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Mullangi Venkatasubbamma v. Mullangi Venkatarangam Chetty

Madras High Court
Jul 25, 1916
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs instituted a suit claiming entitlement to the office of trustee of a public charitable trust. They sought a declaration that they are the present trustees entitled to conduct the charities, and contended that an alienation of the trusteeship made by the 1st defendant (the widow of the last male holder of the office) in favour of defendants 2 and 3 was void and did not affect the plaintiffs' rights. In alternative prayers the plaintiffs asked that, if they were not found entitled to the office in their own right, they be declared the nearest reversioners of the last male holder and that by reason of the alleged alienation they had become entitled to the office and its present enjoyment. They also asked that the 1st defendant be removed from her office as trustee (if necessary) and for possession of the trust properties and account books.

The suit arose following the alienation by the widow of her right to the trusteeship. Because the trust was of a public nature, the opinion states that such an alienation is invalid in law and constitutes a breach of trust. The central procedural question in the appeal was whether Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) barred the maintenance of the present suit.

The court allowed the appeal, dismissed the suit, ordered that each party bear their own costs in this court and in the Court of First Instance, and also allowed Appeal 42 of 1914. Two judges recorded opinions: the Officiating Chief Justice (major opinion) and Seshagiri Aiyar J. (concurring with additional observations).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is a bar to the maintenance of the present suit concerning a public charitable trust.
  2. Whether the action brought is one asserting a private right to the trusteeship (which might fall outside Section 92), or whether it is fundamentally a suit complaining of a breach of trust and seeking removal/appointment of trustees (which would fall within Section 92).
  3. Whether a declaration that the plaintiffs are reversioners (to prevent their rights being barred by limitation) can or should be granted in the present suit without complying with the requirements of Section 92.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents (Plaintiffs in the suit) — arguments as described in the opinion

  • The respondents contended that, despite alleging that the 1st defendant alienated the trusteeship, the suit was essentially one for the assertion of a private right to the office and therefore did not fall within Section 92.
  • They relied on Pydiganlam Jagannadha Row v. Rama Doss Patnaik (and the subsequent decision in Lilabati Misrain v. Bishun Chobey) to argue that if a widow holding the office alienates it and third parties enter into possession, the right of a reversioner can be barred after twelve years; therefore they asserted a need for at least a declaration that they are reversioners to avoid being barred by limitation.
  • It was urged that the plaintiffs should be able to establish their present entitlement to the trusteeship (either in place of the widow or jointly with her).

Other counsel and submissions recorded in the opinion

  • Mr. Venkatasubba Row (for the respondents in argument recorded by Seshagiri Aiyar J.) contended there could be no breach of trust because the public had not suffered by the act impeached.
  • The learned Advocate-General referred to cases (Soiyid Ali v. Ali Jan and Alimannessa Bibi v. Abdul Sobhan) and contended, as recorded in the opinion, that where a trustee has been lawfully appointed and is sought to be removed, Section 92 applies; the Advocate-General conceded at argument that those cases should be limited to situations involving a legally entitled trustee.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pydiganlam Jagannadha Row v. Rama Doss Patnaik Where a widow holding an office makes an alienation of that office in favour of third persons and those third persons enter into possession, the right of a reversioner will be barred if he does not establish his right within 12 years from the date of possession taken by the alienee. The court accepted, for argument's sake, that this decision correctly states the law but held it did not help the respondents because the legislative policy embodied in Section 92 requires suits seeking removal/vesting to comply with its conditions even if hardship might result to reversioners.
Lilabati Misrain v. Bishun Chobey Followed the rule in Pydiganlam Jagannadha Row regarding limitation and reversioners. The court treated it as following the Pydiganlam principle; the opinion assumes correctness but indicates it does not avoid the operation of Section 92 in the present case.
Bishen Chand Basawat v. Nadir Hossein Establishes that alienation of an office intended for members of the founder's family to persons outside the family is opposed to public policy and amounts to a breach of trust; refers to the Court's power to remove and appoint trustees under earlier codified procedure. Seshagiri Aiyar J. relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the alienation here constituted a breach of trust against the public and therefore brought the suit within Section 92.
Soiyid Ali v. Ali Jan; Alimannessa Bibi v. Abdul Sobhan Described in the opinion as cases where a lawfully appointed trustee was sought to be removed. The opinion records that these cases must be read as laying down that where a legal (de jure) trustee's removal is sought, Section 92 bars a suit by private parties. The court regarded them as limited to the proposition involving a legal trustee and applied that understanding here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from an assessment of the nature of the suit to the statutory requirements of Section 92 C.P.C. The critical steps of reasoning set out in the opinion are:

  1. Characterisation of the action: The court examined the plaintiffs' substantive reliefs — a declaration of title to the trusteeship, a contention that the alienation by the widow was void, an alternative claim as nearest reversioners, a prayer for removal of the widow, and a prayer for possession of trust property and books. Because the reliefs included removal of the present trustee and vesting of property in the plaintiffs as trustees, the court concluded the suit sought remedies that Section 92 governs.
  2. Identification of breach of trust: The opinion states that the trust was public in nature and that the widow's alienation of the trusteeship was invalid and amounted to a breach of trust. The presence of a breach of trust is a trigger for Section 92: where there has been an alleged breach and removal or vesting is sought, the suit is to be instituted under the conditions prescribed by that section.
  3. Rejection of the "private right" characterization: The plaintiffs argued the suit was essentially to establish a private right to the trusteeship and therefore outside Section 92. The court rejected that view because the widow was the de jure trustee and until she was removed the plaintiffs could not obtain the substantive relief they sought. Thus the suit was not a purely private action but one that involved the public interest in the administration of the trust.
  4. Consideration of authorities invoked by the parties: The court accepted that prior decisions (notably Pydiganlam Jagannadha Row and Lilabati Misrain) establish that a reversioner's right may be lost by lapse of time after an alienee takes possession, but held that this principle did not permit avoidance of the statutory regime established by Section 92. The court also relied on Bishen Chand Basawat to reinforce that alienation outside the founder's family to third parties is opposed to public policy and constitutes a breach of trust.
  5. Statutory policy and sanction requirement: The court emphasized the legislative policy in Section 92 which requires suits seeking removal/vesting in respect of public trusts (or where breach of trust is alleged) to be instituted in conformity with that section — notably by obtaining sanction from the Advocate-General or the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction under the statutory scheme (or the Religious Endowments Act, where applicable).
  6. Reliefs sought and appropriate forum/process: The court noted that, although the reversioner has remedies (including instituting a suit under Section 92 and being appointed trustee by the court framing a scheme if fit), the plaintiffs here sought a substantive, immediate appointment or possession which could not be granted absent compliance with Section 92. The court further expressed that granting a mere declaration of reversionary right in the context of this substantive suit was not appropriate when the frame of the suit demonstrates it should have been brought under Section 92.
  7. Conclusion and order: For these reasons, the court concluded that Section 92 applied and that the suit was not maintainable as framed; the appeal was allowed and the suit dismissed. Costs were apportioned as each party bearing their own costs in both courts. Appeal 42 of 1914 was also allowed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed.

Implications and consequences:

  • The immediate effect on the parties is the dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit seeking declaration, removal of the 1st defendant, and vesting/possession of trust property; the plaintiffs must comply with the procedure in Section 92 (or under the Religious Endowments Act where applicable) if they wish to pursue remedies related to breach of trust and removal/appointment of trustees.
  • The court ordered that, having regard to the facts, each party will bear their own costs in this Court and in the Court of First Instance.
  • Appeal 42 of 1914 was also allowed by the court.
  • No broader novel legal principle or new precedent is stated to have been created by this opinion; the court applied existing statutory requirements (Section 92 C.P.C.) and existing case law to resolve the dispute as presented.

Note: This summary is strictly limited to the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal propositions beyond what the opinion expressly states.

Show all summary ...

The Officiating Chief Justice.—The question which I first propose to consider in this appeal is whether Sect. 92 of the C. P. C. is a bar to the maintenance of the present suit. The answer to that depends upon what is the nature of the action brought. The suit is instituted by the plaintiffs who claim to be entitled to the office of trustee of certain public charitable trust and they want it to be declared that they are the present trustees of the endowment and as such, entitled to conduct the charities, that the alienation made by the 1st defendant who is the widow of the last male holder of the office in favour of defendants 2 and 3 is void and does not affect the rights of the plaintiff's. Then in para (c) their prayer is that if the Court finds that they are not entitled to the office in their own right, it may be declared that they are the nearest reversioners of Subraya Chetty, the last male holder of the office and that by reason of the alienation by the Ist defendant in favour of defendants 2 and 3 they have become entitled to the office and to the present enjoyment of it. In para. (d) they ask that “if necessary the 1st defendant may be removed from her office as trustee of the endowment”. Then they ask for possession of the properties and of the account books, etc.

The suit arose in consequence of the alienation made by the widow of her right to the office. The trust being of a public nature, such alienation is invalid in law: and there can, also, be no doubt that it amounts to a breach of trust on the part of the trustee. We have therefore these two facts, that there has been a breach of trust on the part of the trustee, and that the plaintiffs who claim to be entitled to the office ask that the 1st defendant, the widow, might be removed from the office of trustee and they themselves might be put in possession of the trust properties.

That being the nature of the suit and the substantive reliefs claimed, it is difficult to see how the application of Sect. 92 of Civil Procedure Code can be evaded. Sub Sect. 2 of that section says: “Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in Sub-Sect. (1)” among which reliefs are the removal of any trustee, appointing a new trustee and the vesting of any property in a trustee—“shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section.” These reliefs can be obtained in a suit instituted under section in the case of any alleged breach of trust or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust.

Here there has been a breach of trust, and the principal prayer in the suit is for the removal of the present trustee and for vesting the property in the plaintiffs in the capacity of trustees. The learned Chief Justice has held that Sect. 92 does not apply because what the plaintiffs seek to establish is their own private right to the trusteeship. No doubt, where a person claims to be a trustee and his case is that the person in possession is not the rightful trustee, he is entitled to institute a suit to establish his right independently of Sect. 92 and such a suit would not be covered by the language of Sub-Sect 2. But in this suit the 1st defendant is the rightful trustee and unless she is put out of the way on the ground that she has, as alleged, committed what amounts to a breach of trust, the plaintiffs cannot succeed.

It is argued by the learned Vakil who appeared for the respondents, the plaintiffs in the suit, that although the plaintiffs sought to remove the 1st defendant on the allegation that the 1st defendant had alienated the trustee's office and the properties, it is still a suit mainly for the assertion of a private right and therefore does not come within the scope of the section. The mere fact that the plaintiffs claim a right to the office cannot be said to bar the application of Sect. 92. As put in one of the cases cited at the bar, once there has been a breach of trust the right of the public to see that the trust is properly administered arises and the policy of the Legislature, as is to be gathered from the wording of Sect. 92 is that in such a case the suit has to be instituted under certain conditions. That is to say, sanction has to be obtained either of the Advocate-General or of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. It was strongly urged before us by the learned Vakil for the respondents that his clients were bound to institute this suit as it has been decided in Pydiganlam Jagannadha Row v. Rama Doss Patnaik(1) that where a widow holding an office like this makes an alienation of this office in favour of third persons and those third persons enter into possession the right of a reversioner will be barred if he does not establish his right within 12 years from the date of the possession being taken by the alienee. That case has been followed in Lilabati Misrain v. Bishun Chobey(2) and I am prepared to assume, for the sake of argument, without throwing any doubt on the correctness of that decision, that it lays down the law properly. But it seems to me that this does not help the respondents. Any hardship there might be if the reversioner is not allowed to bring an action without conforming to the requirements of Sect. 92 cannot be said to outweigh the fact that in the opinion of the Legislature wherever there has been a breach of trust and it is sought to remove the trustee who is holding the office, it is in the interests of the public that no suit should be instituted unless it is in conformity with requirements of Sect. 92, Civil Procedure Code, or the Religious Endowments Act of 1663. The reversioner however, is not without his remedy in such cases. He can institute a suit under the provisions of the section and, if as a matter of fact he has a right to the trusteeship, the Court framing the scheme will, unless he is found to be an unfit person to hold the office, appoint him trustee. It is urged upon us, on behalf of the respondents, that we might at least give them a declaration that they are entitled, as reversioners, to the office of trustee, otherwise their claim would be absolutely barred. But what the reversioner's sought to establish in this suit was their present right to hold the office either in place of the 1st defendant or jointly with her. That is the substantive nature of the suit and we do not think that in the circumstances we are called upon to give the plaintiffs a mere declaration—supposing they are able to establish their right—that they are; as reversioners, entitled to the office on the death of the widow.

We allow the appeal. The suit will be dismissed, Having regard, however, to the facts of the case, each party will bear his own costs in this as well as in the Court of First Instance.

Appeal 42 of 1914 will also be allowed.

Seshagiri Aiyar J.—I entirely agree with the judgment of the learned Officiating Chief Justice but having regard to the fact that we are differing from the learned Chief Justice who tried the suit, I wish to add a few observations. In my opinion the suit is in substance and form one covered by Sect. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the plaint, a breach of trust by a trustee is complained of and his removal is prayed for. It was strenuously contended: by Mr. Venkatasubba Row that there cannot be any question of breach of trust because the public have not suffered by the act impeached. But where the office of trustee which was intended to be managed by the persons belonging to the foundei's family is alienated to a person who does not belong to that family, the alienation is opposed to public policy, and constitutes a breach of trust against the public. This is the principle that, was enunciated by the Judicial Committee in Bishen Chand Basawat v. Nadir Hossein where Sir Barnes Peacock says: “if there had been any objection that he, i. e., the plaintiff was illegally substituted as trustee, an application might have been made by any person interested in the performance of the trusts to have him removed, and a new trustee appointed by the Court under the Code of 1877.” The reference by the Judicial Committee is to Sect. 539 of the Act of 1877. Therefore the first requirement is satisfied, viz., that there has been a breach of trust. The second requirement is that there should be a prayer for the removal of the trustee. In this case the suit was brought within twelve years of the alienation: Consequently the widow had a subsisting right to the trusteeship at the time of the suit, even accepting to the fullest extent the decision in Pydigantam Jagannadha Row v. Rama Doss Patnaik. She was the de jure trustee and although she parted with her rights in respect of some of the properties and delegated, her duties, she was the person legally entitled to the office. Therefore until she is removed from the office plaintiffs can have no right to get in. There was no vacancy at the date of the suit Plaintiffs in terms pray that she should be removed and that they should be appointed trustees at once. Therefore it was a suit for the removal of an existing trustee, and consequently the requirements of Sect. 92 were fully satisfied. Under cl. (2) of that section the suit must be brought with the sanction of the Advocate-General and not by private parties.

As regards the two cases relied upon the learned Advocate-General—the cases in Soiyid Ali v. Ali Jan and Alimannessa Bibi v. Abdul Sobhan it is enough to say that in those cases the trustee who had been lawfully appointed was sought to be removed. If those cases lay down the proposition that in all cases where there is a de facto trustee and where the suit is brought by the plaintiff to establish his right thereto, the suit can only be brought under Sect. 92, the question will have to be further considered In my opinion, wherever a preferential right is claimed it is not a case of removing the trustee because the later has no legal right to the office. It was conceded, however in the course of argument by the learned Advocate-General that those two cases must be considered only as laying down that wherever there is a legal trustee, i. e., a person who is legally entitled to the office of trustee, and his removal is sought, Sect. 92 is a bar to a suit by private parties. I agree in the order proposed by the learned Chief Justice, that the suit should be dismissed as the frame of it shows that it should be brought under Sect, 92, Civil Procedure Code, and not otherwise.

Appeal allowed.

C. K.