B. Rai individually.
- Whether garnishee proceedings under Order XXI, rule 46 (and related provisions) could lawfully attach or reach a debt that was the property of a partnership when the decree was obtained only against one partner in his individual capacity.
- Whether an agreement or adjustment between the company and the engineers (purporting to convert the firm's claim into separate individual claims and providing partial payment in cash and shares) made after the attachments could be effective against the attaching creditors.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (the Company) — principal contentions
- The total sum of Rs. 47,400 due as engineering remuneration was payable to the firm Sundar and Rai and therefore constituted partnership property; such a debt could not be attached under Order XXI, rule 46 when the decree was not against the firm.
- If the company and Sundar and Rai had, by agreement, converted the firm's claim into separate debts payable to the individuals (P.M. Sundar and N.B. Rai) — each for Rs. 13,700, partly in cash and partly in shares — then the respondents could have attached the separate debt due specifically to N.B. Rai. But if the respondents rejected that agreement, they must accept that the original debt remained a firm asset and thus not attachable under O. XXI, r. 46.
- The learned Subordinate Judge should have given effect to the adjustment (or to the fact that the debt had become individual liabilities) if it was effective prior to the attachments.
Respondents (Judgment-creditors)
- The respondents maintained that P.M. Sundar and N.B. Rai were appointed engineers in their individual capacities — a factual contention bearing on whether the sums were individual debts rather than partnership property.
- The respondents resisted the claim that the post-attachment adjustment between the company and Sundar and Rai was binding on them, contending that the agreement relied upon by the company was made after the attachments and therefore could not defeat the attaching creditors' rights.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two connected strands: (1) legal analysis of the applicable execution rules and partnership principles; and (2) factual analysis (and its incompleteness on the record), leading to a partial remand.
On the legal side the Court examined the Code of Civil Procedure provisions governing attachment and garnishee proceedings (Orders XXI, rules 43–54 in general, and rules 46, 46A and 49 in particular). It extracted the following legal principles from the relevant rules and statutory definitions appearing on the record:
- Order XXI, rule 49(1) provides generally that property belonging to a partnership cannot be attached or sold when the decree under execution is not against the firm or against the partners as such. Instead, clause (2) prescribes a charging order (and possible appointment of a receiver) as the mode of enforcement against the partner's interest.
- The scheme of O. XXI, r. 49 aims to protect the partnership as a unit (to avoid breaking up or hampering the firm by interception of gross income), permitting satisfaction only by intercepting the partner's share of net profits via a receiver or by sale of his partnership interest.
- The term “property” for execution purposes (s. 60 of the Code) includes debts; therefore a debt due to a firm from a customer is partnership property within the meaning of O. XXI, r. 49.
- Garnishee proceedings (which presuppose attachment under O. XXI, r. 46 and are governed by r. 46A) cannot validly be used to reach a debt that is partnership property when the decree is only against an individual partner in his personal capacity.
- The Court noted that these provisions reproduce the substance of s. 23 of the English Partnership Act and referenced s. 14 of the Indian Partnership Act for the concept of partnership property, while observing that the Code's definition of “property” suffices for the execution context.
Applying these legal principles, the Court concluded that if the engineering remuneration was, as a matter of fact, payable to the firm Sundar and Rai at the time the prohibitory notices were served (31 January and 18 March 1936), then garnishee proceedings against the company were inconsistent with O. XXI, r. 49 and could not stand; instead the executing creditors should have relied on the partnership-specific modes of enforcement (charging order/receiver or sale of partnership interest).
On the factual side the Court found the record insufficient to resolve the critical question of whether the company's liability for Rs. 47,400 was to the firm or to the individuals. The memorandum of agreement by which the company allegedly promised the engineering remuneration was not on the record. Some documentary and testimonial items (letters and depositions and shareholder resolutions) were equivocal and did not permit a definitive conclusion:
- Letters from Sundar and Rai (Ex. F, F(1), F2) showed repeated proposals to forego remuneration for particular periods if paid lump sums later, but did not amount to a clear conversion of the firm's claim into individual obligations prior to the attachments.
- The directors' annual report (Ex. E(2)) and the April 10, 1935 shareholders' resolution showed that shareholders authorized the Board to negotiate settlement with the engineers, but did not evidence a finalized settlement before the attachments.
- The parties did execute an agreement on April 15, 1936 (accepted by shareholders) under which Sundar and Rai agreed to accept Rs. 27,400 in lieu of Rs. 45,000 — but that agreement was reached after the attachments and therefore could not defeat the prior execution claims of the attaching creditors.
Because the subordinate court had proceeded on the assumption that the debt was to the firm without a full factual investigation, the appellate Court set aside the contested portion of the garnishee order and remanded the case for determination of that factual point on the existing record and on any additional evidence the parties might adduce.
The Court also decided, as a matter of law and on the facts established, that the attachments effected on 31 January and 18 March 1936 were valid and that the April 15, 1936 compromise/agreement could not be allowed to prevail against those valid attachments.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED IN PART; CASE REMANDED.
Holding (core rulings):
- The garnishee order of the lower court is maintained only to the extent of Rs. 1,160 (the admitted sum due to N.B. Rai on account of his remuneration as secretary and fees as director), subject to the cheque for Rs. 1,536-8 having or not having been cashed as discussed below.
- The remainder of the garnishee order (directing deposit of Rs. 22,953-15 in the subordinate court) is set aside and the matter is remanded for a factual determination whether, at the dates when the prohibitory notices were served (31 January and 18 March 1936), the engineering remuneration was payable to the firm Sundar and Rai or to the two persons individually.
- If the lower court finds the remuneration was payable to the firm Sundar and Rai at the relevant dates, the garnishee proceedings (to the extent directed against the company in respect of that remuneration) must be dismissed and no further garnishee order made in respect of that partnership debt.
- If the lower court finds the remuneration was payable to P.M. Sundar and N.B. Rai individually at or before the dates of the attachments, a garnishee order may be made against the company for the sum indicated by the appellate Court's arithmetic (Rs. 23,330-7) subject to deduction if the cheque for Rs. 1,536-8 already paid into Court has been cashed or otherwise is available to the judgment-creditors (in which case the garnishee sum would be reduced; the Court gave an illustrative adjusted figure of Rs. 21,793-15 if the cheque has been cashed and applied).
Implications:
- The decision emphasizes the protective scheme of Order XXI, rule 49: partnership property (including debts due to a firm) is not to be reached by ordinary attachment/garnishee proceedings where the decree is against a partner in his individual capacity; enforcement should proceed by charging the partner's interest or by appointment of a receiver as provided by the rule.
- The April 15, 1936 agreement between the company and Sundar and Rai — reached after the attachments — cannot defeat previously effected attachments; timing of the adjustment relative to the attachments is legally decisive.
- Because the appellate Court did not make a definitive factual finding on whether the engineering remuneration was a firm asset or individual debts, it set aside the contested part of the garnishee order and remanded the question for factual inquiry; no new principle of law beyond the application of the cited provisions was established.
- Costs: the costs of the appeal were ordered to abide the result; further costs were left to the discretion of the lower Court on remand.
Disposition: Case remanded for further factual inquiry consistent with the directions above.
Mitter, J.:— The Kurseong Hydro-Electric Supply Co., Ltd. (hereafter called the company) was incorporated in August, 1930. A firm carrying on business under the name and style of Sundar and Rai, of which P.M Sundar and N.B Rai were partners in equal shares, became the managing agents of that company. It is said by the company that the said firm Sundar and Rai was also appointed its engineers to look after the construction of its works at a monthly remuneration of Rs. 700 with yearly increments of Rs. 25 a month, for a period of three years commencing from October, 1930. The respondents maintain that P.M Sundar and N.B Rai were appointed engineers on those terms in their individual capacities. In our judgment, the controversy on this point is a material one. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, did not record his finding on the same, but, on the other hand, proceeded upon the assumption that the firm, Sundar and Rai, had been appointed as engineers. In reciting the facts in our judgment we will, for convenience, use the phrase “Sundar and Rai” simpliciter without denoting either the firm of that name or the individuals, P.M Sundar and N.B Rai. N.B Rai was also the secretary and one of the directors of the company for a long time. The services of “Sundar and Rai” as engineers were continued after September, 1933, and up to March, 1936, when they resigned. They were paid their engineering remuneration up to February, 1931, but thereafter they received no remuneration from the company. For the period March, 1931 to March, 1936, they would be entitled to get from the company Rs. 47,400 as engineering remuneration. On the footing that P.M Sundar and N.B Rai were the engineers of the company in their individual capacities each of them would be entitled to Rs. 23,700.
On December 17, 1934, the respondent No. 2, Ram Gopal Agarwala, got a decree for Rs. 8,693 against N.B Rai and one Sri Dayal Rai, and on April 29, 1935, respondent No. 1, Lakshmi Narayan Sukhani got another decree for Rs. 21,815 odd against those two persons. But those decrees carried interest. Ram Gopal first applied for execution. His case was numbered Money Execution Case No. 6 of 1936. Lakshmi Narayan followed suit and his case was numbered Money Execution Case No. 19 of 1936. Both the decree-holders applied for attachment of the moneys in the hands of the company due on account of—
(a) the salary, emoluments and remuneration of the judgment-debtor N.B Rai as engineer and employee of the company,
(b) the remuneration of N.B Rai as director and secretary of the company, and
(c) his half share in the firm, Sundar and Rai, as managing agents of the company.
Attachment processes were issued under the provisions of O. XXI, r. 46 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the prohibitory notices were served on the company on the 31st January and on March 118, 1936, in Execution Cases Nos. 6 and 19 of 1936, respectively. Thereafter, garnishee proceedings were started against the company. In those proceedings, the company took up the position that, although the sum of Rs. 47,400 was payable to “Sundarland Rai” as engineering remuneration under the terms of service, there had been an adjustment between it and “Sundar and Rai” by which P.M Sundar agreed to accept Rs. 13,700 partly in cash (Rs. 10,700) and partly in shares of the company (face value of Rs. 3,000) and N.B Rai agreed to accept Rs. 13,700 also partly in cash (Rs. 2,400) and partly in shares of the company (face value of Rs. 11,300) in full satisfaction of their claims for engineering remuneration. Out of Rs. 2,400 payable to N.B Rai in cash under this adjustment, the company paid Rs. 305-9 as income-tax on his behalf. It deposited in Court a cheque for Rs. 1,516-8 and shares of the face value of Rs. 11,300. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, held in his judgment dated February 1, 1937, that the said adjustment with N.B Rai was not binding on the two attaching creditors, as the said adjustment was made after the attachments. He directed the company to deposit in Court Rs. 22,953-15 in cash. The learned Subordinate Judge arrived at that figure in the following manner:—
Rs. a. P. 23,700 0 0 due to N.B Rai as engineer from March 1, 1931, to March 31, 1936. 1,096 0 0 due to N.B Rai on other heads. Total … 24,796 0 0 Less … 305 9 0 for income-tax paid by company on behalf of N.B Rai. 24,490 7 0 Less … 1,536 8 0 deposited in Court by company by cheque. 22,953 15 0
It is against this judgment and the garnishee order for that sum that the appeal has been filed by the company. The garnishee order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge for the sum of Rs. 22,953-15 would, in our judgment, have been a good order, if the sum of Rs. 23,700 was payable by the company to N.B Rai in his individual capacity and not to him in his share qua partner of the firm, Sundar and Rai.
It is admitted by the company that the sum of Rs. 1,096 and an additional sum of Rs. 64, total Rs. 1,160, was due to N.B Rai on account of his remuneration as secretary of the company and for his fees as director. In this sum, the firm, Sundar and Rai, has no claim. The learned counsel for the company admits that the garnishee order is valid to that extent. He further says that if the cheque for Rs. 1,536-8 has not been cashed, his client would deposit in Court in cash the sum of Rs. 1,16 p. He, however, challenges the liability of the company, to deposit any portion of the balance, namely, Rs. 23,330-7 (i.e, Rs. 24,490-7 less Rs. 1,160). He attacks the garnishee order on two grounds:—
(i) the garnishee proceedings in respect of the engineering remuneration are misconceived and illegal, and
(ii) if that point is decided against him, the Court below was wrong in not giving effect to the adjustment between the company and N.B Rai.
He urges his first contention in the following manner:—The sum of Rs. 47,400 due from the company for engineering remuneration was due to the firm, Sundar and Rai; the money was accordingly the property of that firm. It could not, therefore, be attached under the process laid down in O. XXI, r. 46. There could only be an order charging the interest of the partner N.B Rai in the partnership under cl. (2) of O. XXI, r. 49. A garnishee proceeding can only be started, says he, in respect of a debt which in law could be attached under O. XXI, r. 46. He further says that on the basis of an agreement between the company on the one part and Sundar and Rai on the other, the original liability of the company to pay Rs. 47,400 to the firm, Sundar and Rai, was put an end to and the company became the liable to pay separately to P.M Sundar and. N.B Rai and to each of them in their individual capacity the sum of Rs. 13,700 and that partly in cash and partly in shares. It was on the basis of that agreement only that the debt of the company was converted from a debt due to the firm, Sundar and Rai, to two separate debts due to the individuals, P.M Sundar and N.B Rai, respectively. The respondents, the judgment-creditors of N.B Rai could, by accepting that agreement, attach that separate debt due to N.B Rai under O. XXI, r. 46 and take garnishee proceedings against the company to realise Rs. 2,400 in cash and shares of the face value of Rs. 11,300. But, if the respondent take up the position that agreement is of no validity against them and that they are entitled to proceed against the company on the basis of its original liability, they must accept the position, if that be the fact, that the original liability to pay Rs. 47,400 in cash was a liability to the firm, Sundar and Rai. In that event the attachments of half portion of Rs. 47,400 under O. XXI, r. 46 were illegal. There is great force in this argument of the appellant's advocate. We would, accordingly, proceed to examine the legal position on the footing that the debt of the company for the sum of Rs. 47,400 was to the firm, Sundar and Rai.
According to the Code of Civil Procedure garnishee proceedings in respect of a debt can be started only after the debt has been attached under O. XXI, r. 46, if a debt attachable under O. XXI, r. 46 had not in fact been attached or if the debt is one which cannot be attached Tinder the process laid down is O. XXI, r. 46, garnishee proceedings cannot be taken. This follows from the language of O. XXI, r. 46A of the Civil Procedure Code. The first question therefore is whether a debt due to a firm can be attached by the process prescribed in O. XXI, r. 46 in execution of a decree obtained not against the firm or the partners as such, but against one or some of them, not qua partner or partners, but in his or their individual capacities. The rules of the Civil Procedure Code beginning from O. XXI, r. 43, and ending with O. XXI, r. 54, provide for attachment of different kinds of property and prescribe different kinds of processes for effecting attachment which are appropriate to the nature of the property sought to be attached. Order XXI, r. 49 is specific and mandatory. Clause (1) of that rule lays down that, except as provided for in that rule, property belonging to a partnership cannot be attached or sold when the decree under execution is not against the firm or against the partners as such. In such a case, a charging order, with or without the appointment of a receiver, is the mode prescribed by cl. (2) of that rule. The scheme is to provide satisfaction to the decree-holder of such a person either by intercepting the share of the profits due to the latter through a receiver and/or by sale of his interest in the partnership. The scheme is not to break up the firm by a direct action on the part of the executing Court, or to paralyse or hamper the activities of the firm by intercepting any part of its gross income. The share of the judgment-debtor in the profits—the net income—can only be intercepted through the receiver for the purpose of making satisfaction to the judgment-creditor or the interest of the judgment-debtor in the partnership as a going concern can be sold leaving it to the purchaser at the Court sale to take such steps as he may be advised to take. Even the receiver appointed by the Court will not have, during the continuance of the partnership, the right to interfere in the management or administration of the firm, or to require accounts of the partnership transactions, or to respect the books of the firm without an express order of the Court and such an order would not be passed except in special circumstances, as for instance with a view to the dissolution of the firm. This scheme is based on a broad head of public policy, namely, the protection of commerce, which is considered to be an important source of national wealth. If the debt in question is the property of the firm Sundar and Rai, garnishee proceedings in respect thereto would be inconsistent with the scheme of O. XXI, r. 49, which in substance is a reproduction of s. 23 of the English Partnership Act, for the garnishee order would then have the effect of intercepting from the firm a portion of its gross income. The interest of a partner on which a charging order operates is the share of that partner in the firm and is nothing more than his proportion of the partnership assets, which in turn is the gross assets converted into money less the debts and liabilities of the firm. On the principles have discussed above, a debt due to a firm from a customer is the property of the firm within the meaning of O. XXI, r. 49. There is an additional reason in support of this view, for the word “property” in reference to execution has been defined in s. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It includes debts. We need not travel to other Acts, e.g, the Indian Contract Act or the Indian Partnership Act for the purpose of finding out the definition of the word “property of the partnership”, but we may observe that the definition, of the term in s. 14 of the Indian Partnership Act is not exhaustive and does not exclude a debt due to a firm. If, therefore, the debt was due to the firm, Sundar and Rai, the garnishee order in respect thereto passed by the learned Subordinate Judge against the company cannot stand. The materials on the record are not, however, sufficient to enable us to come to a definite conclusion on the point as to whether the engineering remuneration was payable by the company to the firm, Sundar and Rai, or to P.M Sunder and N.B Rai individually. The question of law was not argued in the lower Court from the point of view we have indicated above, and the learned Subordinate Judge, without appreciating the importance of that question of fact, stated in reciting the facts that the debt was due to the firm Sundar and Rai. The memorandum of agreement by which the company promised to pay the engineering remuneration is not on the record. We cannot, therefore, accede to the argument of the appellant's advocate, which he at first advanced, that we must take the debt to be a debt due to the firm, because it is on that footing that the learned Subordinate Judge proceeded. In continuation of his argument he also drew our attention to some items of evidence, which would suggest that the debt was due to the firm Sundar and Rai, e.g, Ex. F to F(2) and the deposition of N.B Rai. The resolutions of the shareholders which have been exhibited are equivocal in terms. We, therefore, accept the suggestion of the respondents' advocates, to which the learned advocate of the appellant agreed in the end, that, for the ends of justice, the point as to whether the engineering remuneration was payable to the firm Sundar and Rai, or to P.M Sundar and N.B Rai individually should be further investigated in the lower Court on the evidence on the record and on such additional evidence as the parties may be advised to lead. We, accordingly, set aside the order appealed against, save and except for the sum of Rs. 1,160, and remand the case to the lower Court for investigation of the point indicated above, the parties being at liberty to adduce additional evidence. If the Court finds that, at the dates when the prohibitory orders issued under O. XXI, r. 46, were served on the company the debt was due to the firm Sundar and Rai, it would dismiss the garnishee proceedings except with regard to the above-mentioned sum of Rs. 1,160. If, however, the finding be otherwise, the questions which have been discussed in the judgment under appeal would be material questions. In order that the said questions may not be further mooted in the lower Court we give our decision thereon in the paragraph following.
If the debt in question was attachable under O. XXI, r. 46, we hold that it was in fact attached on January 31, and March 18, 1936, in Execution Cases Nos. 6 and 19 of 1936, respectively. The fact that Execution Case No. 6 of 1936 was, thereafter, dismissed and another Execution Case No. 67 of 1936 was started by Ram Gopal Agarwala does not matter, for the attachment made in Execution Case No. 6 of 1936 was kept alive by an order of the Court passed at the time of the dismissal of that execution case. We do not also see any force in the contention of the appellant's advocate that P.M Sundar and N.B Rai gave up before the attachments their claim to the engineering remuneration from March, IS 31, to March, 1936. The first letter on the record is Ex. F, dated September 27, 1932, written by Sundar and Rai to the company. In that letter they say that they were prepared to forego their monthly remuneration as engineers from March, 1931, to March, 1932, if the directors of the company paid them a lump sum to be fixed later on by the latter. Ex. F(1) is another letter, dated June 30, 1933, in which they stated that they were prepared to forego their monthly remuneration from April, 1932, to March, 1933, on the same terms as in Ex. F. In Ex. F2, a letter dated January 10, 1935, they recite that a sum of Rs. 23,350 was payable to them by the company for their monthly remuneration from March, 1931, to October, 1933. They were prepared to forego, as on previous occasions, their monthly remuneration from April, 1933, to October, 1933, provided a lump sum was paid to them. After the receipt of the said letters, the directors of the company submitted on March 31, 1935, their annual report to the shareholders. This report dealt with the affairs of the company for the year ending on March 31, 1935. In this report [Ex. E(2); II-7] the directors say thus:—
It is also gratifying to note that the managing agents and engineers have in the interest of the company foregone their claim to the extent of Rs. 20,000.
In the balance sheet, they showed only Rs. 12,750 as the liability of the company for engineering remuneration at the rate of Rs. 750 a month from November, 1933, to March, 1935. The Extraordinary General meeting of the shareholders was held on April 10, 1935. By a resolution passed at that meeting the remuneration due to the engineers from March, 1931, to October, 1933, was taken as the liability of the company and was to be shown in the balance sheet as liability. The balance sheet originally circulated to the shareholders was accordingly amended and the said amount was shown as an additional item of liability. By the same resolution, the Board of Directors was authorised to settle the accounts with the engineers. The meaning is plain. The shareholders did not accept the proposal of Sundar and Rai to forego Rs. 20,000 only, but wanted the Board of Directors to negotiate with them further in order to induce them to forego a sum larger than Rs. 20,000. Up to April 10, 1935, there was thus no new agreement between Sundar and Rai and the company as to the engineering remuneration. That this was the position is shown by a letter (Ex. V; 11-15) which the managing agents of the company wrote to the learned Subordinate Judge on February 22, 1936. On March 16, 1936, Sundar and Rai tendered their resignation as managing agents of the company (Ex. F3; 11-19). In their letter of resignation they stated that they were prepared to accept the sum of Rs. 27,400 in lieu of Rs. 45,000 which was then due to them. They further said that they were prepared to accept payment of the said sum of Rs. 27,400 partly in cash (Rs. 12,400) and partly in ordinary shares of the company (face value of Rs. 15,000). Those proposals were accepted by the shareholders at an extraordinary general meeting held on April 15, 1936 [E. G(1) and G(2); 11-23 and 24]. The agreement between Sundar and Rai and the company was thus made on April 15, 1936, and not before. It was after the attachments in Execution Cases Nos. 6 and 19 of 1936. This agreement is, therefore, of no effect against the claims enforceable under the two attachments effected by Ram Gopal Agarwala and Lakshmi Narayan Sukhani. We fully endorse the reasons given by the learned Subordinate Judge in this respect.
The result is that this appeal is allowed in part. The garnishee order is maintained to the extent of Rs. 1,160 (on the footing that the cheque has not been cashed). The order holding the company liable to pay to the respondents the further sum of Rs. 23,330-7 (Rs. 24,796 less Rs. 1,160 less Rs. 305-9 paid on account of income-tax) is set aside, and the case remanded for determining the question as to whether the engineering remuneration of Rs. 47,400 was payable by the company to the firm, Sundar and Rai, or to P.M Sundar and N.B Rai individually. This question is to be decided on the evidence on the record and on such additional evidence that the parties may adduce. If the Court finds that the said remuneration was payable to the firm, Sundar and Rai, no further garnishee order against the company would be made. If the finding be that the engineering remuneration was payable to P.M Sundar and N.B Rai individually at or before the dates of the attachments, a garnishee order would be passed against the company for the sum of Rs. 23,1330-7. We name this sum on the supposition that the cheque for Rs. 1,536-8 deposited by the company in the lower Court has not been cashed and cannot by reason of the efflux of time be cashed now. If, however, the said cheque has been cashed and the money has either been paid over to the respondents, the judgment-creditors of N.B Rai, or is lying in Court and available to them the said sum of Rs. 1,536-8 has to be deducted from Rs. 23,330-7 and the garnishee order in the contingency we have indicated above would then be for Rs. 21,793-15. Cost of this appeal would abide the result. Further costs are left to the discretion of the lower Court.
Case remanded.
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